Iran International
President Donald Trump’s pledge not to attack Iran before the November 3 US midterm elections has been greeted in Tehran as either a bluff or an opportunity, with some hardliners urging Iran to exploit the three-week window to strike first.
Trump wrote on Truth Social on Thursday that he had no intention of resuming strikes before the midterms, adding that the United States was engaged in “constructive negotiations” with Iran.
Global oil prices, which had fluctuated sharply during the week amid growing threats to shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, fell following Trump’s remarks.
Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former chairman of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, wrote on X that plans by the United States, Israel and their regional allies for another war with Iran had nothing to do with elections in either country.
He argued that Trump’s declaration that Washington would not attack Iran before November 3 was intended to prevent Iran from launching a “pre-emptive strike”.
Parisa Nasr, a journalist considered close to Iran’s Foreign Ministry, similarly dismissed Trump’s statement in a commentary titled “Forget Trump’s nonsense: A third war is imminent.”
“The evidence suggests that Trump’s claim that any military attack on Iran will be postponed until after the US midterm elections is, above all, more like a political game and a psychological operation,” she wrote.
Nasr argued that Washington’s calculations would depend largely on the scale of retaliation it expected from Iran.
Hardline commentator Alireza Taghaviniya also described Trump’s remarks as “deception,” pointing to US and Israeli military movements and coordination with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as indications that a confrontation was approaching.
A window to strike first
Some Iranian hardliners argue that Tehran should use the period before the US midterm elections to launch pre-emptive attacks against American and Israeli interests.
Supporters of this approach say the objective would not necessarily be to trigger an all-out war. Instead, limited strikes could put pressure on oil markets and force Trump to accept an agreement on terms favorable to Iran.
Politician Abdolreza Davari argued on X that Trump had inadvertently exposed a weakness by ruling out a new military attack before the elections while simultaneously describing negotiations with Tehran as constructive. Davari said Trump feared the electoral cost of war.
“From today until November 3, a window of approximately three weeks has opened before Iran,” he wrote. “The Islamic Republic must use this opportunity to intensify military action as a means of bargaining and forcing Washington to accept Iran’s legitimate demands.”
In another post, he was blunter: “Grab the enemy by the throat right now and do not let go.”
The proposal drew warnings online that striking first would play into the hands of Trump and Israel.
A user identified as Mahmoud Irani argued that an Iranian attack would allow Trump to portray the United States as the victim and gain electoral advantage by retaliating: “Iran should maintain its military readiness so that, if Iran is attacked, it can counterattack Trump.”
Another user, identified as Rezvan, warned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been predicting an Iranian pre-emptive attack for weeks and “hopes this will happen,” either to postpone the US election or help Trump win.
Pressure at Hormuz
The debate comes as Iran is already increasing pressure in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian officials and military forces insist the waterway remains closed except to vessels Tehran authorizes, contrary to statements by Trump and other US officials, and say restrictions will remain until Washington accepts Iran’s seven conditions.
Hassan Ghashghavi, spokesman for parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, also disputed Trump’s claim that oil shipments through the strait had increased.
“The initiative in the Strait of Hormuz is in our hands,” he told Rouydad 24, arguing that alternative routes and limited tanker movements had failed to eliminate the effects of Iran’s restrictions.
On Friday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy said it targeted a liquefied natural gas carrier traveling south of the Strait of Hormuz along what Tehran described as an “illegal route”.
The Guards also widened their threat, saying for the first time that action against vessels using unauthorized routes would no longer be confined to the strait and that such ships could face punitive measures elsewhere in the region.
Pressure on shipping gives Tehran another means of raising the cost of the blockade without necessarily launching the direct pre-emptive strike advocated by some hardliners.
Haalvsh, which covers developments in Sistan and Baluchestan, said more than 12 personnel were killed or wounded overall between Wednesday evening and Thursday evening in Nikshahr, Nosratabad, Faryab and Jaleq, but cautioned that the final toll could be higher because some casualties had not yet been identified.
The People's Fighters Front took responsibility for the attacks in Nikshahr, Nosratabad and Jaleq, according to Haalvsh. The alliance, announced in late 2025, includes several Baluch armed groups, among them Jaish al-Adl. The group had not taken responsibility for the killing in Faryab.
Nikshahr and Nosratabad attacks
In the Nikshahr area, Haalvsh said two vehicles carrying military personnel were attacked. Mohammadreza Okati was killed and five others were wounded, according to the outlet, which identified the wounded as Ali Najafi, Mohammadreza Hosseini, Mojtaba Mir and two others identified by the surnames Keikha and Iranmanesh.
Haalvsh said those casualties were taken to Mohammad Rasoulallah Hospital in Nikshahr, while other wounded personnel were evacuated by helicopter to medical facilities in Chabahar, Konarak and Iranshahr. It said it had not established their number or identities.
Iran's army separately confirmed on Thursday that Okati was killed when personnel from its 88th Armored Division came under fire while traveling for a shift change, but said three people were wounded.
In the Nosratabad area near Zahedan, Haalvsh said at least three security personnel were killed and two wounded when gunmen attacked a police commando patrol on the Lakhshak road. It identified two of those reported killed as Vahid Enayat and Abbas Aghaei.
Iranian police had earlier confirmed only Enayat's death, saying officers returned fire and that several attackers were wounded before fleeing.
Police major killed in Faryab
In Faryab, Haalvsh reported that Major Mehdi Jamshidi was shot dead while traveling in a private vehicle in the center of the county.
The outlet said Jamshidi was struck by seven bullets. It also cited reports that he had been among police personnel present during a confrontation involving women and other protesters in the village of Pashmuki in June.
The People's Fighters Front had not issued a statement taking responsibility for Jamshidi's killing, Haalvsh said.
Jaleq police headquarters attacked
The fourth attack targeted the police command headquarters in Jaleq, the administrative center of Golshan County, on Wednesday evening.
Haalvsh said the People's Fighters Front announced that its fighters had used a mine, rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons in the attack and said six police personnel were hit.
Videos obtained by Haalvsh showed heavy gunfire around the facility and at least one support vehicle being targeted, according to the outlet. Haalvsh said it had not independently established the final number or identities of those killed or wounded. IranWire also reported an explosion and gunfire around the police facility.
Attacks follow weeks of violence
The latest incidents follow a series of attacks on Iranian security forces in the southeast. Earlier this week, gunmen attacked two military vehicles in Bampur, while last week a roadside attack near Zahedan and clashes in Rask and other areas produced further casualties.
Official Iranian accounts and reports from Haalvsh have repeatedly differed over casualty numbers in recent attacks. Haalvsh said the toll from the four latest incidents should therefore be treated as provisional, particularly because some wounded personnel were transferred to hospitals outside the areas where the attacks occurred.
The source said three of the five factions covered by the plan had completed agreed handovers, but had not surrendered their entire arsenals. The process instead focused on heavy and specialized weapons and dismantling separate military headquarters.
The Popular Mobilization Forces, which the report said formally operates under Iraq’s commander-in-chief, had received the weapons and military headquarters covered by the agreements. It had also begun integrating faction members and severing their previous political and administrative affiliations, according to the source.
Drones placed under PMF structure
The new drone unit is intended to absorb the factions’ unmanned-aircraft capabilities into official state structures rather than leave them under independently run organizations, the source told Erem News.
But the source stressed that the agreements “do not mean complete disarmament.” Instead, they involve transferring specialized weapons and reorganizing armed formations within the PMF.
Erem News said effective control over those military capabilities would depend on completing the integration process and establishing the chain of command responsible for authorizing their use. The report did not identify the three factions that had completed the handover.
Government seeks changes to PMF leadership
A political source close to Iraq’s Coordination Framework told Erem News that the government was also seeking amendments to the law governing the PMF, including limiting the term of its chairman to two years and bringing professional officers from the regular military into senior posts.
The proposal would directly affect the position of current PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh, according to the report. The source said the plan faced opposition within the Coordination Framework, particularly from Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, which wanted any changes tied to a broader political agreement.
Two factions continue to resist
Erem News said Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba remained opposed to surrendering their weapons, while other factions had accepted the principle of integration into state security institutions.
Zaidi has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for completing the weapons-control plan and has said decisions on war and peace belong exclusively to Iraq’s constitutional authorities. According to the political source, he has also told Coordination Framework leaders that he intends to continue implementing the plan even if political agreement on some of its details stalls.
The source said Zaidi warned that failure by groups with armed wings to meet agreed commitments could expose Iraq to security, economic and political consequences, including additional sanctions or pressure, while adding that the prime minister still favored negotiations over a direct military confrontation with factions resisting the plan.
More than 56,000 people took part in the October 8 poll, with 68% saying ordinary people bear the greatest burden of US pressure. Another 23% said both the public and the government suffer, while 9% said the authorities are affected most.
Men accounted for approximately 76% of respondents and women for 24%.
The largest age group was 25 to 34, representing about 38% of participants, followed by those aged 35 to 44 at 29%. Respondents aged 18 to 24 and 45 to 54 each accounted for 12%.
Thousands of comments accompanying the poll reflected differing views on the economic consequences of US pressure, the Islamic Republic's responsibility for worsening living conditions and whether external pressure could bring political change.
Rising prices dominate concerns
The most common concern among respondents who believed ordinary Iranians were suffering most was the deterioration in daily living conditions.
Many cited rising prices, declining purchasing power, shrinking incomes and the growing financial burden on low-income households.
Others pointed to difficulties accessing medicine and medical treatment, arguing that people with fewer financial resources were particularly vulnerable to economic restrictions.
"Only ordinary people are being crushed under the pressure," one respondent wrote.
Several participants argued that even when US measures target the Islamic Republic, their economic consequences ultimately reach households through higher prices and reduced access to essential goods.
Officials seen as insulated from hardship
Another recurring theme was the perceived gap between the living standards of ordinary Iranians and those of government officials.
Some respondents argued that access to wealth, foreign currency, privileged positions and state resources allowed officials and their associates to avoid some of the hardships experienced by the wider population.
"The main burden falls on the people. The government would even be happy to see people becoming poorer every day," one respondent wrote.
Other participants said the Islamic Republic also suffers from economic restrictions through reduced revenues and limited access to financial resources, but can pass some of those costs on to the public.
For these respondents, the issue was not simply whether sanctions hurt the government or the public, but how the economic burden was distributed.
Economic hardship versus hopes for political change
The sharpest disagreement concerned whether the immediate economic costs of US pressure could be justified by the prospect of political change.
Some respondents acknowledged that ordinary Iranians were suffering but considered the hardship acceptable if it weakened the Islamic Republic or helped bring about a different political system.
"People will endure it because this suffering is worth it for a free Iran tomorrow," one wrote.
Others questioned whether worsening economic conditions would produce meaningful political change.
They argued that household finances could deteriorate far more quickly than external pressure could affect the country's political leadership.
Several respondents held both US policies and the Islamic Republic's economic management responsible for the hardships facing Iranians.
Some likened sanctions to a painful medical treatment, reflecting a willingness among certain supporters of external pressure to accept short-term suffering in pursuit of longer-term political goals.
Others rejected that calculation, arguing that the prospect of political change remained uncertain while the immediate costs to families were already evident.
A divided view of US pressure
Although 68% of respondents believed ordinary Iranians were bearing the greatest burden, their answers did not necessarily show opposition to all forms of US pressure.
Some viewed the economic consequences as unacceptable, while others regarded them as a painful but potentially necessary means of weakening the Islamic Republic.
Likewise, respondents who believed the government was suffering most did not necessarily dismiss the economic difficulties facing households.
