Khamenei should opt for moderation in US talks, commentators gently urge

But as Iran has reeled from the sudden death of a president, regional setbacks as well as deepening unrest and poverty, the rebranding by a conservative political fixture may be a calculated maneuver to survive in one of Tehran's most uncertain times.

In July 2021, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Mohseni-Ejei as Chief Justice following the election of another arch-reactionary cleric and former judge, Ebrahim Raisi, to the presidency.

But since taking office, he has gradually distanced himself from those of ultra-hardliners of the Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and other supporters of the former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.

He has also cultivated a relatively cooperative relationship with the moderate administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian and supported some of its moves including the push for the temporary suspension of a new and very strict hijab law that could provoke public unrest if implemented.

Once infamous for his hardline stance and alleged human rights violations, Mohseni-Ejei has also attempted to rebrand himself as a champion of anti-corruption, repeatedly emphasizing the theme in public speeches.

The political repositioning has drawn sharp criticism from ultra-hardliners. In recent months, Mohseni-Ejei even publicly criticized the late President Raisi after his death over the handling of high-profile corruption cases, angering the Paydari Party and other staunch conservatives.

The backlash centered on the Debsh Tea corruption case, in which two of Raisi’s ministers were implicated and received what critics view as lenient punishments.

Hardliners have also condemned the judiciary’s handling of a long-standing and politically sensitive case involving alleged corruption in a failed gas export agreement with the UAE known as the Crescent deal, accusing the judiciary of neglecting to prosecute key reformist figures including former oil minister Bijan Zanganeh.

Rise to prominence

Born in 1956, Mohseni-Ejei studied at the Haqqani School in Qom, a seminary known for producing many of Iran’s leading hardline clerics. He holds the religious title of Ayatollah, signaling his status as a mujtahid—a scholar authorized to independently interpret Islamic law.

His public profile rose dramatically in 1998 during the televised corruption trial of Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, the reformist mayor of Tehran. Acting as both judge and prosecutor, Mohseni-Ejei’s confrontational courtroom exchanges with Karbaschi were broadcast by state television, elevating his public profile.

Later that year, in November 1998, Khamenei appointed him as Prosecutor General of the Special Clerical Court, a powerful institution that operates independently of the judiciary and prosecutes only members of the clergy, often for politically charged offenses.

Around the same time, Mohseni-Ejei also represented the judiciary on the Press Supervisory Board, which played a central role in the mass closure of reformist newspapers in April 2000, just one day after a sermon by Khamenei attacking the free press.

The crackdown led to the arrest of numerous journalists and the shuttering of dozens of publications, and one of the most colorful alleged episodes in the jurist's career.

Prominent journalist Isa Saharkhiz accused Mohseni-Ejei of going berserk at a 2004 meeting of the Press Supervisor Board and said the cleric threw a two bowls full of sugar cubes at him and went on the attack, biting him in the shoulder.

Saharkhiz filed a lawsuit, but the case was never investigated or brought to court.

Mohseni-Ejei's career soared nonetheless.

Intelligence minister

In August 2005, Mohseni-Ejei joined President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s cabinet as Minister of Intelligence. He held the post until July 2009, when he was dismissed in the aftermath of the unrest following Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election.

Following a brief transitional period during which Ahmadinejad temporarily assumed control of the ministry, Heydar Moslehi was appointed as Mohseni-Ejei’s successor.

Sanctioned chief justice

In August 2009, shortly after leaving the cabinet, Mohseni-Ejei was appointed Prosecutor General of Iran by then-Chief Justice Sadeq Amoli-Larijani. He was later promoted to First Deputy to the Chief Justice in 2014, a position he held until his elevation to Chief Justice in 2021.

In 2011, both the United States Department of State and the European Union sanctioned Mohseni-Ejei for his role in the deadly suppression of protests following the disputed 2009 elections, citing serious human rights abuses.

Khamenei has largely silenced Tehran's hardliners ahead of the third round of talks with Washington but some opposition persists within his own office.

Two newspapers funded and maintained by Khamenei’s office —Kayhan and Ettela'at —have been presenting starkly different perspectives on the talks over the past week. Both are among Iran’s oldest newspapers, and their top management is personally appointed by the Supreme Leader.

Kayhan, known for its consistently anti-US stance, has maintained a hardline, pessimistic view on the negotiations, even after Khamenei’s rhetoric softened in his recent speeches.

The newspaper insists that "the talks will lead to nowhere." Previously, the daily had writted "negotiating with the United States would be foolish." In a controversial satirical commentary, Kayhan even called for the assassination of President Donald Trump.

The newspaper’s editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, wrote on April 18 that "Iran is engaged in a hybrid war with the United States, and the Iranian government should adopt a combat posture against Washington."

Later, on April 22, the daily quoted IRGC-linked Defa Press website as saying, "Iran is sufficiently armed with top-secret weapons to attack Diego Garcia and confront US and British forces there. Iran’s Shahed-136 drones can reach Diego Garcia, located approximately 4,000 kilometers from its borders."

The report added, "Iran can set fire to Diego Garcia with its improved Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, while its cruise missiles can target massive U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean."

Although the articles may be a mix of falsehoods, disinformation and wishful thinking, they appear to reflect abiding suspicions of the diplomatic outreach among hardliners.

'Embarrassing themselves'

Earlier, Ettela'at had welcomed the negotiations. In an analysis published on April 22, the newspaper sought to expose "those who are undermining the talks."

"Three groups in Iran are attempting to obstruct the negotiations. Although they are too weak to derail the process entirely, they might succeed in discouraging some people and embarrassing themselves."

In an apparent reference to previous Iranian governments and their leaders, Ettela'at identified the first group as "those who question why negotiations were not allowed when they were in power and could have claimed them as their own achievement."

The second group, according to the newspaper, consists of "those who equate negotiations and compromise with treason. They chant radical slogans, create tensions, and sometimes their rhetoric proves costly for the government. On occasion, they even incite small protests in the streets." T

This appeared to be a clear reference to ultraconservatives, such as members of the ultra-conservative Paydari Party and the editors of Kayhan.

The third group attempting to obstruct the negotiations, Ettela'at wrote, is "the foreign-based Iranian opposition," which the newspaper characterized as "bankrupt opportunists."

"Let us support détente and the ongoing negotiations," the daily insisted.

This development could be seen as an extension of Khamenei's "good cop-bad cop" strategy. However, the timing –just as negotiations continue—and the stark contrast between the two perspectives strongly suggest a deeper divide within Khamenei's office.

While pockets of resistance against a potential deal with Washington persist, some Iranians—such as sociologist Ebrahim Fayyaz—are already considering the aftermath of an agreement.

Characterizing the negotiations as inevitable, Fayyaz said in an interview with Khabar Online, "This is the first time Iranians are engaging in negotiations with a world power on equal footing."

At the same time, he warned that radical rhetoric from hardliners, particularly those affiliated with Iran’s state television, could point to serious internal instability.

“The recent assault took place in a location with a history of similar crimes,” said Hamed Ali Sadeghi, Khajeh Nasir University’s deputy for student and cultural affairs. “These two were targeted by a specific gang,” he added.

Just days earlier, a female student from Shahid Beheshti University was attacked 50 meters from her dormitory in the capital’s northern Velenjak neighborhood. The robbers broke her teeth and stole her phone.

In February, 19-year-old Amir Mohammad Khaleghi, a business student at the University of Tehran, was stabbed to death by robbers near his dormitory.

Student associations warned afterward that the threat extended to dormitories across the country and criticized authorities for ignoring repeated calls to secure the surroundings of student housing.

Protests erupted following Khaleghi’s death, but attacks have continued. About a month later, two students at Tehran University of Medical Sciences were robbed at knifepoint.

According to the student council, the victims sought help from campus security after being threatened with cold weapons.

The pattern is not limited to student areas. On April 20, video circulated of a motorcyclist snatching a necklace from a woman carrying a child in southern Tehran, knocking both to the ground.

Last week, a surveillance camera recorded a thief tearing off a man’s gold chain as he sat at a café in Saadatabad, northern Tehran.

In Meybod, Yazd province, other footage showed a phone being violently stolen from a 16-year-old girl in broad daylight.

Iranian authorities have announced arrests in a few high-profile cases but have yet to introduce broad preventive measures.

Instead, universities have advised students to use better-lit, alternative routes — guidance viewed by many as an admission of official inaction.

The uptick in street crime comes as Iran’s economy remains in crisis. Inflation is estimated to have reached nearly 50 percent, while the rial has suffered a steep depreciation.

The exchange rate briefly hit 1,060,000 rials to the US dollar during recent weeks before temporarily falling to 800,000 following the resumption of indirect talks with the United States.

Over one third of Iranians now live below the poverty line and unemployment sits at around 20% for the country's young population and 7-8% overall, according to official data, although actual numbers are believed to be far higher.

Earlier this month, Ham-Mihan daily reported that food theft from stores in Iran has increased, with rising prices and growing hunger among the population cited as major reasons.

In September, Ali Valipour Goudarzi, head of Tehran’s Criminal Investigation Police, said that some thieves resort to theft solely due to economic conditions, and that if the situation improves, their numbers will decrease.

Rawa Majid received funds from Iran’s embassy in Denmark to help coordinate attacks against Israeli diplomatic facilities in Copenhagen and Stockholm, according to a source familiar with the matter inside the IRGC.

The source also said the gang leader travels between Iran and Afghanistan for operations overseen by the IRGC.

Majid leads a criminal group, Foxtrot, recently sanctioned by the UK and the US for its alleged role in orchestrating attacks on Israeli interests. Both governments accused the group of working as a proxy force for Iran in Europe. Tehran has denied the charges.

"Iran’s brazen use of transnational criminal organizations and narcotics traffickers underscores the regime’s attempts to achieve its aims through any means, with no regard for the cost to communities across Europe,” US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement in March as the US sanctioned Majid and Foxtrot.

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The US Treasury said the group has carried out operations targeting Israeli and Jewish institutions, including an attempted bombing outside the Israeli embassy in Stockholm and grenade attacks near the Israeli embassy in Copenhagen in October 2024.

The attacks are part of an apparent broader strategy that has alarmed European security services. In a December 2024 report, Bloomberg detailed how Iran-affiliated groups have increasingly recruited local criminals — including minors — to carry out assaults on Jewish and Israeli institutions across Europe.

Iran’s expanding covert footprint in Europe is linked to the broader regional conflict between Israel and Iranian proxy forces, Bloomberg reported, and the strategy may be aimed at fueling social tensions in countries already divided over immigration and integration.

Sweden’s Security Service (Säpo) and Israeli intelligence agency Mossad have both identified the Foxtrot criminal network as one of the groups recruited by Tehran for sabotage operations in Europe.

While Iranian officials deny using criminal organizations abroad, leaders of the Islamic Republic have repeatedly praised attacks on Israeli interests globally.

“They have taken many job opportunities,” Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni said during a meeting of provincial governors on Monday, addressing public concerns that foreign nationals were crowding Iranians out of the job market.

Momeni added that more than 1.2 million undocumented immigrants were repatriated in the past Iranian calendar year ending on March 20.

At the same meeting, the head of the Foreign Nationals and Immigrants Affairs Center at the ministry Nader Yarahmadi said 6.1 million Afghans currently reside in Iran. The actual number may be far higher, or up to 15 million, according to unofficial tallies by Iranian lawmakers and media outlets.

Iranian officials and media outlets frequently use the term foreign nationals as a euphemism specifically referring to Afghan citizens.

Afghans began arriving in Iran as refugees in the early 1980s, later joined by economic migrants. Until the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, their numbers rarely exceeded two million.

Around 780,000 Afghans hold official refugee status and are not considered undocumented. A small minority of non-refugees are wealthier Afghans who fled after the Taliban’s takeover, while the majority are undocumented economic migrants who provide low-cost labor in sectors such as agriculture and construction and live with or without their families.

Anti-Afghan sentiment has grown significantly in recent years, especially on Persian-language social media, where hashtags such as “Expulsion of Afghans is a national demand” frequently trend.

Advocates for the expulsion of Afghan nationals accuse the government of allowing them to benefit from billions of dollars in subsidies for food, fuel, and other essential services, including healthcare and education.

In addition to monthly cash payments to nearly 90 million Iranians, the government heavily subsidizes basic goods such as bread and fuel. The current fiscal year’s budget allocates 2,500 trillion rials out of 64,000 trillion rials to bread subsidies alone.

No official data quantifying the subsidies specifically received by Afghan immigrants exists.

However, Hamidreza Azizi, a lawmaker representing Eghlid in southwestern Fars Province, said in a recent parliamentary speech that the government spends approximately 7,000 trillion rials on subsidies for energy, food, medicine, and education for Afghan children. “In my constituency, Afghan nationals have taken over the entire job market from Iranians,” Azizi told Parliament.

Iran’s official unemployment rate stands at 7.6 percent, but many believe the real figure is significantly higher, as the government considers anyone working at least one hour per week as employed.

Meanwhile, at least one-third of Iranians live below the poverty line, and workers’ strikes over unpaid wages continue in various sectors.

During his campaign, President Masoud Pezeshkian pledged to tighten border controls, register undocumented immigrants and seek support from European countries—either by encouraging them to accept some refugees or to provide financial assistance.

The relatively moderate President argued that Western policies in Afghanistan have driven millions of Afghans to Iran and that those responsible should share the burden.

“There is no reason the Iranian people should bear the costs of others’ failed policies,” Pezeshkian wrote in a series of tweets prior to the election.