100 days on: the anatomy of Iran’s January crackdown

The protests were the result of several crises converging at once. Economic collapse, political exclusion and a growing sense of humiliation pushed society beyond its tolerance threshold and created a shared feeling across social groups that life in Iran had become increasingly unlivable.

When demonstrations erupted across the country, many slogans targeted the Islamic Republic itself.

The roots of the unrest run deep in provinces that host major oil and industrial projects but have long seen little improvement in living standards.

From Abadan to Bushehr and from Kangan to Gilan-e Gharb, many of the cities that first erupted in protest are places where people have spent years asking the same question: where did the country’s oil wealth go?

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government attempted to calm tensions by announcing direct cash payments to households after eliminating subsidized exchange rates. The payment amounted to about one million tomans—roughly seven dollars.

The gesture came at a time when food prices were soaring. Cooking oil prices had risen more than 200 percent, eggs were more than twice as expensive as a year earlier, and some shopkeepers had begun selling basic dairy products on installment plans.

For many Iranians the payment symbolized not relief but humiliation.

The middle class and the bazaar

One of the defining features of the January protests was the erosion of the social distance between Iran’s middle class and its poorer citizens.

Historically, Iran’s middle class has been a carrier of civil and political demands. But by early 2026 many middle-class families were struggling simply to avoid falling into poverty.

Political sociologists have long argued that revolutions are rarely led by the poorest members of society. They tend instead to emerge among groups that once enjoyed relative stability but now feel they are falling.

In Iran, the middle class had not only lost income but also social status. That loss helped create an unwritten alliance between middle-class citizens and poorer groups, both of whom felt they were suffering under the same policies.

Another signal that the unrest had entered new territory came when parts of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed on January 7.

The bazaar has historically been one of the most cautious institutions in Iran’s political life. Even during severe economic crises it has often preferred negotiation and indirect pressure to open confrontation. During the 2009 protests many merchants stayed silent, and in 2022 they largely remained on the sidelines. This time was different.

Currency volatility made supply chains chaotic and pricing unpredictable. A product purchased in the morning could be worth something entirely different by the afternoon. Many traders said they could no longer price goods reliably, and keeping shops open risked losses rather than gains.

When sections of the bazaar shut their doors, it signaled that dissatisfaction had spread beyond traditional protest groups. A conservative economic institution had concluded that the existing order itself had become a source of instability.

The collapse of reformist hopes

For some voters, President Pezeshkian had represented a final opportunity for reform and for avoiding war.

As protests intensified, however, he adopted increasingly hardline rhetoric. On January 11 he described protesters as “terrorists” and called on security forces to respond decisively.

Even some reformist figures who had supported him began to express frustration.

The shift reinforced a broader perception among many Iranians that the political system was incapable of meaningful change.

Combined with the economic crisis and the aftermath of the 12-day war, this sense of political closure deepened public despair.

From scattered anger to mass protest

The January protests also unfolded against a tense geopolitical backdrop.

Statements from foreign political figures—including remarks by Donald Trump warning Tehran against violent repression—were widely circulated among Iranian audiences. At the same time, Iran’s exiled prince Reza Pahlavi called for coordinated demonstrations and nightly slogans across the country.

Such messages helped focus attention on specific moments of protest. But they did not create the anger that drove people into the streets. That anger had been building for years.

The protests occurred as the Islamic Republic appeared to be shifting toward what might be described as a more defensive style of governance.

In this approach, economic grievances and social demands are increasingly treated as potential security threats. Limited cultural concessions—such as relaxing enforcement of the hijab law or allowing controlled concerts—serve mainly as tools for managing pressure rather than as signs of genuine reform.

The January protests tested this model. The state ultimately suppressed the demonstrations. Yet repression alone cannot address the deeper structural tensions that produced the uprising in the first place.

The streets may have emptied. But many Iranians now believe that the country cannot return to the conditions that existed before January.

The backlash, which has intensified in recent days across hardline media and social platforms, prompted Ghalibaf to sit for a lengthy interview on state television aimed largely at persuading critics who reject any form of diplomacy and advocate continued confrontation.

In the interview, Ghalibaf framed negotiations not as a retreat but as a continuation of the conflict by other means. Diplomacy, he said, is neither a withdrawal from Iran’s demands nor separate from the battlefield, but a way to consolidate military gains and translate them into political outcomes and lasting peace.

Most notably, perhaps, he cautioned against exaggerating Iran’s leverage, stressing that US military superiority and capabilities should not be underestimated.

Hardline critics have intensified attacks on Ghalibaf, particularly on domestic social media platforms such as Eitaa, accusing him of ignoring red lines set by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and signaling weakness toward the United States.

One critic wrote in a post that “there is no good in negotiation except harm,” adding that Ghalibaf’s remarks suggested an optimism about progress in the talks that was “worrying.”

Another post went further, calling on the Revolutionary Guard to intervene and stop what it described as Ghalibaf’s “betrayal.”

Similar rhetoric has surfaced in nighttime gatherings by pro-government supporters, where speakers denounce negotiations and potential concessions—such as handing over enriched nuclear material, a core US demand—and chant slogans including “Death to compromisers.”

Ghalibaf did emphasize his personal commitment, declaring that for him there is no distinction between the battlefield and the negotiating table and that he is ready to sacrifice “both my life and my reputation” for “the people to attain their rights.”

The controversy widened after a social media account linked to ultrahardliner Saeed Jalili, a longtime political rival of Ghalibaf and a member of Iran’s national security council, published a post with the hashtag “coup plotter.”

The post called on Mojtaba Khamenei to publicly clarify his position if he indeed supports the negotiations, warning that without such confirmation officials could be accused of acting without the leader’s authorization.

The account was deactivated shortly afterward without explanation.

Jalili, who previously served as Khamenei’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council, has not commented publicly on the controversy, and there has been no official announcement about whether he retains that role under the current leadership.

Despite the backlash, several reformist figures have publicly backed Ghalibaf’s approach.

“A rare historical moment has placed Ghalibaf in a position where anyone who even slightly cares about Iran should support this rational soldier-politician and his decisions on war and peace,” Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a former vice president under Mohammad Khatami wrote on X.

Journalist and commentator Ahmad Zeidabadi also defended him, arguing that volunteering to negotiate in such a tense environment required significant political and reputational risk.

Iranian media outlets have also offered differing interpretations of the interview. The conservative website Tabnak said Ghalibaf was outlining a strategic framework in which military strength, public support and diplomacy operate simultaneously.

The centrist outlet Asr-e Iran described the remarks as a broader roadmap for confronting the United States and Israel, arguing that diplomacy should be seen as a continuation of Iran’s battlefield resistance rather than a departure from it.

At least 36,500 Iranians were killed by the Islamic Republic during the January uprising, mostly on January 8 and 9, according to classified documents, field reports and witness accounts reviewed by Iran International, with the true toll believed by many to be far higher.

The dead included children, students and the elderly. Among the youngest victims frequently cited was three-year-old Melina Asadi.

100%

One image from the unrest remains etched in public memory: a bloodied older woman standing in the street, fist raised, saying, “I’m not afraid. I’ve been dead for 47 years.”

Another was the sight of body bags. Videos that emerged despite the blackout showed rows of black bags lining courtyards, makeshift morgues overflowing and desperate families searching among the dead for loved ones.

Some bodies appeared with catheters and breathing tubes still in place, reinforcing witness claims that wounded protesters were killed after reaching hospitals.

One eyewitness, Kiarash — whose surname is being withheld for security reasons — described Tehran’s main cemetery as a “warehouse of bodies,” saying trucks continued arriving to unload more corpses as families waited outside.

The protests, which erupted in early January, were met with overwhelming force. Demonstrators demanding freedom were confronted with live fire, blades and military-grade repression.

Witnesses also described hospitals turned into extensions of the crackdown. Doctors and healthcare workers were allegedly threatened, detained or attacked for treating the injured. Some families say loved ones who survived initial gunfire were later killed inside hospital wards.

One such case was 17-year-old Sam Afshari, whose father told Iran International that after being wounded during protests in Karaj, his son was taken to hospital alive, placed on a breathing tube and then fatally shot.

“They finished him off,” his father said.

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  'They finished him off': father recounts hospital killing of teen protester

Authorities and some outside observers initially portrayed the unrest as primarily economic. But many Iranians rejected that narrative.

While anger first surfaced in the bazaars — historically seen as a pillar of the Islamic Republic’s support base — in late December, demonstrations quickly spread to universities, provincial towns and religious communities.

Unrest reached hundreds of cities and towns nationwide, according to reports reviewed by Iran International.

For many participants, this was not just another protest wave. It was the release of 47 years of accumulated pressure over repression, corruption, economic decline and personal freedoms.

Iranians were demanding a future not defined by compulsory social controls, state violence or a nuclear confrontation that repeatedly drags the country into crisis.

On January 8, authorities cut public access to the internet, triggering a 20-day digital blackout that rights groups say helped conceal the scale of the killings.

The blackout severely restricted access to independent information, communication with family abroad and documentation of abuses.

Iranian officials also acknowledged economic damage, with estimates placing losses in the tens of millions of dollars per day.

Trump support resonated with some protesters

During the uprising, support from US President Donald Trump drew significant attention.

For some Iranians, it mattered because memories of the 2009 Green Movement — the mass protest movement that erupted after disputed elections under President Barack Obama — still run deep. Many from that era felt the world did not do enough.

A few days after the January 8–9 massacre of protesters, Trump publicly backed demonstrators, writing: “Iranian patriots… KEEP PROTESTING… HELP IS ON ITS WAY.” He urged them to “take over your institutions” and warned the US was “locked and loaded.”

Despite mixed views on the effectiveness of a military campaign to topple the Islamic Republic, many Iranians felt so desperate that they wanted Trump to begin strikes as soon as possible.

He did so nearly 50 days after the massacre.

40-day war hits regime hard

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated military campaign targeting the Islamic Republic’s leadership, nuclear infrastructure, missile systems, air defenses and internal security apparatus.

The operation included tens of thousands of strikes on military and strategic sites across Iran. Senior regime figures were killed, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in the most dramatic leadership blow since the 1979 revolution.

Other targets included IRGC commanders, Basij infrastructure, military production centers and strategic compounds tied to regime control. Iranian missile launchers and parts of the country’s strike capability were also heavily degraded.

For many Iranians who blamed these institutions for repression, torture and killings, the campaign was seen not simply as war, but as the first time the machinery used against them had itself come under sustained attack.

Videos reviewed by Iran International showed some Iranians thanking US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the strikes. Others celebrated in homes and streets, with some dancing to YMCA — the song closely associated with Trump rallies — seeing the moment as symbolic justice after years of suffering.

Others hoped the weakening of the regime’s coercive apparatus could create space for future protest and political change, as promised by both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Yet even as parts of the repressive apparatus were hit, executions of prisoners and dissidents continued. Human rights groups say Iran carried out a record number of executions last year and warn the death penalty may be used even more aggressively after the war.

Diplomacy returns, questions remain?

The military campaign paused with the announcement of a two-week ceasefire on April 8, and the rhetoric has since shifted toward diplomacy: talk of deals, sanctions relief, frozen assets, and uranium transfers.

Iranian civil society groups have urged negotiators to include the release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in any agreement, arguing peace without human rights would leave thousands behind.

For many Iranians, the central question remains unchanged: where are the Iranian people in these negotiations?

Those killed in the streets, in detention and in hospitals did not die for another nuclear arrangement, many argue, nor to see one insider replaced by another such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

One hundred days later, Iran remains suspended between grief and uncertainty.

Some feel partially avenged by the killing of Khamenei and his commanders, and by the weakening of the regime. Others still hold out hope that change may come. But many say they fear the world has moved on without them.

The protests that started in the Grand Bazaar of Tehran in late December and quickly spread across the country were followed by what has been described as the deadliest crackdown on protesters in Iran’s contemporary history in January.

Shortly thereafter, a war involving the United States and Israel began, compounding the country’s economic distress.

The service sector was hit hard during the protests. Advertising agencies, technical consulting firms, digital service providers, and hospitality and tourism businesses have since suffered further, and in many cases irreparable, damage because of the war.

Three weeks of internet disruptions during the protests, and over 1,100 hours since the beginning of the war on February 28, have effectively paralyzed large parts of the digital economy.

"According to official estimates released by Iranian authorities, more than 10 million people in Iran earn their income directly through the internet. As a result, any disruption or shutdown of internet services poses a serious threat to their livelihoods," Dadban, a legal advisory and training center for activists, said in a report.

"With the continuation of this situation, millions have faced a sharp drop in income or unemployment," Dadban added.

More significantly, the conflict has inflicted severe damage on critical economic infrastructure, including key petrochemical industries and steel production across multiple cities. These sectors, considered the backbone of Iran’s industrial economy, have suffered extensive losses.

The destruction of major industries has disrupted the supply of raw materials, triggering cascading effects across manufacturing and related sectors.

Widespread layoffs have followed, affecting not only workers in these industries but also those employed in dependent businesses.

At the same time, exports have declined sharply, further constraining an already limited flow of foreign revenue.

The scale of the economic shock is underscored by official estimates. A government spokesperson has put total war damages at around $270 billion—roughly 57 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product and several times larger than the country’s annual oil revenues.

The figure is estimated to be nearly three times the government’s general budget, highlighting the unprecedented fiscal strain facing the state.

Stagflation and rising risk of renewed unrest

Iran’s economy has now entered a period of stagflation, combining high inflation with economic stagnation and rising unemployment.

Even if the conflict were to end in the near term, economists warn that recovery will be protracted and uneven.

These worsening conditions have heightened the risk of renewed social unrest.

Without a political resolution—particularly an agreement with the United States—analysts suggest that further protests, potentially larger than those seen in December, are increasingly likely.

Public anger boils over online

Public sentiment, particularly on social media, reflects growing frustration and despair.

One user highlighted the desperation faced by unemployed citizens: “I live in Tehran, I’m married and renting. Since January I was working reduced hours, and I was officially laid off on March 25.”

Another user described the collapse of freelance work: “In this situation, most jobs have shut down, especially for people like us who worked freelance. Our income has dropped to zero, and we don’t know what we can do if the war and internet outages continue.”

A third user wrote: “Given the brutality of the clerical regime and its supporters, the skyrocketing prices of basic necessities, and the bizarre inflation that keeps getting worse… I think people are just waiting for a spark to come back to the streets. Death is no longer the issue—this situation is worse than death and must end.”

Inflation surges to historic highs

Inflation has risen dramatically over the past 100 days. Official data show point-to-point inflation, already above 50 percent at the end of December, climbed to over 70 percent by late February—before the war—reaching its highest level in decades.

In essential goods such as meat, dairy, oil, rice, fruits, and vegetables, inflation has exceeded 110 percent. Prices of critical medications, including some types of insulin, have multiplied several times—when they are available at all.

Although updated overall inflation figures have not been released, some experts believe the rate may already have entered triple digits, with further increases expected.

Survival economy takes hold

Some Iranians say the absence of severe shortages during the war reflects collapsing demand rather than stable or sufficient supply. With incomes sharply reduced, many households can no longer afford basic goods.

To cope, families are increasingly relying on savings, rental deposits, or loans from banks and relatives—placing them at risk of losing their homes. In some cases, household are selling personal belongings just to afford food.

Business owners are also under pressure. Many have begun selling equipment, with online marketplaces now flooded with listings for café and restaurant supplies and electronic devices—often with little or no buyer interest.

Meanwhile, the government faces mounting fiscal constraints. Even before the war, it struggled to meet budgetary obligations. Now, with millions feared to be unemployed, the government lacks the capacity to provide adequate unemployment benefits, and some workers report being unable to access them at all.

The man has not been named. Sources say he was a professional working in the area and a peaceful opponent of the Iranian government.

The attack comes at a time of growing concern about threats, intimidation, and violence affecting people linked to Iran in Britain.

On Friday, British police charged three people over an attempted arson attack near the London offices of Iran International. Police said a burning container was thrown towards the broadcaster’s headquarters in north-west London. No one was injured, but the case has added to concerns about the safety of Persian-language media in Britain.

Before that, in March 2026, an Iran-aligned group was reported to have claimed responsibility for an arson attack on Jewish ambulances in Golders Green, north London.

In May 2025, three Iranian men were charged under the National Security Act after a major counter-terrorism investigation. Prosecutors said one of the men had carried out surveillance, reconnaissance, and online research with the aim of committing serious violence against a person in the UK.

The other two were accused of similar activity intended to help others carry out serious violence. The Home Secretary said the case was part of a broader response to threats linked to the Iranian state.

British authorities have warned for several years that Iran poses a serious threat on UK soil.

In October 2024, the head of MI5, Ken McCallum, said the security service and police had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots since January 2022 involving potentially lethal threats to British citizens and UK residents. He said many of the cases were linked to opponents of the Iranian state living in Britain.

The full circumstances of this latest assault are not yet public. But for many in the Iranian community, the message will already be clear. It will be seen as part of a wider climate of fear facing Iranians in exile, especially those who oppose the government in Tehran.