Concessions or distractions? Iran's pop culture challenges theocratic rule

Tarahomi, head of legal affairs at the Anti-Narcotics Headquarters, told state media that speculation about legalizing poppy cultivation was misplaced. “What is under consideration is licensing controlled cultivation of certain poppy species such as Papaver bracteatum -- also known as the Iranian poppy -- for medical use, not opium poppy,” he said.

He explained that Iran had voluntarily halted poppy farming after the 1979 revolution, meeting pharmaceutical needs through seizures and imports. But declining production in Afghanistan has forced Tehran to consider limited licensed cultivation for morphine and related medicines under international conventions.

Tarahomi said licensed crops would be grown only on enclosed land with state purchase and factory processing, leaving no possibility of diversion. By contrast, he warned, illegal growers would face escalating penalties: “The first time a fine, the second time a fine and prison, and from the third time onward, fine, prison and confiscation of agricultural land.”

Officials have previously reported a sharp fall in opium seizures and rising concerns over illegal cultivation in some provinces, with authorities destroying thousands of hectares of illicit fields.

“For nearly half a century, the front of arrogance has employed every kind of conspiracy and enmity against the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic,” Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei told the Supreme Judicial Council, using a phrase Iranian authorities employ to refer to Western powers.

He said economic siege was “nothing new” for Iranians, adding: “At this time, when enemies are focusing all efforts to bring down the Iranian nation and system, we must be vigilant that their agents do not infiltrate and damage national unity.”

“Those who through psychological operations weaken people’s spirit and spread fear will face legal measures,” he said, warning that profiteers or individuals disrupting essential goods markets “whether out of greed, negligence, or acting as enemy agents, will be dealt with decisively under the law.”

Earlier this month, Iran’s prosecutor general’s office warned that media and online outlets would also face legal action if their coverage of the reimposed UN sanctions undermines public morale.

Judiciary’s news outlet Mizan said some websites and channels had posted “sensitive content” about rising prices, adding that such reporting threatened the “psychological security of society.”

The judiciary has previously pursued cases against journalists and citizens over commentary on political and economic issues.

The contrast revived one of the movement’s most searing slogans: “Death to the child-killing government.”

The stories of these children underscore the scale and cruelty of the crackdown, where even toddlers were killed and grieving families were threatened into silence.

The boy who became a symbol

Nine-year-old Kian Pourfalak from Izeh in southwest Iran became a national symbol. He was killed when security forces opened fire on his family’s car on 16 November 2022. His parents—wounded but survived—insist they were deliberately targeted.

A bright, imaginative child, Kian loved rainbows and robotics, constantly inventing projects and experiments. One of his proudest creations was a boat built from lollipop sticks that floated successfully on water.

After his death, images of his rainbow drawings and handmade boat spread widely, becoming symbols of innocence and promise destroyed by the crackdown.

Kian’s parents have faced repeated intimidation and summons by intelligence officials for speaking publicly about his killing

The Youngest Victim

The youngest victim recorded was just two years old. Known only by her family name, Mirshekar, she was reportedly shot dead while playing outside her home in Zahedan, in southeastern Sistan and Baluchestan Province, on 30 September 2022.

That day—remembered as “Zahedan’s Bloody Friday”—was among the deadliest of the uprising.

Security forces and snipers opened fire on protesting crowds after Friday prayers in the city’s Sunni-majority area, killing over 100 people and injuring many more with live ammunition, pellets, and tear gas.

More than a dozen children were among the dead.

The Child Laborer

Also killed on Bloody Friday was Mohammad-Eghbal Nayeb-Zehi, a 16-year-old Baluchi boy.

From a poor family without official identity papers, he had worked in construction since the age of nine to help support his parents and siblings.

That Friday, he walked many kilometers from his village to Zahedan to attend prayers. Carrying just enough money for a sandwich afterward, he was gunned down.

His modest dream was to one day buy a smartphone and open an Instagram account—a simple ambition that captured both his hopes and the fragility of his life.

Lost Before First Class

Hasti Narouei, a seven-year-old about to begin her first year of school, never made it.

On 30 September, her grandmother took her along to Friday prayers. There, she was reportedly struck on the head by a tear gas canister.

Hasti suffocated and died before she ever had the chance to sit in a classroom.

Gunned down on the way to school

In a village near Saravan, also in Sistan and Baluchestan, Mona Naghib was walking to class with her older sister Maryam when security forces opened fire while chasing two teenage protesters.

A bullet struck Mona. Maryam tried to carry her home, but she died before any medical help could arrive. The family has faced threats from intelligence officials who ordered them to remain silent, according to rights groups.

Killed for chanting

Helen Ahmadi, a seven-year-old girl from Bukan in West Azerbaijan Province, was shot on 12 October 2022 while walking home from school with other children, allegedly for chanting slogans.

Activists say security forces later pressured her family to claim her death was caused by a car accident, highlighting the ongoing intimidation faced by families of children killed in the crackdown.

Pezeshkian, who left New York on Saturday empty-handed after failing to secure a deal with European powers, said the United States demanded Iran surrender its stock of highly enriched uranium in exchange for only 90 days of relief from UN sanctions.

“If we are to choose between the unreasonable demands of the Americans and the snapback, our choice is the snapback,” Pezeshkian said, hours before the return of UN sanctions.

Kamran Matin, professor of international relations at the University of Sussex, told Iran International that Iran’s leaders knew negotiations would not succeed because halting enrichment and surrendering the highly enriched uranium stockpiles would have meant “total surrender”—something that would have endangered the Islamic Republic’ cohesion.

US-based commentator Ali Afshari argued that the responsibility went beyond Pezeshkian, stressing that presidents do not determine Iran’s strategic policies.

“Those who peddled illusions in the 2024 presidential ‘quasi-election’ cannot hold only Masoud Pezeshkian responsible for the return of UN sanctions and the war,” he wrote on X, adding that reformists had misled voters by urging participation.

Hardliners claim vindication

The snapback of UN sanctions has emboldened Pezeshkian’s conservative rivals who staunchly opposed the 2015 nuclear deal.

After the UN vote, his hardline election rival Saeed Jalili wrote on X: “In 2015 they said JCPOA would completely lift sanctions but almost nothing (happened). Ten years of a nation’s life was wasted because of this political behavior.”

Ultra-hardline lawmaker Amirhossein Sabeti, a close ally of Jalili, echoed his remarks: the JCPOA “was a colonial and one-sided agreement that wasted ten years of the nation’s life, restricted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and ultimately, by proving the wisdom of the revolutionary camp that opposed it from the beginning, exposed the illusions of the pro-West faction.”

On social media, ultra-hardline users demanded prosecutions. One wrote: “The end of the disgraceful JCPOA—the greatest shame in the history of Iran’s politics—congratulations to patriotic compatriots and those who care for Iran, and condolences to reformists, centrists, moderates, and all traitors to the homeland. It is time that those responsible for this disgraceful agreement be put on trial for this unforgivable betrayal.”

Some voices in the reformist camp lamented the collapse. Azar Mansouri, head of the Reform Front, accused conservatives of political score-settling.

“They fought it for years and now celebrate its death. But returning to the pre-JCPOA era means sanctions, isolation, and more pressure on the people. What is there to celebrate?”

Disillusionment with Pezeshkian

Frustration has increasingly turned toward the president. One user recalled his campaign pledge: “Pezeshkian had promised that if he failed to achieve his goals, including lifting sanctions, he would resign. Why didn’t he rely on popular mobilization to achieve his aims? Why doesn’t he resign now?”

Others mocked his unkept promises. “From the beginning, pinning hopes on Pezeshkian to lift sanctions was wishful thinking,” one activist wrote. “Someone who couldn’t deliver on his promise of lifting internet filtering after a year cannot be expected to deliver on lifting sanctions… He had also promised to resign if his pledges were not fulfilled.”

Journalist Mohammad Aghazadeh faulted reformists for urging turnout: “They frightened us by saying if Jalili won, the JCPOA would collapse, and war would break out. Pezeshkian was elected, but sanctions returned, and war came too—and will come again.”

Activist Hossein Razzagh, who boycotted the election, wrote: “The only thing Pezeshkian is not committed to is the votes of those he lured to the ballot box with promises of lifting the shadow of war. The only thing he is committed to is the Leader!”

Journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi urged Pezeshkian to level with voters: “Most of the decisive factors lie beyond his control. But he must frankly explain to the people what his plan is… In fact, he entered the second round of the presidential election with the aim of saving us from Saeed Jalili’s program. Now he is compelled to play Mr. Jalili’s role himself!”

Political activist Motahereh Gounei summed up the wider sense of betrayal: “You celebrated that Jalili didn’t come and Pezeshkian did! The country was ruined, its resources and infrastructure destroyed, we got both war and negotiations!"

"Sanctions returned, the dollar reached 110,000 tomans, and now I, a young Iranian, am awaiting a prison sentence simply for writing about Khamenei’s incompetence in governance and policymaking," the activist said.

The sanctions, first imposed between 2006 and 2010 under six Security Council resolutions, were suspended in 2015 when Resolution 2231 endorsed the nuclear deal (JCPOA).

They covered arms embargoes, travel bans, financial restrictions, prohibitions on nuclear- and missile-related activity and the freezing of assets belonging to designated individuals and entities.

Resolution 2231 set an October 18, 2025 deadline after which many restrictions were due to expire unless a so-called "snapback" mechanism was triggered.

On August 28, 2025, Britain, France and Germany (the E3) triggered the mechanism citing Iran's failure to comply with its nuclear obligations, beginning a 30-day process that culminated in the sanctions' return.

Why it matters

The return of UN sanctions is expected to hit Iran hard, even though it already faces sweeping US and EU measures.

The difference is that UN sanctions carry international legitimacy, compelling broader compliance by governments, insurers and banks worldwide.

Even if unilateral or secondary sanctions are eased, UN restrictions would remain in force and shape global behavior unless a new Security Council resolution overturns them.

The impact will extend beyond oil and finance, raising trade finance costs, shipping insurance premiums and currency volatility.

Which resolutions are being reimposed?

• 1696 (2006): Demanded Iran suspend enrichment; urged states to block nuclear or missile-related transfers.
• 1737 (2006): Banned supply of nuclear and missile technologies, froze assets of designated entities and imposed travel monitoring.
• 1747 (2007): Banned Iranian arms exports, expanded asset freezes and urged states and IFIs not to extend loans or financial aid beyond humanitarian needs.
• 1803 (2008): Authorized cargo inspections, tightened banking oversight, added designations and restricted dual-use nuclear items.
• 1835 (2008): Reaffirmed previous measures without adding new ones.
• 1929 (2010): The most sweeping pre-JCPOA resolution, it:
  • Expanded an arms embargo to heavy conventional weapons.
  • Restricted shipping, insurance and financial services linked to nuclear and missile activity.
  • Prohibited Iran from investing abroad in sensitive industries.
  • Effectively blocked new foreign investment in oil and gas fields.
  • Created an expert panel to monitor compliance.

What’s the impact?

Reinstated sanctions will directly undermine Iran’s ability to export crude, attract investment and finance its energy sector.

Resolution 1929 is especially damaging, as it restricts shipping insurance and financial services essential for oil exports while deterring foreign energy companies.

Banking restrictions from Resolutions 1737, 174 and 1803 complicate oil sales and payments, cutting revenues. Lower government income will limit Tehran’s fiscal capacity, straining subsidies, salaries, and social programs.

Beyond oil, sanctions will intensify inflationary pressures, weaken the rial and increase transaction costs across supply chains.

The private sector will face new hurdles in accessing raw materials, technology, and international banking, compounding Iran’s broader economic crisis.