Post-Khamenei Iran: Succession race widens as decentralized system sustains war

Over the past several days, Iranian missiles have targeted three oil tankers and several oil and gas facilities in neighboring countries while also obstructing maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

The immediate market reaction was sharp but limited. On Monday, Brent crude surged more than 8 percent to $79 per barrel. Yet this level remains well below earlier projections tied to a potential full closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

So far, Tehran has failed to generate sufficient pressure on Washington by attacking tankers and regional energy infrastructure. On March 2, following two drone strikes on its gas facilities, Qatar announced a temporary suspension of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production.

The Strait of Hormuz accounts for roughly 20 percent of global LNG trade and a similar share of global oil and petroleum product consumption.

Last year, over 80 percent of the crude oil and LNG passing through the strait was destined for Asian markets. Still, Qatar’s LNG suspension triggered a 45 percent surge in European gas prices—underscoring the fragility of global energy interdependence.

Why haven’t oil prices spiked further?

The muted market response, despite near-disruptions to Hormuz transit, has several structural explanations.

First, according to the International Energy Agency, global oil markets were already oversupplied last year. If tanker disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist over the medium term, however, market conditions could tighten considerably.

Second, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess alternative pipeline routes capable of bypassing the strait. Combined, these pipelines can transport an additional 2.6 million barrels per day to global markets. This represents about 40 percent of their normal crude exports but remains a significant mitigating factor.

Iran has previously demonstrated its willingness to target critical infrastructure. In 2019, it struck Saudi facilities in Ras Tanura and the Abqaiq oil processing hub—located roughly 55 miles away—which is connected via a 1,200-kilometer pipeline to the Red Sea. On March 2, Iran again targeted the Ras Tanura refinery.

Thus far, however, Tehran has not attacked the Saudi and Emirati pipelines designed to bypass Hormuz. Should it do so, oil prices would likely rise again—but probably not to levels that would trigger severe market dislocation given current supply buffers.

Inventory data reinforce this point. OECD members—including the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada—hold commercial oil stocks of about 2.8 billion barrels. These reserves provide weeks of supply flexibility in the event of temporary disruption.

Iran itself reportedly holds around 200 million barrels of oil in floating storage in Asian waters and could continue deliveries to Chinese buyers for several months.

Taken together, these factors suggest that in the short term Iran’s oil weapon is unlikely to prove an effective instrument for destabilizing global markets or compelling Washington to halt its military operations.

Tehran’s apparent objective may instead be to pressure US-aligned Arab states into urging Washington to cease its attacks.

This strategy, however, carries significant risks. On March 1, Saudi Arabia signaled it would respond to Iranian attacks and placed its armed forces on heightened alert. Continued escalation could push the kingdom and other Arab states to join the US-Israeli military campaign.

The risk of a protracted conflict

US and Israeli officials have indicated that operations against Iran could continue for several weeks. The key question is whether Tehran can sustain a prolonged war of attrition.

Around 70 percent of Iran’s non-oil trade passes through ports that depend on access via the Strait of Hormuz. While Tehran may be able to disrupt the strait in the short term, sustained interference would disproportionately harm its own economy.

Thus far, the United States and Israel have not targeted Iran’s oil facilities or broader industrial and economic infrastructure, and they may prefer to avoid doing so. But that could change if Iran continues attacking regional energy assets and obstructing Hormuz transit.

Any such escalation could severely damage the country’s already fragile economy.

Another possible countermeasure would be the formation of an international coalition to secure maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—effectively neutralizing Tehran’s leverage over global energy trade.

Finally, it is important to note that the Islamic Republic faces a severe domestic legitimacy deficit. Further weakening of the state could increase the likelihood of widespread unrest similar to the protests of January 2026, potentially raising the prospect of regime collapse from within.

All in all, Iran’s oil weapon appears structurally constrained. While capable of generating volatility, it is unlikely to deliver decisive strategic leverage.

Iran’s constitution allows for both. It requires the Assembly of Experts to choose a new supreme leader “at the earliest possible opportunity,” with no specific deadline.

In practice, the leadership may balance urgency against security risks. Naming a successor swiftly could reassure the political establishment and signal stability at a moment of national crisis. But during an active conflict, concentrating authority in a single new figure could also create a fresh focal point for external pressure.

Whatever timing Tehran ultimately chooses, the succession process itself is well defined.

In the Islamic Republic, the supreme leader is both the highest political and religious authority. His powers are sweeping. He serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints the head of the judiciary and sets the state’s core strategies and red lines.

The constitution requires the leader to be chosen by the Assembly of Experts and to possess distinguished religious scholarship, deep knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and politics, and strong managerial ability.

The interim leadership council

If the leader dies, resigns or becomes incapacitated, the constitution mandates that a successor be selected without delay. Until that happens, a temporary three-member council assumes his powers.

The interim council was formed immediately after Khamenei’s death: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei and senior conservative cleric Alireza Arafi, a member of the Guardian Council and head of Iran’s seminaries.

The council oversees the armed forces, manages national security and supervises key institutions. Its authority, however, is strictly temporary and ends once a new leader is appointed.

How the leader is selected

The Assembly of Experts is composed of 88 clerics elected every eight years in nationwide polls. All candidates must first be vetted by the Guardian Council for religious and political qualifications.

Formally, the Assembly not only selects the leader but also monitors his performance and has the authority to dismiss him if he is deemed unfit. In practice, it has consistently endorsed Khamenei’s leadership without public dissent.

To choose a successor, the Assembly convenes in closed session. Members review potential candidates, assess their qualifications and vote. A majority is sufficient. If no candidate fully meets the constitutional criteria, members may select a figure based on overall leadership capacity.

Deliberations are confidential, and the result is announced only after a decision is finalized.

Power behind the scenes

While the constitution assigns the process to the Assembly, informal power centers may prove decisive.

Senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are widely believed to play a decisive role in shaping elite consensus. Intelligence and judicial institutions can also shape outcomes through internal assessments of potential candidates.

Senior clerics in Qom, particularly grand ayatollahs with independent religious authority, may indirectly influence opinion within the Assembly. Although they hold no formal role in the vote, their views can carry weight in determining religious legitimacy.

Given the current climate of unrest and regional conflict, the interplay among these actors could prove pivotal. For many within the system, the overriding priority is likely to be continuity and institutional survival.

Potential successors

Khamenei’s will has not been made public, and he did not officially designate a successor. Nonetheless, several names have circulated for years.

Mojtaba Khamenei, 55, the late leader’s second son, is a mid-ranking cleric believed to wield influence behind the scenes. Though he has never held senior elected office, he is thought to have close ties to parts of the security establishment.

Alireza Arafi, 65, a member of the interim council, is considered a conservative with strong institutional ties. His leadership of the seminaries and role in the Guardian Council position him as a potential consensus candidate within the establishment.

Hassan Khomeini, 53, grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini, teaches in Qom and oversees his grandfather’s shrine. He is associated with reformist and centrist political circles and was disqualified from running for the Assembly of Experts in 2016. His religious credentials and symbolic lineage could strengthen his standing, particularly if broader legitimacy is seen as valuable.

Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri, 63, a hardline cleric and member of the Assembly of Experts, is known for his staunch ideological positions and close alignment with conservative currents.

Mohsen Araki, 69, a former Guardian Council member with experience in international religious outreach, has also been mentioned as a possible contender.

Ultimately, the succession will hinge less on public debate than on negotiations within the clerical and security elite.

Tehran will want to project normal constitutional continuity, but in the middle of a war it is entirely possible that internal power dynamics and external pressures—not just the formal procedures—will shape both the leadership outcome and Iran’s future.

“From the beginning, we projected four to five weeks, but we have capability to go far longer than that, we'll do it," Trump said on Monday. "Whatever somebody said today, they said, Oh, well, President wants to do it really quickly. After that, he'll get bored. I don't get bored.”

Trump said while the campaign was initially expected to last four to five weeks, Washington is prepared to sustain operations as long as necessary.

His remarks come after he told the New York Post he would not rule out deploying American ground troops “if they were necessary,” while describing the military operation — dubbed Operation Epic Fury — as already “way ahead of schedule.”

The operation, launched Saturday in a joint US-Israel strike on Tehran, killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeted key military and leadership infrastructure.

Speaking Monday, Trump framed the campaign as a decisive effort to neutralize what he called an existential threat posed by Tehran.

“This was our last best chance to strike what we're doing right now and eliminate the intolerable threats posed by this sick and sinister regime and they are indeed sick and sinister,” he said.

Trump outlined four primary objectives: destroying Iran’s missile capabilities, dismantling its naval forces, preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and stopping the regime from arming and directing proxy groups abroad.

“First, we're destroying Iran's missile capabilities, and you see that happening on an hourly basis,” he said. “Second, we're annihilating their navy. We've knocked out already 10 ships. They're at the bottom of the sea.”

He added, “We're ensuring that the world's number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon. Never going to have a nuclear weapon.”

In remarks to CNN earlier, Trump said the US military is “knocking the crap” out of Iran but warned a larger phase of operations may still be ahead, urging civilians inside Iran to remain indoors because conditions were unsafe.

US service members killed

The White House address also struck a somber tone as Trump confirmed four US service members were killed following Iranian attacks in the region.

“Today, we grieve for the four heroic American service members who have been killed in action, and send our love and support to their families,” he said.

“In their memory, we continue this mission with ferocious, unyielding resolve to crush the threat this terrorist regime poses to the American people.”

US Central Command confirmed the fatalities Monday, underscoring the growing regional escalation as Iran launched new waves of attacks on US bases, according to Iranian state media.

Regional tensions intensified further after the United Arab Emirates said its air defenses intercepted nine Iranian ballistic missiles, six cruise missiles and dozens of drones, while Qatar announced it had shot down two Iranian Su-24 bombers.

Energy markets were also shaken as drone strikes forced shutdowns at a major Saudi refinery and oil and gas facilities in Israel and Iraq’s Kurdish region, pushing global oil prices sharply higher.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth described the campaign as “limited and decisive,” saying the objective is to destroy Iran’s missile and nuclear threats rather than launch an open-ended war.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said Monday it had no indication Iran’s nuclear facilities suffered major damage, though Tehran’s envoy claimed the Natanz enrichment site was struck.

Iranian state media also reported that Mansoureh Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, the wife of Ali Khamenei, died following the US-Israeli airstrikes.

Trump insisted the United States holds overwhelming military advantage.

“We have the strongest and most powerful by far military in the world, and we will easily prevail,” he said. “We're already substantially ahead of our time projections. But whatever the time is, it's okay. Whatever it takes, we will.”

Hardline cleric Alireza Arafi is now one of the three members of the interim leadership council tasked with filling the power vacuum after Khamenei’s demise. Within clerical circles he is widely viewed as a potential contender for the country’s highest office. Outside them, most Iranians have barely heard his name.

Many Iranian journalists and political activists abroad assume Arafi will eventually emerge as Khamenei’s successor. Yet Iran’s opaque succession process offers no guarantees.

To become Supreme Leader, Arafi would first have to be nominated by a committee within the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for choosing the next leader, in a session attended by at least two-thirds of its 88 members. He would then need the support of two-thirds of those present — roughly 40 elderly clerics. None of this is assured.

There is also no certainty that the Islamic Republic will survive long enough to appoint a new Supreme Leader, nor that Arafi, or other potential contenders such as Hassan Khomeini, will emerge unscathed from the current turmoil.

On Sunday night, online rumors even claimed that Arafi had been targeted and killed.

A Khamenei Protégé

Over the past two decades, Arafi has been one of Khamenei’s favored clerics. The Supreme Leader elevated him to senior religious positions, granted him access to substantial financial resources and helped him climb the institutional ladder that led to political influence.

Yet within the interim leadership council he has the least political experience.

President Massoud Pezeshkian, despite his limited political background, has greater public visibility. Chief Justice Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, a former intelligence minister, is the only seasoned political figure in the trio, though he rarely speaks publicly about politics.

Arafi’s only clear advantage is that, unlike the other two, he has not been publicly associated with the violent crackdown ordered by Khamenei during the January protests.

Arafi’s influence stems largely from his leadership of Al-Mustafa International University, his position as dean of the Qom seminary and his membership in the Assembly of Experts — all roles granted or supported by Khamenei.

The Supreme Leader praised him for his ideas on expanding Shiite influence abroad.

Despite lacking political experience, Arafi is known for unwavering loyalty to Khamenei and his ideological outlook. He is considered more hardline than the late leader on cultural issues such as compulsory hijab and has advocated the full implementation of Shiite jurisprudence in governance.

Arafi’s Background

Born in 1959 into a clerical family in Maybod near Yazd in central Iran, Arafi’s ascent began in 2002 when Khamenei approved his proposal for an international university to train Shiite clerics worldwide.

He was soon appointed dean of the institution and granted a substantial budget, a recurring point of criticism among economists and journalists during annual budget debates.

Al-Mustafa now operates more than 80 branches abroad and teaches more than 14,000 students online and in person, placing Arafi at the center of a global clerical network.

Under Khamenei, Arafi also served on the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, as one of the 12 jurists of the Guardian Council and as a key member of the Assembly of Experts — the very body tasked with choosing the next Supreme Leader, if the Islamic Republic endures.

The country is passing through one of the most volatile periods in its modern history, raising doubts not only about who might succeed Khamenei but about whether the Islamic Republic will survive long enough for that question to be answered.

Even for figures now described as potential successors, the title “future leader” may prove more fragile than it appears.

“Regarding the status of the nuclear installations in Iran, up to now, we have no indication that any of the nuclear installations, including the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the Tehran Research Reactor or other nuclear fuel cycle facilities have been damaged or hit,” Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told an emergency meeting of the Board of Governors.

“Efforts to contact the Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities through the IEC continue, with no response so far. We hope this indispensable channel of communication can be reestablished as soon as possible,” he added.

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  IAEA says cannot assure Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful

The agency’s Incident and Emergency Centre, Grossi said, was fully operational and coordinating with regional safety networks. “So far, no elevation of radiation levels above the usual background levels has been detected in countries bordering Iran,” he said.

Warning against strikes on nuclear facilities

Armed attacks on nuclear sites, Grossi said, carry risks that extend beyond national borders.

“Let me again recall past General Conference resolutions that state that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked,” he said.

He urged restraint by all sides. “Consistent with the objectives of the IAEA, as enshrined in its Statute, I reiterate my call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation,” Grossi added.

The IAEA chief also said negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program must start again. “To achieve the long-term assurance that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons and for maintaining the continued effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime, we must return to diplomacy and negotiations,” he said.

Iran envoy cites Natanz

Separately, Reuters reported that Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA said the United States and Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities on Sunday. Asked which facility was struck, the ambassador replied “Natanz,” according to Reuters.

The Natanz nuclear facility is Iran’s main uranium enrichment site and has long been central to international concerns about Tehran’s nuclear activities.

Grossi added that while no radiological release has been detected, the situation remains serious. “Let me underline that the situation today is very concerning. We cannot rule out a possible radiological release with serious consequences,” he said.

Iran calls for IAEA condemnation

During the session, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, called on the agency to condemn the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

He rejected that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, calling them “completely false.”

Najafi said Iran’s response would continue, adding that such measures would remain in place as long as what he described as “aggression” continues.