Iran parliament speaker threatens to impeach Pezeshkian government

In 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev stunned the communist world by denouncing Joseph Stalin’s crimes in a closed-door speech at the Communist Party Congress.

The address, later leaked, raised expectations that the Soviet system might be capable of reform from within. Instead, it exposed pressures the leadership struggled to contain, contributing to unrest at home and rebellion abroad—notably in Hungary—and ultimately reinforcing the limits of permissible change.

That pattern—tactical relaxation under pressure, followed by retrenchment—offers a useful lens for understanding Iran’s current moment.

Since June’s 12-day war with Israel and the United States, the Islamic Republic has been navigating what officials privately describe as a convergence of external threat and internal fragility.

Internationally, Tehran faces deepening isolation and a US administration that has shown a willingness to use force. Domestically, the aftershocks of the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising continue to shape public behavior and elite anxiety.

Lifeline: patriotism

Against that backdrop, the state has adopted a dual strategy.

On one track, it has sought to soften flashpoints—particularly hijab enforcement—that could reignite street unrest. Police patrols have become less visible, enforcement more uneven, and officials have emphasized “cultural” rather than coercive methods.

On another track, the leadership has leaned into a form of state-sponsored nationalism that draws selectively on Iran’s pre-Islamic past.

Last month, authorities unveiled a statue in Tehran depicting the Roman Emperor Valerian kneeling before the Sassanid king Shapur I, commemorating a third-century Persian victory over Rome. The accompanying slogan—“You will kneel before Iran again”—was echoed in imagery portraying Israel’s prime minister in a similar posture.

Such symbolism would have been unthinkable for much of the theocracy’s history, when pre-Islamic iconography was treated with suspicion or outright hostility.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reinforced this shift in July when, in his first public appearance after the war, he asked a religious eulogist to perform “Ey Iran,” a nationalist song associated with the pre-revolutionary era.

The gesture was widely read, both inside Iran and abroad, as an attempt to blur the line between religious authority and national identity—and by some, as a signal of potential recalibration.

‘Let a hundred flowers bloom’

History suggests caution. Authoritarian systems have often reached for controlled liberalization or symbolic inclusion during moments of acute stress, only to reverse course once the immediate danger recedes.

Mao Zedong’s 1957 “Hundred Flowers” campaign—launched in part to manage the fallout from Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization—famously invited criticism before giving way to a sweeping crackdown when dissent exceeded official expectations.

Iran’s trajectory over recent months has followed a similar arc.

Even as officials spoke of unity and restraint, legislation advanced to tighten restrictions on speech, expand capital punishment for acts of dissent, and broaden the security services’ remit online.

Arrests and executions have continued at a steady pace, and pressure on journalists, activists and minority communities has intensified.

Earlier this month, Khamenei dismissed criticism of hijab laws as part of a Western ideological campaign, warning domestic media against amplifying such views. The judiciary chief swiftly followed suit, announcing a more coordinated effort involving police and prosecutors—a signal less of retreat than of reorganization.

The episode underscores a recurring dynamic in the Islamic Republic’s history: moments of apparent opening that generate speculation about reform, followed by moves that reassert control once the boundaries of dissent become clearer.

As with Khrushchev’s speech nearly seven decades ago, the significance may lie less in the promise of change than in what the response reveals about the system’s underlying anxieties—and the limits it is ultimately prepared to enforce.

Underlying the renewed debate is the concentration of power in the office of the Supreme Leader. After nearly four decades in power, 86-year-old Ali Khamenei exercises final authority over foreign policy, the economy and security matters, leaving elected institutions with little real leverage.

Calls to amend the constitution—long a staple of reformist discourse—have returned as moderates search for an institutional way out of what they describe as systemic dysfunction.

The proposals focus on strengthening presidential authority, restoring accountability and fixing an election system that critics say has been hollowed out over two decades.

“Based on the current version of the Iranian Constitutional Law, two-thirds of government institutions in Iran are not answerable to anyone and cannot be held accountable for wrongdoing,” Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former head of parliament’s national security committee, told moderate outlet Khabar Online on Thursday.

The remarks echoed similar comments a day earlier by former lawmaker Mansoor Haghighatpoor, who argued that the constitution itself allows for revision and that treating it as immutable has become a political choice rather than a legal necessity.

Long overdue

Reformist and moderate figures have made such arguments for years, most notably former presidents Mohammad Khatami (1997–2004) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021), both of whom sought to expand executive authority and curb unelected power centers.

Their efforts went nowhere. Any constitutional amendment requires Khamenei's approval—an obstacle widely seen as insurmountable.

Much of the current critique centers on the 1989 constitutional revision, which transferred sweeping powers from the presidency to the Supreme Leader.

Since then, Khamenei has also entrenched the Guardian Council’s role in vetting election candidates, an extra-constitutional practice that has steadily narrowed voter choice. Politicians have protested biased disqualifications in every election since 2005, without effect.

Rouhani went further during his presidency, floating the idea of a referendum on limited issues such as legislation needed for Iran to join international financial conventions. Khamenei publicly—and angrily—rejected the proposal.

‘Not God’s word’

Haghighatpoor has focused on what he describes as the constitution’s internal contradictions, citing requirements such as the stipulation that the intelligence minister be a senior cleric.

“The Constitutional Law was not drawn by God,” he said. “It was written by the first Assembly of Experts in 1979, and they explicitly allowed for amendments. If laws no longer fit modern needs, they should be changed. That is a strength, not a weakness.”

Falahatpisheh added that Iran’s system lacks even basic mechanisms found elsewhere, such as the ability of a government or parliament to resign after failure. “This absence of accountability is itself a structural flaw,” he said.

Wishful thinking?

Parliament has no supervisory role over the armed forces, state television, the intelligence ministry or vast financial bodies operating under the Supreme Leader’s office.

Haghighatpoor also pointed to the Executive Headquarters of Imam Khomeini’s Decree (EHIKD), an opaque entity created in 1989—weeks before the death of Iran’s first supreme leader—to confiscate assets linked to the toppled monarchy.

That “temporary” body is now one of Iran’s largest financial conglomerates, second only to the Mostazafan Foundation. It operates directly under Khamenei’s authority and remains beyond parliamentary oversight.

The EHIKD is just one example, Haghighatpoor said, of structural problems that could only be addressed through constitutional reform.

Any such reform, however, requires Khamenei’s consent. For now, even proponents of constitutional revision concede that the debate remains largely theoretical.

In a recent report, Donya-ye-Eghtesad said worsening sanctions have tightened what it described as Iran’s “economic bottlenecks,” accelerating capital concentration while pushing a growing share of households below the poverty line.

The paper pointed to the US Treasury Department’s decision on December 18 to sanction 29 oil tankers and the companies managing them, a move Washington said targeted Iran’s so-called shadow fleet used to bypass sanctions and export oil and petrochemical products.

The United States Department of the Treasury said the vessels and firms had transported hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian products using deceptive practices.

The measures, the daily warned, would sharply reduce Iran’s foreign currency revenues, compounding pressure on an economy already struggling with inflation, currency depreciation and declining purchasing power.

Rising prices signal widening poverty

The surge in free-market prices for foreign currency and gold, the newspaper said, reflects the spread of poverty, with inflation driven by these increases expected to place additional strain on Iranian households in the coming months.

In recent weeks, both markets have posted repeated record highs, fueling broader inflationary expectations.

Over the past year alone, average food prices in Iran have risen by more than 66 percent, according to figures cited in the report. The paper said inflationary pressures have intensified following renewed UN sanctions and repeated statements by Iranian officials insisting on continuing the country’s nuclear program.

Ali Heidari, an Iran-based economic researcher quoted by Donya-ye-Eghtesad, said inequality in Iran is far worse than the global average.

“About 29 percent of the country’s wealth is held by just one percent of the population,” he said.

Poverty, Heidari added, has expanded rapidly. Around 26 percent of Iranians lived below the poverty line in 2022, he said, rising to 36 percent in 2023 – more than 31 million people. “If data for 2025 become available, the number will almost certainly be higher,” he said.

Who loses, who gains

Retirees, workers and salaried employees, Heidari said, have borne the brunt of economic pressure, as workshops and small businesses cut jobs or reduce working hours under sanctions. By contrast, he said, hoarders and speculative actors have benefited.

He blamed Iran’s tax system for encouraging non-productive and underground economic activity, arguing that weak transparency and incentives for speculation have helped fuel wealth concentration.

Analysts have long warned that Iran’s efforts to evade sanctions have contributed to systemic corruption – a policy Tehran continues to frame as “resistance” against international pressure.

Aside from lifting censorship of WhatsApp and resisting enforcement of compulsory hijab laws, most of Pezeshkian’s campaign pledges remain unrealized.

Even on the sensitive issue of the hijab, his refusal to formally implement a hardline law has not halted pressure from radical factions, which have been pushing to regain the lost ground in recent weeks.

At the same time, the deepening impact of sanctions—which Pezeshkian had hoped to remove through direct dialogue with the West—and the almost daily decline in the value of the national currency have pushed conditions to a point where many say society could erupt at any moment.

Disillusionment is no longer confined to critics outside Pezeshkian’s original support base. Some of his former backers are now openly questioning whether he can continue in office at all.

Prominent sociologist Taghi Azad-Armaki, speaking to the website Khabar Online, stated bluntly that he hopes Pezeshkian will remain a one-term president.

“Mr. Pezeshkian is in unity with the heads of the three branches of government, all are aligned with the Supreme Leader, and power has effectively been consolidated to govern the country. However, this alignment has not resulted in broader national, social or regional cohesion,” he said.

“It would actually be a positive development for the ruling establishment … to finally put an end to the elections altogether—to abolish elections, and for the Leader and the ruling establishment to choose a president themselves, that there is a coup so that people could be freed from the current situation,” Azad-Armaki said.

Pezeshkian has one backer who's power is beyond match, however: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The 86-year old theocrat who has ultimate power over all Iranian decisions foreign and domestic has praised him repeatedly in recent speeches.

The office of the presidency has historically provided Khamenei a heat shield from criticism and allows the supreme leader to avoid messy arguments over governance even as officials are constrained by his policies.

Among the most influential voices sounding the alarm on Pezeshkian is Abbas Abdi, a prominent reformist commentator.

Referring to persistent attacks on the government, along with fragmentation and passivity within it, Abdi said in an interview with Eco Iran earlier this month that only if the deadlock is acknowledged and “a decision is made somewhere (above) to change course” could the crisis be overcome.

Without such a shift, he suggested, the next year could be deeply destabilizing for the system. He reiterated similar concerns on the online program Strategic Dialogue, warning that the continuation of a suspended posture toward Israel, combined with the absence of meaningful internal reforms, could trigger a renewed wave of domestic protests.

Abdi’s remarks prompted a sharp response from the Revolutionary Guards-linked newspaper Javan, which accused him of implicitly shifting blame for the government’s failure to implement reforms onto the “system” itself, meaning the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Undeterred, Abdi doubled down last week in an op-ed published in Etemad, defending his prediction that “events outside the will of the system” would occur if the current trajectory continued.

Calls for resignation

Public frustration has increasingly spilled onto social media, particularly after the recent sharp fall in the value of the rial. Hardliners accuse Pezeshkian of incompetence, while disillusioned supporters argue that if structural constraints prevent him from acting, he should step aside.

A user named Saeed wrote on X: “Either you have been allowed to work, in which case you must be accountable for these crushing price increases, or you have not been allowed to work, in which case you must have the courage to tell the people and resign!”

“It’s best to resign before public anger reaches its peak and the people’s patience runs out. We have had enough; we are at our breaking point,” another user, Shirkoohi, posted on X.

“You may not understand the meaning of poverty, misery, and livelihood, but surely by now you should have understood the meaning of the 1979 revolution and the sound of an approaching revolution,” he added.

“I wish all officials would resign collectively and make the Iranian people happy… An entirely corrupt and flawed system needs fundamental change, not the replacement of one individual,” another user posting as Ali Shomali wrote.

As heavy rainfall hits parts of the country, flooding has replaced drought as the most visible sign of Iran’s environmental crisis.

But instead of easing water shortages, the rain is accelerating destruction, washing through cities, villages and farmlands without replenishing groundwater or restoring depleted aquifers.

Decades of destructive urban expansion, dam building, interbasin water transfers and unchecked groundwater extraction have compacted the land, Eskandari said, chalking it up to "bad governance"

Trained in hydraulic structures and environmental research, Eskandari studies how dams, urban expansion, soil degradation and groundwater extraction affect flood behavior and water scarcity, placing him at the intersection of engineering, environment and policy.

Land that once drank in the rainfall no longer can: "The soil has lost the ability to absorb the water," Eskandari said.

A familiar pattern has emerged across Iran: rain arrives after prolonged drought, but instead of recharging groundwater, it turns into runoff. Water remains on the surface, rushing downhill, collecting mud and debris and producing floods.

Climate change has altered rainfall patterns, Eskandari adds, increasing intensity and shortening precipitation periods, which he calls "not a root cause, but can be considered as an intensifier."

Flooding offers little relief because Iran lacks the systems needed to manage water when it arrives. Watershed management, land-use planning and early warning mechanisms that could turn floods into a resource are largely absent.

"These floods could be used to feed the aquifers," Eskandari said. Instead, without preparation, they are simply not used."

Environmental injustice

Damage consistently concentrates in areas with weak infrastructure and limited political influence. These include villages, informal settlements and poorer urban districts.

Wealthier neighborhoods are better protected by drainage networks, reinforced construction and faster access to emergency services, turning flooding into an issue of environmental injustice.

The flooding now unfolding is also taking place against a deeper structural crisis.

When Dr. Kaveh Madani spoke to Eye for Iran earlier this year, he warned that Iran is no longer facing a typical drought but what he calls water bankruptcy, a condition in which consumption exceeds supply and reserves built over generations have already been exhausted.

“We have never seen such a thing,” Madani said. “The people of Tehran, the city that is the richest, most populous and strongest politically, is running out of water, is facing day zero.”

Madani’s warning reinforces Eskandari’s assessment that short bursts of rain or even seasonal floods will not reverse the crisis without systemic reform.

For Eskandari, the shift from drought to flooding is not an anomaly but a warning.

“We are one step closer to territorial collapse,” he said. “These policies have taken Iran into, as I call it, a point of no return,” Eskandari said, “for the land and for the people, both at the same time.”

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