Hassan Moslemi-Naeini, head of Iran’s Academic Center for Education, Culture and Research (ACECR), claims that “a number of Iranian scientists residing in the US have shown willingness to collaborate with Iranian academic institutions.”
The Iranian official did not reveal any details or provide any names.
Doubts persist about the feasibility of these claims. The trend of Iranian expatriates returning to contribute to state-run projects remains minimal, with many questioning the viability of repatriation efforts amidst ongoing internal issues such as political instability, economic challenges, and a lack of academic freedom.
These conditions have historically driven the brain drain, pushing numerous academics and professionals to seek opportunities in more stable environments abroad.
Moslemi-Naeini discussed the plans in the context of launching a national center, focused on advancements in artificial intelligence and robotics, slated to be operational by year's end.
However, critics argue that while the Iranian government projects optimism about attracting global talent, the systemic issues that plague the nation cast a long shadow over the potential success of such initiatives.
In September, Dr. Saeid Moidfar, chairman of the Iranian Sociological Association, conveyed a grim outlook for Iran. He noted the pervasive sense of despair among Iranians, exacerbated by the government’s severe crackdown on dissent, curtailment of women’s rights, and a deepening economic crisis. Moidfar criticized the governance of the country, stating that when people feel disconnected from decision-making, suffer economically every day, and witness the degradation of social values, they see no future in staying.
Iran has imported at least $10 million worth of drone engine parts over the course of two months from countries including China, Turkey, the UAE, Germany, and even the US despite global sanctions.
Data from Iran's customs organization, analyzed by Iran International, showed that several items listed under a US advisory guide were imported in the first two months of the current Iranian year, which began on March 20.
Earlier this month, the US issued an advisory to alert the public about the threat posed by Iran’s procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Given Iran's dependence on foreign procurement for items it cannot produce domestically, specific trade product codes were identified by the US so that “exporters, manufacturers, distributors, and financial institutions” avoid unintentionally contributing to Iran’s UAV programs. Among these codes is 840710, which pertains to aircraft spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines.
The Islamic Republic’s customs report indicated that between late March and May 2024, approximately $10 million worth of goods with this code were imported from China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Germany, the UAE, Russia, Turkey, Italy, the US, Qatar, and Oman.
Following Iran's significant transfer of lethal drones to Russia starting in mid-2022, sanctions have been imposed by the US, UK, and EU against Iranian individuals and entities involved in the UAV supply chain, as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
In February, hackers revealed that Iran was receiving gold from Russia as partial payment for the drones.
The hackers breached the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) email servers, uncovering data on the sale of Shahed drones to Russia via a front company, Sahara Thunder.
In April, the US Treasury, in coordination with the UK and Canada, targeted Sahara Thunder, accusing it of supporting the IRGC and Russia's war in Ukraine. The Treasury highlighted Sahara Thunder's pivotal role in designing, developing, manufacturing, and selling thousands of drones, many of which were transferred to Russia.
Additionally, the Treasury targeted Sahara Thunder's leadership and shipping network, facilitating the sale and shipment of Iranian commodities to China, Russia, and Venezuela.
The sanctions followed Israel's call for international support after Iran's direct assault in April, which involved over 300 missiles and drones launched from Iran, most of which were intercepted by Israel and its allies.
Tehran asserted that the attack was a retaliation for an Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Syria on April 1, which resulted in the deaths of IRGC commanders.
Additionally, after Tehran's attack, the EU expanded its sanctions on Iranian drone and missile producers, complementing existing measures against Iran for selling drones to Russia for use in the Ukraine conflict.
Furthermore, Iran's exports are not limited to Russia. It has reportedly provided weapons technology to militant groups in the region, such as the Houthis.
Since November, the Houthis have utilized Iranian-provided missiles and drones to target commercial vessels in the Red Sea, an essential artery for global trade. Initially triggered by the Israeli military operations in Gaza, these attacks have significantly disrupted maritime commerce in the area.
The Houthis' offensive in the Red Sea commenced following a directive from Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, urging Muslim nations to obstruct Israeli trade routes.
Iran's June 28 snap presidential election is a race dominated by hardliners which is widely considered by critics as a "selection", highly engineered by the state.
In this week's episode of ‘Eye for Iran,' host Negar Mojtahedi speaks to author and journalist Arash Azizi, and Gabriel Noronha, who served as the Iran advisor to the US State Department during Trump's presidency, about the six candidates approved by the Guardian Council to run and what they mean for the future of Iran.
Who will succeed the late president Ebrahim Raisi? Will the 'Woman, Life, Freedom' movement impact the outcome of the elections?
'Eye for Iran' attempts to answers those questions and more.
Azizi and Noronha both believe Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is a top contender to win, and the reason has to do with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei and his age.
"I think the most important question for the future Iran right now is what's going to happen when Khamenei dies...I think Iran after Khamenei is moving into a definitely less clerical and even less Islamist ideology in many ways, into more of a military authoritarian state," said Azizi.
With there being one moderate in the mix, namely Masoud Pezeshkian, Noronha believes it won't make much of a difference. He said "there's the talk about the moderates and the reformists. I don't believe at this point, if you're part and parcel of the Iranian government and establishment, that there is a real reformist movement left at all. And I don't think most of the Iranian people really believe that there's much of a difference at this point."
Watch and listen to this week’s episode of ‘Eye for Iran’ as your host and guests dig into these topics.
Less than two weeks before voting day, there is little sign of the upcoming presidential election among the Iranian public, which appears indifferent. Some speculate this might change, but that seems unlikely given the trend in recent elections.
The six candidates, handpicked by the regime, have so far confined their campaigns to free appearances on state television, participating in dull interviews that have failed to engage or motivate viewers.
It appears the Islamic Republic has run out of politicians who can effectively communicate with the public. The same familiar faces appear on television news daily, offering generic statements like, "We need to use all potentials to turn threats into opportunities!" These platitudes are repeated about nearly every issue, from increasing wheat production or imports to addressing the need for higher salaries and reducing the 50% annual inflation rate.
In the TV interviews, the candidates are often seen sitting, appearing as if they are in great agony. Smiles are rare, as are new and interesting comments or any sense of humor.
The interviewers seem hesitant to ask serious questions about anything. Foreign policy and the nuclear issue are not discussed, suggesting they have been perhaps instructed to avoid sensitive topics. For the first time, state television has openly acknowledged censoring candidates' statements. In at least one instance, the broadcast of an interview with candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was delayed for this reason.
The only candidate who has so far been observed to try to be charming is right-wing cleric Mostafa Pourmohammadi who is being presented as a 'moderate" candidate. He was brave enough to speak against restrictions on social media.
The cleric is the only one of the six candidates who occasionally manages to smile, a stark contrast to his 45 years of habitual frowning. Additionally, he stands out for his well-tailored clerical robes and good taste in color coordination, a notion seemingly loston the other candidates.
He is the only candidate with an organized campaign and a campaign manager well-known to Iranians interested in cultural issues. His campaign manager, Hojjatollah Ayubi, is recognized as one of the most liberal officials the Islamic Republic has ever had in the area of cinema. In contrast, other candidates have typically selected individuals with military or political backgrounds. These factors make Pourmohammadi, who has a controversial background in the judiciary, security, and intelligence affairs, stand out among the six candidates.
Unlike the other candidates, he is transparent about his association with Nameh News, the website that supports him and which he has always been behind. In contrast, other candidates have never publicly associated themselves with the numerous media outlets that serve their interests and are often funded by the government. For instance, Hamshahri newspaper and its affiliated publications support Mayor Zakani, while the hardline websites Raja News and Mashregh News advocate for Jalili's candidacy.
Massoud Pezeshkian likely has the best access to media, with the Reform Front endorsing his candidacy. His images are prominently featured in the two centrist dailies, Ham Mihan and Sazandegi, although these publications occasionally criticize him for one or two mistakes.
Next week the campaign scene will probably change as candidates are to face each other in televised debates. Unlike current interviews that are being aired in a fragmented way from various channels with varying degrees of popularity and viewership and deprive the candidates from being seen by the right viewers at the right time, the debates will be aired from the key channels such as the news channel IRINN at a time that suits most viewers.
State TV has openly stated that it will moderate the debates and has warned candidates to avoid controversial and sensitive issues. However, it will be difficult for most candidates to appear as timid as they do in the interviews, as they might have to respond to accusations and counter-accusations.
But will they have anything different and interesting to say? That remains to be seen. Will the public pay attention to the candidates and their statements? That is an even bigger question.
The Group of Seven leaders warned Iran Friday not to give Russia ballistic missiles, only a day after the two countries’ much-publicized strategic agreement was confirmed to have been halted due to “issues” on the Iranian part.
Iran and Russia have grown closer due to the war in Ukraine, which has resulted in sweeping sanctions on Russia from the US and the EU. Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds of kamikaze drones, and unofficial reports suggest that Tehran may be considering enhancing its assistance with missiles.
"We call on Iran to stop assisting Russia’s war in Ukraine and not to transfer ballistic missiles and related technology, as this would represent a substantive material escalation and a direct threat to European security," the G7 stated.
In February, Reuters reported that Iran had provided Russia with “a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles”. The claim was later repeated by UK defense secretary Grant Shapps, who indicated that he had such information but refused to offer details..
Iran and Russia have been working on a long-term agreement for a few years now, hoping to set in stone a trend that has seen Tehran and Moscow expand and deepen ties.
The new comprehensive cooperation agreement was conceived under former President Hassan Rouhani and officially announced by his late successor, Ebrahim Raisi. “Documents of strategic cooperation can outline the horizons of the [two countries’] relations over 20 years,” Raisi said after he met Putin and presented the draft in 2022.
The agreement was expected to be signed this year, but the Russian side announced Wednesday that the process was halted due to “issues faced by our Iranian partners.” Russia's TASS news agency then quoted foreign minister Sergei Lavrov as saying that several "procedural legislative actions" must be completed before the agreement can be signed.
It is unclear what the “actions” are and if it is related to the unexpected, upcoming presidential elections in Iran, which were announced after Raisi died in a helicopter crash last month.
Earlier on Friday, it was announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran’s acting president, Mohammad Mokhber, had talked on the phone Thursday evening, in what seems to be the latest attempt to counter rumors surrounding the ‘halt’ of the two countries’ comprehensive agreement.
“Both sides expressed their interest in further development of Russian-Iranian cooperation,” according to the Kremlin, “including in implementing promising joint projects in energy and transport.”
Reza Talebi, Iran International's political correspondent, believes the ‘halt could be a strategic move by Putin to exert more pressure on an isolated Iran.
"It's a message from Vladimir Putin to Tehran, warning them not to alter their policies, particularly concerning Ukraine and the Gaza conflict. Additionally, it aims to pressure the incoming Iranian government into negotiations to secure more favorable terms," he stated.
Under severe international sanctions, Russia and Iran have expanded their economic ties, with mutual trade standing at $4 billion, which even Iranian officials admit is far below the target of $40 billion.
The two countries reached an agreement in December to eliminate the use of the US dollar in bilateral trade, a development heralded by Iran's central bank governor as a "new chapter." However, the move has more of a symbolic significance than a real economic act.
Pro-reform candidate Massoud Pezeshkian argued in his first economic discussion aired on state television that Iran's international isolation must end and that foreign investment is essential for economic improvement.
Pezeshkian was accompanied by two economic advisers and was questioned by three economic experts during the 45-minute program about his proposed plans. Throughout the program, however, he insisted that he was not an expert and would only follow the advice of economists.
“As a physician, I will ruin everything if I enter the economic arena [on my own],” he said. Some of his critics on social media charge that without economic knowledge he is more likely to ruin the economy anyway.
“Instead of establishing cooperation and attracting investment they do something else [that defeats the purpose]. We cause such catastrophes even when an investor comes to our country that they regret their decision to invest here,” Pezeshkian said.
“Bringing foreign investment can prevent the [continuation of] current pressures,” he said while also criticizing policies that have resulted in the country’s brain-drain problem.
Pezeshkian's remarks are typical of regime insiders, who when compelled to address the worsening economy, avoid mentioning the real reasons for Iran's isolation: its confrontational foreign policy and its controversial nuclear program. Their typical response is to blame inefficient officials, who do not fully follow policies and laws.
Iran's average annual economic growth rate for the past 12 years has been around zero, with international sanctions on oil exports and international banking devastating the economy and preventing investments. Tehran has also refused accession to global financial transparency conventions, which has further impeded foreign investments.
Ahmad Midari, one of the two advisers accompanying Pezeshkian, mentioned that tensions caused by political factionalism in the foreign policy apparatus and other government bodies was an impediment to the economy that Pezeshkian’s government would try to eliminate.
“The truth of the matter is that those who are unfairly called ‘pro-West’ are executives who were in a position of authority when the establishment decided to negotiate with the West or were employed at such times due to their expertise in negotiation,” he said.
In his introduction to the program, Pezeshkian pointed out that official figures indicate the inflation rate has been over 40 percent between March 2021 and March 2023 and that excluding oil the economic growth rate was negative.
All the presidential candidates have admitted that the economy is in trouble, but none have directly attributed it to Tehran's foreign policy, because that would be viewed as a criticism of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Pezeshkian, however, tried to highlight some negative economic indicators. The government’s debt to the Central Bank has more than doubled to $5.4 billion since March 2021 and its debt to other banks has doubled to $13.5 billion, he said, adding that during the same time the value of securities issued by the government has reached $12.4 billion from $5.5 billion.
Pezeshkian has been criticized for his choice of economic advisers due to their very different expert views. Hossein Abdo-Tabrizi, a former secretary general of the Tehran Stock Exchange (2003-2005), founder of a private bank (Eghtesad Novin), and owner of the banned Sarmayeh (Capital) newspaper is known for defending a free market economy while Midari, deputy minister of cooperatives, labor and social welfare under Hassan Rouhani, upholds left-leaning views and is a researcher in poverty.
Conservative politician Yahya Al-e Es'haq who was a former head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce and served as minister of commerce under Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani sat on the three-member panel that questioned Pezeshkian and his advisers.
Al-e Es'haq was heard several times during the program saying “well said, well said” in response to Pezeshkian’s remarks including when he argued that there was no shortage of laws and problems stemmed from neglecting the existing ones.
Another member of the panel, Davoud Danesh-Jafari who currently sits on the Macro-Economy Committee of the Expediency Council and served as minister of economy under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also occasionally showed his approval of Pezeshkian and his advisers by nodding his head.
The third 'expert' on the panel, Mohammad-Hossein Hosseinzadeh-Bahraini, a cleric and former lawmaker, tried to pressure Pezeshkian into admitting that he supported the elimination of fuel subsidies—an admission that could alienate the public. However, Pezeshkian responded by stating that he would rely solely on expert opinions if such a measure was necessary and would keep the public informed of the details.
Sudden announcement of an increase in fuel prices under Hassan Rouhani resulted in unrest across the country in 2019, during which security forces killed at least 1,500 protesters.