Speaking to domestic media, Iran’s top diplomat, Abbas Araghchi, stated that Tehran is prepared to initiate discussions this week, provided “the other parties are ready.”
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first trip to the West comes just six weeks before the November 5 US presidential election—and amid mounting regional instability in the Middle East. Reuters reported last week that the country’s new president is set to meet with European leaders while in New York, although there is little sign of any breakthrough.
Iran expert Ali Fathollah-Nejad says that this aligns with Pezeshkian’s so-called mission to seek talks with the West in order to obtain sanctions relief. “Pezeshkian’s so-called mission is also supported by the power center in Iran, by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC whose daily Javan had even celebrated Pezeshkian’s presidential victory,” said Fathollah-Nejad, who is the director of the Center for Middle East and Global Order (CMEG).
While some analysis in Western media has lauded the "reformist" new President as a potential bridge between Iran and the West, others remain unconvinced. “Pezeshkian is nothing more than a moderate façade for the regime to ward off Western economic sanctions and pressure. The West seems to have little strategic memory that the regime has used this tactic repeatedly throughout its 45-year history,” Andrea Stricker, the Deputy Director and Research Fellow at FDD’s Nonproliferation & Biodefense Program, told Iran International English.
According to Reuters, which cited three Iranian officials, Pezeshkian is set to deliver a message that "Tehran is open to diplomacy," with one Iranian official reportedly saying that "Iran's rulers believe that the tense standoff with the West over Iran's nuclear program should end... but through negotiations from a position of power, not pressure.”
Stricker argues that the emphasis on "power, not pressure" highlights the regime's understanding that it can leverage nuclear coercion and blackmail to secure Western concessions. These range from the US easing oil sanctions, allowing unprecedented Iranian oil exports, to avoiding strikes on Iranian military assets despite attacks on US interests or global shipping, and the West's failure to hold Tehran accountable at the IAEA for its nuclear violations. “All of this permits the regime to increase its malign regional activity with impunity,” Stricker said.
Pressure on Iran has also been mounting from some corners to respond to the widely believed Israeli operations—including the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and the latest series of strikes on Hezbollah members in Lebanon. Iran’s reluctance to respond, Fathollah-Nejad argues, is because there is a strategic preference by the regime for Pezeshkian to secure “sanctions relief that is considered vital by Iran’s power center, for regime stability reasons.”
Fathollah-Nejad also notes the uncertainty surrounding the upcoming weeks in Tehran's diplomatic efforts to re-engage with the West. He suggests that for the regime, it would be favorable if Kamala Harris wins the US presidency, as there is significant anxiety in Tehran about Donald Trump's potential return to the White House. While he says that it is difficult to predict what the next weeks will look like, Iran might agree to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief from the US.
“This would, of course, be a temporary measure, regardless of the fact that there is a need to broaden Iran policy, not least in the regional geopolitical dimension,” Fathollah-Nejad said.
Regardless of who wins the US presidency, Stricker argues that further rounds of fruitless nuclear talks are merely a tactic to "prevent the West from shifting to a pressure strategy aimed at penalizing, deterring, and rolling back Iran's nuclear advancements." “Just as nearly two years of nuclear talks under Biden were ultimately futile, we should expect the same of any talks that are not backed by severe Western pressure and a credible threat of military force. The current dynamic is the result of a failure of US and European strategy and their fear of escalation,” she said.
The Biden administration has seemingly deprioritized negotiations with Iran, focusing on other issues, and with the 2015 nuclear deal effectively defunct, future diplomatic efforts are likely to be more challenging and less effective. Both European diplomats and US officials have suggested in various reports that while Washington is not ready for serious negotiations, Iran may seek engagement with Europe independently.
Whether there will be a new nuclear deal or not, Stricker and Fathollah-Nejad seemingly agree that it will not address the growing threats Iran poses. “The 2015 nuclear deal is obsolete and set to expire in a few short years. It permitted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program over time, in any case, and legalized the situation we face now with Tehran’s nuclear program,” Stricker maintained, saying the JCPOA was never a long-term solution.
While some have voiced that the West may not have any more tools left to restrain Tehran, Stricker argues the opposite. “It is well past time for the West to revert back to pressure—and to sustain it, backed by a strategy to weaken and destabilize the regime—if there is to be a negotiated solution, but ideally, a free Iran,” Stricker said.
She suggests the West enforce US oil sanctions on Iran by targeting Chinese importers, interdicting shipments, destroying Iranian military assets to restore deterrence, and reimposing UN sanctions expiring in 2025 to reinstate global missile, military, and nuclear restrictions on Tehran. “America, Europe, and Israel can also decisively support the Iranian people in their struggle to rid the country of the root of most Middle East woes—the Islamic Republic regime.”
