Residents across Iran report a surge in security measures, nighttime patrols and pro-government rallies that they say are creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation during the ongoing war, according to messages sent to Iran International.
Accounts from multiple cities describe a pattern of increased checkpoints, armed deployments and organized nightly gatherings, with many residents saying the measures appear aimed at controlling the population rather than addressing external threats.
Witnesses said checkpoints have been set up across urban areas, often staffed by masked security personnel and Basij volunteers, some described as very young.
Vehicles carrying heavy weapons, including machine guns, have been stationed at major intersections, with officers pointing weapons toward passing cars.
“Many of them are very young, some as young as teenagers,” one resident said, adding that “the feeling for me and many others is fear.”
Residents said the checkpoints have disrupted daily life, causing heavy traffic and repeated stops. Some described being questioned without clear cause, while others said their phones were searched.
“It feels like they are looking for any small excuse to harass people or even arrest them,” a resident said.
Reports of such measures have come not only from major cities but also smaller towns, where residents described patrol vehicles moving through streets with mounted weapons.
In one account, security forces were said to require drivers to turn off their headlights when entering checkpoints.
Nightly pro-government rallies
Alongside the security presence, residents reported nightly pro-government gatherings in many cities, often involving convoys of vehicles, loudspeakers and armed escorts.
In several locations, groups of supporters were seen moving through streets broadcasting slogans such as “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” while others chanted religious slogans at high volume.
Residents said the gatherings often continued late into the night or early morning hours.
“These gatherings create more anger than fear,” one resident said, adding that even small groups were accompanied by armed personnel.
Others described loudspeakers mounted on vehicles or in neighborhoods broadcasting chants and songs through the night. “They disrupt the entire neighborhood,” a resident said, describing noise that continued into the early hours.
Some residents said the gatherings included participants wearing symbolic clothing and issuing verbal threats, while others reported that passing cars were stopped and checked if occupants were seen using mobile phones.
Across multiple accounts, residents described the measures as coordinated and sustained over recent weeks, coinciding with intensified military activity in the region.
“There is a clear pattern in how these actions are carried out at night,” one source said, adding that the focus appeared to be on “creating fear and preventing any form of protest.”
While state media has highlighted military activity and messaging around national defense, residents said their primary concerns remain daily living conditions and personal safety.
“We are struggling to get by,” one resident said. “People are worried about their lives, not these displays.”
It suggests that the emergence of Iran Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s name is less about his standing among Iranians and more about how Washington is reading power inside the Islamic Republic.
US President Donald Trump on Monday indicated he was in contact with a senior Iranian figure without naming a formal office. “We’re talking to a top person in Iran,” he said, describing the contacts as “very good and productive,” remarks that coincided with his decision to delay strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure.
Ghalibaf rejected the suggestion outright. “There has been no negotiation with the United States,” he wrote on X, adding that such reports were being circulated “to manipulate financial and oil markets.”
A test channel, not a political endorsement
What places Ghalibaf in this discussion is not legitimacy or popularity, but how he fits a specific operational need.
Washington appears to be searching for a test channel – a figure embedded enough within Iran’s power structure to determine whether pressure has shifted internal calculations, yet visible enough to engage without committing to a formal negotiation track.
Ghalibaf fits that role. As parliament speaker with a background spanning the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the police, and executive administration, he sits at the intersection of political authority and coercive power. Over time, he has also sought to project a more technocratic and managerial image, particularly during election campaigns.
That combination makes him more legible to Washington than figures whose authority is either opaque or purely symbolic.
Who can deliver in Iran’s system?
The central question for US policymakers is not who represents Iran – but who can act. President Masoud Pezeshkian, despite holding elected office, is widely seen as constrained by unelected centers of power. At the same time, killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and uncertainty around leadership structures has made it difficult to identify a single decisive authority.
In that environment, Ghalibaf emerges as a practical option. He connects political, military, and administrative networks and is positioned to transmit signals across factions.
This also aligns with a broader pattern in Trump’s foreign policy. His approach has consistently favored leaders perceived as decisive and capable of enforcing outcomes.
Engagements with figures such as Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un reflect a preference for authority and deliverability over institutional legitimacy.
Ghalibaf fits that pattern as well – not because of what Trump put as being “respectable,” but because of perceived functionality.
Limits of power and the legitimacy gap
Yet the same factors that make Ghalibaf useful to Washington also define his limits. Iran’s strategic decisions are not delegated to individual officials. Authority remains concentrated within tightly controlled security and leadership circles, with networks aligned with the IRGC shaping core policy direction.
Recent statements from these circles have reinforced resistance to negotiations under pressure, with some going further by demanding concessions rather than offering them.
Mohsen Rezaei, a military adviser to the country’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, warned that escalation would be met with force. “If they make this mistake [hitting Iran power plants], we will paralyze them and sink them in the Persian Gulf,” he said in a televised interview Monday night.
Rezaei added that “the war will not end until sanctions are lifted, compensation is paid, and legal guarantees are provided that aggression against Iran will not be repeated,” ruling out any ceasefire under current conditions.
His remarks feature the broader reality facing any potential channel: even if figures like Ghalibaf are engaged, key security actors continue to set maximalist terms that leave little room for negotiation under pressure.
In that context, even a well-positioned figure like Ghalibaf does not have the authority to shift policy. At most, he can serve as a conduit – not a decision-maker.
Public perception
Ghalibaf’s record includes involvement in past crackdowns, including student protests, as well as longstanding corruption allegations. These factors have shaped his image within Iranian society and limit his credibility beyond state structures.
This creates a structural contradiction. A figure who may be functional within the system is not necessarily acceptable outside it.
This gap becomes more pronounced when viewed against recent unrest. Large-scale protests in January, met with a heavy security response in which Ghalibaf was part of the broader system response, showed the depth of public anger toward figures associated with the state.
Slogans widely heard during those demonstrations – including “This is the final battle, Pahlavi will return” and “Reza Pahlavi is the national slogan” – showed that the opposition is widely rallying around the exiled son of Iran’s last Shah, rejecting any one associated with the Islamic Republic.
In that context, any attempt to elevate a figure such as Ghalibaf – even as a de facto interlocutor or transitional figure – would likely face immediate resistance from a public that has already signaled its rejection of the existing power structure.
What Ghalibaf’s selection really reveals
Therefore, the focus on Ghalibaf is not that much about elevating him – it appears it is about testing the system around him.
For Washington, he represents a point of access into Iran’s power structure at a moment of uncertainty, a figure through whom pressure can be measured rather than resolved.
On the other hand, for Tehran, the episode highlights how tightly controlled that structure remains, with authority dispersed across networks that limit any individual’s room to act.
This makes the channel inherently narrow. It may reveal whether pressure has altered internal thinking, but it does not resolve the deeper constraints that define decision-making in Iran.
In that sense, the question is not whether Ghalibaf can deliver – but whether anyone within the current structure can.
