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VOICES FROM IRAN

Iranians voice economic despair as dollar hits 2 million rials

Hooman Abedi
Hooman Abedi

Iran International

Aug 23, 2026, 09:33 GMT+1Updated: 13:08 GMT+1
Iranian rials and US dollars are exchanged in Tehran. (File photo)
Iranian rials and US dollars are exchanged in Tehran. (File photo)

Iranians described deepening financial hardship and questioned whether economic pressure can change government policy as the dollar hit a historic 2 million rials, extending the currency's sharp decline on Sunday.

The US dollar reached 2 million rials on Iran's open market, crossing a threshold it had approached rapidly in recent days.

“We saw revolution, war, sanctions, rising prices and hardship,” one person told Iran International. “Now that we are over 50, we worry about our children, their jobs, their future, education, university and marriage costs. Pressure from outside, pressure from inside. How much can one endure?”

The dollar stood at around 1.865 million rials at the beginning of last week, putting its rise at more than 7% in less than a week. It has more than doubled from around 958,000 rials during the same period last year.

The British pound climbed above 2.72 million rials, while the euro approached 2.34 million rials. Rates can vary between sources because open-market trading is informal and fragmented.

Iranians describe pressure from all sides

The currency's latest fall comes days after US President Donald Trump announced what he called the “most crushing economic operation ever taken against any country,” warning of unprecedented economic isolation and consequences for countries whose financial institutions, businesses or government entities continue providing Tehran with an economic lifeline.

“Oil smuggling, swap lines, cash transfers, exchange houses, ship registries, front companies – it all needs to stop NOW,” Trump wrote on Truth Social, calling on US allies to join the campaign.

Messages sent to Iran International in response to a question about US economic pressure largely focused on the burden borne by ordinary people rather than its effect on the Islamic Republic.

“Iran has been under sanctions for nearly 50 years and the Islamic Republic is still governing,” one person said. “These measures do not work. They only leave the Iranian people poorer and hungrier, without medicine, healthcare or housing.”

Others questioned whether greater economic pressure could force authorities to change course.

“I don't think the government will come under pressure because it covers its budget deficit from people's pockets,” another respondent said. “The tip of the sanctions spear is aimed directly at the people; healthcare, nutrition, education and sports are all at risk.”

Rial's decline compounds daily hardship

Market participants point to high inflation, growing demand for foreign currency, declining foreign-exchange revenues and concern over sanctions as factors driving demand for dollars.

Political uncertainty, disruption to regional oil exports and the deadlock between the Islamic Republic and the United States have added to inflation expectations.

The currency slide comes alongside electricity and water shortages that have disrupted production and daily life. Further rial depreciation can raise the cost of imported raw materials and essential goods, adding to pressure on household budgets.

Some Iranians who contacted Iran International argued that economic pressure would be more effective if directed at assets held abroad by officials and their relatives.

“When they can freeze the foreign accounts of officials and their children, then you can call it pressure on the government,” one respondent said. “Seize their assets.”

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Iran's central bank says it is not hyperinflation. Economists are not convinced

Aug 22, 2026, 12:59 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
100%

Iran's central bank governor says hyperinflation has not happened. A leading Tehran economist says it already has. Whatever it is called, the shelves tell the same story.

Abdolnasser Hemmati, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, used a special broadcast on Wednesday to argue that the country's monetary crisis remains under control. "Some thought hyperinflation would happen," he said. "For now, it has not."

Later in the same program, describing how the government has kept the country running, he offered a defense that its critics will find more revealing than reassuring. Go into the market, he said, and you will see that basic goods are there. "I know it's expensive, but it's there."

The rebuttal arrived the same day. In an interview with Khabar Online, Farshad Momeni, professor of economics at Allameh Tabatabai University in Tehran, was asked whether Iran stands on the threshold of hyperinflation. "Hyperinflation has already happened," he answered.

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While the two men argued over the name, Hemmati was proposing to raise the state food coupon by 23 percent, to 12.3 million rials a month. At market exchange rates, that is about $6.40.

An argument about a word

Both men are, in a narrow sense, right, and the gap between them is a definition.

The standard economists use, set out by Phillip Cagan in 1956, puts hyperinflation at 50 percent a month. By that measure Iran is nowhere near it: monthly inflation in the month of Tir (ended on July 22) was 3.1 percent. Looser conventions treat triple-digit annual rates as hyperinflation, and by that measure parts of the Iranian economy have already crossed the line.

Which is where Momeni takes his stand. He cites the statistics center's own reports showing that inflation lands hardest on low-income groups and deprived provinces. "Triple-digit inflation has already turned up in some regions in these official reports," he said, "and if we look at unofficial reports, the picture is far worse."

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The dispute is not academic point-scoring. "Hyperinflation" has become one of the most heavily used words in Iranian economic discourse, deployed by lawmakers, newspapers and economists with increasing frequency and decreasing precision.

Iranians have lived with double-digit inflation for the better part of five decades, which is Momeni's own point: with one or two exceptions, he says, Iran's economy has been held captive by inflationary policies for 55 years.

A word that has described the ordinary condition of Iranian life for half a century stops carrying information. The reaching for a bigger one is a sign that the old word has stopped working, and that people are trying to name something they have not felt before.

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The official figures give the reaching some grounding. Point-to-point inflation in Tir stood at 87.9 percent, and for food and drink at 128.1 percent. Those rates sit on top of a minimum wage of about 166 million rials a month, roughly $87 at market rates, and typical earnings of 200 to 300 million rials, about $105 to $157. Against food prices that have more than doubled in a year, a $6.40 coupon covers a fraction of a week.

What inflation does to a country

Momeni's larger argument is that inflation of this duration is not an economic problem that also has social effects; it is a solvent.

He points to John Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, who wrote that inflation beyond a certain point makes every contract unstable.

"That includes all contracts," Momeni said: "the constitution, ordinary laws, even the rules governing family life. In that atmosphere, kleptocracy takes the place of cooperation and trust." He notes that even Lionel Robbins, a market fundamentalist by his description, warned that phenomena such as Nazism and fascism were born of high inflation.

He also reaches for a historical case that carries an unmistakable warning for the government he is addressing. Analysts asking why the Chinese public accepted the fall of the nationalist government, he said, tend to answer that Mao and his allies controlled inflation in each province they took, while the nationalists could not.

Momeni's sharpest criticism is reserved for how officials talk about all this. They warn about the dangers of inflation as though they were bystanders.

"They play the role of the opposition themselves," he said. "They perform these deadly tricks and then hold a funeral for the consequences." Officials, he argued, should be reporting their remedies, not their alarm.

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He extends the same skepticism to the labor figures. Official unemployment stands at 7.6 percent, which he called one of the most astonishing claims available, given a Plan and Budget Organization report showing that only one third of the working-age population is employed, with two thirds playing no part in national production.

Inflation and joblessness compound, he said, and "when inflation and unemployment come together, we have entered the abyss of misery."

The governor's toolkit

Hemmati's account of the government's response is a catalogue of technical interventions carried out under severe constraint.

He said oil exports have almost entirely stopped, that Iran's foreign reserves are blocked by the United States while neighbors in the same position can still draw on theirs, and that about $12 billion of Iranian funds in Qatar, which was to have been made accessible under earlier understandings, remains frozen. Preliminary banking agreements had been signed, he said, but nothing operational has followed.

On Iraq, he said Baghdad had promised to address its outstanding debts, while noting that Iraq's own oil revenues had slowed and that its payments to its own employees had been delayed.

He said a meeting with Iraq's prime minister had produced agreement to use Iranian funds held at the Trade Bank of Iraq as backing for guarantees to Iranian contractors. At the BRICS summit he proposed what he called a financial corridor among member states, using their digital assets to reduce dependence on other countries' currencies.

Hemmati's own figures show the strain behind the reassurance. Foreign currency allocated for basic goods and agriculture over five months was about 8 percent lower than a year earlier, and currency available to manufacturers fell roughly 30 percent.

The coupon program alone requires about 870 trillion rials a month, some $455 million, and the government drew $2.5 billion from the National Development Fund before the new year (March 20) to keep it running for four months. He said the government does not want to fund it by printing money.

He was blunt about the limits. Purchasing power has fallen, he said, and while Turkey raised wages in step when its inflation reached 60 to 70 percent, Iran's fixed-income earners, teachers, workers, civil servants, the bottom three income deciles, receive increases of 20 to 25 percent that leave them further behind each year.

The end of the chain

Whatever the argument is called at the top, its shape at the bottom is not in dispute.

Mostafa Pourdehghan, a member of parliament's industries and mines committee, has warned that Iran is heading towards hyperinflation, putting liquidity at a record 170 quadrillion rials and citing Hemmati for a figure of minus three percent economic growth over five months. He has called for an emergency committee on inflation and prices.

Below that, according to reporting by the ILNA news agency, companies that laid workers off and later recalled them have not paid wages since late May, and the returning workers have lost both the substitute income they found and their entitlement to unemployment insurance.

Akbar Shokat, executive secretary of the Workers' House in Qom province, said most of the workforce lives below the poverty line after years of wage suppression and has almost no resilience left, warning that workers could not endure more than another two months. In July, about 1,600 workers at the Tabriz Machine Manufacturing group struck over unpaid wages.

Hemmati and Momeni are arguing about which word describes the Iranian economy. In the shops, where a month's wages no longer reach the end of the month, the argument was settled some time ago.

Iran crude loadings plunge to one-seventh of pre-war level as blockade bites

Aug 21, 2026, 20:54 GMT+1
•
Dalga Khatinoglu
100%
A still image from a video obtained by Reuters on June 5, 2026, shows US forces conducting an interdiction of the sanctioned stateless oil tanker Davina in the Indo-Pacific region, according to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Iranian crude loadings have fallen to about one-seventh of their pre-war level under the US naval blockade, while Chinese receipts of Iranian oil and fuel exports have also dropped sharply, tanker-tracking data reviewed by Iran International shows.

Data from commodities intelligence firm Kpler shows Iran has loaded an average of about 287,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude so far this month, compared with roughly 2 million bpd before the Middle East war.

China, meanwhile, has received an average of just 523,000 bpd of Iranian crude so far this month. That compares with an average of about 800,000 bpd over the previous two months and more than 1.7 million bpd at the beginning of the war.

The United States reimposed a maritime blockade against the Islamic Republic in mid-July. As a result, more than 40 million barrels of Iranian oil stored on tankers in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman have become effectively trapped, Kpler estimates.

Iran has stored 83 million barrels of oil outside the blockade zone, including 43 million barrels in the South China Sea, Yellow Sea and East China Sea. But with China sharply reducing its purchases, Tehran could run out of oil available for delivery to China in roughly five months if the current export rate persists.

Iran also exported around 256,000 bpd of fuel oil, or mazut, last year. Exports remained at roughly 220,000 bpd during the first two months of this year, but have plunged to just 61,000 bpd this month.

Iran had also been exporting a similar volume of LPG before the war. Those exports have now almost come to a halt.

According to Central Bank of Iran (CBI) data, the country’s crude oil and fuel oil exports were worth $57.5 billion last year, accounting for about 55% of Iran’s total exports. Crude oil, petroleum products and LPG together accounted for roughly 65% of the country’s total exports.

The sharp decline in exports of these commodities is likely not only to leave the government facing a massive budget shortfall, but also to create serious difficulties in securing the foreign currency needed to finance imports.

Iran imported nearly $78 billion worth of goods last year, including about $3 billion in gasoline, CBI data shows. Even if the country were to maintain its non-oil exports at last year’s level, they would not be sufficient to finance even half of its goods imports.

The situation is particularly difficult because Iran’s steel industry, which had generated as much as $5 billion a year in export revenues for the Islamic Republic, has been severely damaged by the recent war. The domestic market is now also facing a shortage of steel.

Iran was also a net importer of services last year, running a deficit of about $15 billion. Combined with its $78 billion in goods imports, that means Iran needed roughly $93 billion in foreign exchange to cover goods imports and its net services deficit.

Even if Iran manages to maintain its remaining non-oil exports at last year’s level, those revenues would cover only around one-third of those needs if crude oil, petroleum products, LPG and steel exports are excluded.

The pressure could increase further after US President Donald Trump on Wednesday threatened an “economic D-Day” against Iran, pledging economic warfare and isolation on an unprecedented scale after saying Tehran had failed to make a deal.

The threatened measures could make sanctions evasion more difficult and expose Iran’s already weakened foreign trade to additional challenges.

Turkey’s gas pivot leaves Iran with fewer cards to play

Aug 21, 2026, 05:00 GMT+1
•
Umud Shokri
100%
A worker at a natural gas facility in Iran. Turkey imported 4.536 bcm of Iranian gas in the first half of 2026, up 34 percent from a year earlier.

The expiry of a 25-year gas contract has exposed a shift in the Iran-Turkey energy relationship, with Ankara now enjoying more supply options while Tehran risks losing one of its most dependable export markets.

The contract expired on July 29 after governing Iranian pipeline gas supplies to Turkey for 25 years. Signed in 1996, with deliveries beginning in 2001, it provided for up to 9.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline.

Turkish sector sources said the war prevented the two sides from holding negotiations on a new agreement before the deadline, while existing gas flows could continue temporarily under force-majeure arrangements. No new long-term contract has been publicly announced.

The expiry is particularly significant because Iranian supplies were rising sharply immediately before the agreement lapsed. Turkey imported 4.536 bcm of Iranian gas in the first half of 2026, up 34 percent from a year earlier. In June alone, Iran supplied 883 million cubic meters, narrowly behind Azerbaijan and ahead of Russia among Turkey’s pipeline suppliers.

That complicates any assumption that the expiry automatically means the end of Iranian gas exports to Turkey. Instead, it has opened a period in which Ankara must decide how much Iranian gas it still needs and under what terms, while Tehran risks losing or reducing one of its relatively stable sources of export revenue.

The uncertainty has become more consequential as Washington intensifies economic pressure on Tehran. US President Donald Trump on Wednesday announced what he called an “Economic D-Day” against Iran, threatening economic consequences for countries whose financial institutions, businesses or government entities provide Tehran with what he described as economic lifelines.
Trump did not name Turkey or specify how the campaign would affect its purchases of Iranian natural gas. But the announcement adds another potential complication to any attempt by Ankara and Tehran to turn the temporary post-expiry arrangement into a new long-term agreement.

Iran’s gas vulnerabilities

Iran holds the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, yet its export performance remains far below its potential. Production has long been constrained by aging fields, limited investment, insufficient access to technology and exceptionally high domestic consumption.

The South Pars field, shared with Qatar, remains central to Iranian gas production. Israeli strikes in March damaged processing facilities linked to the field and temporarily disrupted exports, although production was subsequently restored at several offshore platforms and gas was redirected to other processing facilities.

The damage has not yet been fully repaired. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in August that the war had knocked out about 95 million cubic meters of gas production and that reconstruction of four damaged refineries was continuing. He said the lost capacity was expected to return to the network by the end of September.

Rystad Energy estimates that repairing energy-related infrastructure damaged across the region could cost between $34 billion and $58 billion. Iran accounts for the largest number of affected facilities, with its repair bill potentially reaching $19 billion under the consultancy’s high-damage scenario.

These wartime losses compound problems that predate the conflict. Sanctions have restricted access to investment, technology and international markets, while domestic demand for electricity generation, heating and petrochemicals frequently takes priority over exports.

For Tehran, the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline has therefore been more than simply another commercial route. It has provided revenue, political leverage and a direct energy relationship with one of the region’s largest economies. A substantial reduction in exports to Turkey would leave Iran more dependent on limited pipeline sales to Iraq and Armenia, swaps and other short-term arrangements.

Turkey’s stronger hand

Turkey enters the post-contract period in a far stronger position than when the agreement was signed three decades ago.

Its annual gas demand generally ranges between 50 and 60 bcm, but its supply portfolio has become increasingly diversified. Russia remains a major supplier through Blue Stream and TurkStream, while Azerbaijan supplies gas through the Southern Gas Corridor. LNG has also become an increasingly important component of Turkish supply.

Turkey has expanded LNG import and storage capacity and signed long-term supply agreements with international producers, while domestic production from the Black Sea has continued to grow. Those developments give Ankara substantially more flexibility than it possessed when Iranian pipeline gas became a major part of its energy system.

That does not mean Iranian gas has become irrelevant. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said before the contract expired that Turkey could still need the Iranian pipeline for supply security. Turkish sector sources have also described Iranian gas as among the country's cheapest sources.

The combination gives Ankara considerable leverage. Iran still offers competitively priced pipeline gas delivered through existing infrastructure, but Turkey is no longer as dependent on that supply and has more alternatives with which to negotiate.

What happens after the expiry

Several outcomes remain possible. Turkey and Iran could eventually negotiate another long-term supply agreement, reach a shorter transitional arrangement, reduce contracted volumes or retain Iranian gas primarily as a source of additional supply during periods of high demand.

For Turkey, the calculation will involve not only price and physical supply but also reliability and geopolitical risk. Iranian gas has repeatedly been affected by winter shortages, infrastructure problems and now war, while tighter US economic pressure could create additional uncertainty surrounding payments and future contractual arrangements.

For Iran, the stakes are considerably higher. Reduced exports to Turkey would cut foreign-exchange earnings and further expose the gap between Iran’s enormous gas reserves and its limited ability to monetize them internationally.

The expiration of the old agreement therefore does not yet represent the end of the Iran-Turkey gas relationship. Gas continues to move, and both countries retain reasons to preserve the connection.

But the balance underlying that relationship has changed. Turkey has more suppliers, more infrastructure and greater bargaining power, while Iran faces damaged facilities, sanctions, war and renewed US efforts to restrict its remaining sources of foreign revenue.

The question is no longer whether the 25-year contract will expire. It already has. The question now is whether the gas trade that survived its expiry can be converted into another durable agreement — and on whose terms.

Gasoline survey reignites debate over politically risky fuel reform in Iran

Aug 21, 2026, 01:33 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%

A gasoline policy survey by Iran’s energy optimization chief has reignited debate over how the Pezeshkian administration should tackle the country’s fuel deficit without triggering another politically dangerous price shock.

The poll was conducted by Esmail Saghab-Esfahani, Iran’s vice president and head of the Organization for Optimization and Strategic Management of Energy, who launched it on X on Monday and closed it two days later.

Under Iran’s current system, subsidized gasoline quotas are allocated to vehicles through fuel cards, with motorists able to buy a limited monthly amount at a lower price and additional fuel at a higher rate.

Saghab-Esfahani’s survey offered three alternatives: keeping the existing system while giving each citizen an additional tradable 30-liter quota; selling gasoline above current quotas at 870,000 rials per liter; or limiting supply to domestically produced gasoline without additional imports.

About 50% favored a model that would maintain existing quotas while allocating an additional 30 liters of gasoline per person based on national ID numbers. The additional quota could be transferred or sold to others at a mutually agreed market price.

Another 34% supported supplying gasoline beyond existing quotas at about 870,000 rials per liter, while 15% favored supplying gasoline in line with domestic production without additional imports.

Slightly more than 14,000 people took part. Critics, however, questioned whether the results could be considered representative of public opinion, citing the relatively low use of X in Iran, particularly in rural areas.

Iran’s gasoline imbalance is estimated at about 10% of consumption, according to the Khorasan newspaper, which has argued that the problem needs to be addressed but warned against using a policy that could create a much larger economic and social shock.

The economic newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad argued that the results should not be interpreted as a definitive expression of public support for gasoline reform.

“People have shown greater preference for the option that, compared with queues at gas stations and 870,000-rial gasoline, imposes less direct harm on them,” the newspaper wrote. “This difference is important, because the policymaker should not conclude from the higher vote that society has accepted all aspects of the plan.”

The newspaper also questioned why the survey did not include a fourth option combining non-price and structural measures, such as reducing the use of fuel-intensive vehicles, expanding imports of hybrid and electric cars, improving fuel-efficiency standards, developing public transportation, combating smuggling and gradually reforming the auto industry.

It also argued that shifting gasoline quotas from vehicles to individuals would not necessarily reduce consumption if fuel remained cheap and vehicles continued to be inefficient. At best, it said, the measure could make the distribution of subsidies fairer and reduce smuggling or misuse of some fuel cards.

The methodology also drew criticism from users who participated in the discussion. Mohammad Reza Felfalani, a civil-society activist working on water, energy and environmental issues, wrote: “It is unfair to ask people to make a decision or assessment with this amount of data. If you yourselves are designing a plan with this amount of data, give us the right to worry about Iran’s future.”

Financial markets analyst Mohammad Shahrestani warned that none of the proposed options would be cost-free under current economic conditions.

“None of these ideas will be without cost under the current economic and livelihood conditions; a cost that may be irreparable,” he wrote, challenging those who oppose negotiations to offer a solution to the fuel problem that they can implement.

Another commenter warned that any gasoline reform would risk failure unless the government first explained how it intended to control the prices of goods and services that could rise as higher transportation costs feed through the economy. The user warned that such a plan could become vulnerable to unrest on the scale of the January protests.

Hardliner roots of the proposal

Saghab-Esfahani says he does not belong to any political faction, but his positions have often been close to those of conservative hardliners such as former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili. His appointment by President Masoud Pezeshkian in November 2025 drew criticism from reformists.

He has personally shown greater support for a model linking gasoline rations to individual citizens rather than vehicles. The model is among the policies previously promoted by Jalili and featured prominently in his campaign during the last presidential election.

That connection has led some critics to accuse Saghab-Esfahani of framing the survey’s choices in a way that would produce a result favorable to his preferred model and to political groups aligned with him.

One commenter accused the government of trying to impose a proposal developed by supporters of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Jalili over the past eight years.

“You ignored the criticism of every expert and now want to topple the Pezeshkian government by forcing this plan through, and then you stage a survey?” the user wrote.

Another argued that the wording of the choices was designed to steer respondents toward the government’s preferred option, warning that giving every citizen a tradable gasoline credit could become the Pezeshkian administration’s “Achilles’ heel” during wartime.

A further commenter said none of the proposed options could solve the problem and accused the government of using the poll to seek legitimacy for a predetermined policy.

Warnings over a price shock

Many Iranian experts and media outlets acknowledge the need to address the gasoline imbalance while warning against a sudden price shock. The central disagreement is whether consumption should be controlled through sharp price increases or through a combination of quotas, gradual price adjustments, demand management, public transportation and supply-side reforms.

The Khorasan newspaper, in an editorial titled “Do Not Perform Surgery for a 10% Deficit,” argued that if the core problem is an imbalance of roughly 10% between gasoline production and consumption, the government should not resort to a policy capable of creating a much larger economic and social shock.

“The dimensions of the potential consequences may be much greater than the original problem,” the paper argued.

The warning carries particular weight in Iran, where previous fuel-price increases have triggered unrest. A gasoline price increase in 2019 led to widespread protests that were violently suppressed, while an earlier increase in 2007 sparked riots in several parts of the country, including Tehran.

For the Pezeshkian administration, the challenge therefore goes beyond how gasoline quotas are allocated. It must address a persistent fuel imbalance without allowing a reform intended to ease pressure on the energy system to become a new source of economic hardship, political conflict and social unrest.

Death of TV host in exile revives Iranians' grief over lost freedom

Aug 20, 2026, 22:04 GMT+1
100%
Farahnaz Espad

Messages sent to Iran International after the death of its 37-year-old presenter Farahnaz Espad have mixed personal tributes with reflections on exile, repression and hopes for political change among Iranians at home and abroad.

Espad died on Aug. 17 after a two-year battle with cancer. Born on March 11, 1989, she had worked with Iran International for eight years before stepping away from media work two years ago because of her illness.

“Farahnaz, beautiful daughter of Iran, we thank you for all the moments when your voice was a refuge and hope for the people,” one person wrote in a message sent to Iran International, adding that her name and kindness would remain alive in people’s hearts.

Iran’s domestic media is tightly controlled by the state, while independent journalists face censorship, arrests and restrictions. Many journalists have left the country, and Persian-language media based abroad have continued to serve audiences inside Iran despite efforts by authorities to block access to their broadcasts and websites.

The messages and videos sent after Espad’s death reflected not only grief over a familiar journalist, but also wider feelings of separation, exile and repeated loss among Iranians.

One person described Espad as a “kind and capable presenter” whose death felt like losing a member of their own family, “like a sister.”

Another said the news had left them “shaken” after years of watching the work of an “honorable and professional” journalist.

For others, her death evoked the experience of separation from Iran.

One person wished Espad’s family patience and wrote: “Hoping for a day when no one is forced to live in exile, far from their loved ones.”

Another wrote: “Hoping that nothing bad ever happens again to any of my compatriots. Hoping for good days. Long live Iran.”

A message from Firuzkuh, east of Tehran, connected Espad’s death with hopes for political change.

“Once again, another person has left us without seeing the freedom of Iran and the Iranian people,” it said.

Others called Espad a “daughter of Iran” and remembered her as compassionate toward the Iranian people, courageous and sincere, saying her work would not be forgotten.

A person from the northeastern city of Mashhad offered condolences to Espad’s family and colleagues and wrote: “Her honorable voice will remain in our memories.”

Another, from the northern city of Amol, described her as “a fighting, kind and selfless woman” and wished her eternal peace.

One message placed Espad’s death in the context of executions, killings and repeated loss in Iran, saying that losing her in exile felt no less painful to them than losing those killed during anti-government protests.

For many of those who wrote in, Espad’s death became intertwined with a wider sense of loss among Iranians at home and abroad, shaped by exile, repression and years of political upheaval.

The tributes were ultimately as much about what Espad represented to those who watched her as they were about her years on air: a connection to a country from which many Iranians have been separated, and hopes for changes that some fear they may never live to see.