Iran’s new car import plan: A ‘hypocritical’ facade of reform
Imported cars in southern Iran
In the final days of Ebrahim Raisi's administration, an announcement was made that promised to revolutionize the Iranian car market when the cabinet approved a plan to lift the ban on the import of used foreign cars.
The government spokesperson declared last week that Iranian citizens could now import used foreign cars without any restrictions, sparking initial excitement among the media and the public. However, as the details of the plan unfolded, the enthusiasm quickly dissipated.
Stringent restrictions undermine the policy
The regulations accompanying the plan revealed a series of restrictions that cast doubt on the feasibility of the new policy. Among them were stipulations that the cars must be between 3 to 5 years old, have an engine capacity limited to 2500 cc, and must not be imported from the United States. Additionally, imported cars could not be sold for five years. Most critically, the foreign currency used for the purchases had to come from "profits from exports or foreign investment."
Economic realities and ‘hypocrisy’
Currently, the cheapest domestic car costs between $7,500 to $10,000, while the majority of imported cars are low-quality Chinese models priced as high as European or Japanese cars. For instance, a Cherry Tiggo 8 Pro Max SUV costs $50,000. Other Chinese cars, like the Lamari EAMA produced by Dongfeng Liuzhou Motor, assembled in Iran, sell for $31,000. Brands like Great Wall Motors, Baic, FAW, and JAC also import parts for assembly, with prices ranging from $20,000 to $40,000.
An ad for Chinese vehicle Cherry Tiggo 8 for almost 52000 USD in Iran on July 20. 2024
Farhad, a Tehran resident, speaking to Iran International, said the move would not benefit Iranians. We cannot reveal his full name due to security reasons. "We cannot say this move benefits the people. Due to sanctions, they [government] can't access oil money from China, forcing them to import Chinese cars. This new policy will not benefit individuals and is hypocritical.”
Impractical requirements for foreign currency
Ahmad Aghaei, the Deputy Minister of Transportation, clarified that the currency needed for purchasing the cars must originate from abroad and be approved by the Central Bank, limiting those with access to benefit from the new policy.
"The importer must have a foreign currency account or currency outside the country to buy the car. Those who have their currency within the country will face restrictions from the Central Bank for sending the currency out of the country," he added. This requirement further limits the average Iranian's ability to benefit from the policy highlighting the plan's impracticality.
A car sales showroom in Iran
Public outcry and media criticism
In conversations with Iran International, many Iranians dismissed the plan as deceptive. “It is a lie. If you want to import a car, you have to export goods. How many people have the ability to export in order to afford a car?” said Mahmoud from Karaj.
The Iranian news agency Tabnak also pointed out the “deceptive” nature of the plan, stating that the regulations only benefit a small group of exporters, reinforcing the monopolistic market of state-owned car manufacturers.
Financial struggles of domestic manufacturers
In February, the Minister of Industry, Mine, and Trade, Abbas Aliabadi, called for more funds for the country’s two main government-controlled automakers: Iran Khodro and SAIPA. These companies face financial difficulties due to high inflation, and despite government claims, car prices have risen in the market over the past year.
A production line in Saipa car factory
Iranian auto industry experts report that state-owned carmakers are incurring daily losses of $3.7 million, totaling over one billion dollars annually, a direct result of government interventions in the auto industry. The quality of domestically produced cars is also a significant concern, with majority of road deaths in Iran involving drivers of these low-quality vehicles.
According to economic journalist Arash Hassan-Nia, Iran Khodro and Saipa are nearly bankrupt, with around $2.5 billion in accumulated losses. “Due to their managerial and ownership structures, they are unable to improve the quality of their current products,” he earlier told Iran International.
The car mafia and election politics
Ali Khosravani, vice president of the Tehran Automobile Dealers Union, previously highlighted the role of the "car mafia" in Iran, which he described as the main obstacle to new entrants in the car market. This shadowy group maintains a tight grip on the market, further complicating any genuine reform efforts.
During the presidential election debates, president-elect Masoud Pezeshkian questioned why Iranians should be forced to drive substandard cars under the guise of supporting national production.
His rival, Saeed Jalili, made a controversial claim in response saying that “People in Russia wait six months in queues for the Iranian-made Samand vehicle,” a claim ridiculed on social media.
Many now say that the recent decision to import second-hand cars is another “propaganda efforts in the final days of the Raisi government, adding one more item to their list of achievements.”
A slogan with no substance
The new car import regulations in Iran, while initially promising, reveal a complex web of restrictions and inconsistencies that ultimately leave the monopolistic market of state-owned car manufacturers intact. The majority of Iranian citizens remain unable to benefit from the changes, highlighting the gap between government promises and the harsh economic realities on the ground.
Observers believe that the promotion of "one car import for every single Iranian" is clearly a “populist” slogan, as few people have the financial means to import a car, leaving the public disillusioned once again.
The Islamic Republic is prepared for nuclear negotiations with world powers to have sanctions lifted, Iran's president-elect said, a couple of weeks after the White House made it clear that there is no diplomatic path ahead to curb Iran's move toward acquiring a nuclear weapon.
White House National Security spokesman John Kirby told Iran International on July 11 the Biden administration is committed to making sure Tehran would never develop nuclear weapons. "We'd love to be able to do that through diplomacy. But right now, there's not a path, a diplomatic path ahead of us."
Still, Iran's president-elect Masoud Pezeshkian said on Monday, "The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been and remains ready for any kind of dialogue" on the removal of sanctions imposed against the country, even though "it was the US that first withdrew from the JCPOA and then imposed the harshest sanctions on the Iranian nation."
Former US President Donald Trump in 2018 imposed crippling sanctions against the Islamic Republic after withdrawing from the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear deal that had curbed Tehran's nuclear program in return for some sanctions relief.
Various sanctions have since been enforced against Iran because of its nuclear weapons program and support for terrorist groups, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his loyalists have been reluctant to acknowledge the strain caused to the economy. Instead, they claim the sanctions are opportunities for growth and development and could foster national unity.
Now Iran is apparently hopeful that with the election of Pezeshkian, presented as a “reformist,” nuclear talks would resume leading to some reduction in US sanctions that have crippled the economy.
Pezeshkian made the comments in a phone conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, whose country tried to mediate between Tehran and Washington in 2019 during former prime minister Shinzo Abe's trip to Iran.
The Monday phone call may suggest a renewed interest on Tokyo's side to act as a mediator.
The Japanese foreign ministry's readout of Kishida's phone call with Pezeshkian confirms the two leaders have exchanged views on Iran's nuclear program, but only says, "The two leaders discussed the situation regarding the Iran nuclear issue and agreed to maintain communication."
However, Iranian state-run media claim that the Japanese prime minister "expressed his country’s readiness to mediate between Iran and the US in the talks on the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal."
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri-Kani in a visit to New York earlier this month lauded the purported new foreign policy direction under President-elect Pezeshkian.
"We believe that now it is the turn and time of the other side to prove this honesty for interaction and, of course, to open a new chapter," Bagheri Kani said in an interview with Newsweek, fueling speculations that Pezeshkian's election victory might be part of the Islamic Republic's plan to restore the 2015 nuclear deal and end the crippling sanctions that have plagued the country for years.
In his interview with Newsweek, Bagheri Kani said that Tehran remained open to resuming negotiations with Washington toward restoring mutual participation in a nuclear deal.
He made the comments one week after claiming that nuclear talks with the US are ongoing through indirect negotiations mediated by Oman. The claim was categorically rejected by the White House national security spokesman.
"I won't speak or can't speak to channels of communication with Iran one way or the other, but there are no active negotiations going on to restore the nuclear deal. The reason for that is because Iran was killing its own people in protests activity. Iran was continuing to spin centrifuges. Iran was continuing to support terrorist groups. And in the early stages of the negotiations, Iran was making unnecessary demands that made it impossible for us to do that. They weren't negotiating in good faith," Kirby told Iran International.
Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned about Iran’s nuclear activities, raising concerns about the program's peacefulness. The IAEA reported that Iran has stockpiled large amounts of highly enriched uranium, with Raphael Grossi saying that Iran is "weeks not months" from a nuclear weapon.
A new report has highlighted an alarming trend of increasing femicide cases amid an ongoing pattern of violence against women and girls in Iran.
According to the report by Etemad Daily, in the first three months of the Iranian calendar in 2024 alone (March 20 to June 21), at least 35 women and girls were murdered by their close male relatives, particularly their husbands.
The number is a 25 percent increase from the 28 recorded during the same period in 2023 and a 59% rise from the 22 deaths in 2022.
A massive 85 percent of the murders were committed by the victims' husbands and cases were spread across the country. In 2022, 16 women were killed by their husbands, followed by 15 in 2023, with a sharp increase to 27 in 2024 amid the climate of state crackdowns on women and girls.
Rights activists point to Iran’s laws and patriarchal society based on Islamic law as the primary cause of femicide which has worsened since 2022.
Conditions for women have become so bad that the United Nations branded Iran's policy as "gender apartheid" as state policy legitimizes violence against women.
Honor killings can be carried out for as little as not wearing the mandatory hijab, bringing shame on the family.
UN Women says these gender-related killings are the “most brutal and extreme manifestation of violence against women and girls. According to the latest UN Women report, globally on average, more than 133 women or girls are killed every day by someone in their own family.
Speaking to Iran International, Iranian feminist and human rights activist, Mina Khani, highlighted the lack of accurate statistics in Iran amid heavy censorship and corruption, and the state's own involvement in committing femicide.
Official figures suggest numbers even lower than Germany, she said, with massive discrepancies in both the reporting and recording of such crimes.
"In this context, human rights statistics are crucial," she said. "Organizations like Hengaw report femicide statistics in Iran based on the cases they document, as there is no official statistical reference for human rights organizations to rely on,” Khani stated.
Norway-based rights organization, Hengaw, identified that "at least 50 cases of femicide have been recorded in various cities of Iran since the beginning of 2024.
Khani noted "the state's failure to take legal measures to protect women from domestic violence".
She said, "Instead, the regime has legalized violence attributed to honor and gender-based violence against women, and it also engages in state-sponsored femicides".
High profile cases such as Mahsa Amini and Armita Geravand, who both died in morality police custody, exemplify the role of the state, she said, which "has never been held accountable".
Soraya Fallah, an Iranian researcher and women’s rights activist touched on the surge and prevalence of femicide in Iran adding that the situation highlights an “urgent need for serious measures to change laws and address cultural issues in Iran.”
Fallah echoed Khani’s statements, blaming Iran's discriminatory laws for fueling the femicide crisis.
“The Islamic government of Iran has institutionalized unequal laws and their implementation, enabling crimes like honor killings. These laws, such as Article 630, provide legal grounds for such acts, fueling patriarchal violence," she said.
Article 630 of the Islamic Penal Code allows a man to kill his wife and her partner if he catches them in the act of consensual adultery, without facing any punishment. This law exclusively targets women. Additionally, a father or paternal grandfather who kills their child is exempt from the retribution sentence, known as Qesas.
"The Islamic Republic uses these laws to maintain power and perpetuate these issues within society. Comprehensive legal and cultural changes are crucial to address these deep-rooted problems and protect women's rights in Iran," she added.
Amnesty International last year said, "The Iranian authorities’ oppressive methods of policing women and girls and punishes those who dare to stand up for their rights".
"To this day, not a single Iranian official has been held accountable for ordering, planning and committing widespread and systematic human rights violations against women and girls through the implementation of compulsory veiling," it added.
Iran’s president-elect’s praising voters for delivering a "resounding punch to the mouth" of those calling to boycott the polls, has ignited a firestorm of reactions from the public.
"I pray that God spares us from being shamed before these esteemed citizens, who, despite the widespread propaganda discouraging them from voting, turned out in force and delivered a resounding punch to the mouths of those, both domestic and foreign, who campaigned against participation," Masoud Pezeshkian said in parliament on Sunday.
Critics assert that during his campaign, Pezeshkian, presenting himself as a pro-reform politician, used softer language, acknowledging non-voters' grievances and speaking of forgiveness and national unity.
In stark contrast, his current rhetoric in the face of mass abstention, mirrors the hardline stance of the Islamic Republic, further alienating a populace already frustrated by economic hardships and political repression.
Iran’s Independent Filmmakers Association is the latest to join the critics, issuing a statement condemning Pezeshkian's "blatant insult" to Iranians who did not participate in the government elections.
Just 40 percent of Iranians came to the first round of the polls, the lowest trunout in a presidential election in the 45-year history of the Islamic Republic. In the runoff around almost 50 percent participates, according to unverifiable government numbers.
Former MP Bahram Parsaei tweeted addressing Pezeshkian, "If you believe those who voted delivered a resounding punch to non-voters, to whom did the majority who abstained deliver their blow?"
Political prisoner Hossein Razzagh took to X to voice his criticism, stating, "Pezeshkian and Zarif are the epitome of today's reformists! They eagerly seek a moment of favor from the Supreme Leader, becoming willing pawns in his disgraceful puppet shows and justifications of oppression."
Razzagh, who is currently on medical leave, added, "So enamored with the autocrat's bait, they rush to insult the majority who boycotted the elections!"
The new statesman's shift in rhetoric after the election has aggrieved the public who saw him as at least, a less hardline option for president. Before winning the runoff, Pezeshkian notably said, "I have heard, and continue to hear this doubt, dissatisfaction, and disengagement. I urge you to come forward again on Friday, for Iran, and make your choice. To me, both those who voted and those who did not are worthy of respect."
Former political prisoner Mehdi Mahmoudian also joined the chorus of critics, noting the fact that the new president has formed "the most minority-based government of the last five decades".
Slamming the change of tone, he accused Pezeshkian and the government of "deceptive promises, engineered intimidation, and government doping."
Pezeshkian has already courted controversy by dedicating his time to attending religious ceremonies, which critics argue underscores his lack of substantive political planning ahead of assuming office.
“To demonstrate solidarity with the 20% of the establishment’s supporters, he tirelessly moves from one gathering to another each night. Meanwhile, he wields an iron fist against the 60% who chose not to vote,” Mahmoudian added.
Meanwhile, Pezeshkian supporters condemned the controversial language but argued that one sentence should not define him. Pro-reform daily Shargh stood by the incoming statesman, maintaining that his remarks targeted not the non-voters but those actively campaigning to dissuade participation.
On Monday, Pezeshkian took to Twitter with a message that likely fell short of his supporters' expectations. By labeling non-voters and those advocating for a boycott as "enemies" and calling those who voted "honorable citizens", he reverted to the harsh and divisive rhetoric characteristic of the Islamic Republic. He reduced the complex political landscape to a simplistic "us vs. them" narrative, underscoring a tendency to vilify dissent and ignore the nuanced grievances of a significant portion of the populace.
Ehsan Bodaghi, a journalist and a prominent media supporter of Pezeshkian, also took to X to highlight the reasoning behind the mass abstention and called for Pezeshkian "to recognize this segment of society's rights and demands and listen to their voices".
Having voted himself, he said, "Not only was I not looking to punch those who didn't vote by casting my ballot, but I found many of their arguments logical and valid.
Journalist Hormoz Sharifian, has characterized the president-elect's remarks as an "insult" to figures like Sedigheh Vasmaghi, a former political prisoner and Islamic scholar, and Abolfazl Ghadiani, a political activist who had advocated for an election boycott.
On X, Sharifian wrote, "While journalists may not have the right to urge the public against voting, seasoned political activists like the esteemed individuals mentioned certainly do. Exercising their civic rights should not subject them to threats of being 'punched in the mouth' by the president of a minimalist government."
In the face of pressure from the authorities, multiple political prisoners abstained. High profile figures such as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi was among those who publicly declared her refusal to participate, joining many political prisoners who boycotted the elections.
Azadeh Mokhtari, a journalist at Tehran’s Rokna Press, pointed out that the mass abstention is the result of years of suffering. "For years, a significant portion of those who abstained from voting have seen one hollow promise after another burst under the relentless pressure of inflation, leaving them disillusioned and distrustful of any further assurances," referring to Iran's economic crisis amid global sanctions.
But, Pezeshkian's use of incendiary language is not out of character, even throughout his campaign. He once told his ultraconservative rival, Saeed Jalili, that if Jalili were elected and failed to keep his promises, he should be hanged.
During a televised debate on Iranian state TV in July, Pezeshkian challenged Jalili's economic promises: "I will withdraw from the election if Mr. Jalili commits to being executed if he fails to achieve eight percent growth in his government."
Supporters of Pezeshkian seem to overlook his conservative track record, including his years in parliament supporting the IRGC, harsh rules of hijab, and other contentious strategies in the Middle East.
Some supporters insist he is merely posturing to align with the Supreme Leader, hoping this will enable him to implement reforms. They are now anxiously waiting to see the composition of his cabinet, with optimists hoping for a progressive lineup. However, this appears unlikely given the power struggles, as Pezeshkian, even if inclined to appoint moderate figures, would need to persuade the predominantly conservative parliament.
Violence between Iranians and the country's Afghan community is spiralling with two deaths of Iranians in a week fueling calls for the expulsion of possibly millions of illegal immigrants.
Since the incident, Afghans in eastern Tehran have reported an increase in attacks from local residents. In interviews with Afghanistan International, several expressed their fear and described feeling under siege.
"Because I am Afghan, they broke my nose in Bisim Park," one Afghan immigrant said in a video sent to Afghanistan International.
The clash last week was sparked by unpaid building fees owed by the victim's brother, with migrants sent to collect the debt.
It has since spiralled into a wave of violence. One Afghan migrant detailed how he and his family now feel trapped in their home, afraid to venture out for work or even basic necessities like groceries.
Another individual from District 15 of Tehran, the area where the fight occurred, shared a photograph of a notice warning Afghan migrants to leave the neighborhood immediately.
While it is not known who wrote the notice, it explicitly warns Afghan migrants that failure to leave District 15 will result in their forcible expulsion from Iran, exacerbating fears among Iran's largest migrant community who feel increasingly unsafe.
Afghanistan International has also received videos purportedly showing street clashes, although these videos have not been independently verified.
Iranian media report that Afghans have now outnumbered Iranians in some impoverished areas in and around the capital, as well as in major cities and smaller towns.
Afghans initially came to Iran as refugees in the early 1980s and later as economic migrants. Their numbers rarely exceeded two million until the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Currently, around 780,000 Afghans have official refugee status and are not considered illegal.
The 2016 census recorded over 1.5 million Afghans in Iran. Officials acknowledge that this number has significantly increased since then, with unsubstantiated claims suggesting there may now be as many as 10 million Afghans in the country, thousands coming across the border each day.
In recent months, there has been an increase in criticism regarding the presence of Afghan migrants in the country, contributing to a growing atmosphere of hostility.
Two days ago, following the killing of another Iranian man, allegedly by his Afghan restaurant worker, residents of the city of Khor in Fars Province attacked the homes of migrants, setting several houses on fire.
Simultaneously, domestic media quoted Tehran police as saying that ten Afghan citizens had been arrested on charges of "street knife fights."
The current tensions are also being influenced by political rhetoric. During campaigning for snap presidential elections in Iran, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and a candidate approved by the Guardian Council, made one of his main campaign promises to prevent Afghan refugees from entering Iran and to deport illegal migrants.
On April 9, the Ministry of Interior explicitly announced that Afghan refugees without residence permits would not be allowed to stay in Iran and would be expelled.
In March, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that a police plan had been initiated to round up and repatriate unauthorized immigrants from Tehran Province.
In May, it was also announced that a "special patrol" had been established in Shahr-e Rey, south of Tehran, to identify and round up illegal foreign nationals.
The government has largely turned a blind eye to the influx, sparking accusations that Iran may be planning to use Persian-speaking Afghans for political or military purposes.
Last year, Iran International exclusively reported that Unit 400 of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recruits Afghans for suicide attacks and collaborates with Al Qaeda to target Israelis.
Just last month, Al-Akhbar, a newspaper affiliated with Hezbollah in Lebanon, reported that Taliban leaders have promised Iranian officials to send fighters to Lebanon in support of Hezbollah currently fighting Israel on its northern border.
And last year, an Afghan national was arrested in connection to a Tehran-backed plot to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku as the country's poor remain vulnerable to recruitment by Iran in its global proxy war.
Last week, former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif advocated for diversity in selecting the new cabinet, despite the Islamic Republic's history of repressing dissent and even internal critics.
Appointed to propose a list of candidates for each ministry in newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration, Zarif spoke about a kind of affirmative action, in favor of prioritizing youth, women, ethnic groups, and religious minorities in the selection process.
"If the candidate is a man, he does not get points, but if she is a woman, she gets 10 points. Likewise, if you are from other religions, you will get points, and if you are a Shia Muslim, you will not get points here... We want to give points so that we can use other ethnic groups and groups that have less presence in the cabinets, including women and youth," he said.
This criterion faced serious opposition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's representative in the state-run newspaper Kayhan, as well as from "revolutionary" outlets such as Javan and Hamshahri. Additionally, several Friday prayer worshipers expressed their disapproval, some even resorting to using profanity against Zarif.
However, beyond this opposition, is this type of affirmative action a feasible possibility in the Islamic Republic?
Realities
While Zarif spoke of social diversity in the presidential administration, the Islamic Republic has systematically, and sometimes brutally, eliminated not only opponents of the clerical regime but also its own internal critics. The pool of people eligible for even mid-level positions is limited to a few hundred insiders.
When Zarif talks about diversity, he means allowing a relatively broader range of fully loyal individuals to the clerical system and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to be appointed.
In addition to the ideological and political impediments however, certain groups are subject to systemic discrimination in the ruling system.
In the past 45 years, since the inception of the Islamic Republic, only one woman has served in the cabinet, and this was not even in administrations claiming to be “moderate” or “reformist.” Marzieh Dastjerdi was appointed as the Minister of Health during the second term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration (2009-2013).
Over the past decades, there have been no non-Shia ministers, and few relatively high-level officials.
The ratio of women to men in the Strategic Council for determining Pezeshkian's cabinet candidates (run by Zarif) is 2 to 21, with efforts to increase the representation of women and other minorities. Only one Sunni Kurd was added to this council after a Shia Kurd protested.
Possibilities
Pezeshkian wants to appoint younger people to cabinet positions, a quest which enjoys consensus among political factions in Iran, as the revolutionary generation from the 1970s is aging and there is a need for fresh blood in the system.
Regarding female cabinet members, there is no principled opposition from Khamenei or the factions against Pezeshkian's administration. Opposition from the "Revolutionary Islamic Assembly" loyal to Khamenei would likely be directed at the specific individual proposed, rather than the concept itself.
Historically, a Shia Kurd was promoted to the position of administration spokesperson in Mohammad Khatami's cabinet, but no Sunni Kurd has held such a role.
The Islamic Republic has consistently refused to grant high political and judicial positions to Sunnis due to its official Shia religion. The likelihood of a Sunni Baluch or Kurd joining the cabinet remains very low, as Shia sources of emulation in Qom and Najaf oppose it. This would only change if Khamenei were willing to accept the risk of their opposition, which is highly unlikely.
Subtle risk
Zarif's stance on assigning negative scores to "Shia men" in the cabinet selection process challenges the established norms of the Islamic Republic.
This has resulted in strong reactions to his interview.
Unlike defending his proposed cabinet composition on the grounds of meritocracy—which could potentially appeal to public opinion or at least mitigate opposition—Zarif bases his argument on a policy of discrimination against Shia men.
This approach not only contradicts the traditional limits but also fails to present a compelling rationale that aligns with the broader values and expectations of the political landscape.
Showing off diversity in a discriminatory system
The Islamic Republic is characterized by systemic legal and institutional discrimination against various segments of its population. High judicial and legal authorities, along with the appointment of future leaders, are officially reserved for clerics and jurists. This preference extends even to public school teacher appointments, where clerics are favored over non-clerics.
Women face formal barriers to roles such as the presidency, judgeship, and membership in the army. Non-Shiites are effectively excluded from influential bodies like the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Council, and most military, security, and diplomatic organizations. Additionally, wealth, power, and status are concentrated among a small group loyal to the Guardian Jurist.
The representation of women in the Islamic Assembly (Majles) has fluctuated between 1% and 6% over its 12 terms. Despite women occupying over 50% of university seats, their employment rate has remained between 11% and 15%. The economic contribution of Iranian women is estimated based on these employment levels.
Even if a female, Kurdish, or Sunni minister were appointed to the cabinet, it would likely serve a symbolic and deceptive purpose in a system where discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities, and citizens disloyal to the regime is both functional and structural.
Zarif's actions may deceive Western observers and those adhering to "woke" ideology in their so-called advocacy for social justice, but only a small percentage of Iranian citizens are likely to be convinced by this performative statement.
If the new administration is genuine in its diversification efforts, it should start by appointing Sunni governors for regions like Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchestan, where Sunni populations are significant.