Hormuz gives battered Iran room to wait out Trump, experts say

President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered the creation of a special committee to end Iran’s internet blackout, but many Iranians doubt the government can override the powerful institutions controlling cyberspace policy.

Earlier this week, Pezeshkian tasked First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref with forming a body aimed at restoring access to the global internet after more than two and a half months of severe restrictions.

Reformist newspaper Shargh reported that the committee is expected to restore broader access within a month.

Pezeshkian announced the move on X, saying he had instructed Aref to carry out the task while considering “governance sensitivities, the Supreme Leader’s views, and the promise I made to the people.”

During his presidential campaign, Pezeshkian repeatedly promised to ease internet filtering and restrictions. But ordinary Iranians have effectively been cut off from the global internet since US-Israeli strikes began on February 28.

Before the war, some individuals had access to so-called “white SIM cards,” exempt from ordinary filtering restrictions. After the ceasefire, authorities expanded selective access to businesses and approved individuals through services branded as “Internet Pro.”

Many users responding to Pezeshkian’s X post expressed frustration and skepticism.

“Mr. President, don’t make us regret voting for you,” one voter wrote. “End this discrimination, these white SIM cards, these Pro subscriptions, and this class-based treatment of a natural right. We want free internet.”

Another user reminded Pezeshkian that during the election campaign he had said he would resign if he failed to fulfill major promises, including lifting internet restrictions.

It remains unclear whether recent decisions were made by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) or the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Both are formally chaired by Pezeshkian, but other figures and institutions — including the Revolutionary Guards — wield significant influence within them.

The appointment of Aref to lead the new “Special Taskforce for Organizing and Guiding Cyberspace” also drew criticism from conservative figures.

Former Cultural Heritage Minister Ezzatollah Zarghami, himself a member of the SCC appointed by Khamenei, described the initiative as parallel decision-making overlapping with the council’s responsibilities.

“Transformation and restructuring in the decision-making system must be fundamental and involve changing the governance model in cyberspace,” he wrote on X.

One social media user responded sarcastically: “The president realized he can’t stand up to the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, so he created another council that can do absolutely nothing.”

‘Class-based internet’

The prolonged disruption of international internet access has created serious technical and economic problems inside Iran.

Domestic websites and online platforms have struggled because technical teams lost access to international tools and services. Software licenses expired, search engines failed to properly index Iranian sites, and server disruptions affected service delivery.

The impact on employment has also been severe. Millions of jobs linked to online businesses, social media and international digital services have been disrupted, including work done by programmers, online sellers and content creators.

Selective access programs such as “Pro Internet” and white SIM cards have meanwhile become symbols of inequality for many Iranians.

Some groups offered privileged access — including nurses and certain lawyers — refused to accept it, branding it institutionalized discrimination.

Restrictions on ordinary users have also fueled a growing black market.

According to Iranian media reports, while the official price for a 50-gigabyte Pro Internet package is around 20 million rials, the same service is being resold for as much as 120 million rials. White SIM cards are reportedly advertised on Telegram starting at 440 million rials, depending on the level of access provided.

Even before the current near-total shutdown, millions of Iranians already relied on paid VPN services to access blocked platforms such as Instagram and YouTube.

The high cost has effectively turned internet access into a luxury product many cannot afford in a country where some public sector workers, including teachers, earn roughly 150 million rials per month.

Journalist Sadegh Zangeneh wrote in Khabar Online: “The level of anger and dissatisfaction among the people over the internet shutdown and its divisive consequences should not be sought in reports written by those who have monopolized the internet themselves.”

He added: “Either those who deprive people of the internet in the name of security are betraying the country, or those who auction off national security under the label of ‘Pro Internet’ and other forms of class-based internet are doing so.”

Sociologist Mohammad Fazeli also warned about the social consequences of unequal access, arguing that “discriminatory internet” would become yet another reason for people to confront the state.

Tehran commentariat and figures close to the establishment are increasingly accusing hardliners and state television of deepening divisions and undermining national unity as the country faces war, economic strain and growing public anxiety.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the ensuing regional conflagration have aggravated economic troubles to the point that President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned of widespread unrest.

Media close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has sought to position himself as a pragmatist since the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have been among the most vocal critics.

On Thursday, Khorasan newspaper, one of the outlets closest to Ghalibaf, blasted the state broadcaster and several ultraconservative lawmakers for promoting rhetoric that risked “deepening divisions and polarizing the public” at a time of war.

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The US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the ensuing regional conflagration have aggravated economic troubles to the point that President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned of widespread unrest.

Media close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has sought to position himself as a pragmatist since the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have been among the most vocal critics.

On Thursday, Khorasan newspaper, one of the outlets closest to Ghalibaf, blasted the state broadcaster and several ultraconservative lawmakers for promoting rhetoric that risked “deepening divisions and polarizing the public” at a time of war.

The paper singled out hardline MP Ali Khezrian, who it said had received nearly four hours of airtime in less than a week to accuse state officials of serving foreign interests and challenge the authority of the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council.

In a counter-accusation, Khorasan alleged that Khezrian had posted a video of a petrochemical facility in Lorestan Province, effectively “updating Israel and the United States’ list of potential sites to strike.”

The paper also accused Khezrian of presenting his own views as those of Iran’s new leader, adding that if a politician from another faction had done so, they would likely have been arrested by security forces.

Meanwhile, conservative figure and former Resalat editor Mohammad Kazem Anbarlui warned in a May 14 interview with ISNA that hardliners were creating dangerous political polarization by exploiting issues such as hijab enforcement and negotiations with the United States.

On the same day, Khabar Online reported that during a live broadcast on Channel 3, a reporter asked demonstrators: “Which political figures were meaner than the meanest animals?” Respondents named politicians associated with rivals of the hardline camp.

The outlet argued that hardliners were increasingly using state television to erode national cohesion. Since the start of the war, it wrote, the broadcaster had selectively featured hardline commentators and public figures.

Instead of offering expert analysis, Khabar Online wrote, the organization was increasingly relying on controversial guests and sensationalist presenters, pushing it “off its professional path” and disrupting “public order and social calm.”

The national broadcaster now resembled “the exclusive domain of hardliners,” it said — a space where they were allowed to undermine decisions of the Supreme National Security Council and state authority.

Even the IRGC-linked Javan newspaper acknowledged the growing concern.

“When people are constantly led to believe that state officials are incompetent, infiltrated, or intimidated, the result is growing pessimism, distrust, and the erosion of national cohesion,” the paper warned in a commentary published the same day.

“A society whose trust has been damaged” becomes more vulnerable to external crises and adversaries’ psychological operations, it added.

“The outcome,” Javan concluded, “is either public anger or despair.”

The seismic activity began with a mild 3.4-magnitude tremor before intensifying into a 4.6-magnitude earthquake later in the night. Several aftershocks continued into early Wednesday morning.

At the same time, a storm swept through Tehran, bringing severe dust, power outages and fallen trees. At least seven people were reportedly injured in the storm, though authorities said the earthquakes themselves caused no casualties or major damage.

Still, the tremors revived a long-standing fear in Tehran: the possibility of a devastating earthquake along the active fault lines beneath eastern Tehran and surrounding towns.

The big one may be overdue

ILNA quoted earthquake expert Fariborz Nateghi Elahi criticizing the lack of serious crisis planning for the major quake scientists have long warned about.

“We know an earthquake will happen,” he said. “Not on this scale, but something much, much larger.”

Eastern Tehran and nearby towns sit atop an active fault stretching at least 200 kilometers and capable of generating earthquakes above magnitude 7. Geologists say the fault typically produces a major earthquake roughly once every century.

Nearly 200 years have passed since the last truly destructive event. In 1830, a massive earthquake estimated at magnitude 7.1 devastated Tehran, then a relatively young capital.

Scientists now warn that pressure accumulated underground since then has left the fault in a critical state, primed for a major release of energy.

In December 2017, a 3.5-magnitude tremor caused widespread panic, sending residents into the streets and forcing many families to sleep in their cars overnight. This time, despite the stronger quake, the public reaction appeared noticeably more subdued.

Crisis fatigue

Some residents still spent the night in parks, streets or inside their vehicles, but many on social media said the trauma of recent air and missile attacks during two wars had numbed their reactions.

One psychologist writing on X suggested the muted response could be explained by “crisis fatigue.”

A social media user wrote: “The 2017 earthquake made Tehran residents sleep in their cars until morning. Streets were completely gridlocked, and gas stations were packed. Its magnitude? 3.5. Now our reaction is: ‘Oh, it’s just an earthquake,’ and we pull the blanket over our heads and go back to sleep. I think only a nuclear bomb could still move people in this country.”

Another user described how the storm initially triggered fears of renewed military attacks: “The storm started, windows were shaking, and I thought: ‘Is it fighter jets?’”

She said she then checked the news and realized it was just a storm, which briefly calmed her. “Then the earthquake came, and I thought: well, that’s nothing. Compared to war, everything feels like a joke.”

Reports during and after the summit, including comments highlighted by Fox News, suggested China had signaled readiness to play a more active role in stabilizing the situation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. But any Chinese cooperation is likely to remain limited, transactional and tied to Beijing’s broader strategic priorities.

Before Trump’s departure from Washington, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent accused China of “funding the largest state sponsor of terrorism,” while Trump himself said he was going to have “a long talk” with Xi. Earlier, the Treasury Department sanctioned five of the so-called “teapot” refineries that process Iranian oil in China.

These moves were not surprising. The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran has shaken the Middle East, threatened global energy flows and become increasingly unpopular among American voters and consumers. Iran has become a priority issue for the White House.

China has reasons to listen. Beijing has already shown some willingness to restrain Tehran, including by nudging Iran toward the Islamabad talks. It does not want the fragile ceasefire to collapse. It does not want the Strait of Hormuz closed. Nor does it want a global downturn that would damage Chinese exports.

China’s investments in electrification and renewable energy have increased its resilience, but they have not made it immune to a major shock in the Middle East. Yet Xi’s help, if it comes, will not be free.

In his recent conversation with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear that Taiwan remains the core issue for China and the greatest risk in US-China relations. Chinese readouts of the Trump-Xi meeting also placed Taiwan at the center of discussions, with the “situation in the Middle East” appearing much lower on the agenda.

The implication is difficult to miss: if Washington wants Chinese cooperation, Beijing will expect a more accommodating US position on Taiwan. Several current and former American officials have expressed concern that Trump, who said he intended to have “that discussion” with Xi, could delay or reduce the $14 billion weapons package for Taiwan approved by Congress in January.

In other words, China has strong reasons to support de-escalation over Iran, but Beijing also appears to view the crisis through the lens of a much larger strategic bargain with Washington.

Xi’s help is also likely to remain limited. Beijing and Tehran still share a fundamental objective. Both want the Iranian regime to survive. Both want Iran to avoid emerging from the conflict as a defeated and humiliated loser. Both oppose a regional order shaped by the United States and Israel.

For Tehran, defeat would be a regime-threatening disaster. For Beijing, it would be another demonstration that American coercive power can still break an anti-US partner.

China may therefore encourage Tehran to negotiate, support language about regional stability or help Trump claim diplomatic progress. It may even make quiet tactical adjustments to its economic dealings with Iran. But any such move will be carefully calibrated to serve China’s own interests.

China may help stabilize the situation; it will not help Washington defeat Tehran.

The fact that the Chinese embassy in Washington has not denied reports that Wang Yi and Rubio agreed in April that the Strait of Hormuz must remain toll-free is a good example of this dynamic. So too is the American readout stating that China opposes Iran developing nuclear weapons. Both signal goodwill, but neither represents a meaningful shift in Beijing’s position or a compromise of its interests.

This means Trump may have secured Chinese support for de-escalation. He may even have persuaded Xi that a prolonged conflict is too costly for China and that Beijing has an interest in pushing Tehran toward compromise. But he cannot force China to choose Washington over Tehran. Pressure alone is unlikely to work, especially if it requires Xi to appear publicly subordinate to American demands.

There is another problem: it remains unclear what Washington actually wants. It is not enough to accuse China of enabling Iran. The United States still lacks a clearly defined objective. Does it want a ceasefire, renewed nuclear talks, limits on Iranian regional activity, security guarantees for regional partners or some combination of these?

Without a coherent strategy, China will continue using the crisis to extract concessions elsewhere while offering only limited help.

The summit may not have determined the future of the Middle East. But it did reveal something important about the emerging great-power rivalry. The United States remains militarily dominant but strategically erratic. China is economically central but cautious as a security actor.

Trump arrived in Beijing seeking Chinese help on Iran. Xi may offer some. But the price will be high, and the help will not come at Tehran’s expense.