Thousands of diaspora users have downloaded and run an application called Psiphon Conduit that allows them to securely share part of their bandwidth with the widely popular censorship circumvention tool Psiphon, helping users inside Iran maintain access to it.
By leaving unused phones or computers connected to home Wi-Fi networks and power, they have created small, fragile bridges that help keep Psiphon reachable from inside Iran.
In recent days, many Iranians who had been offline since the shutdown began January 8 have managed to contact relatives and friends via WhatsApp and Telegram or publish posts on social media after nearly two weeks of silence.
The closure coincided with two days of mass killings of protestors by security forces.
Psiphon
Much of the recent connectivity has been enabled by Psiphon Conduit, an application designed to function during severe censorship and shutdowns.
In recent days, many diaspora users with unlimited internet access have installed Psiphon Conduit and kept spare devices continuously connected. Inside Iran, users searching for a connection are automatically matched with these external helpers, allowing limited access to the global internet.
Each external user can enable access for roughly 25 people, albeit at low speeds.
The connection is considered relatively secure because traffic ultimately exits through Psiphon servers, meaning neither the Iranian user’s IP address nor the intermediary’s IP address is directly exposed.
According to Psiphon’s official website, Iran currently has more Psiphon users than any other country.
On January 22, more than half of the 2.8 million recorded Psiphon Conduit connection attempts originated from Iran. At the time of writing, more than 40,000 Iranian users were connected simultaneously, according to the site’s live data.
Other means, brief openings
Some users inside Iran report occasional success using the Tor Project’s Snowflake feature, Lantern’s unbounded mode, or WireGuard-based tools, though speeds are often extremely slow and unreliable.
Others say that, at times, unfiltered international internet access briefly becomes available on certain mobile operators in specific provinces. These short windows may be the result of technical glitches or testing of filtering methods, allowing users momentary passage through the state-imposed digital barrier.
The government has effectively sealed Iran’s internet by blocking international gateways and many VPN protocols. Under these conditions, traffic cannot normally leave the country, while limited domestic connectivity—such as banks, government services, and some content delivery networks—remains active.
Tools like Psiphon Conduit exploit narrow pathways that cannot be fully closed without disrupting the state’s own systems. They disguise encrypted traffic as ordinary web activity and route it through these small openings.
When shutdowns occur, users who already have the application installed do not need to download anything new; traffic begins flowing through whatever cracks remain.
This access, however, is far from comprehensive. Telegram or X may load sporadically, images and videos upload slowly, and connections frequently drop and reconnect.
Life online remains unstable
On Friday, Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said global internet access would be restored within 24 hours. Still, the closure continues.
Currently, the only access provided to users inside the country is to a highly unstable, filtered intranet, largely cut off from the global network.
Users say even domestic websites and government-linked platforms frequently disconnect, making basic tasks such as banking or administrative work difficult and at times impossible.
One user wrote on X: “Living without internet access, confined to a handful of domestic media outlets and news agencies and a few foreign satellite channels, is one of the darkest human experiences."
Others say that while they are relieved to have escaped two weeks of digital darkness, gaining access to information and videos withheld during that period has also caused profound distress.
Dark days, costly workarounds
Following the internet and phone shutdowns on January 8—and the violence of that day and the next—some Iranians traveled to border regions, used SIM cards from neighboring countries or left Iran entirely to regain connectivity and share footage with the outside world.
The first video showing large numbers of bodies at the Kahrizak forensic medicine center reportedly reached media outlets days later, filmed by someone who said they had traveled more than 1,000 kilometers to access the internet. Others shared limited information using Starlink, despite significant personal risks.
According to the monitoring site Filterban (Filter Watch), more than 300 hours of internet disruption pushed international connectivity into a black market. Proxies and configurations were reportedly sold at inflated prices—up to $15 for 10 GB of access which is a huge sum in Iran—amid widespread fraud.
Economic damage
For many, internet access is not optional. Hundreds of thousands of small and home-based businesses—from handicrafts and agricultural products to online language and music lessons —have been severely disrupted or effectively shut down.
Officials have yet to present a clear plan for restoring connectivity.
Mohammad-Jafar Ghaempanah, the president’s executive deputy, has said the government itself suffers losses from internet shutdowns, acknowledged that filtering fuels public dissatisfaction, and apologized for the disruption.
At the same time, hardline figures such as Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the Kayhan newspaper, continue to advocate for permanent use of the National Information Network— an intranet system designed to sever direct, universal access to the global internet.
