Iran International
Tehran’s catalogue of political feuds appears to have grown with the dwindling presence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei following the June war with Israel—a trend that, Iranian scholars warn, could push a country already rife with discontent to the brink.
Khamenei, long the ultimate arbiter among rival factions, has been seen in public only a few times since Israeli strikes killed his most senior commanders.
His absence—coupled with a pervasive sense of imminent crisis—has sharpened long-standing rivalries among factions that now see it as more urgent than ever to position themselves for an inevitable post-Khamenei era.
Tensions between former security chief Ali Shamkhani and ex-president Hassan Rouhani’s camps have grown so fierce that the IRGC-linked daily Javan urged both sides to “declare a ceasefire.”
Earlier this month, Shamkhani accused Rouhani of knowing immediately that the Ukrainian airliner was downed by IRGC missiles in 2020, despite his claims of learning about it days later.
Last Friday, a video appeared on social media from the wedding of Shamkhani’s daughter, which was far from Islamic standards promoted by Iran’s establishment, leading many to say it was Rouhani’s response.
‘Flying the Russian flag’
In another episode, hardliners sided with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who last week blamed former foreign minister Javad Zarif for a clause in the 2015 nuclear deal that Lavrov and his supporters in Tehran say led inevitably to return of UN sanctions in September 2025.
Hardline MP Mojtaba Zarei went as far to urge the public prosecutor to summon Zarif to court. In response, Hessamoddin Ashna, a former aide to Rouhani and Zarif, warned on X that everyone would lose if the duo were to “open their mouths.”
The reformist outlet Rouydad24 also came to Zarif’s defense, quipping that “the Russian flag was flying over the hardline camp in Tehran.”
Former IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi escalated tensions by making a veiled threat against Rouhani, sarcastically recalling the death of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in a swimming pool.
Rouhani’s aides reminded him that Rafsanjani had once saved Safavi from execution on treason charges in 1988. Safavi went on to accuse Rafsanjani of seeking power beyond his presidential authority—a pointed analogy aimed at Rouhani.
‘Mind the gaps’
Commenting on the rising tensions, former lawmaker Gholam Ali Jafarzadeh Imanabadi accused president Masoud Pezeshkian of recklessly fueling popular discontent with hiring thousands of new hijab enforcers, saying it was “funding the dangerous social divide.”
“The government is funding the escalation of social divides,” Imanabadi told business daily Jahan-e San’at, adding that the moderate president may be overlooking the consequences.
Renowned Iranian sociologists such as Mohammad Fazeli and Taqi Azad Armaki have long warned that widening divides between rich and poor, urban and marginal, old and young, and men and women could trigger a “social tumour.”
They say reckless decisions by unelected hardliners—or by those elected with the backing of a small minority—risk reigniting widespread unrest like that of 2022.
With Khamenei’s presence waning and factional rivalries deepening, the state may find itself more vulnerable than ever to the very unrest its leaders fear most.
It remains to be seen whether, after such bitter feuds, the ruling elite can again close ranks in the face of popular adversity — as they have so often done before.
The grouping promotes a vision of “Islamic civilization” that supporters hail as moral renewal—but critics see as another bid to consolidate control within the ruling system.
Positioning itself as an ambitious civilizational force, the party pledges disciplined ideology, elite-cadre training, and governance rooted in “revolutionary justice.”
It rejects technocratic reformism, presenting itself as guardian of the revolution’s founding ideals and the “discourse of resistance” championed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Establishment and structure
The party formally launched its activities at its first congress on October 9, which also elected a central council for a two-year term.
It announced plans to form national expert commissions and provincial offices devoted to “discourse-building,” “cadre development,” and “strategic planning” to steer its political, cultural, and social outreach.
Funding sources remain undisclosed, raising questions about the scale and backing of its operations. It is also unclear whether the party intends to field candidates or focus primarily on ideological and institutional work.
Key Figures
All major figures in the party backed Saeed Jalili in the 2024 presidential race, underscoring its alignment with the hardline “resistance” camp.
Ideology and tenets
The party’s social-media platforms invite participation in “ummah-building” and the realization of a new Islamic civilization.
Its rhetoric draws heavily on the writings of Khamenei and his predecessor—Iran’s first supreme leader—Ruhollah Khomeini, emphasizing “revolutionary governance” centered on Islamic justice and resistance.
It opposed a recent proposal by the semi-official House of Parties to grant amnesty to security convicts, arguing that such measures encroach on the Khamenei’s prerogative as supreme leader.
The party’s ideological terrain overlaps with existing ultra-conservative networks such as the Paydari (Steadfastness) Front and Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF)—signaling its role as part of a broader effort to institutionalize Khamenei-era orthodoxy through new organizational channels.
