Oil, gas and Iran economic analyst
Iran’s petrochemical sector is now openly under threat, marking a significant escalation in the conflict and raising the prospect of far-reaching economic consequences for the country and potentially the wider region.
Israeli strikes in recent days have hit Iran’s two main petrochemical hubs, Mahshahr and Assaluyeh, while US President Donald Trump has warned that further attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure could follow if no deal is reached by Tuesday night.
Iranian authorities said Monday that industrial facilities in the Mahshahr petrochemical zone are being evacuated ahead of Trump’s deadline.
On Saturday, April 4, Israeli forces targeted at least eight major petrochemical complexes in the Mahshahr region, along with critical supporting infrastructure, including power plants that supply electricity to the industrial zone.
Two days later, similar strikes hit the vast petrochemical facilities in Assaluyeh, the center of Iran’s South Pars gas and petrochemical operations.
Although the full extent of the damage remains unclear, Iranian officials have acknowledged that operations in both regions have been halted.
Mahshahr accounts for approximately 28 percent of Iran’s petrochemical production, while Assaluyeh contributes more than 48 percent. Together, the two hubs represent roughly three-quarters of the country’s total petrochemical output.
Iran’s petrochemical industry is the second-largest source of export revenue after crude oil. The country has a nominal production capacity of about 95 million tons per year, although actual output is closer to 75 million tons due to persistent shortages of electricity and natural gas.
Around half of this production—valued at approximately $13 billion annually—is exported, accounting for more than one-fifth of Iran’s non-oil exports.
The shutdown of these facilities therefore represents more than a temporary industrial setback. It directly threatens one of Iran’s most important sources of foreign currency earnings.
If the damaged infrastructure cannot be restored in the medium term, the second-largest producer of petrochemicals in the Middle East could even face shortages.
Over the past decades, Iran has invested an estimated $70 billion in developing petrochemical infrastructure. In the event of severe damage, rebuilding these facilities would pose a major financial and technical challenge.
Given the constraints imposed by sanctions, limited access to international capital and broader economic pressures, Iran is unlikely to have the resources required for rapid reconstruction.
Even if external financing were secured, restoring production capacity would take years, and possibly more than a decade.
Petrochemical plants are highly complex systems that depend not only on physical infrastructure but also on stable energy supply, advanced technology and efficient logistics networks—all of which are currently under strain in Iran.
The strikes on petrochemical facilities come alongside recent attacks on major steel plants in Isfahan and Khuzestan, which together account for roughly half of Iran’s steel output. Taken together, the pattern suggests a broader strategy aimed at weakening Iran’s industrial backbone rather than targeting isolated sectors.
The timing of these strikes is particularly significant given Iran’s pre-existing structural weaknesses.
In recent years, the country has faced chronic shortages of natural gas, electricity and refined fuels, forcing many industries to operate well below capacity. These constraints have already reduced industrial output and increased production costs.
At the same time, Iran’s logistics sector suffers from deep inefficiencies. According to World Bank data, the country ranks near the bottom in regional logistics performance, second only to Afghanistan. This limits Iran’s ability to reroute supply chains, manage disruptions or quickly recover from large-scale damage to infrastructure.
The combined effect of these factors could push Iran into a deeper economic crisis. A sustained disruption in petrochemical exports would significantly reduce foreign currency inflows, putting additional pressure on the national currency and exacerbating inflation.
Ultimately, the burden of this crisis will fall disproportionately on ordinary Iranians who are already struggling with high inflation, energy shortages and rising unemployment.
If Trump follows through on his threat, the conflict could move further into the economic domain, reshaping the trajectory of Iran’s economy and potentially sending shockwaves through regional—and even global—energy markets.
His death matters because he sat at the junction of two of the system’s most sensitive functions: guarding the Guards from infiltration and directing the intelligence arm accused of crushing dissent.
In March, Washington’s Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on Khademi and other senior IRGC figures, a sign that he was seen abroad not just as an internal operator but as a high-value intelligence target.
In symbolic terms, one of the men tasked with stopping penetration of the state was himself reached in the middle of Tehran.
A security man from the inner system
Khademi was one of the least public senior figures in Iran’s power structure. Iranian and regional reports have described him as being from the Fasa area in Fars province, while official and semi-official outlets have referred to him under different versions of his name, including Majid Khademi and Majid Hosseini, reflecting the opacity that surrounds senior intelligence officials.
Unlike many top IRGC commanders, he does not appear to have built his standing mainly through front-line war command. He rose instead through the quieter, more secretive world of protection, vetting and internal security.
From internal monitoring to the top intelligence job
Khademi was appointed head of the Defense Ministry’s intelligence protection organization in 2018. In 2022, after a major shake-up inside the IRGC following a series of security failures and reported Israeli penetrations, he was made head of the Guards’ Intelligence Protection Organization.
He was promoted again in June 2025, after the killing of his predecessor Mohammad Kazemi, to lead the IRGC Intelligence Organization itself.
That move put him in charge of a body the US Treasury later said had been “instrumental” in violently suppressing protests through mass violence, arbitrary detentions and intimidation.
That progression is part of what makes his killing significant. Khademi had spent years policing the system from within before ending up at the top of one of its most feared coercive institutions.
Why his role was so sensitive
The IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization and its Intelligence Organization do different jobs, but together they form a core part of the Islamic Republic’s security state.
The first looks inward – loyalty, secrecy, infiltration and internal discipline – while the second has been linked to domestic repression and political-security cases.
Khademi mattered because he had moved through both worlds. He was not simply another general; he was a custodian of the regime’s inner files, vulnerabilities and suspicions.
That means his loss is not only personal or symbolic, but potentially institutional, at least in the short term. This is an inference from his portfolio and the structure of the IRGC, rather than a point Iranian officials have conceded.
How Khademi framed tighter control
Khademi gave a rare interview in February to the website of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and it offered a blunt window into how he saw the country.
He framed the January uprising not as a domestic revolt against the state, but as a foreign-backed plot, and presented mass preemption as routine intelligence work.
In that interview, he said the Guard had summoned 2,735 people linked to what he called anti-security networks, “counseled” 13,000 others, seized 1,173 weapons and identified 46 people allegedly tied to foreign intelligence services. He also said authorities had received nearly 500,000 public tips and reports by the end of the month.
Those figures are important less as verified facts than as a statement of doctrine. In his telling, the answer to unrest was wider surveillance, earlier intervention and a larger dragnet.
He also recalled Khamenei telling him to “pay attention to intelligence work” because “this period is like the year 60” – a reference to the early 1980s, one of the Islamic Republic’s bloodiest and most repressive phases.
The line is revealing because it shows the regime was reading the moment through the lens of existential internal threat, not ordinary dissent.
Khademi said Khamenei had stressed “two types of infiltration”: one deliberate and one broader current of people advancing the enemy’s aims without necessarily knowing it. Read plainly, that is the language of a state that sees not only organized opponents but also ordinary social and political currents as security problems.
Another revealing part of the interview was his insistence on the “national information network,” the state-backed effort to tighten control over Iran’s internet and communications space. That linked Khademi directly to the Islamic Republic’s broader push for censorship, digital control and isolation of the domestic information sphere.
A telling figure of the post-crackdown state
Khademi’s rise after the 2022 reshuffle suggested that the Islamic Republic wanted a harder, more security-centered figure to restore trust after repeated failures. His career embodied a system trying to repair itself through tighter internal control.
His death therefore lands on two levels at once. It removes a senior official tied to repression, and it exposes the vulnerability of a security apparatus that has long defined itself through secrecy, discipline and counter-penetration.
Why the killing matters now
Khademi was not just another uniformed commander. He was a product of the Islamic Republic’s hidden architecture – the part built to monitor loyalty, protect secrets and suppress threats before they reached the street.
His killing is more than the loss of one official. It is a blow to a man who personified the Islamic Republic’s effort to defend itself from within – and a reminder that even those charged with hunting infiltration have not been beyond its reach.
