State TV emerges as battleground in Iran’s wartime infighting

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the ensuing regional conflagration have aggravated economic troubles to the point that President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned of widespread unrest.

Media close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has sought to position himself as a pragmatist since the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have been among the most vocal critics.

On Thursday, Khorasan newspaper, one of the outlets closest to Ghalibaf, blasted the state broadcaster and several ultraconservative lawmakers for promoting rhetoric that risked “deepening divisions and polarizing the public” at a time of war.

The paper singled out hardline MP Ali Khezrian, who it said had received nearly four hours of airtime in less than a week to accuse state officials of serving foreign interests and challenge the authority of the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council.

In a counter-accusation, Khorasan alleged that Khezrian had posted a video of a petrochemical facility in Lorestan Province, effectively “updating Israel and the United States’ list of potential sites to strike.”

The paper also accused Khezrian of presenting his own views as those of Iran’s new leader, adding that if a politician from another faction had done so, they would likely have been arrested by security forces.

Meanwhile, conservative figure and former Resalat editor Mohammad Kazem Anbarlui warned in a May 14 interview with ISNA that hardliners were creating dangerous political polarization by exploiting issues such as hijab enforcement and negotiations with the United States.

On the same day, Khabar Online reported that during a live broadcast on Channel 3, a reporter asked demonstrators: “Which political figures were meaner than the meanest animals?” Respondents named politicians associated with rivals of the hardline camp.

The outlet argued that hardliners were increasingly using state television to erode national cohesion. Since the start of the war, it wrote, the broadcaster had selectively featured hardline commentators and public figures.

Instead of offering expert analysis, Khabar Online wrote, the organization was increasingly relying on controversial guests and sensationalist presenters, pushing it “off its professional path” and disrupting “public order and social calm.”

The national broadcaster now resembled “the exclusive domain of hardliners,” it said — a space where they were allowed to undermine decisions of the Supreme National Security Council and state authority.

Even the IRGC-linked Javan newspaper acknowledged the growing concern.

“When people are constantly led to believe that state officials are incompetent, infiltrated, or intimidated, the result is growing pessimism, distrust, and the erosion of national cohesion,” the paper warned in a commentary published the same day.

“A society whose trust has been damaged” becomes more vulnerable to external crises and adversaries’ psychological operations, it added.

“The outcome,” Javan concluded, “is either public anger or despair.”

The seismic activity began with a mild 3.4-magnitude tremor before intensifying into a 4.6-magnitude earthquake later in the night. Several aftershocks continued into early Wednesday morning.

At the same time, a storm swept through Tehran, bringing severe dust, power outages and fallen trees. At least seven people were reportedly injured in the storm, though authorities said the earthquakes themselves caused no casualties or major damage.

Still, the tremors revived a long-standing fear in Tehran: the possibility of a devastating earthquake along the active fault lines beneath eastern Tehran and surrounding towns.

The big one may be overdue

ILNA quoted earthquake expert Fariborz Nateghi Elahi criticizing the lack of serious crisis planning for the major quake scientists have long warned about.

“We know an earthquake will happen,” he said. “Not on this scale, but something much, much larger.”

Eastern Tehran and nearby towns sit atop an active fault stretching at least 200 kilometers and capable of generating earthquakes above magnitude 7. Geologists say the fault typically produces a major earthquake roughly once every century.

Nearly 200 years have passed since the last truly destructive event. In 1830, a massive earthquake estimated at magnitude 7.1 devastated Tehran, then a relatively young capital.

Scientists now warn that pressure accumulated underground since then has left the fault in a critical state, primed for a major release of energy.

In December 2017, a 3.5-magnitude tremor caused widespread panic, sending residents into the streets and forcing many families to sleep in their cars overnight. This time, despite the stronger quake, the public reaction appeared noticeably more subdued.

Crisis fatigue

Some residents still spent the night in parks, streets or inside their vehicles, but many on social media said the trauma of recent air and missile attacks during two wars had numbed their reactions.

One psychologist writing on X suggested the muted response could be explained by “crisis fatigue.”

A social media user wrote: “The 2017 earthquake made Tehran residents sleep in their cars until morning. Streets were completely gridlocked, and gas stations were packed. Its magnitude? 3.5. Now our reaction is: ‘Oh, it’s just an earthquake,’ and we pull the blanket over our heads and go back to sleep. I think only a nuclear bomb could still move people in this country.”

Another user described how the storm initially triggered fears of renewed military attacks: “The storm started, windows were shaking, and I thought: ‘Is it fighter jets?’”

She said she then checked the news and realized it was just a storm, which briefly calmed her. “Then the earthquake came, and I thought: well, that’s nothing. Compared to war, everything feels like a joke.”

Most outlets framed negotiations as deadlocked. Reform-leaning Fararu warned of “the increasing possibility of yet another escalation.”

In an article titled “Negotiating About Negotiating” published by Sharq, former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi examined the growing impasse after Trump reportedly rejected Iran’s latest 14-point proposal as “completely unacceptable.”

According to Tasnim and IRIB, Tehran’s proposal included demands for the withdrawal of US forces from Iran’s periphery, war reparations, full sanctions relief and a new legal framework for the Strait of Hormuz.

Ahmadi argued that the recent exchange of written messages marked a regression from even the already limited framework of indirect negotiations.

“This is no longer substantive diplomacy,” he wrote, describing the process instead as “negotiating about the method of negotiation.”

He argued that Trump remains focused on Iran’s 60 percent uranium enrichment while Tehran continues prioritizing sovereignty and economic compensation, leaving little common ground.

Rather than full-scale war, Ahmadi predicted prolonged “low-intensity military encounters,” tighter naval blockades and sustained economic pressure aimed at keeping Iran unstable.

In Etemad, foreign policy analyst Morteza Makki argued that after 40 days of military confrontation both Tehran and Washington are now effectively “forced” to seek some form of agreement.

Makki said the conflict had reshaped regional dynamics, arguing that despite heavy costs Iran had preserved key strategic objectives and demonstrated deterrence in the Persian Gulf, while Washington had failed to secure broader goals despite military escalation and operations such as Operation Freedom.

“The White House is now managing the costs of war rather than leading an offensive,” he said.

Makki pointed to domestic pressures in the United States, fears of rising energy prices and reluctance among Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia to enter a broader conflict.

He concluded that both the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz remain negotiable if political will exists, but argued that China is now the only power capable of offering guarantees Tehran would trust.

“It seems China is the only country that can play an effective role in creating space for dialogue and guaranteeing a stable agreement between Iran and the U.S.,” he said.

Expanding on China’s role, Iran’s former ambassador to Beijing Hamid Aboutalebi argued in a Fararu commentary that the confrontation has evolved beyond a regional crisis into a test of China’s willingness to defend partners against US pressure.

He wrote that the conflict was no longer simply about sanctions or Iran’s nuclear program, but about whether Beijing is prepared to challenge a US-centered global order.

According to Aboutalebi, if China succeeds in building alternative financial and energy networks while defending partners such as Iran, Tehran could evolve from an isolated sanctioned state into a key player in an emerging multipolar order.

But if Beijing retreats under pressure, he warned, it would expose the limits of Chinese power despite its global ambitions.

He argued that tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have elevated the conflict into a broader geopolitical contest, increasingly forcing China to balance its ambitions as a global power against its dependence on stability and open trade routes.

Iranian ambassador to China Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli wrote Monday on X that relations between Tehran and Beijing “are stronger than any US effort aimed at changing China’s position toward Iran through pressure.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun reinforced that message Monday, saying Beijing’s position remained “clear and consistent” and that the priority should be preventing renewed war and further escalation.

Crucially, Beijing also signaled opposition to any US-led blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, saying such actions were “not in the common interests of the international community.”

Observers viewed last week’s meeting in Beijing between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as an effort to coordinate positions ahead of the expected Trump-Xi talks.

During the meeting, Wang said China was prepared to play a “greater role” in regional peace efforts and encouraged dialogue between Iran and Persian Gulf Arab states.

Trump pressure Xi over Iran

Western media reports indicate Trump plans to press Xi over China’s economic and strategic ties with Iran, particularly oil purchases and alleged military assistance.

While Trump acknowledged he would raise the issue, he also said before departing for Beijing that he did not believe Xi’s cooperation was strictly necessary to manage the crisis.

Tensions between Washington and Beijing over Iran have intensified in recent weeks following the seizure of a Tehran-linked cargo vessel near the Strait of Hormuz.

In a CNBC interview, Trump criticized what he described as China’s “unexpected support for Iran,” saying he had anticipated greater understanding from Beijing.

Former US ambassador Nikki Haley also alleged on X that the seized vessel was carrying chemicals intended for Iran’s missile program, presenting the case as evidence of growing Chinese support for Tehran.

China’s expanding regional role

At a May 8 press conference in Beijing, Rahmani-Fazli said Tehran and Beijing had agreed to advance Xi’s four-point regional security initiative.

The proposal emphasizes peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and adherence to international law as foundations for stability in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East.

Iranian outlet Khabar Online described the initiative as part of Beijing’s broader effort to position itself as a major diplomatic mediator in the region while distancing itself from what it called US unilateralism.

The outlet argued that the approach could strengthen Iran’s negotiating position and increase pressure on Washington to accept at least some Iranian demands.

Rahmani-Fazli said Monday that any future agreement with Washington “must inevitably include guarantees from major powers” and ultimately be raised at the UN Security Council.

Could China become a mediator?

So far, China has largely pursued a cautious approach to the confrontation between Iran and the United States, avoiding direct involvement while calling for de-escalation.

Still, some Iranian analysts believe Beijing may now be willing to take on a more active diplomatic role.

Former Iranian ambassador to China Mohammad Keshavarzzadeh told Shargh newspaper that Chinese officials appeared interested in facilitating negotiations and reducing tensions.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei also suggested Beijing could use Trump’s visit to warn against what Tehran describes as unlawful US pressure and its consequences for regional and global stability.

At the same time, some Iranian analysts believe China may be uneasy with Tehran’s threats to restrict access through the Strait of Hormuz.

Former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi told Nour News that Beijing’s primary concern remains preserving open trade routes essential to its export-driven economy.

According to Ahmadi, this could push China to place greater emphasis on protecting the legal status of international waterways and opposing any disruption in Hormuz that might set precedents elsewhere.

Disputes over Chinese support for Iran

Last month, Trump called on Xi not to send weapons to Tehran and claimed China had offered assurances on the matter.

In recent days, the US State Department sanctioned three Chinese satellite companies accused of assisting Iranian military operations by providing imagery linked to Iranian military activity. Beijing rejected the allegations.

The US Treasury Department also sanctioned several companies in mainland China and Hong Kong accused of helping supply weapons-related materials to Iran.

Beijing does not recognize US sanctions on Iranian oil exports and has instructed domestic companies not to comply with American restrictions targeting so-called “teapot” refineries purchasing Iranian crude.

The moves underscore growing US efforts to pressure Beijing over its ties with Tehran ahead of the Trump-Xi meeting.

On May 10, Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, said Beijing could serve as the guarantor of a future deal between Iran and major world powers. He added that any agreement should ultimately be endorsed by the UN Security Council, echoing Tehran’s long-standing preference for multilateral guarantees over bilateral commitments.

A day later, Rahmani Fazli wrote on X that Iran was prepared to support President Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal for “sustainable security” in the Persian Gulf, adding that the position had already been affirmed during recent talks between the two countries’ foreign ministers.

China’s approach to emphasizes mutual guarantees among regional states, with Beijing presenting itself as a mediator and economic stabilizer rather than a military enforcer.

In mid-April, Xi introduced a four-point proposal aimed at moving the region away from the brink of wider war toward what Chinese officials described as a “comprehensive and sustainable security architecture.”

The proposal called for peaceful coexistence among regional powers, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law and the UN Charter, and balancing security with economic development and reconstruction.

Chinese diplomacy surrounding the Iran crisis has increasingly been framed in Tehran as an alternative to Washington’s military-first approach.

Iranian media and officials have portrayed Beijing as a power capable of maintaining relations with all sides while avoiding direct military involvement.

Tehran and Beijing have both linked these initiatives to their expanding strategic partnership, which Iranian officials increasingly describe as a counterweight to US influence in the region.

Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to China has added new significance to that relationship as ceasefire tensions persist and negotiations remain stalled.

Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, recently reiterated that security guarantees remain one of Tehran’s central demands in any negotiations with Washington.

Iranian commentators argue that while Tehran does not trust the Trump administration to uphold a purely bilateral agreement, Chinese involvement could provide a framework both sides may find harder to abandon.

Still, major obstacles remain.

Trump has repeatedly rejected any agreement resembling the 2015 nuclear deal, arguing that it failed to protect US interests. Iran, meanwhile, continues to push for a broader truce framework without first resolving disputes over its nuclear program, a position unlikely to gain traction in Washington.

Tensions escalated further on May 12, when Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Iran was prepared for war if Trump rejected Tehran’s terms. The same day, Trump said military options remained on the table.

Against that backdrop, Beijing has increasingly signaled that its immediate priority is preventing further disruption in the Persian Gulf and ensuring safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy markets.

For Tehran, China’s growing diplomatic role offers more than mediation. It represents the possibility of a powerful external guarantor at a time when trust between Iran and the United States appears close to collapse.