Scam messages seek crypto for ships’ safe passage through Hormuz, firm warns

Judiciary-affiliated media identified the man as Amirali Mirjafari and said his death sentence had been upheld by the Supreme Court before being carried out early on Tuesday.

State media said Mirjafari had set fire to the Gholhak Grand Mosque in Tehran and acted as a leader of a network accused of links to Israel’s Mossad intelligence service, framing the case as part of efforts against foreign-backed activity.

Authorities said he had confessed after his arrest to taking part in protests in January, damaging public property, including phone booths and buses, and setting fire to motorcycles using gasoline-filled bottles.

Amnesty and other rights groups have repeatedly said Iranian courts rely on confessions obtained under duress in such cases.

Iran has used broad security charges to prosecute people detained during the January protests, which followed a new wave of anti-government demonstrations and a widening crackdown by authorities that became one of the most extensive in recent years.

Tehran has not released official nationwide arrest figures, but Iran International reported earlier this year that the number exceeds 36,500, based on internal security briefings the channel obtained and reviewed.

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Earlier this month, Iran executed 18-year-old Amirhossein Hatami, who had been convicted in the same case linked to the nationwide anti-government protests that the Islamic Republic repressed in what became its broadest crackdown to date.

In a recent report, Amnesty International said 11 men were at risk of imminent execution over participation in the protests. The rights group said they had been subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in detention before being convicted in grossly unfair trials based on forced confessions.

“Many bakeries are facing flour shortages and cannot keep up with long lines of customers,” a resident from Malard west of Tehran said.

Another account said: “Right after the war, bread prices doubled. Barbari (a type of Iranian bread) is now 250,000 rials and Sangak is 350,000. Subsidized flour has been removed.”

The reported prices are far above official rates, with the latest approved price for Sangak at about 76,000 rials and Barbari around 55,000.

April 20 marks National Wheat and Bread Day in Iran, meant to highlight the central role of wheat in daily life, but accounts point to worsening conditions for a basic staple.

Conflicting claims on wheat supply

Wheat self-sufficiency has long been a goal promoted by many officials of the Islamic Republic. The first celebration of wheat self-sufficiency was held on November 16, 2004, during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami.

However, this self-sufficiency did not continue in subsequent years for various reasons, including water shortages, and Iran remained reliant on wheat imports. Still, the aspiration for self-sufficiency has continued to be repeated in officials’ statements.

Now, 22 years after the first “self-sufficiency celebration,” as buying bread is becoming an economic challenge for citizens, Ataollah Hashemi, head of the National Wheat Farmers Foundation, has once again reiterated the goal. Speaking on Saturday, April 18, he said: “The country will not need to import wheat this year.”

Yet official customs data shows Iran imported about 2.75 million tons of wheat worth nearly $1 billion in the 10 months to February 2026. The imports were sourced largely from Russia, as well as through intermediaries such as the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.

The reliance on intermediaries, which are not major wheat exporters themselves, points to complications tied to banking restrictions and payment channels, increasing costs through additional transport and fees.

The gap between official statements and import figures raises questions about the sustainability of domestic production and the credibility of self-sufficiency statements.

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Rising costs and policy pressures

Bread prices have increased across provinces in the current Iranian year that began on March 21, following subsidy cuts and the move toward a single flour pricing system. Prices now vary depending on flour type and region, with some bakeries selling above official rates.

Despite parliament approving a budget that allocates more than 5,000 trillion rials (over $3 billion) for bread subsidies, no new national price list has been issued for the current year. As a result, last year’s rates remain in effect, while enforcement appears inconsistent.

Inflation and shortages

Before the latest conflict and US-Israeli strikes, annual inflation had already exceeded 70 percent, with food inflation reaching triple digits. Official data shows bread and cereals recorded year-on-year inflation of about 140 percent.

The removal or reduction of subsidized flour in parts of the market has added to the pressure, with more bakeries operating under higher-cost “free flour” systems.

Citizen reports suggest the combined impact of shortages and rising prices is becoming more visible. Long queues at bakeries and inconsistent supply have emerged alongside sharp increases in retail prices.

For many households, bread remains a primary food source, making these changes particularly significant.

The accounts from Tehran and other areas point to a broader strain across the country, where access to basic goods is increasingly shaped by rising costs, uneven supply, and policy shifts that have yet to stabilize the market.

Reports from Tehran suggest the government’s new reconstruction plan has created a deep sense of abandonment among citizens who assumed war-related destruction caused by a national conflict would be covered by the state.

On Thursday, the Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) quoted Tehran Province official Mohammad Sadeq Motamedian as saying that “nearly 40,000 residential units across Tehran Province have been damaged.”

Earlier, Donya-ye Eghtesad reported that the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development estimated roughly 45,000 residential and non-residential units were damaged during the March war but did not require demolition, while nearly 1,000 units needed full reconstruction.

Motamedian’s assessment has intensified debate over the true scale of destruction and the government’s approach to rebuilding.

In Tehran, Mayor Alireza Zakani had previously promised full reconstruction of ruined homes and restoration of damaged buildings, but there has been little clarity on how much progress has been made.

The government’s reconstruction strategy became more controversial after spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani said on April 15 that the administration would not provide direct financial assistance to rebuild destroyed homes.

Instead, she said the government would offer what officials call “floating density,” a system of additional building permits intended to encourage private developers to help reconstruct damaged housing.

Under the plan, builders could reconstruct damaged or destroyed homes in exchange for permission to add one or two additional floors to new buildings, which they would then be allowed to sell for profit.

Critics say the proposal is unrealistic. Density bonuses cannot compensate families who have lost their homes, especially at a time when construction costs are soaring.

For many displaced households, the absence of direct financial support raises serious questions about how reconstruction could realistically proceed.

Government bodies have also released widely differing figures about the scale of damage. Some officials have suggested only a few thousand homes were affected, while others have put the number in the tens of thousands.

Donya-ye Eghtesad noted that estimates range from about 1,000 homes requiring full reconstruction to tens of thousands with varying levels of damage, leaving residents uncertain about the true scale of destruction and the level of support they can expect.

The discrepancies have fueled speculation that the government may be downplaying the extent of war damage in order to limit financial obligations, reinforcing broader criticism of opaque communication during and after the conflict.

The protests were the result of several crises converging at once. Economic collapse, political exclusion and a growing sense of humiliation pushed society beyond its tolerance threshold and created a shared feeling across social groups that life in Iran had become increasingly unlivable.

When demonstrations erupted across the country, many slogans targeted the Islamic Republic itself.

The roots of the unrest run deep in provinces that host major oil and industrial projects but have long seen little improvement in living standards.

From Abadan to Bushehr and from Kangan to Gilan-e Gharb, many of the cities that first erupted in protest are places where people have spent years asking the same question: where did the country’s oil wealth go?

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government attempted to calm tensions by announcing direct cash payments to households after eliminating subsidized exchange rates. The payment amounted to about one million tomans—roughly seven dollars.

The gesture came at a time when food prices were soaring. Cooking oil prices had risen more than 200 percent, eggs were more than twice as expensive as a year earlier, and some shopkeepers had begun selling basic dairy products on installment plans.

For many Iranians the payment symbolized not relief but humiliation.

The middle class and the bazaar

One of the defining features of the January protests was the erosion of the social distance between Iran’s middle class and its poorer citizens.

Historically, Iran’s middle class has been a carrier of civil and political demands. But by early 2026 many middle-class families were struggling simply to avoid falling into poverty.

Political sociologists have long argued that revolutions are rarely led by the poorest members of society. They tend instead to emerge among groups that once enjoyed relative stability but now feel they are falling.

In Iran, the middle class had not only lost income but also social status. That loss helped create an unwritten alliance between middle-class citizens and poorer groups, both of whom felt they were suffering under the same policies.

Another signal that the unrest had entered new territory came when parts of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed on January 7.

The bazaar has historically been one of the most cautious institutions in Iran’s political life. Even during severe economic crises it has often preferred negotiation and indirect pressure to open confrontation. During the 2009 protests many merchants stayed silent, and in 2022 they largely remained on the sidelines. This time was different.

Currency volatility made supply chains chaotic and pricing unpredictable. A product purchased in the morning could be worth something entirely different by the afternoon. Many traders said they could no longer price goods reliably, and keeping shops open risked losses rather than gains.

When sections of the bazaar shut their doors, it signaled that dissatisfaction had spread beyond traditional protest groups. A conservative economic institution had concluded that the existing order itself had become a source of instability.

The collapse of reformist hopes

For some voters, President Pezeshkian had represented a final opportunity for reform and for avoiding war.

As protests intensified, however, he adopted increasingly hardline rhetoric. On January 11 he described protesters as “terrorists” and called on security forces to respond decisively.

Even some reformist figures who had supported him began to express frustration.

The shift reinforced a broader perception among many Iranians that the political system was incapable of meaningful change.

Combined with the economic crisis and the aftermath of the 12-day war, this sense of political closure deepened public despair.

From scattered anger to mass protest

The January protests also unfolded against a tense geopolitical backdrop.

Statements from foreign political figures—including remarks by Donald Trump warning Tehran against violent repression—were widely circulated among Iranian audiences. At the same time, Iran’s exiled prince Reza Pahlavi called for coordinated demonstrations and nightly slogans across the country.

Such messages helped focus attention on specific moments of protest. But they did not create the anger that drove people into the streets. That anger had been building for years.

The protests occurred as the Islamic Republic appeared to be shifting toward what might be described as a more defensive style of governance.

In this approach, economic grievances and social demands are increasingly treated as potential security threats. Limited cultural concessions—such as relaxing enforcement of the hijab law or allowing controlled concerts—serve mainly as tools for managing pressure rather than as signs of genuine reform.

The January protests tested this model. The state ultimately suppressed the demonstrations. Yet repression alone cannot address the deeper structural tensions that produced the uprising in the first place.

The streets may have emptied. But many Iranians now believe that the country cannot return to the conditions that existed before January.

Since late February 2026, the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has widened, with traffic through the Strait of Hormuz becoming a major pressure point for the global economy.

Under that pressure, a temporary ceasefire was first announced with Pakistani mediation. That was followed by rare direct talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad.

Pakistan’s role was publicly acknowledged by both Washington and Tehran, each of which described it as the “central mediator.”

The talks held in Islamabad on April 11-12 lasted more than 20 hours and ended without an immediate agreement. Even so, the channel remained open, and efforts to prepare a second round have continued.

That process has raised a central question: was Pakistan merely passing messages, or was it managing a broader peace process?

Although the direct US-Iran talks took place in Islamabad, Pakistan’s role can be seen across several parallel tracks.

Hidden channels of communication

From the beginning of the war, Pakistan helped facilitate the exchange of messages between Washington and Tehran.

A number of Pakistani politicians have openly acknowledged that US proposals – at times in the form of specific points or clauses – were conveyed to Iran through Pakistan, and that Iran’s responses were then relayed back to Washington.

That role became particularly important at a moment when some of the Persian Gulf’s traditional mediators, including Qatar, were themselves under severe security pressure and were being targeted daily by Iran.

Structuring the agenda of the talks

By hosting the talks, Islamabad took three practical steps.

First, it provided a secure environment and the necessary logistics for both sides, which trusted Pakistan’s capacity in that area.

Second, it separated the negotiations into distinct tracks: the nuclear program, sanctions, frozen assets, the Strait of Hormuz, and regional security.

Third, it pressed for a timetable and a mechanism for a “second phase” of talks and for dialogue to continue.

Although the talks ended without an immediate outcome, Pakistan succeeded on the first two fronts. That is why it did not remain passive afterward and continued its mediation efforts in preparation for a second round.

Coordination with regional partners

Pakistan has also sought to widen support for a ceasefire and renewed talks by securing broader backing – especially from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt.

That coordination matters because it allows each side to use its influence and reduces the likelihood of disruptive action by spoilers.

Why trusting Pakistan?

Although there are countries in the region more powerful than Pakistan – India being the clearest example – trust in Pakistan has not stemmed from moral authority. It has come from necessity, leverage, and calculation.

Pakistan has long-standing security ties with the United States, as well as neighborly and working relations with Iran. Together, those ties provide a minimum level of mutual trust for both sides.

For Washington, the need was for a country able to transmit messages within a framework aligned with US interests and to provide a negotiating venue acceptable to Donald Trump’s administration.

In that context, India was not a suitable choice for the United States, because the degree of influence and leverage the Trump administration has over Pakistan does not exist in the same way over India.

At the same time, America’s Arab allies are not only under intense pressure, but are also seen by Iran as direct partners of Washington and therefore lack the credibility needed for mediation. The United States also needed an Islamic country with nuclear capability to play that role. From that perspective, Pakistan was the best available option.

Pakistan also has workable relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and its trust-building efforts during the talks could prove useful.

Pakistan depends on the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East for energy, labor remittances, and regional stability. A prolonged war would therefore carry domestic economic and security costs. Those costs, in turn, increase Islamabad’s incentive to preserve the ceasefire and keep negotiations alive.

There is also a domestic political calculation. Pakistan’s government is trying to ease both internal and external pressure, particularly amid the country’s political crisis and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan. By taking part in a process in which the United States is one of the parties, Islamabad may hope to reduce pressure on Shehbaz Sharif’s government.

Economic distress is another dimension. Pakistan hopes that these talks may help it secure US economic support as well as financial aid and loans from Arab states – a need Islamabad understands well.

At the same time, Pakistan has security and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia and could, if the war dragged on, come under pressure to support Riyadh. That concern appears to have pushed Pakistan to avoid direct entry into the conflict: first by opening confrontations in Afghanistan to signal to its allies that internal instability left it unable to cooperate militarily against Iran, and then by presenting itself as a mediator for peace.

For Iran, too, Pakistan may not be the ideal mediator, but in practice there are few alternatives. Tehran has targeted many Arab countries, while Qatar – which had previously played a mediating role – has itself become a casualty of the war. That leaves Pakistan, as an Islamic country, as the remaining option. For that reason, Tehran has also welcomed Pakistani mediation.

The role of the security institutions and the army

In a crisis of this kind, guaranteeing a ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of messages is difficult without the involvement of security institutions.

According to reports, Pakistan’s army chief is seen in Washington as a reliable channel for direct contact, and that has accelerated decision-making.

Pakistan has also previously hosted and facilitated confidential contacts between major powers, including during the period of rapprochement between China and the United States. That history suggests Islamabad has experience in closed-door diplomacy.

Reports further indicate that direct contact between the Trump administration and General Asim Munir helped smooth the decision-making process, and that Washington believes Pakistan has practical influence over security commitments, can preserve its relationship with Iran, maintain its ties to the Arab world, and is itself affected by instability in the Middle East.

Why is the army chief at the center of this diplomacy?

In this mediation effort, it has been not the prime minister or foreign minister, but Pakistan’s military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who has emerged as the main figure in the negotiations.

Pakistan’s military has more than 51 years of experience dealing with US and Iranian security and military circles. Pakistani officials say responsibility for maintaining confidential channels with the political and military leadership in Tehran and Washington has been placed in Munir’s hands. In a crisis like this, security guarantees carry greater weight than purely political commitments.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said in a speech that Munir had played an especially prominent role in the talks. He added that Munir received the Iranian delegation in full field marshal dress and welcomed the American delegation in formal Western attire – a symbolic message suggesting that Pakistan was guaranteeing the process not only at the level of the civilian government, but at the level of the state and security establishment.

After the imprisonment of Imran Khan, public discontent with the army in Pakistan had risen sharply, and many came to see the military as the root of the country’s crises. Munir appears to have understood that mood clearly, and by accepting a mediating role at such a sensitive moment, he has, to a considerable extent, managed to rebuild some of the public trust that had been lost.

According to a source in the Pakistani prime minister’s office, Trump’s office contacted Munir directly 12 times after the first round of talks.

That suggests Pakistan’s army chief is effectively acting as an indirect representative of the United States while also handling the transmission of messages.

Political parties and civilian institutions in Pakistan, however, are unhappy with that role and worry that, if the talks succeed, the army’s power will grow further and the already weakened political sphere will fall more deeply under military influence.

After the first round ended, Munir traveled to Tehran to prepare the ground for a second round of talks and to convey Washington’s messages and proposals to the Iranian side. The trip was directly linked to efforts to shape the next phase and extend the ceasefire.

The prospects for success in talks

Although the first round ended without a final result, the repeated trips by Pakistan’s army chief and the pressure created by the situation in the Strait of Hormuz – on both the United States and global markets – have increased the chances of at least a partial agreement.

The path ahead, however, is far from straightforward, because the disagreements are more structural than merely technical.

Several difficult but essential steps could improve the prospects for success.

• A step-by-step agreement: first, an extension of the ceasefire, a temporary mechanism for Hormuz, and limited sanctions relief; then deeper discussions on nuclear and regional issues.
• A package of guarantees: balanced guarantees – rather than automatic snapback mechanisms –in the event of a ceasefire breach, with Pakistan seeking to underpin those guarantees through security channels.

Statements by Pakistani officials suggest they are trying to lay the groundwork for those two stages and hope that Islamabad will reap what they describe as “the sweetest fruit” from both Washington and Tehran.

That expectation rests on a broader calculation. Tehran no longer has the capacity for a long war and wants relief for its weak economy from sanctions pressure, while the United States has shown signs of willingness to ease some of those sanctions.

On the other side, the Trump administration is facing rising domestic political and economic pressure, while Iran has sent positive – though conditional – signals on the nuclear file.

For those reasons, hopes for the success of the talks have increased.