Senior visiting fellow, George Mason University
Iran, home to the world's second-largest natural gas reserves, is turning to Russia for supplies as war damage and years of underinvestment threaten to deepen an energy crisis ahead of winter.
After meeting President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on November 5, Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei said the two countries had discussed pipelines to ease Iran's gas shortages and supply neighbouring markets.
The proposal offers potential relief, but raises a larger question: whether Russian imports will help Iran repair its struggling energy system or merely postpone the reforms needed to make it work.
On November 1, National Iranian Gas Company chief Saeed Tavakoli said attacks on four processing facilities had removed 230 million cubic metres of daily capacity. Repairs had restored 100 million, leaving 130 million unavailable.
Tavakoli warned that Iran could face a peak winter shortfall of around 400 million cubic metres a day. The figure is an official estimate for periods of maximum demand, not a year-round deficit.
The consequences are already visible. Gas supplies to cement plants were cut from October 23, according to an industry representative, forcing factories to switch to fuel oil. Such rationing protects household heating but disrupts production, increases costs and worsens air pollution.
The US Energy Information Administration estimated that the country produced 9.4 trillion cubic feet of gas in 2023 while consuming 8.9 trillion, leaving a narrow margin that conceals much sharper winter shortages.
Heavily subsidised prices encourage consumption, while inadequate investment, limited storage and restricted access to technology constrain supply. The giant South Pars field also needs investment to counter declining reservoir pressure.
Sanctions have obstructed financing and equipment purchases, but Tehran's policies have compounded the problem. Expanding dependence on cheap gas without sufficient investment in efficiency and production has left the economy vulnerable whenever temperatures fall.
Russian imports could provide breathing space. They cannot correct those weaknesses by themselves.
Iran and Russia have discussed gas cooperation for more than two years, but announcements have repeatedly outpaced delivery. Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company signed a memorandum in June 2024.
In January 2025, Putin outlined initial supplies of 2 billion cubic metres annually, potentially rising to 55 billion. Iranian officials announced further progress in October 2026, but a firm delivery date and financing for a major pipeline remain unclear.
Two billion cubic metres annually averages just 5.5 million cubic metres a day, less than 2% of Iran's estimated peak winter shortfall. Even the ambitious target of 55 billion annually averages about 151 million cubic metres a day.
These comparisons illustrate scale rather than guaranteed winter deliveries, which would depend on contracts, pipeline capacity and seasonal demand. Initial imports could help particular regions or industries but would make only a modest difference nationally.
Existing infrastructure through Azerbaijan could carry limited initial supplies. Reaching the larger target would require substantial investment in pipelines and equipment, transit agreements and reliable delivery arrangements.
Commercial terms also remain uncertain. Pricing and payment arrangements were still unresolved earlier this year, and subsequent announcements have not disclosed the details. Selling imported gas into Iran's heavily subsidised domestic market could increase pressure on public finances.
US sanctions could complicate financing and payments, although certain natural gas transactions are exempt from specific restrictions. Other sanctions affecting banks, contractors and designated companies would still need to be navigated.
For Moscow, the attraction is clear. Having lost much of its European pipeline market, Russia needs alternative buyers. Iran offers substantial demand and potential access to neighbouring markets.
But the partnership could come with unequal leverage. Tehran urgently needs gas, infrastructure and financing, while Moscow has supplies to sell. Dependence on Russian equipment, funding and deliveries could leave Iran with fewer options when negotiating prices and future commitments.
The arrangement also fits Tehran's ambition to become a regional gas trading hub. Yet that ambition faces a basic credibility test: can Iran reliably supply neighbouring countries when it struggles to meet domestic demand during winter?
Russian gas could support regional trade, but Iran risks becoming primarily a route for Russian exports without gaining meaningful control over prices or supply.
Ultimately, imports could help keep factories operating and reduce emergency fuel switching. Lasting energy security, however, requires repairing damaged facilities, sustaining production at South Pars and improving efficiency, alongside gradual subsidy reform that protects poorer households.
For a country with the world's second-largest gas reserves, the need to import is itself a measure of striking energy system deterioration. Whether the arrangement helps reverse that decline or just deepens Tehran's dependence on Moscow matters far more than the volume of gas promised.
Unpaid insurance reimbursements and rising medicine and equipment prices are draining private hospitals' finances, threatening their ability to maintain services and increasing costs for patients, hospital executives said in accounts published on Thursday.
A journalist in Iran described the financial pressures facing non-government hospitals following a meeting of hospital directors, with some executives saying insurers had failed to settle bills dating back to the Iranian calendar year that ended in March 2025.
One director of a major hospital in a provincial capital said the facility had contracts with about 35 basic and supplementary insurers, welfare departments, banks and other institutions, none of which had settled their outstanding bills for that year.
The largest unpaid balances belonged to Dey and Dana Insurance, the director said.
The financial shortfalls come as hospitals face rapidly increasing costs for medicines and medical supplies, with treatment tariffs adjusted annually even as procurement prices change daily.
A director overseeing another hospital with more than 1,200 medical and administrative employees said inflation had made it increasingly difficult to replace medicines and supplies after use.
The price of Ringer's solution, a commonly used intravenous fluid, had increased by 600 percent over three years, the director said.
Insulin and widely used blood pressure medications have also risen in price by as much as 50 percent over the past month.
Some retirees said these medicines were unavailable at Social Security medical facilities, forcing them to seek supplies from other pharmacies.
Hospital costs rise faster than treatment tariffs
One private hospital with more than 300 beds and nearly 20 operating rooms has established a separate department to update medicine prices because they change daily, its director said.
The hospital is not profitable, with revenue covering only operating expenses and staff salaries, according to the director.
The mismatch between changing procurement costs and annually fixed treatment tariffs has added to the financial pressures on hospitals already waiting for overdue insurance payments.
The difficulties extend to Iran's public health insurance system.
Inflation and rising expenditure have created an imbalance between resources and spending at the Iran Health Insurance Organization since the second half of the Iranian calendar year beginning in March 2024, its chief executive Mohammad Mehdi Nasehi said on October 24.
The Health Ministry owed the organization 420 trillion rials (about $157 million), while shares worth 850 trillion rials (about $318 million) transferred to settle outstanding receivables had not been converted into cash, Nasehi said.
Those figures cover the organization's wider network of contracted providers rather than the outstanding debts owed to individual hospitals.
Iran's Social Security Organization announced on November 3 that it had paid 50 trillion rials (about $19 million) to private pharmacies, family physicians and university-affiliated and private medical facilities.
The announcement did not specify how much of the outstanding debt to hospitals remained unpaid.
Patients face higher costs and reduced coverage
Private hospital executives said rising foreign exchange rates and tighter sanctions could make obtaining medicines and medical equipment more difficult.
Patients are also facing higher treatment costs and restrictions on insurance coverage, adding to the financial pressures across Iran's healthcare system.
The removal of some injectable medicines from outpatient insurance coverage is among the changes that could increase patients' out-of-pocket expenses.
Some retirees have stopped visiting doctors or purchasing medicines because of treatment costs, retirement rights advocate Ali Akbar Eyvazi told the ILNA news agency on Thursday, November 5.
The removal of medicines from insurance coverage had extended to commonly used diabetes and blood pressure treatments, Eyvazi said.
Prices for some pharmaceutical products have increased by as much as 380 percent in recent months, while patients have described shortages and rising insulin prices.
For years, Iranians have turned to gold to protect their savings from the relentless depreciation of the rial. Now, as war and soaring living costs deepen the economic crisis, some are selling those holdings to pay for everyday necessities.
The World Gold Council (WGC) said demand for gold bars and coins in Iran fell by more than half to 5.6 tonnes in the third quarter of 2026 compared with a year earlier.
“The war continued to disrupt daily life, and prompted some selling of bars and coins to cover living and relocation costs,” the report said.
Overall, Iranian demand for gold bars and coins reached 19.1 tonnes in the first nine months of 2026, down from 36.2 tonnes in the same period last year, a decline of approximately 47%.
“Iranian demand declined 17% to 5.4 tonnes as the ongoing war strained consumer sentiment and disrupted daily life,” the WGC said, referring to gold jewellery.
Jewellery purchases totalled 15.8 tonnes in the first nine months of 2026, compared with 21 tonnes in the same period last year.
An economy under strain
The decline comes amid a sharp depreciation of Iran's national currency and soaring gold prices. The rial has lost approximately 60% of its value against the US dollar over the past year.
Meanwhile, the price of the Bahar Azadi gold coin has surged by 141% over the past 12 months, putting new purchases increasingly beyond the reach of many households.
Years of US sanctions have restricted Iran's oil exports, access to international banking and foreign investment, depriving the economy of revenue and putting sustained pressure on the rial.
Decades of economic mismanagement, widespread corruption and inefficient state-dominated industries have compounded the damage, fuelling inflation and undermining living standards.
Official data from Iran's Statistical Center show that food inflation surged to nearly 123% last month, while prices for water, electricity and fuel almost doubled compared with October 2025.
The deteriorating economic situation has also been accompanied by job losses and a slowdown in business activity.
Wages fall behind living costs
Seyed Malek Hosseini, deputy minister for entrepreneurship development and employment at the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare, recently said around 500,000 jobs had been lost last year.
He added that a further 1.2 million to 1.4 million jobs had been lost following the latest war, which began on February 28. Hosseini put the country's current employed population at 23.5 million.
The financial pressure on Iranian households is also evident in the widening gap between wages and the cost of living.
Reuters recently reported that official estimates put the minimum monthly cost of living for a three-person working-class family at around $336, more than three times the average monthly wage of approximately $92 at the free-market exchange rate.
“As wages fail to keep pace with inflation, many families have exhausted savings, cut consumption or borrowed money to cover daily expenses,” Reuters reported.
For some Iranian households, gold is no longer simply a safeguard against the rial's collapse. It has become a way to pay for everyday necessities.
Iran may be able to repair much of its war-damaged energy infrastructure without new Western technology. Whether it can rebuild a modern, reliable energy industry is another question.
Successive rounds of US and Israeli strikes have damaged oil storage facilities, gas-processing plants and petrochemical infrastructure.
Iranian engineers, supported by suppliers from China and Russia, may be able to restore substantial capacity.
But sanctions, limited investment, ageing equipment and the threat of further attacks complicate the prospects for lasting recovery.
Satellite analysis by the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) following the June 14, 2025 attacks confirmed the destruction of four storage tanks at Tehran's Shahran depot.
The same analysis documented damage at South Pars Phase 14, where Iranian state media reported a temporary halt to 12 million cubic metres of daily gas production.
Further attacks in March 2026 damaged oil storage facilities at Shahran, Aqdasieh and Karaj, as well as the Tehran refinery site, according to CEOBS.
The International Energy Agency also identified damage to South Pars gas-processing facilities following strikes on Asaluyeh.
Petrochemical infrastructure suffered additional damage. Industry publication ICIS reported that April 4 strikes hit the Fajr 1 and Fajr 2 utility plants in Mahshahr, while the Bandar Imam complex sustained partial damage.
The Fajr facilities supply essential utilities to other industrial plants, meaning damage to them can disrupt production well beyond the immediate impact sites.
Challenges ahead
Some recovery has already been reported. On September 23, Reuters cited an Iranian official as saying that half the damaged South Pars capacity had been restored, although independent verification remained limited.
Iran has considerable domestic engineering expertise. Local contractors have continued developing oil and gas fields despite sanctions, while engineers at MAPNA have reported successful tests of upgraded heavy-duty turbines.
But repairing the physical damage caused by war is only one of the challenges facing an industry already struggling with years of underinvestment and restrictions on access to specialised technology.
As gas reservoirs mature, declining pressure can reduce production unless additional compression equipment is installed. Maintaining output therefore requires investment even at facilities that have escaped military attacks.
The problem is particularly acute at South Pars, the vast gas field shared with Qatar.
According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the withdrawal of foreign partners disrupted plans for offshore compression at South Pars Phase 11.
The gap is even more pronounced in liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Iran has long sought to develop LNG exports, but sanctions-related technology restrictions have helped stall those ambitions, according to the EIA.
Restoring damaged gas-processing equipment could help recover domestic supplies. It would not, however, create a competitive LNG export industry, which requires specialised liquefaction technology, financing, shipping arrangements and long-term customers.
Moscow and Beijing to the rescue?
China and Russia offer potential alternatives to Western suppliers, but neither can be assumed to finance or rebuild Iran's energy industry on the scale required.
China is a major buyer of Iranian oil and could provide equipment, engineering services and project financing. Yet purchasing discounted crude does not necessarily translate into a willingness to undertake expensive, long-term infrastructure projects.
The EIA has documented the withdrawal of China's CNPC from South Pars Phase 11 after US sanctions were reimposed. Chinese companies considering new projects must still assess payment security, access to equipment and the returns available from investments elsewhere.
Russian assistance faces similar constraints.
A $40 billion memorandum of understanding signed between Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company in 2022 raised expectations of extensive Russian involvement. But the Congressional Research Service has questioned Russia's financial resources and commercial interest in expanding Iranian gas exports.
Reconstruction depends not on the value of memoranda but on financing secured, equipment delivered and facilities brought back into operation.
Damage, repair, repeat
Sanctions and restrictions on international payments limit Iran's access to foreign capital and imported equipment, while disruptions to oil exports further constrain the revenues available for reconstruction.
Even where Iran has the money and technical capacity to rebuild, the possibility of renewed military attacks creates another obstacle.
Although President Donald Trump has expressed skepticism about renewed strikes, US and Israeli planners have reportedly considered further attacks on Iranian petrochemical facilities.
The possibility of renewed strikes complicates long-term reconstruction. Companies may be reluctant to finance projects, supply specialised equipment or deploy personnel to facilities that could be attacked again.
This makes reconstruction priorities particularly important. Restoring gas treatment facilities and shared industrial utilities may bring multiple downstream operations back online, while repairing an isolated export facility may offer limited benefits if its supply connections remain disrupted.
Recovery timelines will also vary considerably. Some damaged units could restart within weeks or months if equipment is available, while major replacements and technological upgrades may take years.
Iran's engineers and its Chinese and Russian partners may be able to restore much of the damaged infrastructure.
But without sustained investment, specialised technology and protection against further attacks, Tehran risks becoming trapped in a cycle of destruction and repair rather than achieving lasting recovery.
Iranians responding to an Iran International appeal said they could not afford emergency supplies or had nowhere safe to go if wider war resumes with the United States and Israel, with others describing exhaustion after repeated rounds of fighting.
Iran International asked its Instagram followers whether they would prepare emergency kits in the event of another war, drawing around 4,000 replies, many of which cited poverty, rising prices and a lack of public shelters.
Others described growing exhaustion after the 12-day war in June 2025 and the 40-day conflict from February to April 2026, both involving the United States and Israel, as well as decades of political and economic uncertainty.
The responses come after The Atlantic reported last month that the Trump administration was considering renewed strikes on Iran following the US midterm elections, with energy infrastructure among the potential targets.
Some respondents said they would not prepare emergency supplies, although their reasons varied.
‘We buy yogurt in four installments’
Financial hardship was a recurring reason cited by respondents, many of whom said meeting everyday needs had become difficult, let alone stockpiling food, medicines and emergency equipment.
"We buy yogurt in four installments, and then they expect us to stockpile three months' worth of food!" one respondent wrote.
Several Iranians pointed to the considerable cost of putting together even a basic emergency kit containing a flashlight, radio, canned food and other essential supplies.
"Putting together this bag costs 200 million rials [about $73]. Where are we supposed to get that money?" another respondent said.
One person questioned how anyone earning 250 million rials ($91) a month could afford an emergency kit costing at least 150 million rials ($55).
Another estimated the cost of a kit at nearly 300 million rials ($109), saying it was difficult for people who could not afford food for the following day.
The concerns reflect a broader cost-of-living crisis in Iran.
Iran's Statistical Center reported that point-to-point inflation, which compares prices with the same month a year earlier, reached 88.7% in the Iranian month of Mehr, which ended in October.
"We have no money, we're unemployed, and even covering the cost of daily food has become difficult," one respondent said.
Some said they could afford only a few basic items.
"Only things like sanitary pads, pills, tissues and biscuits. I can't afford the rest," one person wrote.
Others said they intended to prepare emergency kits despite the costs, particularly because of concerns about prolonged disruptions to water, electricity and gas supplies.
Several respondents with cardiovascular conditions, diabetes or epilepsy said they had stockpiled several months' worth of essential medication.
‘Where are we supposed to go?’
A lack of safe shelter was another major concern among respondents, with some questioning the purpose of preparing emergency supplies when they had nowhere to escape to.
"Even if we pack a bag, where are we supposed to go? The main question is, where do we go?" one person wrote.
Another said sarcastically: "During a war, all I can do is move from one room to another."
The shortage of public shelters has been acknowledged by Iranian officials.
On September 15, Tehran City Council Chairman Mehdi Chamran said metro stations should be equipped to serve as emergency shelters. He had previously acknowledged that the capital lacked fully equipped and ready-to-use shelters for residents.
Some respondents questioned whether emergency supplies would make any meaningful difference if strikes damaged essential infrastructure, leaving households without electricity, running water or gas for extended periods.
"If they strike the infrastructure, what can you possibly do with a backpack that, at most, can get you through one week?" one wrote.
Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said on September 27 that damage to gas infrastructure during the two recent wars had reduced supplies, adding to the country’s energy shortages.
‘Our entire lives have been a state of emergency’
Beyond financial hardship and the lack of shelter, many responses reflected psychological exhaustion and a growing sense of resignation after repeated conflicts.
Some joked that preparing emergency kits was something only people experiencing war for the first time would do.
"It was only during the 12-day war that the anxiety felt new," one respondent wrote.
Another recalled preparing supplies during the first conflict but gradually abandoning the effort.
"We only packed one the first time. Then we needed our belongings and kept taking them out of the bag. The second time, we just entrusted ourselves to God," the respondent said.
Iran International documented similar sentiments in a June 8 report, when respondents described exhaustion with war, economic pressures and uncertainty about the future.
Despite concerns about the consequences of further fighting, some expressed hope that another conflict could bring political change.
That contradiction was also evident in the latest responses, with some saying they no longer feared renewed war and were instead waiting for it to begin.
"Now I'm more stressed about the possibility that war might not happen," one person wrote.
Others spoke of growing fatigue with the uncertainty surrounding the country's future.
Several respondents blamed the Islamic Republic for keeping Iran in what they described as a state of "suspension and crisis," "constant anxiety" and "living on red alert" throughout its 47 years in power.
One respondent summed up the sentiment shared by many: "Our entire lives have been in a state of emergency."
Qatar is securing long-term supplies of US liquefied natural gas to protect revenues against disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, while pursuing mediation between Tehran and Washington to end the war.
The country’s dependence on the waterway leaves its gas industry exposed to prolonged shipping disruptions. For state-owned QatarEnergy, buying supplies produced outside the Persian Gulf offers a way to earn trading income when its own exports are constrained.
The new contracts will begin delivering in 2030 or later. They offer protection against future losses, but cannot restore shipments from Qatar’s damaged facilities or reopen its export route.
The risks were underscored on Friday, when a Qatari LNG carrier was struck by “unidentified objects” in the Persian Gulf, the same day Qatari mediators held talks in Tehran aimed at reaching a deal between Iran and the United States.
The Al Mayeda was hit Friday evening, its owner Nakilat said Sunday. No crew members were injured or environmental damage reported, and the vessel remained operational.
Qatar condemned the attack as a “dangerous act” threatening maritime navigation and global energy supplies, saying investigations were underway to identify those responsible.
War exposes Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz
Qatar is particularly vulnerable to disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. LNG accounts for half of its foreign-currency export revenues, and shipments to markets beyond the Persian Gulf must pass through the waterway.
Unlike some neighboring oil exporters, Qatar has no pipeline route capable of replacing those shipments. Its oil exports amounted to just 530,000 barrels per day last year, leaving its foreign-currency revenues largely dependent on gas.
According to official Qatari government statistics, the country exported 79 million tonnes of LNG last year, supplying 17% of global LNG consumption. Another 20 billion cubic metres of natural gas, equivalent to approximately 15 million tonnes, was delivered to the UAE and Oman through the Dolphin pipeline. By volume, LNG accounted for nearly 84% of Qatar’s total gas exports.
Qatar was forced to almost completely halt LNG exports for three months starting in March, with shipments gradually recovering from June. According to Kpler data, however, it exported only 4.58 million tonnes in the third quarter, less than a quarter of the volume recorded a year earlier.
September exports reached 1.6 million tonnes, the highest monthly level since the war began. That was still less than a quarter of the pre-war monthly average, with around one-third of shipments going to Kuwait and remaining within the Persian Gulf.
Damage to infrastructure has also been substantial. Iranian missile strikes in March damaged Ras Laffan’s liquefaction units, known as trains, 4 and 6, knocking 12.8 million tonnes of annual capacity offline—about 17% of Qatar’s pre-war capacity.
Energy Minister and QatarEnergy chief executive Saad al-Kaabi initially estimated repairs would take three to five years. In an October 29 interview with Reuters, he put the repair period at about three years.
QatarEnergy has extended force majeure on deliveries to Italy’s Edison until the end of December, the Italian company said on October 27. Shipping has also come under attack: in July, the LNG carrier Al Rekayyat was struck while transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Qatar has ruled out a pipeline bypass on commercial and technical grounds. Kaabi said in September that transporting gas to another coast would require new liquefaction facilities, duplicating infrastructure already being built in Qatar. He has also warned that pipelines and associated facilities could themselves become targets.
US supplies offer protection against lost revenue
Qatar’s overseas investments predate the war, but its latest purchase agreements form part of a strategy to protect income against future shipping disruptions.
The first major overseas source is the Golden Pass LNG project in Texas. QatarEnergy owns a 70% stake, while ExxonMobil holds the remaining 30%. LNG production began on March 30, 2026.
The project has a total planned capacity of 18 million tonnes per year, giving QatarEnergy an equity share equivalent to 12.6 million tonnes of annual capacity once fully operational. The first train has a capacity of approximately 6 million tonnes per year, of which QatarEnergy’s share is 4.2 million tonnes.
The second element is long-term purchases from US producers. QatarEnergy signed two agreements with Cheniere Energy on October 22 to purchase a combined 4 million tonnes annually, split equally between its Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana and Corpus Christi terminal in Texas.
Deliveries will begin in the early 2030s and continue through 2054. One million tonnes of the annual Sabine Pass supply is conditional on a final investment decision for an expansion project.
A week later, QatarEnergy signed a 20-year agreement to purchase up to 3 million tonnes annually from Woodside’s Louisiana LNG project. QatarEnergy expects deliveries to begin in 2030, with volumes increasing as additional production units start operating.
Together, the agreements provide for up to 7 million tonnes annually.
The Cheniere purchase price is linked to the US Henry Hub gas benchmark, plus a fixed fee. Both companies’ agreements provide for free-on-board deliveries, meaning QatarEnergy arranges transportation.
Lower US gas prices can create opportunities for profitable sales into Europe and Asia, although returns depend on liquefaction fees, shipping costs and destination-market prices.
Kaabi told Reuters the purchases were intended to generate revenue during future Hormuz disruptions. He cautioned that US cargoes could not simply replace supplies under existing long-term contracts specifying particular export terminals and destinations.
QatarEnergy is also negotiating with Venture Global. Kaabi said he expected further 20- to 25-year supply agreements with US and other producers before the end of 2026.
Qatar has overseas options Iran lacks
Iran’s own gas sector is also under pressure, but it has far fewer options to offset damage through foreign investment and overseas projects.
According to the National Iranian Gas Company, attacks in March knocked around 230 million cubic metres per day of production capacity offline at four gas processing plants. Approximately 100 million cubic metres has since been restored.
That leaves around 130 million cubic metres per day unavailable, equivalent to about 16% of last year’s daily production. Iran already faces substantial gas shortages during colder months, and the company has warned that around 11 provinces could experience supply problems this winter.
Iran’s financial capacity to rebuild damaged infrastructure is limited, while foreign participation in its energy projects is virtually nonexistent. Qatar has substantially greater financial resources to repair its damaged LNG trains and invest overseas.
Those differences do not establish how long Tehran can sustain disruptions to shipping. They do, however, give Qatar more commercial options for managing the consequences.
QatarEnergy’s equity share of Golden Pass will represent 12.6 million tonnes of annual capacity once all three trains are operational, while the Cheniere and Woodside agreements provide for purchases of up to another 7 million tonnes annually.
Those volumes will become available gradually and remain modest compared with Qatar’s pre-war annual capacity of 77 million tonnes and its planned expansion to 142 million tonnes by 2030.
Overseas trading can help cushion the financial impact of disruption. But repairing Qatar’s production facilities and securing passage through Hormuz remain essential to restoring its own exports.
