Inflation pushes Iranians to buy food in installments

For years, Tehran portrayed fuel self-sufficiency as proof that sanctions had not crippled the energy sector. But recent comments by officials suggest the country was already facing a daily shortfall of roughly 20 million liters before the latest war.

MP Reza Sepahvand recently said production stands at around 105 million liters a day while consumption is closer to 135 million.

War damage, disrupted imports and pressure on petrochemical units have now pushed a long-running structural problem into public view.

Why a producer runs short of gas

Iran may hold vast oil reserves and operate sizable refineries, but that does not automatically guarantee enough gasoline for domestic use.

Much of the country’s refining system depends on aging infrastructure, limited maintenance and technology constrained by years of sanctions, leaving production increasingly out of step with demand.

Fuel consumption is also on the rise. Expanding cities, heavy reliance on private cars and millions of older, fuel-inefficient vehicles place constant pressure on supply.

Cheap subsidized gasoline also encourages overuse, while large price gaps with neighboring countries fuel widespread smuggling that pulls millions of liters out of Iran each day.

The crisis is tied to politics as much as energy. Subsidies help keep fuel affordable and reduce public frustration, but they also deepen waste, smuggling and financial pressure on the state.

Iranian leaders know reforms are necessary, yet past fuel-price increases have triggered unrest, leaving the government trapped between avoiding social anger and managing a system that is becoming harder to sustain.

How war made things worse

The latest war has turned a chronic imbalance into a more immediate stress test. Strikes on energy infrastructure and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz have affected refining, storage, distribution and imports.

Even when refineries are not completely knocked offline, damage to depots, logistics networks and supporting industrial units can sharply reduce the amount of usable gasoline reaching consumers.

One overlooked issue is Iran’s reliance on petrochemical components for gasoline blending.

When refineries cannot produce enough high-quality gasoline, producers blend in octane-boosting components to improve fuel performance. These can include aromatic-rich streams such as benzene, toluene and xylenes, as well as additives such as MTBE.

Such components are widely used in global fuel production because they raise octane levels. The difference lies in regulation.

Many countries tightly restrict substances such as benzene because of health and environmental risks. Iran’s heavier reliance on petrochemical blending can worsen pollution if quality controls weaken or blending exceeds safer limits.

Higher levels of benzene and aromatics increase harmful emissions, especially in congested cities such as Tehran, where air quality is already poor. MTBE also carries environmental risks, particularly for groundwater contamination.

Damage to petrochemical facilities therefore matters for two reasons: it can reduce the supply of components Iran needs to stretch gasoline production while also increasing pressure to rely on lower-quality blending practices to keep fuel flowing.

Either outcome creates problems: tighter supply or worsening health and environmental costs.

When will it really bite?

Before the war, Iran managed the imbalance through imports, rationing, fuel cards, blending and informal restrictions. Those measures helped prevent a full public breakdown but never solved the underlying problem.

If the reported daily shortfall of 20 to 30 million liters persists, shortages could become more visible within weeks or months, especially during peak summer demand.

Longer queues, tighter quotas, regional outages, rising black-market prices and growing pressure on transport and agriculture are among the most likely consequences.

Recent public comments by lawmakers suggest officials are no longer able to present the issue as a temporary inconvenience.

War damage has made repairs and imports more difficult, while years of overworking refineries, postponing maintenance and relying on imports and petrochemical blending left little room to absorb new shocks.

Partial recovery of refining and distribution capacity may be possible within one or two months if damage is limited and supply routes remain open. Full normalization would likely take far longer because the deeper causes are structural: rising demand, old vehicles, sanctions, smuggling, weak investment and distorted pricing.

Iran’s gasoline shortage is therefore not only an energy problem but also a governance problem.

For ordinary Iranians, the consequences are increasingly visible in longer fuel lines, higher unofficial prices, rising transport costs and worsening air pollution: exposing the widening gap between official claims of resilience and economic reality.

Former Industry Minister Mostafa Hashemitaba says the crisis is rooted not only in consumer markets but across the country’s collapsing production chain, from fertilizers to poultry farming.

Writing in Sharq on May 20, Hashemitaba said the price of a 50-kg bag of triple-phosphate fertilizer had jumped within months from three million rials to 70 million rials, a nearly 24-fold increase. Other fertilizers, he added, rose by more than 1,100 percent over the same period.

The result, he argued, has been the shutdown of farms and poultry operations, feeding directly into soaring prices for fruit, vegetables and meat.

A report published by Etemad described growing despair among Iranians struggling with job losses, displacement and rapidly rising living costs after the conflict.

Columnist Nayereh Khademi interviewed a 40-year-old university-educated man who said that after losing his job during the war, he briefly considered living in a cardboard box with his wife.

“What frightened me most was a future in which nothing was certain,” he said.

Another man described the horror of watching missile strikes destroy homes around him. When he realized his own house was still standing, he said he felt guilt rather than relief.

For many who lived through the attacks, the war’s aftermath brought a second shock: rapidly rising prices and shrinking access to basic necessities.

One resident interviewed by Etemad described it as “surreal” to walk past shops selling everyday goods that had suddenly become unaffordable.

Several Tehran newspapers reported last week that a kilogram of poultry meat had reached 1.5 million tomans, roughly one-tenth of an ordinary worker’s monthly salary.

Even some members of parliament, usually focused on rhetoric about national strength and resistance, publicly acknowledged the severity of rising food prices.

Hashemitaba contrasted the economic deterioration with what he described as unrealistic official ambitions elsewhere in the economy.

He recalled that in September 2023, then-President Ebrahim Raisi’s industry minister proudly showed him an electric vehicle and promised that 100,000 units would be produced by March. By spring, he wrote, it became clear that the display model was effectively the factory’s only output.

“How can a country that manufactures precision missiles fail to produce cars?” Hashemitaba wrote.

The worsening economic picture is also reinforcing arguments inside parts of Iran’s political establishment that some form of relief through negotiations with Washington may be unavoidable after months of war and financial turmoil.

While hardliners continue to frame diplomacy as resistance management rather than compromise, even some conservative figures have increasingly acknowledged the scale of economic pressure facing ordinary Iranians.

The strain is now extending beyond households. Cafés and restaurants in Tehran that once offered a temporary escape from political tensions and economic anxiety are also reportedly struggling to survive amid surging supply costs.

Government officials, including President Massoud Pezeshkian, who once tried to downplay the scale of the crisis, have increasingly acknowledged the depth of the country’s economic problems.

But hardline critics on Thursday attacked Pezeshkian simply for publicly recognizing the extent of public hardship—a reaction that underscored how disconnected parts of the political establishment appear from the realities facing many ordinary Iranians.

The initiative drew renewed attention after a video circulated online this week showing a couple marrying at one of the gatherings, turning a state-backed rally into a showcase for a policy goal many young Iranians say has become unaffordable.

Fars News, an outlet close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, reported that matchmaking booths had been set up at rallies in Tehran, allowing young men and women to register for introductions under what organizers call “easy marriage.”

The report said some visitors had already completed initial registration, with organizers collecting basic personal information before matching applicants by age, education and religious beliefs.

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“Families come here looking for a good future for their children,” a woman overseeing one of the stalls said in comments published by Fars. “We try to make marriage easier by reducing expectations.”

She said the gatherings were a suitable venue because “family is one of the country’s core cultural values,” adding that men had registered in greater numbers than women.

The campaign comes as Iranian officials warn of falling marriage and birth rates, even as economists and sociologists point to inflation, unemployment, housing shortages and declining purchasing power as major reasons many young people delay family life.

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Official statistics show marriage rates falling sharply over the past decade as the average age of marriage rises, especially in large cities where housing and living costs have surged.

Economic pressure collides with state messaging

The campaign also reflects a broader push by the Islamic Republic to frame marriage as a cultural and ideological priority despite worsening economic conditions that many young Iranians say make long-term commitments difficult.

State-linked media and religious institutions have increasingly promoted simpler weddings, lower dowries and earlier marriage as officials try to reverse Iran’s demographic decline.

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At the same time, online platforms offering temporary religious unions – known in Shiite jurisprudence as sigheh – continue to operate openly across messaging applications and websites, creating what critics describe as a parallel market built around legally sanctioned short-term relationships.

An investigation by Iran International previously found Telegram channels advertising “Islamic marriage services” that arranged fixed-term unions in exchange for payments, with some operators presenting the arrangements as religiously approved alternatives to prohibited sexual relationships.

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The investigation found some services demanded payments for introductions alone, while others offered monthly arrangements with fees varying according to age, location and education level.

The booths turn ideological rallies into platforms for state-backed social messaging. Organizers told Fars they urge young people to lower expectations and marry earlier.

Critics say the campaign ignores the economic pressures keeping many Iranians from marriage, including stagnant wages, high rents and uncertainty about the future.

Sara Kanaani, a social media influencer, documented what she described as “40 days of motherhood” after taking custody of a baby through Iran’s Mizban temporary foster care scheme run by the State Welfare Organization.

State-affiliated outlets including IRNA and Hamshahri newspaper amplified the story with emotional coverage focused on the woman’s attachment to the child and the separation that followed.

Images of Kanaani without mandatory hijab also circulated through state media, drawing further attention online.

Foster care program under spotlight

The Mizban program, launched in 2023, allows children from welfare institutions to be placed temporarily with approved families or individuals while remaining under state supervision.

Unlike adoption, custody under the program is limited in duration and does not transfer permanent parental rights.

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Iran’s Welfare Organization says applicants are assessed for financial stability, mental health and caregiving capacity before approval.

Similar foster care systems exist in many countries, where temporary family-based care is generally viewed by specialists as preferable to institutional care for infants and young children.

The controversy intensified after critics accused Kanaani of turning the experience into a sustained social media project through daily videos, emotional posts and photographs of the child.

Some users questioned whether a child unable to consent should become part of a personal online brand or public campaign.

Others raised concerns after Kanaani discussed details about the infant’s biological mother in social media posts.

Wider criticism follows media coverage

Psychologists and child welfare advocates also debated the emotional impact of repeated attachment and separation during infancy.

Some specialists argued temporary family care can still benefit children when conducted under stable and professionally supervised conditions.

Others pointed to a lack of public information about oversight, caregiver training and welfare standards in Iran’s implementation of the program.

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Part of the attention surrounding the case focused on Kanaani’s status as a single woman.

Iranian law permits unmarried women over 30 to adopt girls under certain conditions, though couples remain prioritized in most custody arrangements.

Critics also questioned the role of state media, saying the extensive coverage reflected efforts to promote emotionally driven narratives centered on women, family and social solidarity during a period of economic and social strain in Iran.

The report said officials had begun speaking more openly about Khamenei’s condition amid speculations that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards were effectively running decision-making.

“They are projecting that there’s no change . . . the supreme leader was the apex of the system and is still the apex,” Vali Nasr, a former US official and professor at Johns Hopkins University was quoted as saying. “And that he’s alive, functioning and in control.”

He added that the guards were also seeking to project that “they are not running the show and [Khamenei is] not just a figurehead.”

The report referred to remarks by Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Mazaher Hosseini, a senior official in the Supreme Leader’s office.

Pezeshkian said on earlier this month that he had met with the Supreme Leader, offering a first public account of him meeting Mojtaba Khamenei since he suffered severe wounds at the start of the Iran war on February 28.

Hosseini said later that Mojtaba Khamenei suffered minor injuries to his kneecap, back and behind his ear in the airstrikes that killed his father and wife, insisting he is now in “full health” and dismissing reports of a serious head injury as “lies.”