Iran says envoy will stay in Beirut despite Lebanon expulsion order

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, Trump said Washington was making progress in “direct and indirect” negotiations with Tehran and that a deal could emerge quickly.

But he also said he would like the United States to “take the oil in Iran” in an interview with the Financial Times, floating the idea of seizing Kharg Island, the terminal through which most of Iran’s crude exports pass.

“I could only say that we’re doing extremely well in that negotiation. But you never know where they’re at, because we negotiate with them, and then we always have to bomb them,” he told reporters.

“I think we’ll make a deal with them, pretty sure. But it is possible we won’t.”

Markets have struggled to interpret the shifting signals. Oil prices have surged more than 60 percent over the past month amid fears the war could disrupt global energy supplies, with Brent crude trading near $116 a barrel.

Hours before Trump’s remarks, Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf posted a cryptic message on social media using trading jargon that many interpreted as a jab at the US president and his announcements.

“Pre-market so-called ‘news’ or ‘Truth’ is often just a setup for profit-taking. Basically, it’s a reverse indicator,” he wrote. “Do the opposite: If they pump it, short it. If they dump it, go long.”

Ghalibaf has been mentioned in several unofficial reports as playing a leading role in contacts with Washington. Trump referred to him in the FT interview, saying he had authorised more Pakistan-flagged ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Aboard Air Force One shortly afterward, Trump suggested that “regime change” had effectively already taken place and that he was now dealing with “professionals.”

“We’re dealing with different people than anybody’s dealt with before. It’s a whole different group of people,” he said. “So I would consider that regime change, and frankly they’ve been very reasonable.”

But the president’s remarks left observers unsure whether diplomacy or escalation would shape the next phase of the conflict, which shows little sign of subsiding after a month of fighting.

Pakistan has renewed its offer to mediate between Washington and Tehran. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said after talks with the foreign ministers of Turkey and Egypt that Islamabad stood ready to help bring both sides to the negotiating table.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump is weighing a plan that could involve US forces entering Iran to seize its stockpile of enriched uranium, a move that would represent a dramatic escalation if pursued.

Iranian residents discovered their visas had been revoked before returning to the UAE, preventing their re-entry, several affected individuals told Iran International, as relations between the two countries deteriorate following Iranian strikes on the Arab state.

Earlier reports had also pointed to the cancellation of tourist visas for Iranian nationals traveling to the UAE.

Several individuals described sudden cancellations while traveling. One Iranian resident said that after leaving for India with his family following the outbreak of war, he found his residency had been revoked, while his non-Iranian family members were still able to return.

Another said his residency tied to a 10-year “golden visa” had been canceled while he was abroad. A London-based Iranian with a UK work visa said he discovered his UAE residency had been revoked before traveling to Dubai.

As of the time of reporting, no official statement has been issued by UAE authorities. Iran International requested clarification from Emirati officials but has not received a response.

The developments come amid escalating regional tensions. Following the start of joint US-Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic, Iran launched attacks on countries in the region, with the UAE reportedly facing the highest volume.

Iran has so far launched 393 ballistic and cruise missiles and 1,835 drones toward the UAE, resulting in at least 10 deaths and 171 injuries, including Iranian nationals, according to official statistics.

In response, UAE authorities have suspended the operations of Iran-linked institutions, including an Iranian hospital, Iranian schools, the Club of Iranians, the UAE branch of Islamic Azad University, and the Imam Hossein mosque.

Housing units tied to these institutions have been vacated, and staff whose visas were linked to them — including teachers and some medical personnel — have had their residencies canceled, according to information obtained by Iran International.

At least five Iranian schools in the UAE have been closed, with student records returned to families.

Individuals whose residencies were revoked are being repatriated to Iran via Afghanistan, first transferred to Herat and then crossing by land.

UAE authorities have also instructed Iran’s consulate in Dubai to reduce its staff and continue operating with minimal personnel.

Senior UAE officials have in recent weeks taken unusually direct positions against Iran. Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan described the Islamic Republic as “terrorist,” saying the UAE would never submit to “terrorist blackmail.”

President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan earlier called Iran an “enemy” and warned that the country was “not an easy target.”

In response to Operation Epic Fury, Tehran turned to asymmetric leverage, relying on its capacity to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and drive up global oil prices.

Anticipating market volatility, the US Treasury issued a targeted sanctions waiver designed to stabilize oil markets while preserving financial pressure on Tehran.

Yet as the waiver framework evolved from an India-specific mechanism into a more generalized policy, it continued in practice to serve Indian refiners, redirecting sanctioned crude away from China and toward India.

The Russian test case

On March 5, Treasury issued a waiver allowing Indian refiners — IOC, BPCL, HPCL, and Reliance Industries — to purchase already-produced Russian crude cargoes that were on the water.

When Treasury expanded the waiver on March 12–13, Indian refiners remained the only significant buyers of the authorized Russian barrels. The expansion continued to apply only to cargoes already on the water, did not restore formal banking channels, and did not lift underlying sanctions.

Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, described General License U as authorizing “the commodity transaction; it says nothing about payment.” The license permits the sale of oil but does not restore banking access or create a formal payment channel. That distinction allowed trade in physical barrels while preserving financial pressure.

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  India tells US it needs Iran, Venezuela crude to offset Russian cuts

The Iranian extension

The March 20 application of the same waiver model to roughly 170 million barrels of Iranian crude floating offshore replicated the policy — and once again, India remained the only swing buyer.

Reliance Industries, the largest Indian public company, purchased 5 million barrels of Iranian crude at a $7 premium to Brent. The same Indian refiners, IOC, BPCL, and HPCL, reportedly plan to resume purchases.

Homayoun Falakshahi, head of crude oil analysis at Kpler, said Iranian crude often remains unsold until reaching Asian discharge zones such as Singapore or Malaysia. Because many cargoes were already produced but waiting for buyers, releasing them under the waiver had immediate supply effects. He added: “Now that India has entered as a competitor, the price in China will most likely increase.”

In effect, India’s participation disrupted China’s near-monopsony over sanctioned Iranian crude — reshaping pricing leverage without formally lifting sanctions.

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  Iran still depends on Hormuz despite years of workarounds

Before 2019, Indian refiners imported roughly 450,000 barrels per day of Iranian crude under contracts with National Iranian Oil Company. They retain the technical configuration and commercial familiarity to scale quickly within short waiver windows. That institutional memory gives Washington a ready-made alternative buyer base whenever it chooses to recalibrate supply pressure.

India’s strategic ascent

India’s admission into the Pax Silica, formalized on February 20, placed it within the US-led supply-chain initiative focused on reducing dependence on China in semiconductor and AI production. As Under Secretary Jacob Helberg said: "Pax Silica is really not about China, it is about America. We want to secure our supply chains. We view India as a partner to help de-risk and diversify those supply chains."

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel on February 25–26, where the two countries elevated ties to a “special strategic partnership.” Two days later, Operation Epic Fury began.

The new world order

Early in President Trump’s second term, Washington sought to reshape the global order. India was expected to become a counterweight to China, and Iran was given a chance for realignment. Neither objective materialized at the outset. India’s role remained limited, negotiations with Iran collapsed, and a 12-day war followed. Trade and tariff disputes further complicated the restructuring effort.

Washington’s tactical support of India’s energy role may carry implications beyond temporary oil supply management. Pax Silica realigns industrial supply chains; the waiver framework redirects sanctioned energy flows. Together, they position India within the technological and commodity axes of great-power competition.

This suggests a second, more structured attempt to reshape the global order. With India onboard, the decisive variable becomes whether Operation Epic Fury generates sufficient leverage to push Iran away from its long-standing partnerships with Beijing and Moscow. A realignment toward Washington could be the tipping point in the consolidation of this new order.

On March 20, Iran fired two long-range ballistic missiles at the Diego Garcia base, a target long considered beyond its declared range of around 2,000 kilometers.

Iran’s attempted long-range strike — which US officials say did not hit its target — marks the first time Tehran has demonstrated the ability to reach as far as Diego Garcia.

For years, Iran claimed its missile range was capped at around 2,000 kilometers. That claim now appears increasingly untenable.

The attempted strike exposes a reality that can no longer be ignored, experts told this week's episode of Eye for Iran: Tehran’s missile capabilities extend far beyond the Middle East, its hardened arsenal has withstood sustained US and Israeli strikes, and the conflict is now colliding with critical global pressure points — from the Strait of Hormuz to the growing likelihood of a broader military phase.

A threat no longer abstract

Iran’s ballistic missile threat is no longer abstract — it is real and expanding.

Both Janatan Sayeh, an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and Farzin Nadimi, a defense and military expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, warned on the Eye for Iran podcast that Tehran’s capabilities now extend far beyond previously stated limits — potentially reaching as far as the United Kingdom.

“This should not come as a surprise,” Sayeh said. He noted that Iranian missiles and drones have already been used on European soil through Russia.

“The difference now is that the regime itself can launch them directly from Iranian territory," said Sayeh.

The shift marks a critical evolution — from indirect projection of force to direct long-range capability — underscoring the growing reach of Iran’s arsenal.

Even if unsuccessful, the Diego Garcia strike signals a move from regional containment to global reach — with direct implications for Europe and beyond.

In his State of the Union address last month, President Donald Trump cautioned that Iran’s missile program could soon put the United States within reach — a claim that, in light of recent developments, is no longer theoretical.

Missile cities: A durable arsenal

That expanded reach is underpinned by an infrastructure designed not just to deter — but to endure.

Nadimi said Iran has long possessed the technical ability to extend the range of its missiles, including through payload modification and dual-use space-launch technology.

More significantly, he described a vast network of hardened underground facilities — some “the size of a small city” — buried deep beneath mountainous terrain and reinforced structures, making them extraordinarily difficult to destroy.

These so-called “missile cities” are often positioned near — and in some cases beneath — civilian infrastructure, including residential neighborhoods and public spaces, complicating targeting while increasing their survivability.

“Many of these missile bases are so deep that even the most powerful bunker-buster bombs cannot reach them… some are as deep as 500 meters and the size of a small city," Nadimi told Eye for Iran.

Strait of Hormuz: Global Stakes

The implications extend far beyond military capability.

The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes — has emerged as a central pressure point in the conflict.

Disruptions tied to the war have already rattled global energy markets, with prices reacting to uncertainty around shipping routes and potential escalation.

Joel Rubin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Obama administration, warned on Eye for Iran that Iran’s actions reflect a broader strategic calculus.

“This is how Iran behaves,” he said. “They are willing to disrupt and destroy the global economy to protect themselves.”

Dr. Walid Phares, foreign policy expert, advisor to past US presidents and author, described the Strait not as a theoretical chokepoint, but as an active military theater — where Iranian missile systems along the coastline could trigger direct US intervention to secure global shipping lanes.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly said the United States would reopen the Strait “with or without” allied support — underscoring the scale of the economic stakes.

“Which tells me that ground forces, limited special forces, Marines, now we understand, may be used," said Phares, author of Iran: An Imperialist Republic and US Policy.

Talks as strategy, not solution

Even as diplomatic efforts continue, both sides appear to be using negotiations as part of a broader strategic game.

Rubin pointed to a narrowing political and economic window in Washington, suggesting the US is unlikely to sustain prolonged negotiations as domestic pressure builds.

Phares also framed talks not as a pathway to de-escalation, but as part of a parallel track where diplomacy unfolds alongside active military preparation.

In this environment, negotiations are not replacing escalation — they are occurring within it.

Toward escalation: troops and targets

On the ground, signs of a deeper military phase are becoming more pronounced.

The Pentagon is weighing sending up to 10,000 additional ground troops to the Middle East, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal and Axios — a move that would significantly expand US combat presence in the region.

The deployment would include infantry and armored units, adding to thousands of Marines and paratroopers already moving into position.

Officials say forces could be staged within striking distance of Iran, including near Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub that handles the vast majority of the country’s crude exports.

Military planners are also reportedly developing options for a “final blow,” including a large-scale bombing campaign and the potential use of ground forces.

No final decision has been made — but the scale and positioning of forces point toward preparation, not restraint.

A region already shifting

At the same time, regional dynamics are beginning to shift.

The United Arab Emirates has publicly warned — in a Wall Street Journal op-ed by its ambassador to Washington — that a simple ceasefire is not enough, signaling growing alignment among US partners around the need for a more decisive outcome.

In Lebanon — long considered firmly within Iran’s sphere of influence — mounting pressure on Hezbollah, moves to marginalize IRGC influence, and the withdrawal of Iran’s ambassador from Beirut point to potential cracks in Tehran’s regional posture.

For many observers, the attempted strike toward Diego Garcia marks a turning point because of what it revealed: the range and the probable intent, all are now visible.

Each time tensions escalate between the United States, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, a familiar pattern emerges in Western commentary. Before events have meaningfully unfolded, a chorus of analysts moves quickly to declare failure. T

he comparisons are predictable: Iraq, Afghanistan, quagmires. The conclusion is often presented as inevitable.

This reflex deserves scrutiny. Skepticism is necessary in matters of war. But when skepticism hardens into certainty, it ceases to be analysis. To assert at the outset that success is impossible is not caution; it is intellectual closure. Every conflict contains a range of possible outcomes, and serious analysis requires acknowledging that reality.

Part of the current pessimism is political. Assessments of strategy are often filtered through attitudes toward leadership, particularly in the case of President Donald Trump.

For many critics, this leads to the presumption that any policy associated with him must fail. But political actors are rarely defined by a single dimension. The same American founders who articulated the principle that “all men are created equal” also upheld slavery.

Whatever one’s broader evaluation of Trump, the objective of preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power addresses a widely recognized security concern. Judging that objective should not depend on personal or partisan preferences, but on its strategic implications.

Many Middle Eastern states are concerned about Tehran’s regional power projection. Cross-border attacks, missile strikes and the use of proxy forces such as Hezbollah reinforce fears that Iran’s leaders are willing to escalate conflict to preserve their position.

Yet the most common analytical error may lie elsewhere: in assumptions about Iranian society. Political theorists from Antonio Gramsci onward have emphasized that durable power requires more than coercion. It requires a governing narrative, a form of “common sense” that people internalize and that gives legitimacy to rule.

The Islamic Republic once possessed such a narrative, rooted in revolutionary ideology and religious authority. But that narrative has eroded; large segments of Iranian society no longer identify with the ideological foundations of the state.

This matters because regimes that lose narrative cohesion often become increasingly dependent on force. They can persist for long periods, but in a more brittle and reactive form.

During the 12-day conflict in June, reactions inside Iran appeared complex rather than uniformly relieved. While many welcomed the ceasefire, reporting from within the country pointed to a mix of fear, uncertainty and guarded expectation. As Israel’s battlefield advantage became apparent, some Iranians expressed concern that the regime might turn inward to reassert control.

The deadly crackdown that followed in January 2026 underscored the argument that the state’s first instinct when challenged is repression.

A different concern has also surfaced in some discussions among Iranians: that conflict might end prematurely, leaving the regime intact and emboldened. For a population that has repeatedly risked its life in protest, partial measures carry their own consequences.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, external intervention collided with deeply fragmented societies marked by sectarian divisions, tribal rivalries and competing power centers. Iran has its own social and political cleavages, but not necessarily the same degree of entrenched sectarian fragmentation.

Opposition to the Islamic Republic frequently cuts across class, gender and regional lines, creating a form of shared political discontent that differs from those earlier conflicts.

Those ruling Iran appear aware of this vulnerability. Several senior officials have used state media in recent weeks to warn citizens against protest. A government at war focusing on controlling its own population may reveal a measure of insecurity rather than strength.

A similar pattern is visible in its information strategy. Governments confident in their position rarely need to shut down internet access for tens of millions of people. Nor do they typically rely on implausible claims of battlefield success, including reports circulated on state media suggesting the downing of advanced fighter jets, the destruction of major Israeli cities or even the death of senior Israeli leaders such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Meanwhile, the external balance has also shifted in ways that are often underappreciated. Israel and the United States have killed several key figures since they began their attacks on Feb. 28. Tehran’s reaction—striking many neighboring states have—has expanded concern beyond its traditional adversaries.

Governments that previously sought to manage relations with Iran now face a more direct security calculus, some even reportedly pondering a more direct involvement in the war.

None of this guarantees a particular outcome. The Islamic Republic retains significant resources, including coercive capacity, financial networks and ideological constituencies. It also benefits from the willingness of committed supporters to endure high costs, reinforced by narratives that valorize sacrifice and martyrdom.

But acknowledging these realities does not require ignoring countervailing pressures. A regime that faces internal discontent, increasing reliance on repression and expanding external pressure may prove less stable than it appears.

To interpret its most extreme actions solely as signs of strength risks misunderstanding the nature of power. Erratic behavior can reflect desperation as much as confidence.

A more balanced assessment would therefore consider not only the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the conditions that distinguish Iran: the erosion of ideological legitimacy, the agency of its society and a shifting regional environment.

Iran is not Iraq. It is not Afghanistan. Its trajectory is not predetermined.

The more relevant question is not whether failure is inevitable, but whether current analysis adequately captures the possibility that this moment—shaped by internal and external pressures alike—may unfold differently.