US President Donald Trump arrives in China, May 13, 2026
Ahead of Donald Trump’s arrival in Beijing, Iranian officials rejected suggestions that US pressure could weaken Iran-China ties amid growing speculation over a possible Chinese mediation role in the Iran conflict.
Iranian ambassador to China Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli wrote Monday on X that relations between Tehran and Beijing “are stronger than any US effort aimed at changing China’s position toward Iran through pressure.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun reinforced that message Monday, saying Beijing’s position remained “clear and consistent” and that the priority should be preventing renewed war and further escalation.
Crucially, Beijing also signaled opposition to any US-led blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, saying such actions were “not in the common interests of the international community.”
Observers viewed last week’s meeting in Beijing between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as an effort to coordinate positions ahead of the expected Trump-Xi talks.
During the meeting, Wang said China was prepared to play a “greater role” in regional peace efforts and encouraged dialogue between Iran and Persian Gulf Arab states.
Trump pressure Xi over Iran
Western media reports indicate Trump plans to press Xi over China’s economic and strategic ties with Iran, particularly oil purchases and alleged military assistance.
While Trump acknowledged he would raise the issue, he also said before departing for Beijing that he did not believe Xi’s cooperation was strictly necessary to manage the crisis.
Tensions between Washington and Beijing over Iran have intensified in recent weeks following the seizure of a Tehran-linked cargo vessel near the Strait of Hormuz.
In a CNBC interview, Trump criticized what he described as China’s “unexpected support for Iran,” saying he had anticipated greater understanding from Beijing.
Former US ambassador Nikki Haley also alleged on X that the seized vessel was carrying chemicals intended for Iran’s missile program, presenting the case as evidence of growing Chinese support for Tehran.
China’s expanding regional role
At a May 8 press conference in Beijing, Rahmani-Fazli said Tehran and Beijing had agreed to advance Xi’s four-point regional security initiative.
The proposal emphasizes peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and adherence to international law as foundations for stability in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East.
Iranian outlet Khabar Online described the initiative as part of Beijing’s broader effort to position itself as a major diplomatic mediator in the region while distancing itself from what it called US unilateralism.
The outlet argued that the approach could strengthen Iran’s negotiating position and increase pressure on Washington to accept at least some Iranian demands.
Rahmani-Fazli said Monday that any future agreement with Washington “must inevitably include guarantees from major powers” and ultimately be raised at the UN Security Council.
Could China become a mediator?
So far, China has largely pursued a cautious approach to the confrontation between Iran and the United States, avoiding direct involvement while calling for de-escalation.
Still, some Iranian analysts believe Beijing may now be willing to take on a more active diplomatic role.
Former Iranian ambassador to China Mohammad Keshavarzzadeh told Shargh newspaper that Chinese officials appeared interested in facilitating negotiations and reducing tensions.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei also suggested Beijing could use Trump’s visit to warn against what Tehran describes as unlawful US pressure and its consequences for regional and global stability.
At the same time, some Iranian analysts believe China may be uneasy with Tehran’s threats to restrict access through the Strait of Hormuz.
Former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi told Nour News that Beijing’s primary concern remains preserving open trade routes essential to its export-driven economy.
According to Ahmadi, this could push China to place greater emphasis on protecting the legal status of international waterways and opposing any disruption in Hormuz that might set precedents elsewhere.
Disputes over Chinese support for Iran
Last month, Trump called on Xi not to send weapons to Tehran and claimed China had offered assurances on the matter.
In recent days, the US State Department sanctioned three Chinese satellite companies accused of assisting Iranian military operations by providing imagery linked to Iranian military activity. Beijing rejected the allegations.
The US Treasury Department also sanctioned several companies in mainland China and Hong Kong accused of helping supply weapons-related materials to Iran.
Beijing does not recognize US sanctions on Iranian oil exports and has instructed domestic companies not to comply with American restrictions targeting so-called “teapot” refineries purchasing Iranian crude.
The moves underscore growing US efforts to pressure Beijing over its ties with Tehran ahead of the Trump-Xi meeting.
Iran is increasingly looking to China not just as an economic partner, but as the only major power capable of offering credible guarantees in both the Persian Gulf and any future agreement between Tehran and Washington.
On May 10, Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, said Beijing could serve as the guarantor of a future deal between Iran and major world powers. He added that any agreement should ultimately be endorsed by the UN Security Council, echoing Tehran’s long-standing preference for multilateral guarantees over bilateral commitments.
A day later, Rahmani Fazli wrote on X that Iran was prepared to support President Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal for “sustainable security” in the Persian Gulf, adding that the position had already been affirmed during recent talks between the two countries’ foreign ministers.
China’s approach to emphasizes mutual guarantees among regional states, with Beijing presenting itself as a mediator and economic stabilizer rather than a military enforcer.
In mid-April, Xi introduced a four-point proposal aimed at moving the region away from the brink of wider war toward what Chinese officials described as a “comprehensive and sustainable security architecture.”
The proposal called for peaceful coexistence among regional powers, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law and the UN Charter, and balancing security with economic development and reconstruction.
Chinese diplomacy surrounding the Iran crisis has increasingly been framed in Tehran as an alternative to Washington’s military-first approach.
Iranian media and officials have portrayed Beijing as a power capable of maintaining relations with all sides while avoiding direct military involvement.
Tehran and Beijing have both linked these initiatives to their expanding strategic partnership, which Iranian officials increasingly describe as a counterweight to US influence in the region.
Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to China has added new significance to that relationship as ceasefire tensions persist and negotiations remain stalled.
Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, recently reiterated that security guarantees remain one of Tehran’s central demands in any negotiations with Washington.
Iranian commentators argue that while Tehran does not trust the Trump administration to uphold a purely bilateral agreement, Chinese involvement could provide a framework both sides may find harder to abandon.
Still, major obstacles remain.
Trump has repeatedly rejected any agreement resembling the 2015 nuclear deal, arguing that it failed to protect US interests. Iran, meanwhile, continues to push for a broader truce framework without first resolving disputes over its nuclear program, a position unlikely to gain traction in Washington.
Tensions escalated further on May 12, when Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Iran was prepared for war if Trump rejected Tehran’s terms. The same day, Trump said military options remained on the table.
Against that backdrop, Beijing has increasingly signaled that its immediate priority is preventing further disruption in the Persian Gulf and ensuring safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy markets.
For Tehran, China’s growing diplomatic role offers more than mediation. It represents the possibility of a powerful external guarantor at a time when trust between Iran and the United States appears close to collapse.
Alghadir hospital in east Tehran is one of the places where the January massacre could be seen in full: a five-body morgue overflowing, blood on the floors, and families searching through blankets and body covers for the people they loved.
As security forces opened fire around Haft Hoz and Tehranpars, two protest flashpoints in east Tehran, the wounded and the dead were carried to Alghadir hospital, where images and videos later captured one of the clearest records of the January massacre.
Some bodies were wrapped in blankets or plastic. Others were placed in garbage bags or left on top of one another.
After the images spread online, Hossein Kermanpour, the Health Ministry’s public relations chief, confirmed they were real. He said about 150 wounded people and 36 bodies were brought to Alghadir on January 8, while the morgue could hold only five bodies. The images, he said, were “accurate.”
The scenes formed one fragment of the wider January massacre, in which more than 40,000 people were killed in two days as the Islamic Republic moved to crush a nationwide uprising.
Iran International has identified and verified nine of the people whose bodies were taken to Alghadir or whose final hours passed through the hospital. Among them were a 17-year-old student, a 19-year-old woman, a father, a worker, a young man trying to build a future, and a protester shot while helping a wounded girl.
A witness said there were so many dead inside Alghadir that bodies were placed on top of each other. Security forces outside threatened to burn the hospital with everyone inside if the doors were not opened, while relatives of the wounded tried to block their entry.
A wounded protester said officers later entered, hit a nurse on the head with a baton and took several people away. Doctors hid some of the wounded in a storage room. “We kept hearing gunfire,” the protester said. “It sounded like coup de grace shots being fired at the wounded.”
Medical staff said body bags ran out, some of the dead were put in garbage bags, two vans came in the morning and took bodies away, and the corridors, elevators and courtyard were covered in blood as people carried the wounded in blankets toward surgery.
A nurse said January 9 was worse than the previous night. Security forces fired pellets and threatened those trying to help the wounded in the street, she said. One girl had been hit in the eye, one person had been shot in the heart and another had both legs torn apart. “I did not know who to help first,” she said.
Witnesses said security forces and Basij members set up checkpoints around Haft Hoz and near Sarallah Mosque, where the Zakereen Basij base is located. Armed forces were stationed on four sides of the square, they said, and shots were fired even inside the hospital grounds.
A source said many of the wounded had come from around Rashid police station in Tehranpars. Some who died after being taken to surgery were removed through the rear door of the operating room by IRGC and Basij forces, while relatives waited on the other side for news.
One hospital worker described a girl with long hair under a cloth, her head severed and her body missing. A staff member who saw the scene could not return to work for two days, the source said. Another witness said an elderly hospital guard suffered a fatal heart attack after seeing a headless body.
Several sources said security forces later reviewed Alghadir’s security cameras to control records of who had entered the hospital and how the wounded and dead had been moved.
But behind the scenes from Alghadir were individual lives that could still be traced. Families searched corridors, storage rooms, courtyards and morgues for those who had disappeared into the chaos of those two nights. Iran International has identified and verified nine of them.
Aida Aghili
Aida Aghili: The woman in the checkered blanket
Aida Aghili, born on June 23, 1991, joined the uprising in Haft Hoz on January 8. While chanting slogans, she was shot twice in the head at close range and killed.
Before leaving, she hugged her mother and told her what should be done with her belongings if she did not return.
Security bodies tried to bury her in the Behesht Zahra cemetery section used for executed prisoners, but her family resisted. She was buried beside her grandmother on January 11.
On her birthday, Aida had written on Instagram of stress “inside my bones,” “a war in my soul and my homeland,” and a freedom she still believed would come.
Hossein Heidari
Hossein Heidari: ‘Your place is on the street'
Hossein Heidari, 50, was killed in Haft Hoz on January 8, two days before his birthday. He was shot in the back of the head and the side.
Before joining the protests, he had written: “Your place is on the street; every night until freedom, we will not sit down for a moment.”
His family first searched for him at Ansari hospital, where they found no trace of him. They later found his body in Alghadir’s back courtyard, wrapped in a blue blanket.
Hossein loved Esteghlal, the Tehran football club known as the Blues.
His family identified him by his boots, a birthday gift from his daughter. Relatives described him as joyful and fond of laughter. He was buried on January 12 under security restrictions.
Gholamreza Mozhdehi
Gholamreza Mozhdehi: A man taken alive to hospital
Gholamreza Mozhdehi, 52, was wounded during night protests in Tehranpars on January 8 and taken to hospital while still showing signs of life, witnesses said.
Security agents prevented him from receiving medical help. Hours later, his body was found in Alghadir’s basement, in an area used for hospital waste, beside other bodies.
He had a live bullet wound to the neck, pellet injuries to the head, and wounds from knives or machetes. Married with two children, he had joined the protests in solidarity with others.
Mohsen Ghahremanpour
Mohsen Ghahremanpour: Shot at close range, buried in silence
Mohsen Ghahremanpour was 22 and from Malayer, Hamadan province. On January 8 in Tehranpars, security forces shot him in the head and eye from about one meter away.
People took him to Alghadir, where he died. His body was later found in the hospital’s back courtyard.
Relatives said the family faced threats and financial pressure, including a demand for 3.5 billion rials, about $1,945, to release his body.
Iran International has documented similar cases in which authorities demanded money from families or pressured them to sign papers identifying killed protesters as members of the Basij, the IRGC’s paramilitary force, turning the dead into evidence for the Islamic Republic’s own account of the crackdown.
Under that pressure, Mohsen was buried in silence as a Basij member.
He had worked as a laborer and had recently begun container construction.
Setareh Rafiei
Setareh Rafiei: The 19-year-old found in storage
Setareh Rafiei was killed in Tehranpars on January 8. She had been shot twice with live rounds, once in the heart and once in the head.
Her family later found her body in a storage area at Alghadir, among many others left there after the morgue filled.
Pouya Derakhshan
Pouya Derakhshan: A student lost among the dead
Pouya Derakhshan was 17 and a student. On January 8, he was near the Haft Hoz metro station with friends when security forces attacked protesters.
Sources said he was beaten on the head with batons, then shot in the heart. People called an ambulance and he was taken to Alghadir, where doctors found he had no pulse.
After his body was transferred to Kahrizak morgue, a wrong identification code left him missing among the dead.
Relatives had to open the covers of several bodies before identifying him at the washing facility in Behesht Zahra cemetery. He was buried on January 10 in section 326 under security measures.
Sahar Bayat
Sahar Bayat: A body held for days
Sahar Bayat was killed in the evening of January 8 while returning from protests with her husband and friends.
Sources said a live round hit her from behind and she died at the scene.
Her body was first taken to Alghadir, then transferred to Kahrizak. Her husband spent one night at Alghadir and three nights at Kahrizak waiting for her body to be released.
Sources said authorities refused to hand over the body until money was paid. Relatives were also forced to sign pledges that no slogans would be chanted at the funeral. Sahar was buried in Tuyserkan, Hamadan province.
Amir Hossein Emamjomeh
Amir Hossein Emamjomeh: A father shot beside his wife
Amir Hossein Emamjomeh was 29 and the father of a daughter. He was killed during the January 8 protests in Tehranpars after being shot with a live round.
Sources said he was in the crowd with his wife when he was targeted by a sniper, apparently because of the white hat he was wearing. The bullet struck near his nose.
People took him to Alghadir, but he died from his injuries.
Mohammad Radmannia
Mohammad Radmannia: Shot while helping a wounded girl
On January 9, he was on Tavousi Street in Nezamabad when he went to help a wounded girl. He was shot directly in the head and killed.
Sources said people took him to Alghadir, but security agents did not allow treatment. His body was not handed over to his family.
Mohammad had repeatedly helped wounded protesters, taking some into homes to bandage their wounds.
In his final moments, he was again moving toward someone who had been shot.
People who knew him described him as kind, athletic and fond of animals.
His fortieth-day memorial was held on what would have been his birthday.
The nine cases verified by Iran International are not a full list of those taken to Alghadir. They are names recovered from one hospital, in one part of Tehran, over two nights of the crackdown.
A Bahraini court sentenced a woman to life in prison after convicting her of communicating with Iran's Revolutionary Guards with intent to carry out hostile acts against the kingdom and harm its national interests, Bahrain's public prosecution said on Tuesday.
The prosecution said the woman used a social media account to post photos and coordinates of key sites and facilities in Bahrain and shared content that harmed the kingdom's military, political and economic standing.
Authorities said the account also promoted what the prosecution described as Iranian attacks against Bahrain.
The woman admitted to the charges during questioning, prosecutors said, adding that she told investigators she used her social media account to assist those targeting Bahrain by sharing images and coordinates of vital sites alongside messages indicating they could be targeted.
The prosecution said the court also ordered the confiscation of seized items. It did not identify the woman or say when the alleged acts took place.
Bahrain-Iran tensions
The ruling comes days after Bahrain said it had arrested 41 people allegedly linked to a group tied to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist – the doctrine underpinning the Islamic Republic’s system of clerical rule and giving Iran’s supreme leader ultimate religious and political authority.
Authorities said legal proceedings were underway and investigations were continuing.
Bahrain's Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani on Saturday accused Tehran of interfering in the kingdom's internal affairs after the arrests, calling it a violation of international law and good neighborly principles. Iran has not publicly responded to the accusations.
As the US-Iran gap widens and President Trump brands the truce “on life support,” three competing visions of international law are struggling for mastery over the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Each captures part of the truth. None fully resolves the tensions.
The first, rooted in the peacetime law of the sea, asserts the enduring right of transit passage. Customary international law, reflected in UNCLOS Articles 38 and 44, imposes a continuing obligation on coastal states not to hamper navigation through a strait upon which one-fifth of the world’s oil depends.
In this view, the IRGC’s mining operations, swarm attacks and threatened tolls violate established norms governing international waterways.
The second perspective prioritises the law of armed conflict. Once hostilities began, the San Remo Manual and Hague Convention VIII became increasingly relevant. Belligerents gain expanded rights to mine, blockade and restrict.
Under this framework, the IRGC may claim some legal justification for defensive measures within its territorial waters. Yet the same body of law imposes strict limits: notification, self-neutralisation, distinction and protection of neutral shipping.
The third school focuses less on legal doctrine than on the practical limits of enforcement. Without a UN Security Council resolution, both sides operate in a grey zone where customary rules are asserted but difficult to enforce amid active hostilities.
Each framework has significant weaknesses. The peacetime approach underestimates how armed conflict alters the legal environment. The wartime framework risks legitimising measures whose consequences extend far beyond the immediate belligerents. The enforcement-focused view accurately describes the absence of central authority but offers little guidance for resolution.
A more coherent framework emerges through triangulation: integrating all three regimes.
Peacetime transit passage supplies the baseline obligation to keep the strait open to neutral commerce. The law of armed conflict supplies limited belligerent rights—proportionate blockades and defensive mining—subject to strict restraints of notification, self-neutralisation and proportionality.
Customary international law, shaped by the global importance of Hormuz, acts as the reconciling principle. It prevents any party from turning one of the world’s critical maritime arteries into a private toll road or permanent minefield.
Within this framework, the IRGC’s mining operations without adequate safeguards, combined with strikes on Persian Gulf Arab infrastructure, exceed legitimate defensive measures.
By attempting to globalise the conflict—compensating for its conventional military weaknesses by widening the economic costs—the IRGC has threatened the security interests of multiple states and strengthened arguments for collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The US blockade, narrowly directed at Iranian ports and coastal areas while preserving neutral passage, appears to fit more comfortably within belligerent rights. Yet no legal arrangement can ignore the Iranian people themselves. They remain trapped between the repression of the IRGC and the economic pressure of the Hormuz stalemate.
Any workable regime must therefore include verifiable humanitarian channels: inspection mechanisms that protect energy security while ensuring essential supplies reach civilians. As in Iraq after the expulsion from Kuwait, the regime would inevitably divert portions of aid to its networks, yet some assistance would still reach ordinary citizens.
Such a framework cannot rest on American shoulders alone. European states, above all France with its defence commitments to the United Arab Emirates and its capable naval presence, would need to participate. The Combined Maritime Forces operating from Bahrain already provide the foundation for such a multinational mechanism.
Still, triangulation confronts one overriding reality. Safe corridors, mine-clearance verification, ceasefire monitoring and dispute resolution ultimately require a United Nations Security Council resolution. If Russia and China were prepared either to abstain or acquiesce, such a framework could open the path toward a formal armistice convention.
At present, however, the “ceasefire” remains little more than a pause. Despite President Trump’s declaration on April 8, the IRGC continued strikes on Persian Gulf Arab infrastructure until April 9. Absent a formal convention defining duration, obligations and enforcement mechanisms, the fog of war and the fog of law will continue to thicken together.
During the 1956 Suez Crisis, President Eisenhower withheld support from Britain, France and Israel, helping force the operation’s collapse. Today the strategic balance is markedly different: the United States under President Trump enjoys overwhelming military superiority, while Russia and China lack the Soviet Union’s former capacity to directly challenge American power in the region.
Yet many governments and commentators increasingly frame the present stalemate as a strategic success for Tehran despite the immense economic, military and diplomatic damage sustained by the Islamic Republic.
Should the current deadlock persist, the IRGC is unlikely to ease either regional escalation or internal repression. If negotiations prove illusory, President Trump—who has repeatedly spoken of regime change—may face growing pressure from regional allies, particularly Israel and the UAE, to move from rhetoric toward a more explicit strategy aimed at dismantling the current power structure in Tehran.
The Strait of Hormuz is now more than a naval theatre. It has become a test of whether international law and diplomatic statecraft can contain a conflict that the IRGC is actively seeking to globalise.
Even if hostilities continue, the world may soon face a difficult question: whether to construct such a framework now, or wait for both the fog of war and the costs of paralysis to deepen further.
A prominent international academic organization focused on Iranian studies has urged the United Nations and the European Union to condemn US-Israeli attacks on universities and educational institutions in Iran during the March and April conflict.
In a letter dated May 11, the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Association for Iranian Studies (AIS) warned that Iran’s educational system had become “a frontline in the widening U.S.-Israel war against the country.”
The letter was addressed to several senior international figures, including UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, UNESCO chief Audrey Azoulay, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
The group accused the United States and Israel of systematically targeting universities, schools, research centers and medical institutions in violation of international humanitarian law.
It cited reported damage to major universities including Sharif University of Technology, Shahid Beheshti University, Amir Kabir University and the Iran University of Science and Technology.
AIS, founded in 1967, is one of the leading international scholarly organizations focused on Iran and Persianate studies. Its Committee on Academic Freedom has frequently criticized the Islamic Republic’s repression of student activism, arrests of academics and crackdowns on campuses following protests and political unrest in Iran.
In its latest statement, the group argued that the war had compounded the trauma already inflicted on Iranian students and universities by state repression.
“The 2026 war and the resulting disruption of education, following upon such attacks and repressive measures, have inflicted both physical and psychological trauma on students at all levels—effects that many young Iranians are likely to carry throughout their lives,” the letter said.
The letter also referred to strikes on medical research institutions including the Pasteur Institute of Iran and the Tofigh Daru pharmaceutical research center, as well as attacks on schools.
It rejected US-Israeli arguments that some institutions constituted legitimate “dual use” targets because of alleged links to Iran’s military sector, arguing that such claims ignored proportionality and the cumulative harm inflicted on civilians and educational infrastructure.
The organization called for international condemnation of attacks on educational institutions, pressure to end the war and support for rebuilding damaged academic infrastructure.