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Rubio says Iran strike aimed at stopping nuclear and missile threat

Mar 31, 2026, 22:15 GMT+1

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Tuesday Washington’s attack on Iran was aimed at preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons and dismantling what he described as a growing missile and drone “shield.”

In a video published by the White House on X, Rubio said there was “zero doubt” Iran ultimately seeks nuclear weapons, rejecting Tehran’s claims that its program is solely for civilian energy.

"They could have nuclear energy like all the other countries in the world have it. And that is, you import the fuel and you build reactors above ground. That's not what Iran has done," he said. "They build their reactors and their facilities deep in mountains away from the public glare, and they want to enrich that material, the same equipment that they could use to enrich material for energy they could use to quickly enrich it to weapons grade."

“We were on the verge of an Iran that had so many missiles and so many drones that no one could do anything about their nuclear weapons program,” Rubio said, calling it an “intolerable risk.”

He said the operation aims to destroy Iran’s missile and drone capabilities so it “can’t hide behind it” and must engage with the international community over its nuclear ambitions.

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Iranian media report strikes on multiple steel facilities

Mar 31, 2026, 22:04 GMT+1

Iranian state-linked media reported on Tuesday that several steel facilities in central and southwestern Iran were targeted in airstrikes.

IRGC Affiliated Fars News Agency said that, alongside a steel mill in Esfahan, parts of the Sefid Dasht Steel Complex in Borujen were hit.

Separately, Mehr News Agency reported an airstrike on Khuzestan Steel as well as Esfahan’s Mobarakeh Steel facility.

Khameneism after Khamenei- why Mojtaba represents continuity, not change

Mar 31, 2026, 21:42 GMT+1
•
Roozbeh Mirebrahimi

The rise of Mojtaba Khamenei is not an unexpected deviation within the Islamic Republic—it is the logical outcome of a system carefully engineered over nearly four decades by Ali Khamenei.

What appears, at first glance, as a dynastic shift is in fact the continuation of an ideological and institutional project: the consolidation and reproduction of Khameneism.

The central argument is straightforward: Mojtaba Khamenei does not represent a new phase in the Islamic Republic. He represents the success of a long-term process of “rail-laying”—a deliberate restructuring of power that ensures continuity regardless of who formally occupies the position of Supreme Leader. In this sense, the system no longer depends on individual authority; it reproduces a predefined ideological and political logic.

This transformation was made possible by the way Ali Khamenei maximized the latent capacities of the Islamic Republic’s constitutional framework. The constitution already concentrates extraordinary power in the office of the Supreme Leader. However, Khamenei did not merely operate within these limits—he expanded and operationalized them. Over 37 years, he systematically turned flexible or ambiguous mechanisms into rigid and enforceable structures, embedding his ideological preferences into the institutional fabric of the state.

One of the clearest examples of this process is the evolution of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. This body, notably absent from the constitution, was gradually transformed under Khamenei into a central pillar of ideological control. What began as a mechanism for purging universities in the early years of the revolution became a highly structured institution with dozens of sub-councils, extending its reach across education, culture, media, and social policy. It evolved into a powerful instrument for shaping and policing societal norms—without ever requiring formal constitutional legitimacy. This is Khameneism in practice: the ability to formalize control without formal law.

A similar trajectory can be observed in the transformation of the Guardian Council. Originally conceived as a supervisory body overseeing legislation and elections, it was reengineered into a decisive mechanism for controlling political outcomes. Through expanded vetting powers and systematic disqualification of candidates, the council moved from oversight to orchestration. Over time, it became capable not only of influencing elections but effectively determining their results in advance. This shift—from supervision to engineering—was not incidental; it was a key step in institutionalizing Khameneism.

These developments were not isolated. They formed part of a broader strategy to eliminate unpredictability from the system. Independent political actors were sidelined, reformist currents neutralized, and institutional autonomy steadily eroded. What emerged was a tightly controlled ecosystem in which all meaningful levers of power—political, judicial, cultural, and economic—were aligned with a single ideological framework.

Within this context, the emergence of Mojtaba Khamenei as a central figure becomes comprehensible. His lack of traditional religious credentials or broad political legitimacy is not a contradiction—it is a consequence of the system’s evolution. Years of institutional engineering, including the careful management of the Assembly of Experts and the systematic removal of potential obstacles, made such a transition possible. The “selection” process itself reflects the culmination of Khamenei’s long-term restructuring: a system in which outcomes are preconfigured rather than contested.

More importantly, Mojtaba’s rise demonstrates that Khameneism has achieved a critical threshold—it can now sustain itself without its original architect. The ideology has been embedded so deeply within the system that any successor, regardless of personal inclination, is compelled to operate within its parameters. The structure dictates the outcome.

This is why the question of leadership succession is, in many ways, secondary. Whether it is Mojtaba Khamenei or another figure, the current institutional configuration leaves little room for deviation. The mechanisms of control, the networks of power, and the ideological priorities—particularly the emphasis on regime preservation, anti-Western positioning, and hostility toward Israel even at significant national cost—are all structurally entrenched.

Khameneism, therefore, is no longer simply an ideology associated with one leader. It is a system of governance—self-reinforcing, expansive, and resistant to change. The Islamic Republic has, through decades of deliberate restructuring, lost its capacity to generate alternative political paths from within.

In this sense, Mojtaba Khamenei is not the beginning of a new chapter. He is the continuation of a trajectory that has been decades in the making.

And perhaps more significantly, this continuity underscores a deeper reality: the Islamic Republic has reached a point where change from within has become structurally improbable. The very mechanisms designed to preserve the system have also eliminated its flexibility.

Khameneism, as both ideology and structure, may ultimately define not only how the system survives—but how it ends. It sustains the Islamic Republic by centralizing power, eliminating dissent, and enforcing ideological conformity across all institutions. Yet those same mechanisms steadily erode the foundations of long-term stability: public trust, institutional adaptability, and economic resilience. A system built to prevent deviation becomes incapable of reform; a state designed to suppress a crisis becomes dependent on perpetual coercion to manage it.

In this sense, Khameneism transforms survival into a self-consuming process. Each cycle of repression narrows the regime’s options further, raises the cost of governance, and deepens the gap between state and society. The tools that once ensured control—security dominance, ideological rigidity, and exclusion of alternative voices—gradually become liabilities, locking the system into a path where it can neither evolve nor retreat.

As a result, Khameneism may determine not only the durability of the Islamic Republic, but also the form of its eventual breakdown: not a sudden collapse, but an accumulated exhaustion. A system that endures by sacrificing its capacity to renew itself ultimately reaches a point where continuation itself becomes unsustainable.

Trump says Iran war is coming to an end – NBC News

Mar 31, 2026, 21:37 GMT+1

US President Donald Trump on Tuesday told NBC News the war with Iran is “coming to an end,” the latest in a series of remarks suggesting possible de-escalation after weeks of conflict.

In a short interview with the New York Post on the same day, Trump echoed the message, saying the conflict is nearing the end.

“We’re not going to be there too much longer. We’re obliterating the s–t out of them right now,” Trump told The Post in a phone interview.

Iran’s inflation surges further as consumer prices hit new highs

Mar 31, 2026, 20:57 GMT+1

Iran’s official data show inflation accelerating again amid a war with the United States and Israel, with prices more than fivefold higher than in 2021 and food costs rising even faster, hitting poorer and rural households hardest despite signs of monthly easing.

The Statistical Center of Iran has released its latest Consumer Price Index (CPI) report for March 2026, showing a continued acceleration in inflation across the country.

The CPI, calculated with a base year of 2021 (index = 100), reached 542.3 in March 2026. This means that average prices for goods and services have increased more than 5.4 times compared to 2021—equivalent to a cumulative rise of approximately 442% over four years.

Year-on-year inflation (compared to March 2025) climbed to 71.8%, up 3.7 percentage points from the previous month. Annual inflation (covering the 12 months ending March 2026) was reported at 50.6%, also rising by 3.1 percentage points month-on-month.

Food prices driving inflation

The sharpest increases continue to come from food and essential goods—a critical issue in Iran, where food accounts for a large share of household spending, particularly among lower-income groups.

Year-on-year inflation in the category of food, beverages, and tobacco reached 112.5%, up from 105.4% in February.

Within this category, several subgroups recorded extreme price increases compared to March 2025:

  • Bread and cereals: 140%
  • Meat (red and poultry) and related products: 135%
  • Oils and fats: 219%
  • Fruits and nuts: 104.2%
  • Dairy products (milk, cheese, eggs): 116.8%
  • Vegetables and legumes: 46.4%

Monthly inflation for food slowed to 8.6% in March (from 15.5% in February), but price levels remain significantly elevated.

Non-food inflation and services

The non-food and services category recorded 50.4% year-on-year inflation, slightly higher than February’s 49%.

Key contributors include 72.8% in furniture and household maintenance, 90.4% in miscellaneous goods and services, and 67.5% in transportation.

Housing and utilities—including rent, water, electricity, gas, and fuel—saw a comparatively lower increase of 34.9%, making it the least inflationary major category.

Monthly inflation in non-food goods and services stood at 3.5%.

Inequality and regional disparities

The report also highlights widening inequality in inflation burdens:

Annual inflation for the second income decile (among the poorest households) was 54.2%, while for the tenth decile (the wealthiest households), it was 49.2%.

The inflation gap between income groups widened to 5 percentage points, up from 4.1 points in February—indicating that lower-income households are disproportionately affected.

Geographically, rural households experienced significantly higher inflation:

  • Rural year-on-year inflation: 86.5%
  • Urban year-on-year inflation: 69.3%

The CPI index reached 531.8 in urban areas and 606.2 in rural areas, with annual inflation at 49.6% and 56.8%, respectively.

Interpreting the data

While these figures are based on official data, they should be read with some caution. Iran’s statistical system is fragmented, and key indicators such as inflation have at times been reported differently by institutions like the Statistical Center and the Central Bank. Methodological choices—such as weighting, sampling, and price collection—can also affect the final estimates.

At the same time, independent assessments and observable market signals—particularly exchange rate movements and the pricing of essential goods—often point to inflationary pressures that feel more severe at the household level than headline figures suggest. This gap between reported averages and lived experience is especially visible in food markets, where price increases tend to be both faster and more immediately felt.

Taken together, the latest data confirm that year-on-year inflation continues to accelerate, even as monthly figures show temporary moderation. The persistence of high food inflation, combined with widening inequality and regional disparities, suggests that inflationary pressures remain deeply embedded in Iran’s economy.

Masih Alinejad awarded inaugural European Paulskirche Prize for Democracy

Mar 31, 2026, 18:52 GMT+1

Iranian-American journalist and women’s rights activist Masih Alinejad was awarded the first-ever European Paulskirche (St. Paul's Church) Prize for Democracy in Frankfurt on Tuesday.

The prize, established by the city of Frankfurt, honors individuals who have made significant contributions to democracy and human rights. It commemorates St. Paul's Church, regarded as the cradle of German democracy, where the country’s first elected parliament convened in 1848.

In an interview with German broadcaster Tagesschau, Alinejad said it was better “to live with dignity and to have a mission,” adding: “I love democracy.”