Iran International
A blunt acknowledgment by Iran’s former state broadcasting chief that the country’s satellites ban and the so-called morality police had become “obsolete” has underscored how the state's strict social codes are eroding in practice.
“The law banning satellite receivers has become obsolete and is no longer enforced,” Ezzatollah Zarghami wrote in the government’s official daily Iran. “Similarly, the morality patrol is now obsolete.”
“All those who care for the revolution admit the wrongfulness and ineffectiveness (of the satellite ban),” added Zarghami, who served as culture minister under conservative President Ebrahim Raisi.
Other establishment figures have voiced similar views.
Mohammadreza Bahonar, a senior Expediency Council member, said during a televised debate that “the era of governing the country through mandatory hijab laws is over,” though he later softened his tone, calling the hijab a “social necessity.”
Such comments from prominent conservatives suggest the theocracy’s flagship ban may be on its way to a long list of restrictions that have quietly fallen into disuse.
Satellite dishes: banned but ever-present
The possession and use of satellite equipment has been banned under a 1994 law but millions of Iranians continue to use dishes, and with the ban only remaining on paper, enforcement largely lapsed.
During the 2000s and 2010s, police and Basij forces famously rappelled down buildings to seize dishes in a crackdown against “Western cultural invasion.” The raids targeted households secretly using satellite dishes.
Morality patrols in retreat
Feared morality patrols that enforced Islamic veiling largely vanished from the streets of Tehran and other cities after the nationwide protests following the death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in their custody in September 2022. Many women now go out without even carrying a headscarf.
Iran's Supreme National Security Council this year shelved a very strict new hijab law drawn by the Parliament’s ultra-hardliners, likely in a bid to avert a public backlash.
The new law aimed to dramatically increase fines and prison terms for women appearing unveiled in public and extended penalties to businesses and online platforms that fail to enforce or promote the dress code.
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government says no resources will be allocated for enforcement, but hardliners continue to push back.
Judiciary spokesman Asghar Jahangir affirmed earlier hijab laws remain enforceable, with police warning businesses to comply and Tehran’s morality enforcers say they are planning to mobilize 80,000 “promoters of virtue” to monitor women’s dress across the capital and a “Chastity and Hijab Situation Room” involving cultural and executive bodies.
Bans fail or fall away
From satellite dishes to hijab, chess and billiards, Iran’s history shows that laws may be decreed, but culture often wins in the end.
Chess was banned for several years following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as some clerics considered it a form of gambling and a distraction from religious duties.
Ayatollah Khomeini, who initially opposed the game, issued a 1988 fatwa allowing chess if no gambling was involved and religious obligations were not neglected.
Its reinstatement led to a resurgence of interest. Today, chess tables and players are a common sight in urban parks.
In the early 1980s, billiard halls were shut down as symbols of Western decadence and immoral leisure, with authoritities associating them with gambling, smoking and social corruption. Even selling billiard tables was prohibited.
By the mid-1990s billiards was officially reclassified as a “sport” rather than a “vice,” allowing clubs to operate legally. Today, Iranian players compete internationally.
The grouping promotes a vision of “Islamic civilization” that supporters hail as moral renewal—but critics see as another bid to consolidate control within the ruling system.
Positioning itself as an ambitious civilizational force, the party pledges disciplined ideology, elite-cadre training, and governance rooted in “revolutionary justice.”
It rejects technocratic reformism, presenting itself as guardian of the revolution’s founding ideals and the “discourse of resistance” championed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Establishment and structure
The party formally launched its activities at its first congress on October 9, which also elected a central council for a two-year term.
It announced plans to form national expert commissions and provincial offices devoted to “discourse-building,” “cadre development,” and “strategic planning” to steer its political, cultural, and social outreach.
Funding sources remain undisclosed, raising questions about the scale and backing of its operations. It is also unclear whether the party intends to field candidates or focus primarily on ideological and institutional work.
Key Figures
All major figures in the party backed Saeed Jalili in the 2024 presidential race, underscoring its alignment with the hardline “resistance” camp.
Ideology and tenets
The party’s social-media platforms invite participation in “ummah-building” and the realization of a new Islamic civilization.
Its rhetoric draws heavily on the writings of Khamenei and his predecessor—Iran’s first supreme leader—Ruhollah Khomeini, emphasizing “revolutionary governance” centered on Islamic justice and resistance.
It opposed a recent proposal by the semi-official House of Parties to grant amnesty to security convicts, arguing that such measures encroach on the Khamenei’s prerogative as supreme leader.
The party’s ideological terrain overlaps with existing ultra-conservative networks such as the Paydari (Steadfastness) Front and Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF)—signaling its role as part of a broader effort to institutionalize Khamenei-era orthodoxy through new organizational channels.
