Iran International
Tehran’s upcoming city council elections will be held under a proportional representation system for the first time, but widespread voter apathy has raised concerns of an extremely low turnout outside conservative ranks.
The city and village council elections in May will also be held independently of the presidential race for the first time, a change that further distinguishes them from previous electoral cycles.
City council contests are significant to political figures and groups in Iran because they have repeatedly served as springboards to national power, particularly the presidency.
Tehran’s current hardline mayor, Alireza Zakani, rose through the city council before becoming mayor and later used that position as a launchpad for his bid in last year’s presidential election, though he was ultimately unsuccessful.
Before him, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad famously moved from the Tehran mayoralty to the presidency, underscoring the political weight of municipal office in Iran.
Voter disillusion and the risk of low participation
Unlike all other elections in Iran, city council races are not supervised by the Guardian Council, an unelected body widely accused by critics of “engineering elections” in favor of conservatives and hardliners through mass candidate disqualifications.
As a result, council elections have generally been freer than presidential and parliamentary contests over the past two decades.
Even so, political analysts and activists say the depth of public frustration with elections and governance makes it unlikely that large segments of the electorate will return to the polls, with some warning that turnout could fall below levels seen five years ago, when only around 25 percent of eligible voters participated in Tehran.
This is particularly true of the so-called “gray voters,” a broad and often decisive group whose participation has frequently tipped election outcomes in favor of reformists and moderates.
Recent electoral experience reinforces these concerns. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, after most reformist candidates were disqualified, turnout in Tehran hovered around 10 percent. The top candidate in the capital won roughly 580,000 votes—about six percent of eligible voters.
The reformist-leaning daily Arman-e Melli warned of the potential total marginalization of reformists and moderates under the new electoral model and prevailing voter apathy in an article titled “The Proportional Election Trap Facing Reformists.”
“If conservatives enter the race with two lists and split their organized votes between them, while reformists fail to mobilize their political base, the total reformist vote could fall to third place. In such a scenario, even the complete exclusion of reformists from Tehran’s city council would not be far-fetched.”
Uneven campaign energy
So far, there has been little visible enthusiasm among reformists for the upcoming vote. Conservatives and hardliners, by contrast, have been planning for months.
Meanwhile, according to the centrist website Asr-e Iran, three conservative camps are already maneuvering aggressively: Mehrdad Bazrpash, a long-time rival of Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, is reportedly has an eye toward becoming Tehran’s next mayor by placing allies in the council, while supporters of Saeed Jalili and members of the hardline Paydari Front, and neo-conservative allies of parliamentary speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, also push for maximum seats.
How proportional elections work—and why they matter
Under the new model, seats are allocated based on the share of the total vote won by each party or coalition list, with independent candidates assessed according to their percentage of overall ballots cast.
In practice, this means that in Tehran, organized political forces with disciplined voter bases—particularly conservatives and hardliners—are likely to benefit the most, while candidates without party backing face steep obstacles.
While many political groups agree that proportional representation can, in theory, improve the performance of councils and municipalities, some argue that introducing it under current political and institutional conditions may produce the opposite effect.
Skepticism across the political spectrum
Opposition to the new model is not limited to any single political camp.
Masoud Zaribafan, a former close ally of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has publicly warned against the risks.
He said that if ideologically rigid and unqualified individuals enter the council, it will “certainly face serious problems in selecting a mayor—especially someone who intends to use the mayoralty as a springboard to a higher position, including the presidency.”
He added: “Even if they manage to elect a mayor, I doubt they will be able to choose a powerful and efficient one.”
Mohammad Mehdi Tondgouyan, a former Tehran council member close to reformists, argued that proportional elections make little sense in a country without deeply rooted parties. “Our people have no real connection with parties,” he said.
Mahmoud Mir-Lohi, a senior member of the National Trust Party and a former deputy interior minister under President Mohammad Khatami, noted that Iran has around 200 registered parties, most of which function more like professional associations than genuine political organizations.
Former parliamentary candidate Tina Amin echoed this concern in a post on X: “If proportional elections are applied based on the current party landscape, they will not solve the problems of majoritarian elections. Instead, they will reproduce party-based rent-seeking and a lack of meritocracy in a different form.”
“People are asking what problem Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Chief Justice Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei had with former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that they firmly enforced the sensitive jobs law against him, but are now ignoring the same law in the case of Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref,” Tehran MP Hamidreza Rasaei said in an open session of parliament.
Rasaei said key provisions of Iran’s transparency law – requiring disclosure of officials’ income, judicial rulings, commission proceedings, major contracts and recruitment – had not been implemented by the government or the judiciary, adding that non-compliance is defined as a criminal offense.
He accused both branches of violating the law and said public frustration was growing as legal requirements were enforced rigidly in some political cases but ignored in others.
Referring to the law governing sensitive positions, which bars officials if close family members hold foreign citizenship, Rasaei said Aref’s appointment was unlawful because his child holds German nationality, contrasting it with the earlier removal of Zarif.
“When laws are applied selectively,” Rasaei said, “this is the result.”
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said runaway increases in the cost of basic goods had become one of the public’s main concerns, with rising foreign exchange and gold prices acting as key drivers – or what he called pretexts – for broader inflation.
Speaking in an open parliamentary session, Ghalibaf said the legislature had held a series of oversight meetings with senior government officials, including the ministers of economy, agriculture and industry, as well as the heads of the planning and budget organization and the central bank.
He said the talks had focused on preventing further erosion of household purchasing power, implementing a state-backed food voucher scheme and managing volatility in the currency market.
“If these measures do not deliver results, then in order to minimize time and tension, the priority will be for the government to repair its cabinet,” Ghalibaf said. “If the necessary reforms are not carried out by the government, representatives will be forced to begin the impeachment process.”
The warning adds to a widening chorus of concern inside Iran’s political establishment as inflation, a weakening rial and sharp rises in food and housing costs strain living standards, particularly for lower-income households.
Ghalibaf said parliament would continue to pursue the issue with urgency, stressing that lawmakers viewed the surge in prices for everyday necessities as a national priority.
The pressure on the Pezeshkian administration has also extended beyond economic policy.
During the same parliamentary session, dozens of lawmakers issued formal written warnings to the president and cabinet ministers on a wide range of issues, from perceived inequality in the state bureaucracy to delays in infrastructure projects, internet access, student housing and unpaid wages.
Such parliamentary admonitions are a routine feature of Iranian politics, but their volume shows the breadth of dissatisfaction as economic hardship deepens.
Impeachment is not a theoretical threat. In March 2025, just six months after Pezeshkian took office, parliament voted to impeach and remove Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati, citing the rising dollar rate and higher prices for basic goods.
During that session, Pezeshkian hinted at the limits of his authority, pointing indirectly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s stance on relations with the United States and saying the government had to align itself with those positions.
Iran’s economic woes are rooted in years of sanctions, policy missteps and political constraints that have narrowed the government’s room for maneuver.
Inflation has remained high, the national currency has repeatedly hit record lows and the cost of essential goods has surged, eroding public confidence and adding to social tension.
The latest parliamentary threat comes as broader debates intensify over accountability and power in Iran’s political system. Moderates and reformist figures have increasingly argued that elected institutions lack the authority to address structural problems, while ultimate control over key areas of policy rests with unelected bodies under the Supreme Leader.
At the same time, even some of Pezeshkian’s former supporters have begun to question whether he can deliver meaningful change, with commentators and social media users warning that continued economic deterioration could trigger renewed unrest.