Iran, US back to ‘square one’ as diplomacy stalls

As government-aligned forces advanced along Yemen’s southwestern coast, the Houthis stepped up pressure around Taiz, one of the country’s largest cities, leaving a battlefield moving in two directions at once.

The reversal came as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan activated their Mecca Joint Defense Agreement following an emergency meeting in Riyadh, saying they would accelerate the deployment of agreed military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia.

Together, the developments point to a potentially consequential new phase of the Yemen war. But whether the counteroffensive can be sustained, and what any lasting reversal would mean for Iran’s position in Yemen, remains unclear.

“I think it’s too early to talk about sustainable gains against the Houthis at this point,” Thomas Juneau, a Yemen expert and non-resident fellow at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, told Iran International.

“I think we need more time to see the dust settle.”

Iran watches a critical coastline

The importance Tehran attaches to Yemen’s western coast was apparent even as the latest Houthi gains were being reversed.

An IRGC-aligned Iranian newspaper led its coverage Monday with the headline “Ansarullah’s Upper Hand in Regional Equations,” arguing that Houthi positions around Bab al-Mandab translate into deterrence and regional leverage extending far beyond Yemen.

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But the territory captured during the Houthis’ September advance was always going to be difficult to defend.

Juneau described southwestern Yemen as flat and exposed, with few natural defensive advantages and increasingly stretched Houthi supply lines.

“If it turns out that the losses are limited to the southwest corner of Yemen, that is not surprising in the sense that that was difficult for the Houthis to hold,” he said.

Even if pushed farther from Bab al-Mandab, the Houthis remain close enough to threaten Red Sea shipping with missiles and drones.

“So that would not be a strategic setback for them,” Juneau said.

Fatima Abo Alasrar, a Yemeni scholar, senior policy analyst and founder of Ideology Machine, said the Houthis’ September push had IRGC backing and caught Saudi-backed Yemeni forces poorly coordinated to respond.

Monday’s counteroffensive, however, demonstrated how quickly those gains could be reversed.

“The biggest takeaway is that this myth of Houthi invincibility is no longer there,” she said.

Hodeidah and Taiz complicate the picture

The more consequential test may now lie elsewhere.

The Houthis still control Hodeidah farther north on the Red Sea coast, preserving their ability to threaten maritime traffic even without holding territory immediately around Bab al-Mandab.

“Bab al-Mandab was just the icing on the cake,” Abo Alasrar said.

The possibility of attacks can itself increase shipping and insurance costs, meaning the Houthis do not need to physically control the strait to retain leverage over maritime traffic.

A loss of Hodeidah would represent a much more significant change to their strategic position. Late on Monday, the Saudi-led coalition said its naval forces struck Houthi military infrastructure in Yemen’s Hodeidah governorate, including weapons storage sites, facilities housing explosive-laden boats and stockpiles of sea mines.

At the same time, the Houthis are increasing pressure around Taiz, one of Yemen’s largest and most densely populated cities.

The geography presents a very different battlefield from the exposed southwestern coast and raises the prospect of a costly war of attrition.

“What I’m watching right now is the population centers,” Abo Alasrar said. “It’s in the cities, it’s in the population centers that the Houthis can inflict real damage.”

Iranian media has also shown growing interest in the fighting around Taiz, with Tasnim closely tracking Houthi advances there.

The simultaneous movement on the two fronts is one reason Juneau cautioned against drawing broad conclusions from the coastal counteroffensive.

“I don’t think we’re in a position to say yet that the Houthis are sustaining losses,” he said.

Two wars increasingly intertwined

The fighting is unfolding against the backdrop of the wider confrontation involving Iran, but Yemen cannot be understood solely through that lens.

“The war in Yemen is unlikely to end without a broader resolution to the war with Iran,” Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemeni-American analyst and founder of the Basha Report, told Iran International.

“But ending the confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz will not, by itself, end the war in Yemen.”

“The two conflicts are interconnected, but they are also distinct, with their own actors, grievances, battlefields, and political dynamics,” he added.

That distinction is important in assessing what the latest Houthi setbacks mean for Tehran.

Iran’s support has helped the Houthis develop into a powerful regional actor, but the group also operates within a distinctly Yemeni conflict shaped by domestic political, tribal and territorial dynamics.

A battlefield setback for the Houthis therefore does not translate automatically into an equivalent strategic loss for Iran.

Saudi Arabia signals it can absorb the risk

The activation of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement adds another dimension to the confrontation.

Following an emergency meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan said they would move immediately to implement their joint-defense commitments and take measures to provide agreed military forces and capabilities and expedite their deployment in Saudi Arabia.

The three countries said the security of each member state was an integral part of their collective security and that implementing the agreement would strengthen deterrence.

“This is an important signal. It is a deterrent signal,” Abo Alasrar told Iran International following the announcement.

Saudi Arabia entered the counteroffensive knowing that supporting Yemeni government forces could expose the kingdom to retaliation from Houthi drones and ballistic missiles.

In Abo Alasrar’s assessment, the agreement signals that Riyadh is preparing to absorb that risk rather than allow the threat of retaliation to constrain the campaign.

It also sends a message about time.

The Houthis had hoped they could pressure Saudi Arabia and eventually emerge with concessions, she said. A Saudi signal that it is prepared for a prolonged confrontation potentially changes that calculation.

“This changes the rules of the game because Saudi Arabia is basically signaling that it’s going to play their game,” Abo Alasrar said. “It’s going to stay at this war as long as they want to, and that they’re ready to absorb the costs until they deal with this problem.”

Whether that deters the Houthis or leads to further escalation remains to be seen.

Limits to a broader government advance

Saudi-backed forces face another obstacle if they try to turn Monday’s counteroffensive into a broader campaign: divisions within the anti-Houthi camp.

Juneau said Iranian assistance explains only part of the Houthis’ resilience.

“Anti-Houthi forces remain fragmented and disunited,” he said.

The Houthis, by comparison, remain a considerably more coherent force, while rivalries among their opponents have repeatedly undermined efforts to establish a united front.

That is one reason Juneau remains skeptical of increasingly confident statements from Yemen’s government about eventually retaking Sana’a.

“When I hear the president of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, talk about getting Sana’a back, as of now, I think that’s wishful thinking,” he said.

The contrast captures one of the central uncertainties surrounding the latest offensive: demonstrating that Houthi territorial gains can be reversed is one thing; translating that success into a sustained campaign against the group is another.

Tehran’s longer game

For Iran, the strategic calculation extends well beyond the movement of individual frontlines.

The Houthis have become an increasingly important part of Tehran’s regional network, particularly as other members of the so-called Axis of Resistance have come under intense pressure.

In Juneau’s formulation, small territorial losses along Yemen’s western coast are “the tree.” The durability of Houthi power is “the forest.”

“The forest, from Iran’s perspective, is the long game of seeing Houthi power in Yemen becoming institutionalized, becoming legitimated,” he said.

Juneau pointed to what appears to be an understanding under which the Houthis refrain from attacking US vessels in the Red Sea while Washington refrains from directly attacking the group.

The precise nature of any understanding remains unclear. But Washington dealing with the Houthis as an entrenched power is itself significant, he said.

“The US is making deals with the Houthis, you know, de facto a mutual non-aggression pact, which in practice legitimizes Houthi rule in large parts of Yemen, which is exactly Iran’s objective,” Juneau said.

Monday’s counteroffensive showed that recent Houthi territorial gains can be rapidly reversed. It has not yet shown that those reversals can be sustained or translated into a broader weakening of Houthi power.

Nor is the battle confined to Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis remain in control of Hodeidah, are applying pressure around Taiz and face opponents whose internal divisions have repeatedly worked to their advantage.

For Tehran, that leaves the picture similarly unsettled: one of its most important regional partners has shown itself vulnerable on the battlefield, but the foundations of the leverage Iran has built through the Houthis remain, for now, largely intact.

President Masoud Pezeshkian initially rejected Paknejad’s resignation, submitted some time earlier because of “personal issues,” but accepted it after the minister again pressed to step down, deputy presidential communications chief Mehdi Tabatabaei said.

Paknejad’s departure, the first by a minister from Pezeshkian’s cabinet, followed weeks of Iranian media reports linking his position to disputes over sanctioned oil sales, major energy projects and management of Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC).

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Pezeshkian appointed National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) managing director Hamid Bovard as acting oil minister. The government has not indicated whether Bovard will remain a caretaker or be nominated for the post.

Export crisis raises questions

Several Iranian outlets had linked Paknejad’s resignation to disagreements with Pezeshkian during cabinet meetings over the oil ministry’s handling of sanctioned crude sales.

Other reported disputes concerned delays to major projects, including development of the South Pars gas field, and the network of intermediaries entrusted with selling Iranian oil and returning the proceeds while circumventing sanctions.

Paknejad left as Iran’s floating oil inventories were approaching exhaustion and questions mounted over around 80 million barrels handed to intermediaries, Rouydad24 wrote.

The website questioned whether “personal reasons” adequately explained the timing, arguing that replacing the official overseeing the sector would not resolve falling exports, foreign currency shortages, unpaid oil revenues and the opaque structure of sanctioned sales.

Eghtesad Online website similarly questioned why Pezeshkian accepted a resignation that had been pending for some time when Iranian oil exports had approached zero.

Billions at stake in trustee system

The use of trusted intermediaries to sell crude under sanctions has become a central controversy surrounding the oil ministry, with lawmakers and media raising questions over unpaid revenues and the allocation of oil.

One intermediary, Hassan Aghayari, owed several billion dollars, ILNA reported on September 13, citing a letter Bovard sent to a senior supervisory body while serving as NIOC chief.

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The contract allowing Aghayari to sell oil was concluded on the minister’s order without approval from the sanctions-countering task force, Bovard wrote, according to ILNA. The oil ministry denied the report.

Around 80 million barrels were separately handed to four intermediaries following the Islamabad agreement, lawmaker Valiollah Bayati told Hamshahri newspaper. Hossein Shamkhani, son of former Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Shamkhani, was among them, Bayati said.

More than 86 million barrels were allocated to trustees without guarantees, lawmaker Hossein Samsami said. Around 30 million barrels reached final buyers, leaving the status of more than 56 million barrels unclear, according to Samsami.

The accounts have raised questions over how intermediaries were selected, what guarantees were required and why further allocations went to people who allegedly owed money from previous oil sales.

Battle over petrochemical giant

Paknejad’s departure has also been linked to a dispute with Mohammad Shariatmadari, head of PGPIC, Iran’s largest petrochemical holding company.

The oil ministry sought to replace Shariatmadari with Hassan Abbaszadeh in July 2026. PGPIC rejected the move, saying it lacked the procedures required under stock-market regulations and board approval. Shariatmadari remained with support from the presidential office.

Paknejad was unwilling to remain as minister if Shariatmadari kept his position, Iranian media reported. Meetings ordered by Pezeshkian failed to settle the dispute, according to those reports.

Shortly before the resignation was accepted, editor of the oil-focused outlet Miz-e Naft Vahid Hajipourwrote on X that Paknejad had been given an ultimatum at a cabinet meeting over Shariatmadari’s continued tenure.

“Paknejad did not accept,” Hajipour wrote, adding that Pezeshkian consequently decided to end cooperation with the minister.

Political pressure

Political pressure offers another explanation. Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was angered by the removal of his ally Hossein Ghorbanzadeh from PGPIC’s board and Paknejad’s refusal to reinstate him, journalist Hatef Salehi wrote on X on October 1.

Ghalibaf subsequently pressed Pezeshkian to remove Paknejad, Salehi said.

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“If the oil minister is replaced in the coming days, the roots of the decision should be sought in Ghorbanzadeh’s longstanding friendship and relationship with Ghalibaf, not in the government’s strategy,” Salehi wrote.

The competing accounts leave no single explanation for Paknejad’s departure, placing it instead at the intersection of an export crisis, disputed sanctioned oil sales, a battle over one of Iran’s biggest companies and reported political pressure over control of key posts.

The contrasting messages came as months of intermittent diplomacy remained stalled and tensions intensified around the strategic waterway, where Iran and the United States have imposed competing restrictions on shipping. Tehran has tied progress to conditions surrounding Hormuz, while Washington has pressed for broader concessions, including on Iran’s nuclear program.

“Our problem with the United States is that every time we come to the negotiating table, war is immediately imposed on us,” Pezeshkian told Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan during a meeting in Tehran.

Pezeshkian said negotiations made no sense with an adversary that “every day engages in assassination, sanctions, pressure and threats” and breaks its commitments.

“We have been attacked three times so far following talks, and this shows that they are not seeking dialogue; rather, their goal is to overthrow the Islamic Republic,” he said.

Trump, however, said Monday that he remained open to direct talks with Tehran, keeping a diplomatic path available after saying over the weekend that Iran could resolve the confrontation “the easy way or the hard way.”

The two sides have continued exchanging messages indirectly despite the impasse. Tehran presented Washington through intermediaries with a seven-day proposal aimed at restoring security in the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian officials said Sunday they were reviewing the US response. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran remained serious about diplomacy but was also prepared to defend itself.

The diplomatic standoff coincided with another escalation at sea Monday, when a tanker was struck by an unidentified projectile in the Strait of Hormuz, sparking a fire in its engine room. UK Maritime Trade Operations said the crew was battling the blaze and no casualties or environmental impact had been reported.

The strike marked the third tanker hit in two days. UKMTO said Monday it had received delayed reports that two tankers — one carrying liquefied petroleum gas and another crude oil — were struck by unidentified projectiles Sunday.

UKMTO did not attribute those attacks to Iran. But in a separate incident Monday, it said an inbound tanker 11 nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman, turned back after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hailed the vessel and threatened to target it if it continued.

The IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency separately reported Monday that Iran had targeted 13 tankers it described as “violators” in the Strait of Hormuz over the previous seven days.

The incidents came as the United States intensified enforcement of its naval blockade against Iran. US Central Command said Monday its forces had redirected 130 commercial vessels since resuming the blockade on July 14, disabled three ships that refused to comply and destroyed 13 commercial vessels it said were violating the blockade or were part of the IRGC’s multibillion-dollar shadow network.

“The US military remains intensely focused on this mission,” CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper said. “We will swiftly act against any vessels trying to run the blockade.”

Washington has also stepped up economic pressure. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Monday that the rial had fallen to record lows and Iran loaded no crude onto tankers last month, citing the figures as evidence that the US pressure campaign was working.

The military pressure has also continued alongside the diplomatic impasse. Senior members of Trump’s national security team met at Camp David on Friday to discuss the Iran war, with Trump considering renewed major combat operations as negotiations remain stalled, Axios reported.

Iranian officials warned Monday that renewed military action could widen the conflict. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said another attack or “miscalculation” against Iran could open additional fronts.

“Every miscalculation by the enemy against Iran has brought it a heavy defeat,” Rezaei said. “The next mistake will bring new fronts and bigger surprises.”

Sasan Valizadeh, an adviser to the president’s deputy for parliamentary affairs, said Pezeshkian sent the nomination to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf under Article 133 of the constitution, which requires ministers to win a parliamentary vote of confidence. Lawmakers are expected to review Akhlaghi Ketabchi’s program and policies before scheduling the vote.

The Defense Ministry has been run by Majid Ebn-e-Reza since March 2, when Pezeshkian appointed him acting minister after Nasirzadeh’s death on February 28. Ebn-e-Reza, previously the deputy defense minister, has represented the ministry in domestic and foreign meetings but was never nominated for the permanent post.

Akhlaghi Ketabchi is a longtime Defense Ministry official with deep roots in Iran’s missile and aerospace industries. He was listed by the UN Security Council in 2007 as head of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, a Defense Ministry entity linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program. His name returned to the UN sanctions list when earlier sanctions on Iran were re-applied in September 2025.

Then-defense minister Hossein Dehghan appointed him head of the Aerospace Industries Organization in November 2014. The United States also sanctioned him in 2020, identifying him as director of the Defense Industries Organization and citing conventional arms-related activities.

The nomination also raises the question of how the appointment was cleared at the top of Iran’s political system. Defense ministers are formally nominated by the president and confirmed by parliament, but the post is among the sensitive ministries whose nominees have traditionally been coordinated with and approved by the supreme leader beforehand.

That process is less transparent under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not made a public appearance since taking office. Decisions, appointments and written messages have continued to be issued in his name, but officials have not said whether or how his approval was obtained for Akhlaghi Ketabchi’s nomination.

The decision followed an emergency meeting of the Mecca defense pact’s committee, which reaffirmed the three countries’ solidarity in confronting attacks against Saudi Arabia and Islamic holy sites, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister said.

The committee agreed to activate “collective deterrence measures” in response to the attacks and those responsible for them, he said.

Pakistan’s foreign ministry said in a joint statement that the three countries had also agreed on the rapid deployment of military forces and capabilities in Saudi Arabia. The statements did not detail the forces involved or specify what role they would play.

The move came as Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces reported major gains along the Red Sea coast, saying Monday they had retaken Mokha and advanced around the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one day after launching a major offensive to recover territory seized by the Houthis last month.

The armed forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government said they had recaptured the port of Mokha, Reuters reported. Military spokesman Majed al-Nuzaili also reported the capture of Dhubab airport and the cutting of the road linking Dhubab to Mokha.

Saudi-led coalition spokesperson Maj. Gen. Turki al-Malki said 100 fighter jets were participating in Operation Yemen Dawn, providing round-the-clock support for ground forces and air cover over Bab al-Mandeb. He said the campaign had destroyed 324 “high-value” Houthi targets.

The Houthis earlier denied reports of government advances around the strait.

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Eryani told Reuters government forces had secured effective control of Bab al-Mandeb, although another government source said fighting continued at a nearby military base.

The offensive follows Houthi advances along Yemen’s western coast and around Taiz. Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced the campaign Sunday, setting out ambitions to recover Houthi-held territory and restore state institutions.

Saudi campaign expands toward Sanaa

The government’s stated objectives extend beyond recovering recently lost coastal territory to retaking Sanaa, which has been under Houthi control since 2014.

“Our armed forces have begun implementing a strategic offensive operation on Sanaa,” al-Nuzaili said Monday. Houthi-run Al Masirah television reported attacks on the capital, although the announcement did not establish that government ground forces had reached the city.

The government’s reported coastal gains came alongside further Houthi advances inland. The Associated Press reported that the group captured Turbah on Sunday, a town on the main road between Taiz and Aden that had served as an important position for government forces defending Taiz.

The Houthis have also continued missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, the attacks that prompted Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad to put their new collective-defense framework into operation.

On Monday, the group’s HOCC agency warned airlines that Saudi airspace was unsafe for civilian flights and would become a “theater of operations” for its forces, according to a statement carried by the Houthi-run Saba news agency.

US backs Saudi right to respond

The activation of the Mecca pact adds another layer to Saudi Arabia’s military response as Washington provides support without directly joining the war in Yemen.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio backed Saudi Arabia’s right to respond to Houthi attacks in remarks to reporters Monday.

“Obviously the Saudis have come under Houthi attack … and they have a right to defend themselves,” Rubio said. He also said Washington intended to honor what he described as its binding security agreement with Riyadh.

Rubio said neither Saudi Arabia nor Yemen’s internationally recognized government supported continued Houthi control of territory taken from government forces.

About 200 US advisers are working in Saudi planning and operations centers, including on targeting, while Washington is also providing intelligence sharing, planning assistance and aerial refueling, Al Jazeera reported Monday, citing a US official.

The official said, however, that US forces were not participating in the Yemen war and had no specific military objectives there.

At the center of the campaign is Bab al-Mandeb, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Fighting there threatens commercial shipping at a time when the Iran war has also disrupted passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian officials had previously presented Houthi control of the waterway as a strategic gain against Washington. In remarks reported September 27, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, described Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb as another step toward a broader US defeat in the region.

Even if government forces consolidate their coastal gains, the Houthis could still threaten shipping with drones and missiles launched from positions farther inland or elsewhere along Yemen’s coast.