Iran Claims Thwarting ‘Terrorist’ Infiltration Ahead of Elections

During a meeting in Mecca, attended by the Iranian Ambassador to Riyadh, Navvab stated that "Some of the host country's (Saudi Arabia) actions have been unprecedented in any previous Hajj seasons."

He highlighted the recent expulsion of six individuals, identified by Iranian officials as members of an Iranian government media group, suggesting that these expulsions occurred under questionable circumstances. Navvab also mentioned that an Iranian detained in Medina is facing harsh conditions, with little hope for a prompt release. No further details about this individual were provided.

The statement by the official come as Tehran has historically used the Hajj and the presence of Iranian pilgrims to instigate political demonstrations. In a speech on May 6, Supreme Leader Khamenei criticized the US and Israel, indirectly targeting Saudi Arabia by condemning those who befriend these nations.

He reiterated a call for Iranian pilgrims to distance themselves from "the criminal Zionist enemy and its supporters," reviving a rhetoric of confrontation reminiscent of past decades.

Although the Islamic Republic resumed diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia last year, brokered by China, after a seven-year break, the two regional powers are far from establishing close ties and exhibiting mutual trust.

The Iranian official did not reveal any details or provide any names.

Doubts persist about the feasibility of these claims. The trend of Iranian expatriates returning to contribute to state-run projects remains minimal, with many questioning the viability of repatriation efforts amidst ongoing internal issues such as political instability, economic challenges, and a lack of academic freedom.

These conditions have historically driven the brain drain, pushing numerous academics and professionals to seek opportunities in more stable environments abroad.

Moslemi-Naeini discussed the plans in the context of launching a national center, focused on advancements in artificial intelligence and robotics, slated to be operational by year's end.

However, critics argue that while the Iranian government projects optimism about attracting global talent, the systemic issues that plague the nation cast a long shadow over the potential success of such initiatives.

In September, Dr. Saeid Moidfar, chairman of the Iranian Sociological Association, conveyed a grim outlook for Iran. He noted the pervasive sense of despair among Iranians, exacerbated by the government’s severe crackdown on dissent, curtailment of women’s rights, and a deepening economic crisis. Moidfar criticized the governance of the country, stating that when people feel disconnected from decision-making, suffer economically every day, and witness the degradation of social values, they see no future in staying.

Data from Iran's customs organization, analyzed by Iran International, showed that several items listed under a US advisory guide were imported in the first two months of the current Iranian year, which began on March 20.

Earlier this month, the US issued an advisory to alert the public about the threat posed by Iran’s procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Given Iran's dependence on foreign procurement for items it cannot produce domestically, specific trade product codes were identified by the US so that “exporters, manufacturers, distributors, and financial institutions” avoid unintentionally contributing to Iran’s UAV programs. Among these codes is 840710, which pertains to aircraft spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines.

The Islamic Republic’s customs report indicated that between late March and May 2024, approximately $10 million worth of goods with this code were imported from China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Germany, the UAE, Russia, Turkey, Italy, the US, Qatar, and Oman.

Following Iran's significant transfer of lethal drones to Russia starting in mid-2022, sanctions have been imposed by the US, UK, and EU against Iranian individuals and entities involved in the UAV supply chain, as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

In February, hackers revealed that Iran was receiving gold from Russia as partial payment for the drones.

The hackers breached the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) email servers, uncovering data on the sale of Shahed drones to Russia via a front company, Sahara Thunder.

In April, the US Treasury, in coordination with the UK and Canada, targeted Sahara Thunder, accusing it of supporting the IRGC and Russia's war in Ukraine. The Treasury highlighted Sahara Thunder's pivotal role in designing, developing, manufacturing, and selling thousands of drones, many of which were transferred to Russia.

Additionally, the Treasury targeted Sahara Thunder's leadership and shipping network, facilitating the sale and shipment of Iranian commodities to China, Russia, and Venezuela.

The sanctions followed Israel's call for international support after Iran's direct assault in April, which involved over 300 missiles and drones launched from Iran, most of which were intercepted by Israel and its allies.

Tehran asserted that the attack was a retaliation for an Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Syria on April 1, which resulted in the deaths of IRGC commanders.

Additionally, after Tehran's attack, the EU expanded its sanctions on Iranian drone and missile producers, complementing existing measures against Iran for selling drones to Russia for use in the Ukraine conflict.

Furthermore, Iran's exports are not limited to Russia. It has reportedly provided weapons technology to militant groups in the region, such as the Houthis.

Since November, the Houthis have utilized Iranian-provided missiles and drones to target commercial vessels in the Red Sea, an essential artery for global trade. Initially triggered by the Israeli military operations in Gaza, these attacks have significantly disrupted maritime commerce in the area.

The Houthis' offensive in the Red Sea commenced following a directive from Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, urging Muslim nations to obstruct Israeli trade routes.

In this week's episode of ‘Eye for Iran,' host Negar Mojtahedi speaks to author and journalist Arash Azizi, and Gabriel Noronha, who served as the Iran advisor to the US State Department during Trump's presidency, about the six candidates approved by the Guardian Council to run and what they mean for the future of Iran.

Who will succeed the late president Ebrahim Raisi? Will the 'Woman, Life, Freedom' movement impact the outcome of the elections?

'Eye for Iran' attempts to answers those questions and more.

Azizi and Noronha both believe Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is a top contender to win, and the reason has to do with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei and his age.

"I think the most important question for the future Iran right now is what's going to happen when Khamenei dies...I think Iran after Khamenei is moving into a definitely less clerical and even less Islamist ideology in many ways, into more of a military authoritarian state," said Azizi.

With there being one moderate in the mix, namely Masoud Pezeshkian, Noronha believes it won't make much of a difference. He said "there's the talk about the moderates and the reformists. I don't believe at this point, if you're part and parcel of the Iranian government and establishment, that there is a real reformist movement left at all. And I don't think most of the Iranian people really believe that there's much of a difference at this point."

Watch and listen to this week’s episode of ‘Eye for Iran’ as your host and guests dig into these topics.

The six candidates, handpicked by the regime, have so far confined their campaigns to free appearances on state television, participating in dull interviews that have failed to engage or motivate viewers.

It appears the Islamic Republic has run out of politicians who can effectively communicate with the public. The same familiar faces appear on television news daily, offering generic statements like, "We need to use all potentials to turn threats into opportunities!" These platitudes are repeated about nearly every issue, from increasing wheat production or imports to addressing the need for higher salaries and reducing the 50% annual inflation rate.

In the TV interviews, the candidates are often seen sitting, appearing as if they are in great agony. Smiles are rare, as are new and interesting comments or any sense of humor.

The interviewers seem hesitant to ask serious questions about anything. Foreign policy and the nuclear issue are not discussed, suggesting they have been perhaps instructed to avoid sensitive topics. For the first time, state television has openly acknowledged censoring candidates' statements. In at least one instance, the broadcast of an interview with candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was delayed for this reason.

The only candidate who has so far been observed to try to be charming is right-wing cleric Mostafa Pourmohammadi who is being presented as a 'moderate" candidate. He was brave enough to speak against restrictions on social media.

The cleric is the only one of the six candidates who occasionally manages to smile, a stark contrast to his 45 years of habitual frowning. Additionally, he stands out for his well-tailored clerical robes and good taste in color coordination, a notion seemingly loston the other candidates.

He is the only candidate with an organized campaign and a campaign manager well-known to Iranians interested in cultural issues. His campaign manager, Hojjatollah Ayubi, is recognized as one of the most liberal officials the Islamic Republic has ever had in the area of cinema. In contrast, other candidates have typically selected individuals with military or political backgrounds. These factors make Pourmohammadi, who has a controversial background in the judiciary, security, and intelligence affairs, stand out among the six candidates.

Unlike the other candidates, he is transparent about his association with Nameh News, the website that supports him and which he has always been behind. In contrast, other candidates have never publicly associated themselves with the numerous media outlets that serve their interests and are often funded by the government. For instance, Hamshahri newspaper and its affiliated publications support Mayor Zakani, while the hardline websites Raja News and Mashregh News advocate for Jalili's candidacy.

Massoud Pezeshkian likely has the best access to media, with the Reform Front endorsing his candidacy. His images are prominently featured in the two centrist dailies, Ham Mihan and Sazandegi, although these publications occasionally criticize him for one or two mistakes.

Next week the campaign scene will probably change as candidates are to face each other in televised debates. Unlike current interviews that are being aired in a fragmented way from various channels with varying degrees of popularity and viewership and deprive the candidates from being seen by the right viewers at the right time, the debates will be aired from the key channels such as the news channel IRINN at a time that suits most viewers.

State TV has openly stated that it will moderate the debates and has warned candidates to avoid controversial and sensitive issues. However, it will be difficult for most candidates to appear as timid as they do in the interviews, as they might have to respond to accusations and counter-accusations.

But will they have anything different and interesting to say? That remains to be seen. Will the public pay attention to the candidates and their statements? That is an even bigger question.