What we are more likely to see instead are continued displays of power intended to shape the terms of any eventual agreement.
For now, negotiations speak the language of war more than diplomacy. When Washington talks about “progress” or “flexibility,” it is not simply describing talks; it is projecting the idea that military pressure is forcing Iran toward an American framework for ending the conflict.
Tehran’s denial of negotiations serves a similar purpose. Rejecting reports of talks helps prevent any existing contacts from being interpreted as evidence of weakness or submission.
Nor will the outcome depend only on Washington and Tehran. Regional actors will seek a role in shaping any settlement, and any country or coalition attempting to reopen the Strait of Hormuz will attach its own demands to the process.
Washington’s rhetoric reflects this struggle over narrative as much as over territory. In the second week of the war, the US defense secretary said that “at every stage, the conditions of the war will be determined by us.” Similar language echoes in Donald Trump’s repeated threats to send Iran “back to the Stone Age.”
Yet military power becomes a real victory only when it can be translated into a political settlement. When US officials speak about “progress in negotiations,” they are attempting to move from delivering blows to defining the outcome.
The very need to emphasize negotiations suggests that this transition remains incomplete. If battlefield superiority had already produced a decisive political result, Washington would have little reason to stress mediation and contacts.
The rhetoric also serves audiences beyond Tehran: financial markets, domestic politics, and allies trying to assess the war’s trajectory.
Israeli objectives further complicate the picture. US officials have acknowledged that Washington’s goals differ from those of Israel, which appears more focused on weakening Iran’s leadership.
Tehran’s definition of victory is also different. For the Islamic Republic, success means preserving the regime while reshaping the balance of power in the Strait of Hormuz.
Admitting negotiations under intense military pressure and under Washington’s conditions would risk appearing politically subordinate. Denial therefore becomes part of the struggle over legitimacy.
At the same time, Iran’s leadership—its military weakened and many senior figures killed—also needs a way out of the conflict. It must keep communication channels open while ensuring those contacts cannot be portrayed as retreat.
Iran’s strategy is therefore less about proving it has won than about preventing the United States from presenting its victory as complete. Tehran may not be able to claim triumph outright, but it seeks to ensure Washington cannot dictate the outcome alone.
Trump’s push for negotiations may also serve another purpose: testing where real power lies inside Iran. Every reported contact, denial, or proposed channel becomes a way of probing who still has the authority to make decisions.
Reports of fractures inside Iran’s leadership since the war began suggest uncertainty over that question. In wartime conditions, however, the Revolutionary Guards appear to hold the strongest position within the system.
Meanwhile, mediators are beginning to shape the diplomatic landscape. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently suggested that neither Washington’s nor Tehran’s demands will remain at their current levels, and that the task of mediators is to bring those positions closer to political reality.
But mediators are not neutral actors. Any settlement will also reflect their own interests in the region’s future energy and security order.
These states are caught between two fears: they do not want the Gulf to become a permanent instrument of Iranian pressure, yet they are also wary of confronting Tehran alone if Washington eventually disengages.
For now, mediation reflects less a drive for peace than a shared effort to contain instability.
Diplomacy has become another arena in the struggle to shape the balance of power emerging from the battlefield. As long as both Washington and Tehran continue to claim the upper hand, escalation remains more likely than compromise.
For now, what passes for diplomacy is the management of collapse, not the architecture of peace.
