Iran state TV rifle displays stir unease over domestic intimidation

Mohsen Mobarra, head of the union overseeing coffee shops in Tehran, told economic daily Donya-e-Eqtesad that café operating costs have more than doubled while customer numbers have fallen by as much as 50 percent in recent months, with up to 40 percent of cafés shutting down.

“Continuing operations does not mean profitability,” he said. “The profits of these businesses are steadily shrinking. As a result, cafés that rent their locations or lack strong financial backing are heading toward closure.”

Over the past two decades, cafés became an important part of urban life in Iran, taking root in Tehran before spreading across the country.

With affordable entertainment options limited, they emerged as some of the few accessible spaces where young Iranians could socialize, work and spend time outside the home.

Many evolved into more than places to drink coffee or eat light meals. They hosted poetry nights, small music performances, photography exhibitions and informal gatherings, becoming rare spaces for social interaction at a time when few other public spaces remained accessible.

Until a few months ago, Tehran alone had around 6,000 cafés of different sizes in operation. But the collapse in consumers’ purchasing power has hit the industry hard.

Sanaz, a 28-year-old receptionist at a private company, said she and her friends used to visit cafés several times a week. But now, with sharp increases in the costs of food, transportation and housing, even such small pleasures require careful calculation.

“I have to calculate every expense, even this simple form of entertainment, just to make it to the end of the month — assuming I don’t lose my job,” she said.

“If I lose my job, after years of financial independence, I’ll have to move back to my parents’ home in my hometown.”

The closures and downsizing have also eliminated jobs for many workers, most of them young people and women.

Shana, 26, completed professional barista training before finding work at one of the branches of the well-known Saedi Nia café chain.

In January, the chain’s branches were abruptly shut down after the owner voiced support for opposition protesters. Shortly afterward, war broke out.

“Even cafés that have survived the economic downturn are not hiring new staff anymore,” she said. “Many are actually laying off existing employees.”

“I have no hope that even by learning new skills like cooking or other work, I’ll be able to find a job. The economy keeps getting worse every day, and the job market is shrinking.”

Coffee itself is also becoming a luxury.

Tea remains Iran’s dominant traditional drink, but coffee consumption expanded rapidly in recent years. Now, however, the sharp rise in foreign currency prices and disruptions to imports have pushed coffee prices so high that many households are cutting consumption or abandoning it altogether.

Although global coffee prices have declined, the cost of coffee beans in Iran — largely imported through the United Arab Emirates before the war — has nearly doubled compared to pre-war levels.

The increase has directly affected café prices. With rents and other expenses also rising, the price of a cup of coffee in some cafés has climbed by as much as four times.

One café owner told Donya-e-Eqtesad that even cafés specializing in basic coffee drinks are seeing falling demand because many people can no longer justify going out even for coffee.

Tara, the manager of an advertising company with ten employees, said coffee has become so expensive that even buying it for office use is increasingly difficult.

“For the first time in the past twenty years, I’ve had to stop buying coffee for the office kitchen, where it was always available for employees alongside tea,” she said.

“It’s not just about coffee prices. Since last summer’s war, work has effectively been frozen. Clients have even canceled half-finished projects, and everyone knows the company is taking its last breaths.”

“If this situation continues, we’ll have no choice but to shut down.”

Trump’s visit had fueled speculation in parts of the Iranian press that China might play a more active mediating role or pressure the United States toward concessions over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader conflict.

Instead, Chinese statements after the summit largely emphasized stability in global trade and uninterrupted shipping flows, reinforcing perceptions in Tehran that Beijing would ultimately prioritize its own economic interests.

Part of the disappointment stems from signs that Trump saw little value in seeking China’s help on Iran, while Beijing itself appears unwilling to meaningfully intervene unless its own strategic and economic interests are directly threatened.

Hamid Reza Taraghi, a senior figure in the traditional conservative Islamic Coalition Party, said no real negotiations are currently taking place between Tehran and Washington.

While the two sides continue exchanging written messages through Pakistan, he said Trump has offered no positive response to Iran’s proposals.

“The prolonged limbo,” he told moderate outlet Khabar Online, "is worsening economic pressures inside Iran," complicating efforts to stabilize markets and deepening public uncertainty about the future.

Taraghi also acknowledged internal divisions within Iran, saying domestic opposition to negotiations continues to disrupt the process and is amplified by prime-time coverage on state television.

Like many Iranian commentators in recent days, Taraghi described the greatest danger facing the country as the risk of another round of conflict.

That sense of strategic deadlock was echoed Friday in a lengthy analysis published by the reform-leaning Fararu website, which argued that Washington now finds itself trapped in a “no victory, no exit” situation.

The report said the United States appears torn between several risky paths: reviving indirect diplomacy through regional intermediaries, escalating military pressure through a heavier regional presence, or tightening maritime restrictions to further squeeze Iran’s trade and access to sea routes.

None, Fararu argued, offers a clear path to success.

The analysis also pointed to divisions inside Washington, with Republican hawks pressing for stronger military action while Democrats continue advocating diplomacy and warning against deeper entanglement in the Middle East.

According to analysts cited by the outlet, the current US approach has failed to achieve its central objectives, while Iran has largely preserved both its deterrence posture in the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear leverage.

Some of the unnamed experts warned that Washington risks repeating long-standing miscalculations about Iran’s vulnerabilities, potentially deepening rather than resolving the crisis.

Fararu suggested the Trump administration may ultimately seek a symbolic off-ramp—potentially even through rebranding or redefining its military campaign to justify limited renewed strikes while claiming a form of victory.

But the analysts cited by the publication argued that Iran is unlikely to yield under pressure, leaving Washington facing an increasingly unappealing choice between renewed escalation and acceptance of a costly stalemate.

The panel, moderated by Iran International’s Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, brought together Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute and Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies to discuss what comes after a ceasefire that has not ended the wider confrontation.

The debate, held on May 14, came a month after the US naval blockade of Iranian ports began on April 13, intensifying pressure on Tehran’s economy and maritime trade. But the blockade has also pushed shipping, insurance risk and control of Hormuz to the center of the conflict.

A regime under pressure, but not necessarily near collapse

Alterman said the Iranian regime has changed since the war began, but “not in a positive way.” He warned that the war may not have pushed the Islamic Republic toward compromise, but further into the hands of its security establishment.

With Mojtaba Khamenei less visible and Revolutionary Guard hardliners appearing more influential, he said Tehran’s instinct seems to be to “hunker down and wait out” President Donald Trump.

“It feels like the default is toward confrontation rather than compromise,” Alterman said.

For Alterman, that does not necessarily mean the regime is closer to falling. It may instead mean Tehran is more likely to absorb pressure and wait for Trump’s political calendar to become more difficult.

Pletka also warned against assuming that a weakened regime automatically produces a better outcome. She said Washington often frames Iran’s power struggle as one between hardliners and moderates, but the reality is more complicated.

“These are all people who support the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” she said. “Some of them want to kill fewer people. Some of them want to kill more people.”

The danger, she suggested, is that US and Israeli strikes weaken Iran militarily while empowering the most repressive factions at home. Alterman put the question more starkly: does the pressure lead to regime collapse, or “just lead to more Iranians suffering for a longer period of time”?

Hormuz changes the balance

The clearest divide between the two experts came over the Strait of Hormuz.

Alterman argued that the war has revealed an uncomfortable truth for Washington: even a damaged Iran can still disrupt one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.

“Even a weak Iran, a battered Iran, can control the strait,” he said.

It only needs to create enough fear to alter the behavior of shipping companies, insurers, and neighbouring Arab states and energy markets. In that sense, the threshold for disruption is lower than many had assumed.

Pletka sharply disagreed with the idea that Iran truly controls the strait.

“The reason the Iranians control the Strait of Hormuz right now is because we’re letting them,” she said. “We can take control of it. We can do what we want. We can move traffic through.”

She said the issue is no longer only military. It is also about risk, insurance and the willingness of shipowners to send vessels into waters where even a single strike, mine or ambiguous threat can have major consequences.

The result is a paradox: Iran may be weaker than before the war, but it may have discovered a tool it can use more confidently than before.

No clear road to victory or a deal

Both experts were skeptical that the current diplomatic track can quickly produce a comprehensive settlement.

Alterman said the two sides have persuaded themselves that they are excellent negotiators, which makes compromise harder. The best Washington may get, he argued, is not a grand bargain but a framework for drawn-out talks.

“The best-case scenario from a US perspective is locking yourself into negotiations with the Iranians through the end of the Trump administration,” he said.

Such a process could include talks over the nuclear file, missiles and freedom of navigation, but it would likely remain incremental and fragile, with both sides preserving the option to resume escalation.

Pletka said Trump appears most focused on removing Iran’s fissile material and its ability to produce more. But she warned that narrowing the issue to the nuclear file would repeat a familiar mistake.

“Everybody focuses on the nuclear when they need to focus on all of it at once,” she said, pointing to missiles, proxies and Iran’s regional conduct as inseparable parts of the challenge.

That leaves the conflict suspended between competing assumptions. Trump appears to believe economic pressure will force Iran to blink. Alterman suggested Tehran may believe it can outlast him by enduring pain, repressing dissent and waiting for US domestic politics to intervene.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered the creation of a special committee to end Iran’s internet blackout, but many Iranians doubt the government can override the powerful institutions controlling cyberspace policy.

Earlier this week, Pezeshkian tasked First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref with forming a body aimed at restoring access to the global internet after more than two and a half months of severe restrictions.

Reformist newspaper Shargh reported that the committee is expected to restore broader access within a month.

Pezeshkian announced the move on X, saying he had instructed Aref to carry out the task while considering “governance sensitivities, the Supreme Leader’s views, and the promise I made to the people.”

During his presidential campaign, Pezeshkian repeatedly promised to ease internet filtering and restrictions. But ordinary Iranians have effectively been cut off from the global internet since US-Israeli strikes began on February 28.

Before the war, some individuals had access to so-called “white SIM cards,” exempt from ordinary filtering restrictions. After the ceasefire, authorities expanded selective access to businesses and approved individuals through services branded as “Internet Pro.”

Many users responding to Pezeshkian’s X post expressed frustration and skepticism.

“Mr. President, don’t make us regret voting for you,” one voter wrote. “End this discrimination, these white SIM cards, these Pro subscriptions, and this class-based treatment of a natural right. We want free internet.”

Another user reminded Pezeshkian that during the election campaign he had said he would resign if he failed to fulfill major promises, including lifting internet restrictions.

It remains unclear whether recent decisions were made by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) or the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Both are formally chaired by Pezeshkian, but other figures and institutions — including the Revolutionary Guards — wield significant influence within them.

The appointment of Aref to lead the new “Special Taskforce for Organizing and Guiding Cyberspace” also drew criticism from conservative figures.

Former Cultural Heritage Minister Ezzatollah Zarghami, himself a member of the SCC appointed by Khamenei, described the initiative as parallel decision-making overlapping with the council’s responsibilities.

“Transformation and restructuring in the decision-making system must be fundamental and involve changing the governance model in cyberspace,” he wrote on X.

One social media user responded sarcastically: “The president realized he can’t stand up to the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, so he created another council that can do absolutely nothing.”

‘Class-based internet’

The prolonged disruption of international internet access has created serious technical and economic problems inside Iran.

Domestic websites and online platforms have struggled because technical teams lost access to international tools and services. Software licenses expired, search engines failed to properly index Iranian sites, and server disruptions affected service delivery.

The impact on employment has also been severe. Millions of jobs linked to online businesses, social media and international digital services have been disrupted, including work done by programmers, online sellers and content creators.

Selective access programs such as “Pro Internet” and white SIM cards have meanwhile become symbols of inequality for many Iranians.

Some groups offered privileged access — including nurses and certain lawyers — refused to accept it, branding it institutionalized discrimination.

Restrictions on ordinary users have also fueled a growing black market.

According to Iranian media reports, while the official price for a 50-gigabyte Pro Internet package is around 20 million rials, the same service is being resold for as much as 120 million rials. White SIM cards are reportedly advertised on Telegram starting at 440 million rials, depending on the level of access provided.

Even before the current near-total shutdown, millions of Iranians already relied on paid VPN services to access blocked platforms such as Instagram and YouTube.

The high cost has effectively turned internet access into a luxury product many cannot afford in a country where some public sector workers, including teachers, earn roughly 150 million rials per month.

Journalist Sadegh Zangeneh wrote in Khabar Online: “The level of anger and dissatisfaction among the people over the internet shutdown and its divisive consequences should not be sought in reports written by those who have monopolized the internet themselves.”

He added: “Either those who deprive people of the internet in the name of security are betraying the country, or those who auction off national security under the label of ‘Pro Internet’ and other forms of class-based internet are doing so.”

Sociologist Mohammad Fazeli also warned about the social consequences of unequal access, arguing that “discriminatory internet” would become yet another reason for people to confront the state.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the ensuing regional conflagration have aggravated economic troubles to the point that President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned of widespread unrest.

Media close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has sought to position himself as a pragmatist since the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have been among the most vocal critics.

On Thursday, Khorasan newspaper, one of the outlets closest to Ghalibaf, blasted the state broadcaster and several ultraconservative lawmakers for promoting rhetoric that risked “deepening divisions and polarizing the public” at a time of war.

The paper singled out hardline MP Ali Khezrian, who it said had received nearly four hours of airtime in less than a week to accuse state officials of serving foreign interests and challenge the authority of the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council.

In a counter-accusation, Khorasan alleged that Khezrian had posted a video of a petrochemical facility in Lorestan Province, effectively “updating Israel and the United States’ list of potential sites to strike.”

The paper also accused Khezrian of presenting his own views as those of Iran’s new leader, adding that if a politician from another faction had done so, they would likely have been arrested by security forces.

Meanwhile, conservative figure and former Resalat editor Mohammad Kazem Anbarlui warned in a May 14 interview with ISNA that hardliners were creating dangerous political polarization by exploiting issues such as hijab enforcement and negotiations with the United States.

On the same day, Khabar Online reported that during a live broadcast on Channel 3, a reporter asked demonstrators: “Which political figures were meaner than the meanest animals?” Respondents named politicians associated with rivals of the hardline camp.

The outlet argued that hardliners were increasingly using state television to erode national cohesion. Since the start of the war, it wrote, the broadcaster had selectively featured hardline commentators and public figures.

Instead of offering expert analysis, Khabar Online wrote, the organization was increasingly relying on controversial guests and sensationalist presenters, pushing it “off its professional path” and disrupting “public order and social calm.”

The national broadcaster now resembled “the exclusive domain of hardliners,” it said — a space where they were allowed to undermine decisions of the Supreme National Security Council and state authority.

Even the IRGC-linked Javan newspaper acknowledged the growing concern.

“When people are constantly led to believe that state officials are incompetent, infiltrated, or intimidated, the result is growing pessimism, distrust, and the erosion of national cohesion,” the paper warned in a commentary published the same day.

“A society whose trust has been damaged” becomes more vulnerable to external crises and adversaries’ psychological operations, it added.

“The outcome,” Javan concluded, “is either public anger or despair.”