Iran rules out talks with US, criticizes Europe

Q: How and when did Khamenei approve the 2013 nuclear talks?

On September 17, 2013, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei signaled his approval for nuclear talks with world powers, using a religious analogy in a speech to suggest that "flexibility" is sometimes necessary to achieve victory against adversaries.

Two weeks later, he expressed support for the diplomatic initiative of then-President Hassan Rouhani’s administration in another speech.

Between April and July 2015, as nuclear talks neared their conclusion, Khamenei cautioned military officials against allowing "aliens" to inspect military facilities "under the guise of supervision and inspection." He warned against halting Iran’s defense development or permitting the interrogation of Iranian nuclear scientists. Khamenei also pledged continued backing for the Islamic Republic’s "friends in the region," including the "peoples" of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon.

Additionally, Khamenei insisted that all sanctions, whether imposed by the United Nations or the United States, must be lifted immediately once a deal was finalized.

Q: What role did Khamenei play in the 2015 nuclear deal?

Khamenei has consistently claimed that he was not directly involved in the details of the nuclear negotiations with world powers, which began in November 2013.

However, officials’ statements suggest that the negotiating team regularly reported to him, followed his instructions, and adhered to the “red lines” he established. A deal, by all accounts, required his ultimate approval.

In July 2013, Khamenei showcased his in-depth knowledge of the negotiations, citing technical terms and specific figures during a speech to government officials.

“Regarding the enrichment capacity, they aim to make the Islamic Republic consent to 10,000 SWU, but they began by demanding a limitation to 500 SWU or 1,000 SWU. 10,000 SWU is produced by the 10,000 old-type centrifuges we had and still have. Our officials say we need 190,000 SWU. This is the country’s definite need,” he said.

SWU (separative work units) refers to the amount of separation achieved in the uranium enrichment process.

Q: Did Khamenei accept responsibility for the 2015 nuclear deal?

Khamenei avoided taking direct responsibility for the nuclear deal, deferring its final approval to the conservative and hardliner-dominated Parliament. He neither explicitly endorsed nor opposed the agreement.

Speaker Ali Larijani expedited the parliamentary vote, reportedly acting on Khamenei’s instructions, and blocked debate on the legislation despite objections from hardliners. The deal passed with 161 lawmakers voting in favor, 59 opposing, and 13 abstaining.Some reports claimed that Khamenei had conveyed his desire for the deal’s approval through Asghar Hejazi, an official in his office. However, the office issued a statement denying such allegations.

Q: When did Khamenei first publicly criticize the 2015 nuclear negotiation team?

After the US withdrew from the nuclear deal – formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – in May 2018, Khamenei described the negotiations as a mistake in an August speech.

He stated that he had permitted the talks because senior officials, likely President Hassan Rouhani and his negotiation team led by Javad Zarif, had insisted on pursuing them.

In the same speech, he accused the negotiators of crossing the “red lines” he had set.

Q: Has Khamenei issued a fatwa prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons?Iran's government has consistently stated that it will not pursue nuclear weapons, citing a fatwa (religious edict) by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei banning all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms.Iranian officials first referenced Khamenei’s fatwa at an IAEA meeting in Vienna in August 2005 and reiterated it at the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament in April 2010.

According to Khamenei’s official website, Iran’s mission later pledged to submit a translation of the fatwa in several languages to the UN for registration as an official document.

In an October 2019 speech, Khamenei declared that building and maintaining nuclear weapons is "absolutely haram," meaning strictly forbidden under Islamic law. He stated that although Iran had the capability to develop a bomb, it chose not to. He emphasized there is no justification for pursuing a weapon that is religiously prohibited.

However, analysts argue that the so-called fatwa is merely an advisory opinion rather than a binding legal decree. They argue it was intended to mislead the international community about the true intentions of a nuclear program that Tehran insists is peaceful.

Q: Can Khamenei’s ‘nuclear fatwa’ be overturned?

Fatwas are issued by Shia Marja – senior clerics recognized as sources of emulation in Islamic jurisprudence.

Skeptics say that such fatwas are not immutable; they can be revised or revoked based on the “requirements of time and place.” This principle allows rulings to adapt to new circumstances, as shown by historical instances where one Marja or another has altered earlier decisions.

“Of course, he will once again pursue his maximum pressure [campaign] against Iran,” Boulos told the French outlet Le Point, adding that Trump will be open to diplomacy alongside his firm approach.

“[He] is very clear that he absolutely does not want Iran to have a nuclear program,” he said, and would be “ready to run serious negotiations” with Tehran to achieve that goal.

Trump in his first term followed a range of measures to weaken Iran’s economy and curb its regional influence. He withdrew the United States from the nuclear deal with Tehran but did not initiate talks that would lead to another agreement.

During his 2024 election campaign, Trump struck a diplomatic tone, saying he did not intend to harm Iran if his red line was not crossed.

“My terms are very easy. Iran can't have nuclear weapons” he said, casting his vote. “I’d like them to be a very successful country,” without going into details of his plans for US-Iran relations.

The relationship between Washington and Tehran remains deeply strained, marked by proxy conflicts across the Middle East. Both sides have traded accusations of fueling instability, further complicating any diplomatic overture.

The ongoing hostility has not made Trump consider regime change in Iran however, according to his senior adviser Boulos.

“He did not talk about regime change but only about a nuclear agreement,” Boulos told Le Point referring to his conversations with the president-elect.

Boulos is a Lebanese-American businessman and the father-in-law of Trump's daughter Tiffany. He may prove to be an important player in shaping the incoming US administrations’ policy in that region.

His appointment adds another voice deeply skeptical of Iran to a foreign policy team deeply supportive of the Islamic Republic's arch-foe Israel.

"In case of a snapback reinstatement, one of the options we proposed was withdrawing from the NPT ... we could leave the treaty," deputy foreign minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi was quoted as saying by a parliamentary spokesman on Tuesday.

The remarks followed Takht-Ravanchi's discussions in Geneva with representatives from the UK, France, and Germany — the three European signatories to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

"We did not negotiate in Geneva because we had no text, and there was no text to negotiate on," Takht-Ravanchi said.

The Geneva talks were held in the wake of a controversial resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors, which calls for a report on Iran’s nuclear program and its lack of full cooperation with the IAEA by spring 2024.

This resolution could trigger the activation of the snapback mechanism, a provision within the JCPOA that would automatically restore international sanctions on Iran and potentially bring the country under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The resolution, marking the second such action against Iran in two years, has prompted Iran to announce it will activate new and advanced centrifuges as a retaliatory measure.

"Unfortunately, our enemies have made Iran’s nuclear file very complicated and politicized," said Behrooz Kamalvandi, spokesperson for Iran's Atomic Energy Organization.

The breakdown in negotiations between Iran and the three European countries reflects broader diplomatic tensions. Efforts to revive the JCPOA, which collapsed after the United States withdrew under President Donald Trump in 2018, have stalled under Presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi.

"We have no intention of negotiating with Washington at this time, as there is no basis for such talks," Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said recently, adding that Iran would reassess its approach once the new US administration’s policies become clearer.

However, some within President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration have shown interest in potential talks with the United States, particularly those aligned with the more moderate camp.

Among them, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Pezeshkian's strategic deputy, wrote in an article in Foreign Affairs magazine that Trump should pursue an agreement that benefits both sides.

“The West needs a more constructive approach—one that takes advantage of Iran’s hard-earned confidence, accepts Iran as an integral part of regional stability, and seeks collaborative solutions to shared challenges," he wrote. "Such shared challenges could even prompt Tehran and Washington to engage in conflict management rather than exponential escalation.”

"The United States pursues authoritarianism and unilateralism on the international stage," Pezeshkian said in a meeting on Wednesday with China's vice premier Zhang Guoqing in Tehran.

"We are determined to expand our cooperation with China and Russia to counter unilateralism," the Iranian president said.

The government is working to implement the 25-year agreement between Beijing and Tehran, he said.

Announced in 2016, the comprehensive strategic partnership aimed to increase bilateral trade to $600 billion by 2026. However, trade volume reached just $12.5 billion last year according to the International Monetary Fund.

China remains Iran's largest trade partner and purchases nearly all of Iran's crude oil in defiance of US sanctions. Nonetheless, Chinese companies have secured substantial contracts with other regional players, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, totaling billions of dollars.

Iran's embattled Vice President for Strategic Affairs and former foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled "How Iran Sees the Path to Peace," stating, "The Islamic Republic is open to negotiations – including with America."

Zarif added: "Instead of increasing pressure on Iran, the West should pursue positive-sum solutions. The nuclear deal provides a unique example, and the West should look to revive it. But to do so, it must take concrete and practical actions—including political, legislative, and mutually beneficial investment measures—to make sure Iran can benefit economically from the agreement, as was promised. Should Trump decide to take such steps, then Iran is willing to have a dialogue that would benefit both Tehran and Washington."

While Zarif talked about "reviving" the 2015 nuclear deal, the United States clearly wants a totally new deal covering matters beyond the nuclear issue, including Iran's regional ambitions and its missile program which happens to be a source of concern for Iran's neighbors and European states.

Despite Zarif's overture, hardliner analyst Foad Izadi who is characterized by the Iranian state television as an expert on the United States, told conservative Nameh News website in Tehran: "We cannot say with a one hundred percent assurance whether negotiating with the United States is good or bad for Iran as we do not have access to confidential information."

Expressing distrust of the United States, Izadi accused the US, along with Turkey, of involvement in the Syrian insurgents' surprise attack on government forces allied with Iran. As evidence for his claim, he cited Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who remarked that "the United States was not surprised" by the attack on Aleppo, despite Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the main insurgent group, being designated as a terrorist organization by the US.

Izadi further alleged, "If the Americans did not design the attack, they were at least aware of it—and they are undoubtedly pleased with what is happening in Syria." He added, "The United States' plan is to settle scores with the Islamic Republic within the next four years, as beyond that, it will be unable to act due to Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS agreements."

He further charged that Iranian supporters of negotiations with the United States are not aware that the other sides use negotiations only “to buy time, to confuse Iranian officials and to wage a psychological war on Iranians."

Iran should negotiate with the United States only when the officials can say with a high degree of certainty that the country is going to be better off after the talks, Izadi said.

Former head of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, told the Khabar Online website in Tehran that China and Russia favor Trump's "maximum pressure" policy against Iran. He added that Russia is also wary of any potential agreement between Iran and Europe. However, he noted that Europe’s primary goal in its negotiations with Tehran is to address its own concerns.

Falahatpisheh emphasized that the United States remains the primary actor in negotiations with Iran. He argued that Iran's best course of action is to persuade Europe not to allow itself to be leveraged by the US to trigger the 2015 nuclear deal’s snapback mechanism against Iran.

He concluded, "Trump will never engage in negotiations that do not advance the interests of the United States."