Iran International
An outlet linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards on Thursday conceded that life is getting harder for Iranian families, in a sign that economic malaise has become too severe to ignore even by the ruling establishment.
Javan newspaper, which rarely acknowledges public hardship, wrote at length about the near-daily rise in grocery prices.
“Life has become more difficult and more expensive for Iranian families,” the daily wrote, citing examples of dairy, fruit, and bread skyrocketing.
According to the Statistical Center, food and beverage prices rose more than any other category during the month of Mehr (September 23–October 23). Bread prices increased by 98%, fruit by 94% and vegetables by 77%.
Not surprisingly, the paper laid the blame entirely on President Masoud Pezeshkian and his administration, whose mandate falls well short of tackling the domestic and foreign policy failures that have undermined Iran’s economy in recent years.
“He says at least three times a week that he never intended to become Iran’s president,” Javan wrote, accusing Pezeshkian of shirking responsibility.
The relative moderate is opposed by the hardline conservative Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Soaring inflation
The paper also criticized his supporters, including former President Mohammad Khatami, for focusing on abstract debates such as “the tension between religion and freedom” or “celebrity scandals” instead of economic realities.
The Statistical Center reported that point-to-point inflation from late September to late October reached 48.6%, with the Consumer Price Index climbing to 403.8 relative to 2021—meaning prices have quadrupled since.
Iran’s economy has been battered by sweeping international sanctions targeting its oil revenues, banking, and shipping sectors.
Years of corruption, opaque budgeting, and mismanagement of resources already strained by those sanctions have deepened the crisis and fueled public anger, as evidenced by the collapse of a major retail bank this week.
Despite mounting pressure on households, the government recently approved steep price hikes for vehicles produced by state-owned companies, ignoring the ripple effects on other goods and services.
Growing concern
Javan also attacked moderates for not speaking up against the administration they favor, singling out journalist-turned-politician Mohammad Ghoochani.
Ghoochani once warned of a “meat’s rebellion” when the dollar stood at 500,000 rials and meat cost 1.5 million rials per kilogram ($3), Javan jibed. “Now, with the dollar at one million rials and meat priced at 10 million rials per kilogram ($10), he remains silent.”
Junior hardliners in parliament received a brief rebuke too, scolded by the IRGC outlet for “challenging senior politicians” merely to boost their social media profiles.
The latest wave of price increases has forced many families to cut consumption, with some essential items disappearing entirely from household shopping baskets.
Even Iran’s tightly controlled media, including outlets owned by the government and armed forces, are now reporting on the growing hardship.
Karroubi made the remarks during a meeting with the family of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the Green Movement leader who has been under house arrest since 2011. Both men were presidential candidates in the disputed 2009 election, which they contended was marred by fraud and irregularities.
“In the 2009 election, Mr. Khamenei not only did not tolerate the people’s vote, but he supported fraud and violent suppression and accused us of sedition, lack of insight and indecency,” Karroubi said.
The 2009 election, in which authorities swiftly declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the winner, triggered one of the biggest street unrests since the 1979 revolution, with mass demonstrations and a crackdown by security forces. Khamenei at the time urged Iranians to accept the result and later warned protesters to end rallies.
"Khamenei claimed insight, but destroyed the economy, culture, security and ethics, and what you see today is the product of that wrong approach,” Karroubi was quoted as saying by Iranian media.
Karroubi, who is no longer under house arrest, said both he and Mousavi “saw deviation” in 2009 and intervened out of concern for the country, arguing that the growing role of the Revolutionary Guards, Basij militia and security agencies in politics and the economy had “ruined” governance and eroded oversight.
“Oversight bodies lost their effectiveness and unbridled corruption spread throughout the country.”
Karroubi, a former parliament speaker who ran in 2009, also called for the release of Mousavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard. “I hope that childish grudges and stubbornness will end, and that we will soon witness the freedom of Mr. Mousavi and his respected wife,” he said.
Mousavi, a former prime minister who also contested the 2009 vote, has remained under house arrest with Rahnavard since 2011, while Karroubi’s detention eased earlier this year.
Karroubi linked political decisions to Iran’s economic deterioration, citing the currency’s collapse since their detention. “The day we went into house arrest, one dollar was 900 tomans and today it is 108,000 tomans, and if this path is not corrected God knows how much it will be in the near future,” he said.
He also criticized what he called excessive alignment with Moscow by some officials and lawmakers. “The deviation from the revolution and the martyrs’ ideals is such that some military men in parliament tear their shirts for [Vladimir] Putin,” he said.
Mousavi, who in July called for a referendum to convene a constitutional assembly, has said Iran’s political structure “does not represent all Iranians.”
Iranian authorities say the 2009 election was fair and that security measures then and since have been necessary to preserve order.
The deal with Basra Oil Company and the State Oil Marketing Organization, announced last week, aims to revive production at Majnoon, which is part of the same geological structure as Iran’s Azadegan field.
ExxonMobil plans to invest $5-10 billion to boost Majnoon’s output by 240,000 barrels a day over five years, helping Iraq hit its target of seven million barrels per day by 2030.
The American supermajor had left the Iraqi space when it exited another oil field due to what it described as challenging contract terms.
Across the border, decades of sanctions, underinvestment, and weak governance have crippled Iran’s ability to tap the same reservoirs including Azadegan, Yadavaran and West Karun, leaving output far below capacity.
Iraq’s comeback
Iraq’s resurgence is best illustrated by Majnoon, Artawi and Dehloran.
Majnoon, discovered in 1975 but dormant for decades, now produces more than five percent of Iraq’s total output. Artawi doubled production last year and is on course to do so again this year.
Together, these fields have added roughly 300,000 barrels a day since 2010, far outpacing Iran’s performance on the same geology.
The October ExxonMobil deal builds on this momentum, introducing advanced processing infrastructure and a profit-sharing model designed to sustain growth.
Iran’s stagnation
Iran, despite holding the world’s fourth-largest proven oil reserves, produces only about 200,000 barrels a day from the West Karun cluster—less than comparable Iraqi fields.
Modest gains at South Azadegan and Yaran this year have done little to close the gap.
Experts estimate Iran needs $11 billion to fully develop its five joint fields, but sanctions have deterred most international investors.
Sporadic involvement by Chinese and Russian firms has yielded little progress, while the absence of a bilateral framework for cross-border field management risks reservoir damage from unilateral drilling.
Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company still relies on old-style contracts offering low returns of 15-20 percent, compared with Iraq’s 20-30 percent technical service terms that attract global players.
As a result, Iran’s shared fields operate at barely a quarter of their potential.
Recent government plans to raise West Karun output to 550,000 barrels a day by 2033 are widely seen as unrealistic without sanctions relief and major reforms.
Meanwhile, a shadow trade rebranding Iranian oil as Iraqi through ship-to-ship transfers keeps exports near 1.5 million barrels a day but undermines transparency and investor confidence.
Shifting Power Balance
The contrast between Basra’s humming rigs and Ahvaz’s stalled projects reflects more than technical capacity — it marks a shift in regional power. Iraq’s energy sovereignty is strengthening through foreign partnerships and phased development, while Tehran’s stagnation erodes both revenue and influence.
Iraq’s experience shows how targeted investment and competent management can turn contested resources into engines of growth. For Iran, isolation and rigid policies have turned the same geology into a symbol of lost opportunity.
Ayandeh survived on illusion—paying old investors with new deposits while building an empire of glass and marble called Iran Mall.
Earlier this week, Iran’s Central Bank ordered its liquidation into the state-owned Bank Melli, the country’s largest financial institution.
Built on sand
Founded in 2010 by businessman Ali Ansari, Ayandeh emerged from the merger of his Bank Tat with several smaller institutions.
Within a few years, it shook up Iran’s banking sector by offering interest rates roughly four percentage points higher than those allowed by the Money and Credit Council.
The strategy drew millions of depositors and rapidly expanded its market share; by 2017, Ayandeh held 7.6 percent of all deposits in Iran’s banking system. Beneath that success lay a web of risky loans and inflated promises.
By 2020, the bank’s fortunes had reversed, and calls for its liquidation began. When it was finally folded into Bank Melli, the savings of seven million depositors were trapped in bad loans and speculative ventures.
Much like a Ponzi scheme, Ayandeh relied on a steady inflow of new deposits to pay earlier investors while channeling enormous sums into illiquid assets—mostly real estate.
Biggest Gamble: Iran Mall
Experts trace Ayandeh’s downfall to its massive exposure to real estate, especially the Iran Mall—a colossal shopping and leisure complex west of Tehran (1.95 million square meters) developed and owned by Ansari himself.
Investigations showed that roughly 70 percent of Ayandeh’s lending went to the Iran Mall Development Company, a subsidiary fully owned by the bank.
The loans exceeded the legal limit for a single borrower by more than a thousandfold—blatant self-dealing that violated banking laws capping ownership of any single shareholder at 10 percent, or 30 percent with Central Bank approval.
Ayandeh’s executives effectively lent billions to themselves, betting that post-nuclear-deal optimism and foreign investment would transform Iran Mall into a profit engine.
But after the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran’s economy contracted, purchasing power plunged, and foreign brands stayed away. What was meant as a monument to modern commerce became a mausoleum of financial hubris and cronyism.
Shielded by Power
Ansari, now 63, began building his empire in his twenties, founding Bank Tat in 2009 with a capital base of 2 trillion rials (about $200 million at the time) before merging it with other institutions to form Ayandeh.
Beyond Iran Mall, he owned several luxury properties, including a Tehran tower sold to convicted tycoon Babak Zanjani, who paid only one-fifth of the price.
After Ayandeh’s dissolution, Ansari claimed his “conscience is clear,” though he has faced no legal proceedings.
Rumors persist of political protection, including alleged ties to Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s son, and Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, Mojtaba’s father-in-law.
These remain unverified but reinforce perceptions that Ayandeh’s rise and fal were inseparable from Iran’s political elite.
‘People pay the price’
By the time the Central Bank dissolved Ayandeh, the bank was 550 quadrillion rials (roughly $5.1 billion) in debt.
If its real-estate assets—including Iran Mall—cannot be sold to cover liabilities, the Central Bank will have to print money to repay depositors, injecting vast sums into the economy—a “pure inflationary disaster,” as the financial outlet Bourse Press warned.
Officials have pledged that major shareholders will be held accountable and small depositors repaid first, but skepticism abounds.
Economist Ali Sarzaeem argued that the Central Bank long knew the scale of Ayandeh’s abuses but lacked the will to act.
“If the bank’s assets are overvalued or unsellable,” he wrote, “the gap between debt and equity will again be filled from the pockets of ordinary Iranians.”
The moderate-conservative Jomhuri Eslami painted an even bleaker picture: “Even more tragic is that this infection has been passed on to Bank Melli—and that bank too will sooner or later meet the same fate.”