Israel may launch a new attack on Iran within three months if the current trends continue, defense and security analyst Farzin Nadimi told Iran International.
“I think that within a maximum of three months, if such a decision is made, it will be carried out. If things continue on this path,” said Nadimi, a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute.
Both sides had drawn lessons from the 12-day conflict in June and neither sought a prolonged or costly war, he added.
Any Israeli decision, he said, would rest on advance planning and readiness of defenses. “If Israel makes such a decision, it must prepare a set of assumptions, and its defensive capabilities must be more ready.”
Nadimi pointed to recent US military deployments as evidence of enhanced preparation.
“Reports have indicated that the THAAD battery, which the United States had deployed in Israel, has now been increased. In other words, four launchers have been added to the existing six,” he said.

On the eve of the return of UN sanctions against Iran, all sides insist the doors of diplomacy remain open, but the table beyond those doors looks less like one for negotiation than for autopsy—an exercise in assigning blame for a failure long deemed inevitable.
The 2015 nuclear deal set out a mechanism allowing UN sanctions to be reimposed within 30 days if Iran was accused of breaching its commitments.
That window closes at 8:00 p.m. Washington time on September 27. Yet even at this late hour, officials speak of talks more than they conduct them.
The US and Europe have made demands Tehran cannot meet in the wake of the 12-Day War: cooperation with the IAEA, clarifying the fate of 60%-enriched uranium, curbing the missile program, and striking a deal with Washington.
Tehran, meanwhile, signals readiness for “fair” talks but chiefly to show it did not slam the door.
Packages of blame
Western capitals have pursued “diplomacy backed by threats” since talks resurfaced in early 2025, and the war did not alter that approach.
Their demands serve less to reach agreement than to build the narrative: “We gave Iran a chance; it refused.”
Washington’s posture has been no more conciliatory. US envoy Steve Witkoff spoke of willingness to engage as late as Wednesday, but both Iranian Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref and Reuters reported Tehran’s messages have gone unanswered.
Tehran’s signals point the same way.
Officials from the Supreme Leader to Ali Larijani stress that negotiations must be “fair” and free of threats—framing the Islamic Republic’s line as: “We tried, they refused.”
This is less about diplomacy than about managing domestic opinion, with rival factions poised to pin the blame on one another once snapback hits.
Moscow and Beijing’s pause
In the stalemate, Russia and China floated a six-month delay at the Security Council—but few ever expected it to pass.
The point was never to resolve the crisis but to buy time, cast the West as obstructionist, and tether Tehran more tightly once sanctions return.
It may also be viewed as geopolitical gamesmanship: draining US and European bandwidth in the region.
Had Moscow and Beijing sought a solution, they could have mediated far earlier.
Where the failure bomb lands
The sanctions are now all but certain to proceed.
The war has left Tehran unable to concede, the West will not soften its conditions, and Russia and China are content with delay.
What remains is not crisis-solving but narrative-shaping: deciding where the bomb of failure lands.
For the US and Europe, the message is: “Iran squandered its chance.” For Tehran: “We negotiated, they refused.” For Russia and China: “We offered diplomacy, the West rejected it.”
As a senior European diplomat told Al-Monitor this week: “The negotiations have failed, and snapback will occur.”
It was a verdict on talks but also the opening line of the autopsy of a lost decade since the deal in 2015.
Richard Nephew, a former US negotiator in past Iran nuclear talks, commented on a report by London-based Amwaj Media that said Iran had offered to allow immediate UN inspections at its Natanz nuclear facility in exchange for European support of a Russian-drafted resolution to delay the return of sanctions later today.
“No deal. First, this isn’t the only access required. Second, the CSA applies to all safeguarded material, not just Natanz. Third, accepting the conditioning of CSA obligations in general is a mistake,” Nephew said in response to the reported offer.
“Iran signed the safeguards agreement. It should fulfill it.”

Iran’s economy has slipped into its first contraction in more than four years and now faces mounting debt and record capital flight, official data show, days before UN sanctions are due to return.
According to the Statistical Center of Iran, GDP shrank by 0.1% in the spring, ending 17 straight quarters of expansion. Industrial and mining output, which grew 5.9% last spring, fell to -0.3% this year, while agriculture plunged from +2.3% to -2.7%.
Severe water and electricity shortages disrupted production across both sectors, hitting farms and factories alike.
With the so-called snapback of international sanctions due on September 2, Iran faces a narrowing path to growth—and a worrying prospect of rising unemployment and public discontent.
Mounting debt
A separate Central Bank report shows government debt to the bank surged 63% year-on-year as of June, reflecting the administration’s failure to meet revenue targets.
Officials say only 60% of projected revenues were generated in the first five months of the year, worse than in previous years and well short of the levels needed to stabilize public finances.
Since 2018, when President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from a 2015 nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions, about a third of Iran’s annual budget has gone unrealized.
The IMF now estimates public debt at 37% of GDP and climbing. This trend is likely to accelerate if sanctions further limit oil revenues.
Record capital flight
The Central Bank also reported a net capital account of -$21.7 billion for the last fiscal year—the highest on record and 2.5 times greater than in 2020.
Capital flight has been accelerating since 2020, as businesses and households move assets abroad to escape currency depreciation and political uncertainty.
The scale of outflows highlights both a collapse in investor confidence and the inability of the banking system to hold foreign exchange inside the country.
Oil gains vanished
Iran earned $66 billion from oil, petroleum products and natural gas exports last year, a 17% increase. Including non-oil goods, total exports reached $115 billion, $27 billion more than imports.
On paper, that left the goods trade in surplus.
But the services sector recorded a record $12 billion deficit, dragging the overall trade balance for goods and services down to just $13 billion.
Combined with the $21.7 billion in capital flight, much of the hard currency generated by oil exports is effectively leaving the country.
The result is sustained pressure on Iran’s already fragile foreign reserves and further instability in the rial, which hit a record low of 1.08 million to the dollar on Thursday.
The bottom line is that Tehran’s extremely hard-gained oil cash is being wiped out by falling output, runaway debt and unprecedented capital flight—leaving the country perilously exposed just as fresh sanctions loom.

Seven years after Donald Trump quit the nuclear deal, his duel with Ali Khamenei looks lopsided: the US president spoke from New York with renewed leverage, while Iran’s leader replied in taped defiance that evinced more strain than authority.
Khamenei’s televised speech on Tuesday captured both his persistence and his weakness.
Shortly before, Trump told a packed United Nations that Iran's "so-called" Supreme Leader had spurned a US offer of full cooperation in exchange for suspending its enrichment of uranium.
The rasping 86-year-old leader repeated that uranium enrichment is Iran’s sovereign right and dismissed negotiations with Washington as futile, but the context was unmistakable: nuclear sites had been struck, senior commanders lost and the economy reeled after a 12-day Israeli-American war in June.
The timing made clear that the speech was taped hours earlier before Trump had even spoken, and Khamenei’s delivery relied on hand-scribbled notes.
What was presented as a rebuttal was in fact a prepared monologue, more an appeal to a weary population than a real-time answer to Washington.
Turning point: Soleimani
The confrontation has followed a familiar rhythm.
In September 2018 Trump told the UN the US had quit the “horrible” nuclear deal, restored sanctions and denounced Tehran as the “world’s leading sponsor of terrorism.” Days later, Khamenei addressed crowds in Azadi Stadium, boasting of an unbroken axis from Yemen to Gaza.
The following year, protests over fuel hikes revealed cracks at home, and on January 3, 2020, an American drone strike killed Qassem Soleimani, Khamenei’s most trusted lieutenant and the architect of Iran’s proxy network.
By September 2020 Trump was still boasting of Soleimani’s death and tightening sanctions, while Khamenei deflected with reminders of Iran’s endurance during the Iran-Iraq War embargo.
Fractured command
Fast forward to September 2025: Trump once again denounced Iran from the UN podium. Hours later Iranians heard Khamenei’s taped message—defiant, but less an assertion of command than an effort to buy time for a regime battered by war, inflation, and looming snapback sanctions.
Between June 12 and 24, 2025, Israel launched a sweeping air campaign against Iran, killing nuclear scientists along with hundreds of civilians and military personnel. Iran retaliated with volleys of drones and missiles. But the upshot was unmistakable.
Khamenei vanished from public view for nearly three weeks and has appeared only sparingly since. His speech on Tuesday sounded less like triumph than a plea for stamina from a population strained by sanctions and conflict.
In late August 2025, the E3 (Britain, France, Germany) triggered it, citing Iran’s growing stockpile and obstruction of inspections. On September 19, the Security Council failed to adopt a draft to offer relief, meaning all UN sanctions are set to return on September 28.
On borrowed time?
Khamenei spoke against this backdrop of dwindling external support and exposed vulnerabilities. Hopes of Russian and Chinese protection have proven illusory, and Israel’s strikes stripped away the proxy shield that once kept Iran at arm’s length from direct confrontation.
The Islamic Republic—the “system” in Iran’s official parlance—now leans on survival tactics: smuggling networks, repression and symbolic defiance, reminiscent of Saddam in the 1990s.
Tehran seeks to wring advantage from global distractions, from the US-China rivalry to Europeans’ recognition of Palestine. Yet harsh realities persist: a broken economy, an alienated populace and the specter of renewed confrontation.
After the June war, thousands more were arrested—including many from Iran’s Jewish community — on suspicion of collaboration with Israel. At least nine people have been hanged on such charges since October 7, 2023, according to the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights Organization.
Khamenei’s defiant message hardly offered a way out. It functioned more as reassurance to his circle and propaganda for the base—another effort to buy time.
The veteran theocrat's latest message served more as reassurance to his circle and propaganda for the base than as a real strategy. It showed him boxed into a mentality that time can be bought through attrition.
The reckoning ahead will decide whether his persistent defiance can prolong the ruling system, or whether sanctions, airstrikes and popular anger will force concessions that no rhetoric can forestall.

Iran's push to modernize its oil industry through artificial intelligence and advanced drilling techniques faces daunting old obstacles from restricted access to technology to mounting financial constraints which have dogged exports for years.
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) chief Hamid Bord in a February speech set an ambitious target of raising production by 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) this year, putting AI and digital reservoir management at the center of the plan.
These tools use data modeling and automation to map underground reserves, optimize drilling, and improve recovery rates from aging fields.
Bord urged Iran’s knowledge-based firms to launch pilot projects for smart drilling and enhanced recovery, hoping to boost output despite sanctions and isolation.
More than six months later the vision remains unrealized, with exports roughly steady at around 1.7 million bpd with stiff US sanctions only increasing since the return of US President Donald Trump and his so-called maximum pressure sanctions in January.
Major obstacles
The gap between high-tech ideas and field-level execution remains wide.
Early trials have already exposed operational problems and underscored the heavy responsibility on NIOC to turn innovation into results.
The cash required for such projects is also scarce. Whatever capital is available is drained away by aging infrastructure, maintenance backlogs, surging domestic demand and sanctions that block access to equipment.
Iran hemorrhages the value of about four out of every five barrels of oil it manages to export, a former senior US Treasury official told Iran International last week, as sanctions forced funds to be lost in corrupt smuggling networks.
Tehran casts this push as part of a broader sanctions-resilience strategy.
By investing in high-tech solutions and formalizing technology integration, it hopes to build an advanced, adaptable export network more resilient to blockade or interception.
Expanding capacity through digitization also carries geopolitical stakes: more barrels could strengthen Iran’s position within OPEC and global markets, offsetting its diplomatic isolation.
But scaling innovations in Iran’s difficult oilfields is another matter.
Many startups lack the resources and experience to apply their technologies at scale, leaving NIOC to supervise integration in hostile operating conditions.
Rising gas consumption—already above one billion cubic meters daily—is adding to the strain, diverting investment from oil exports and worsening supply-demand imbalances.
Big prize, little chance
If those hurdles can be overcome, the payoff would be significant.
Advanced drilling and AI-driven recovery could extend the life of aging fields, stabilize revenues and reduce reliance on costly new reserve exploration. Building a knowledge-based ecosystem might also diversify the economy, generate jobs, and spur research and development.
Limited international partnerships, including with European universities, provide channels for technology transfer and best practices, blending local innovation with selective global input.
Iran’s tech-driven oil strategy reflects determination to sustain its role in global energy despite sanctions and isolation. But its success hinges on closing the gap between vision and implementation while managing surging domestic demand—a tall order as UN sanctions are set to snap back within days.






