IRGC chief vows ‘different’ form of revenge against Israel
IRGC chief commander Hossein Salami. FILE photo
After a period of relative calm in Iran's aggressive rhetoric toward Israel, IRGC Chief Commander Hossein Salami stated on Sunday that Iran's revenge against Israel would be “different,” though he did not provide further details.
"The Israelis will taste the bitter revenge for their wickedness,” Salami threatened.
For more than a month since the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, Iranian officials, who blame Israel for the attack, have been issuing threats of a severe response. However, no direct Iranian retaliation has occurred, unlike the large missile and drone strike in April, which followed an Israeli attack on Iran’s consular compound in Damascus.
In the meantime, Iranian officials have softened their rhetoric, signaling that Tehran's response may not involve a large-scale, direct attack. However, Salami's statement on Sunday served as both a renewed threat and an indication that Tehran is likely avoiding a major escalation. His remarks suggest a more calculated, possibly asymmetric response, rather than an immediate, overt military operation.
According to Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, Hossein Salami, when asked about "when, where, and how" Iran’s revenge on Israel will be carried out, stated: "It will certainly be different, and this mystery will be solved in time for everyone."
In a gathering in Yasuj Sunday evening, Hossein Salami stated that Israel is "surrounded by Muslims" and, referring to Iran’s anticipated revenge, added that the "nightmare of inevitable action" shakes Israel day and night. He also commented on protests over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's failure to secure the release of hostages held by Hamas, saying, "They cannot continue their political life like this, and we are witnessing signs of their political downfall."
The IRGC chief previously responded to a reporter's question about revenge for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, stating, "You will hear good news." On Tuesday, September 3, Mostafa Rostami, head of Khamenei's representative office in universities, added, "We await revenge for the blood of the martyrs, especially the martyr who was our guest. This revenge is delayed due to considerations, but it is certain."
Although Iran quickly vowed revenge after Haniyeh's killing, it faced a dilemma. A direct attack risked triggering a major military escalation, potentially exposing key targets within Iran to retaliation. On the other hand, failing to act would damage its credibility in the region, particularly among its allies and proxy forces. This put Tehran in a challenging position, balancing the need to maintain its reputation with the danger of escalating the conflict further.
A member of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission claims that the Islamic Republic is bartering its missiles and drones in exchange for Russian soy and wheat.
These remarks come amid recent denials by Iranian officials and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding reports about the delivery of ballistic missiles to Russia.
The lawmaker, Ahmad Bakhshaei Ardestani, has stated clearly, "We provide missiles to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi, so why shouldn't we provide them to Russia?"
According to this parliamentarian, in order to meet its needs, including importing soy and wheat, Iran must engage in bartering; one part of this barter involves sending missiles, while the other part includes sending drones to Russia.
Bakhshaei Ardestani's claim about bartering drones and missiles for Russian wheat and soy comes despite official customs statistics and the Iranian Chamber of Commerce indicating that Iran does not import soy from Russia.
Paying higher prices
Statistics from the Iranian Chamber of Commerce reveal that last year Iran imported nearly $2 billion worth of soy, sourced from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey, the UAE, and Oman, with no soy shipments coming from Russia.
However, Iran did purchase $595 million worth of wheat, along with $260 million worth of corn and $150 million worth of barley from Russia last year.
Details from the Chamber of Commerce show that Russia actually exports agricultural products to Iran at prices significantly higher than regional market rates. For example, last year Iran bought ordinary wheat for human consumption from Kazakhstan and Turkey at prices ranging from 31 to 37 cents per kilogram, while similar wheat imported from Russia cost between 43 and 47 cents per kilogram.
This higher price for Russian wheat is notable, considering that the Iranian government purchases domestic wheat for less than 30 cents per kilogram and delays payments to local farmers.
Previously, Ahmad Maroufkhani, the head of the Iranian Oil Exporters Association, stated that Russia sells gasoline to Iran at 20% higher than global prices. He announced last year that Iran pays $150 per ton of gasoline imported from Russia, which is 20% above the international price.
The high cost of Russian gasoline for Iran violates the European Union and seven industrialized nations’ price caps on Russian gasoline and diesel, forcing Russia to sell its oil products at lower prices in global markets.
This Iranian behavior of paying more for Russian commodities remains a mystery, unless one can argue that they might be hidden military and security deals between the two.
Trade Turnover
Iranian customs statistics show that last year Iran had $1.7 billion in imports from Russia, which is unchanged from 2021, prior to Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. However, compared to the period of U.S. sanctions against Iran in 2018, this figure represents a 60% increase. Iranian exports to Russia have seen little growth from the execution of U.S. sanctions until 2021, but since 2022, they it nearly doubled, reaching $950 million last year. These statistics do not include trade in petroleum products and weapons.
A significant portion of Iran's exports to Russia consists of fruits and vegetables, while a considerable part of its imports includes grains, industrial machinery, wood, and cooking oil.
Since 2022, following Western sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, Russian customs have ceased publishing details of trade with foreign countries. However, both Iranian and Russian officials report bilateral trade totaling $5 billion. If accurate, this figure suggests that either half of the trade between the two countries is not recorded by customs or involves items such as oil products and weapons not covered by Iranian customs statistics.
Israeli airstrikes on Sunday hit facilities in the Scientific Research Studies Center (CERS) in Syria’s Masyaf, which are said to be used by Iran and its proxies to produce chemical weapons, killing 14 people, Syria media reported.
Israel's defense minister revealed in 2022 that the facilities at the Scientific Research Studies Center in Masyaf were being used by Iran to produce advanced missiles and weapons for its proxies. Benny Gantz made the remarks following an Israeli airstrike on the sites at the time, but the strikes do not seem to have removed the threat, as the facilities were once again targeted on September 8, 2024.
Late Sunday night, a series of Israeli airstrikes hit multiple locations across central Syria, resulting in the deaths of at least five individuals and injuring 19 more, according to Syrian state media. The strikes caused fires and damaged infrastructure in the area, with firefighting teams battling to control the flames into the early hours of Monday.
Two regional intelligence sources told Reuters a major military research center for chemical arms production located near Masyaf was hit several times. It is believed to house a team of Iranian military experts involved in weapons production.
Syria’s official news agency, SANA, reported that the country's air defense systems responded to what they called an "aggression" targeting several points in the central region, specifically in Hama province. One of the strikes damaged a highway in the province, further complicating the situation on the ground.
Faysal Haydar, the director of Masyaf National Hospital in western Hama province, confirmed the number of casualties, which SANA says were all civilians.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a UK-based war monitoring group, also confirmed the strikes and reported that one of the targeted sites was part of the CERS in Masyaf, a location known to house Iranian militias and weapons experts. These forces have reportedly been stationed in Syria to assist in developing military capabilities for the Assad regime, the report said.
“Under the vision of Soleimani, Iran transformed CERS in Syria's Masyaf into production facilities for mid and long-range, precise missiles and weapons, provided to Hezbollah and Iranian proxies. These sites host significant threats to the region and to Israel," Benny Gantz said in September 2022.
Israel’s Alma, an institute focused on threats to northern Israel, has revealed in a detailed report that “Iran’s major focus is to develop and manufacture precision missiles and rockets, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Syrian soil”.
Israel’s Alma, an institute focused on threats to northern Israel, has revealed in a detailed report that “Iran’s major focus is to develop and manufacture precision missiles and rockets, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Syrian soil”. Operations are centered around the CERS Center, which is the heart of Syria's military industry. Established in 1971, the institute has transformed into a collaborative platform involving Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah since the beginning of the civil war, according to Alma's statement.
Over the years, Syria’s CERS Center has been shown to be accountable for the research, development, and military production of advanced weapons such as surface-to-surface missiles such as the M-600 / Fateh-110 missile, which is “at the heart of the joint Iranian-Syrian and Hezbollah precision project", Alma reported. More alarmingly, it states that “the CERS Center is responsible for developing and manufacturing chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear weapons”.
Also on Sunday, local media reported strikes near Damascus and the coastal city of Tartous, though details on the extent of the damage or casualties in that area were limited at the time.
The incident marks yet another escalation in the ongoing conflict in Syria, with Israeli airstrikes becoming a frequent occurrence, particularly targeting sites linked to Iranian forces operating in the country. While Israel rarely confirms such operations, it has repeatedly stated that it will not tolerate Iran’s military presence in Syria, which it views as a direct threat to its national security.
The number of deaths from road accidents has reached a 12-year high in Iran, according to recent data from the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization (ILMO).
After a decade of steady decline, traffic fatalities began to rise again in the Iranian year 2021, with over 20,000 deaths reported in the last Iranian calendar year 2023 (March 21, 2023 – March 19, 2024).
Citing data from the ILMO, Etemad newspaper reported that around 20 years ago, the annual death toll from road accidents approached 28,000. Due to various interventions, this number was reduced to approximately 16,000 by 2020. However, the report noted that since 2021, traffic fatalities have been rising once more, now surpassing 20,000, a figure not seen since 2011, breaking a 12-year record.
Despite existing laws aimed at reducing traffic deaths, Etemad noted that the Iranian government had committed to reducing road fatalities by 10% annually. This goal, had it been met, would have brought the number of deaths down to fewer than 10,000 per year. However, the rising numbers have shown that this target has not been achieved.
On Saturday, Taymour Hosseini, the Chief of Iran’s Traffic Police, reported that last week, there were 264 fatal accidents in the country, resulting in 314 deaths at the scene. In addition, 8,156 injury-related accidents were recorded, with speeding, driver inattention, and loss of vehicle control identified as the primary causes.
Hosseini did not mention other widely referenced factors such as the poor quality of domestically manufactured vehicles and inadequate road conditions, which many experts cite as key contributors to Iran's high rate of road fatalities.
In 2022, Kamal Hadianfar, the former Chief of Traffic Police, acknowledged that there were 5,200 high-risk accident spots across the country, with 877 of them considered especially dangerous and in need of urgent improvement.
A substantial portion of Iran's road fatalities has been attributed to the quality of vehicles and the state of the country's roads. Around 90% of motorcycles and 40% of passenger cars are considered outdated, while parts of the public transportation fleet also suffer from wear and tear.
The ongoing rise in fatalities has raised concerns over the effectiveness of safety measures and road infrastructure improvements. Official estimates suggest that the economic impact of road accidents accounts for between 2% and 7% of Iran's GDP.
Experts warn that given the current upward trend in fatalities, the figure could increase further if urgent action is not taken.
Over 90% of Iran’s population is dissatisfied with the country’s current state, with a significant portion believing that the situation is 'beyond repair' amid authoritarian crackdowns and an economic crisis.
The revealing insight comes from a new survey conducted by a department affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, published by the pro-reform daily Ham-Mihan on Sunday.
The results, part of the Fourth Wave of the National Survey on Values and Attitudes of Iranians, offer a rare glimpse into public sentiment in a system that often avoids transparency about the true depth of dissatisfaction among its citizens.
Conducted in November 2023 by the Office of National Plans of the Research Institute of Culture, Art, and Communications, the survey polled 15,878 Iranians over the age of 51 across 15 provinces.
Iran's oil workers in a strike rally in the south of the country on December 17, 2022
While the full survey results have not yet been made public, sections of the data have been released to researchers and are slowly being published. According to Ham-Mihan, 92% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the country’s current trajectory, with about one-third of them going so far as to state that “the country’s situation is beyond repair.”
This figure comes as no surprise in a country that is in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the founding of the Islamic Republic, international isolation, and rising authoritarianism.
Among the most pressing issues identified by respondents were inflation and high prices (81.9%), unemployment (47.9%), addiction (26.9%), corruption (13.1%), housing shortages (12.1%), and, notably, the issue of the hijab (11.9%).
The prominence of the hijab issue, which has risen to become the sixth most important concern, reflects a dramatic shift in public sentiment following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 while in the custody of the morality police.
Protests that erupted after her death challenged the Islamic Republic’s dress codes and have since shifted the national debate on personal freedoms, particularly for women.
The survey also underscores the growing sense of insecurity among Iranians, with 54.8% of respondents stating that their property and belongings are not safe. Women, in particular, expressed concerns about safety, with 14% stating they feel "very little" safety in public, and 21.5% indicating they feel "somewhat unsafe."
Sociologists warn that this overwhelming sense of hopelessness could lead to greater unrest. Speaking to Ham-Mihan, sociologist Simin Kazemi pointed out the fact that 60% of eligible voters did not participate in the first round of the 2024 presidential election, a sign of widespread political disillusionment.
“If the new government fails to seize this opportunity and address the concerns, growing dissatisfaction could spiral into political and social crises larger than anything we’ve seen before,” Kazemi said.
The outlook painted by the survey echoes past studies, including a 2022 poll by the Gamaan Institute, which found that 81% of respondents inside Iran wanted an end to the Islamic Republic altogether. Similarly, a 2021 survey by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) revealed that 59% of Iranians had no hope for the future of their country.
A former Iranian MP and commentator Heshmatollah Falhatpisheh has called Iran's latest arms sales to Russia "the dirtiest example of Russophilia" as Iran gets ever closer to its allies in Moscow.
He said Iran's leaders "have turned Iran into a playing card" in the war on Ukraine as Iran already faces global sanctions for providing drones to Russia used in civilian areas of Ukraine.
The outspoken former MP said the latest debacle was part of a "dirty game" as Iran is dragged further into global conflict and sanctions which have led to the country's worst economic crisis since the founding of the Islamic Republic.
"It will continue until the dictator [Putin] leaves the quagmire," he blasted.
The former chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, he is now a faculty member of Allameh Tabatabaei University. He has made no secret of his opposition to the government's policies which continue to lead the country closer to conflict with global powers such as the US.
The latest arms sales to Russia were confirmed by an Iranian lawmaker who denied that the delivery of ballistic missiles would risk heavy implications for Iran, also sanctioned for human rights abuses at home and its nuclear weapons program. Iran's supply of kamikaze drones to Russia since 2022 has already angered Western powers that have imposed sanctions against Iranian entities and individuals.
Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani justified it by saying Iran has to subsequently "barter for our needs, including importing soybeans and wheat. Part of the barter involves sending missiles, and another part involves sending military drones to Russia."
When asked whether sending ballistic missiles to Russia might lead to further sanctions or trigger the so-called "snapback" mechanism against Iran, the member of the Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee replied, "It can't get any worse than it already is. We give missiles to [our proxies] Hezbollah, Hamas, and Hashd al-Shaabi, so why not to Russia?"
On Sunday, Nasser Kanaani, the spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, once again denied being an ally to Russia in its war in Ukraine, saying "the Islamic Republic has never been part of the Russia-Ukraine conflict."
He said that "military cooperation between the Islamic Republic and Russia dates back well before the start of the Ukraine war."