Journalist and Iran analyst
As Ali Khamenei’s coffin is carried through days of state-orchestrated mourning, the Islamic Republic is trying to recast a humiliating wartime death as martyrdom, continuity and power, and repair a system wounded by war and public distrust.
The funeral is not simply the burial of a dead ruler. It is an attempt to rebuild the image of a damaged power structure.
The Islamic Republic lost its leader in the first blow of the war, at the heart of its own power network and alongside members of his family.
Now it is trying to use a coffin, flags, religious elegies, organized crowds and the language of sacrifice to change the meaning of that defeat.
Whether Khamenei’s actual body is inside the coffin may matter less than what the coffin is being made to carry.
That uncertainty is itself part of the Islamic Republic’s new condition: a system that hides the truth, manages death and turns opacity into political ritual.
The coffin is therefore more than a funeral object. It is a message. The system wants to show that it can still stage power, mobilize crowds and manufacture a national narrative.
A coffin in place of authority
In life, Khamenei was the final symbol of unaccountable power in the Islamic Republic.
For decades, he oversaw repression, executions, the elimination of opponents, control over women’s bodies, engineered elections and security violence. But the way he died broke the image of invulnerability built around him.
A leader who presented himself as commander of the “resistance” and the center of regional power was not killed on a battlefield. He was targeted in a moment that exposed the vulnerability of the structure he ruled.
That is why the Islamic Republic has to rewrite the scene of his death.
The funeral is meant to replace the image of defeat with another image: a slain leader, a grieving religious community, a foreign enemy and a system that still stands after being struck.
As so often in the Islamic Republic, religious ritual becomes a tool of political survival.
In the Islamic Republic’s political culture, death is rarely allowed to remain death. If it can serve power, it is turned into martyrdom.
The state is now trying to reconstruct Khamenei not as the repressive ruler of the past four decades, but as a sacred and wronged figure killed by an external enemy.
But the problem for the Islamic Republic is that society’s memory has not been erased.
For millions of Iranians, Khamenei’s name is tied to the January 2026 killings, the suppression of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the bloody crackdown of November 2019, the execution of protesters, mass poverty, forced migration, structural corruption and the reduction of ordinary life to survival.
The government wants the sound of elegies and the image of crowds to cover that memory. But official mourning is not the same as social grief.
A crowd gathered through buses, public holidays, state resources, administrative pressure, round-the-clock propaganda and networks linked to the Basij and other government bodies is not proof of public love.
It is proof of the state’s capacity, and insistence, on organizing the street.
The Islamic Republic wants to turn bodies present in public space into evidence of loyalty, even if many of those bodies are there because of fear, coercion, benefit, habit or indifference.
A ritual for political survival
The timing of the ceremonies during the holy Shiite month of Muharram gives the state a powerful symbolic opportunity.
Since its birth, the Islamic Republic has narrated politics through the language of Ashura: oppression, blood, enemies, sacrifice and martyrdom.
It is now trying to place Khamenei’s death inside the same structure of meaning.
In that narrative, a ruler responsible for many deaths is recast as a victim whose blood must be avenged. This reversal is the core of the propaganda.
The real victims are removed from the scene, while the agent of repression is placed in the position of the wronged.
The mothers of those killed, political prisoners, suppressed women and the families of executed protesters are absent from this stage.
The scene is designed for only one authorized form of mourning: grief for humiliated power.
But the state’s urgent need for religious spectacle also exposes weakness. If political authority were enough, why would the system need so much ritual, spending, closure, security and propaganda to prove that it continues?
The answer is that after Khamenei’s death, the fracture in the image of power has become visible.
His funeral is the first major test of the Islamic Republic after Khamenei.
The system wants to show that his death has not produced collapse, paralysis or a vacuum, and that it can still occupy the street.
The ceremonies are a postwar maneuver by a state that has suffered a military blow, lost much of its social legitimacy and faces a deeply distrustful society.
That is why Khamenei’s funeral is not the end of an era. It is an attempt to control the narrative of how that era ended.
The Islamic Republic knows that the way Khamenei died symbolizes weakness. It is trying to make the way he is buried symbolize power.
But the project contains a central contradiction. A system trying to build authority from Khamenei’s coffin is admitting, without saying so, that authority alone is no longer enough.
If real legitimacy existed, such a vast display would not be necessary. If society were truly grieving, this level of organization would not be needed.
If Khamenei were genuinely loved, the state would not have to rewrite his death with such a volume of propaganda, ritual and security control.
The report, written from Tehran by an anonymous author whose identity is known to WELT’s editors, said officials have drawn up contingency plans for a possible mass-casualty disaster during the processions for the slain former Supreme Leader.
According to WELT, a classified letter from the Iranian Red Crescent and the national crisis management organization to First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref projected between 1,500 and 3,000 possible deaths.
The report said a special unit had been set up to handle the dead and missing, while thousands of new graves had been prepared at Tehran’s Behesht-e Zahra cemetery.
One Tehran municipality employee, identified under a pseudonym for security reasons, told WELT that colleagues in the city’s crisis headquarters had confirmed the preparations.
“The prepared graves really exist,” she was quoted as saying. “Those responsible were told that up to 3,000 dead would be okay. With such a large crowd and this extreme heat, no one knows what will happen.”
The claims have not been independently confirmed.
Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies began in Tehran on Saturday and are expected to continue through Qom, the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala, and finally Mashhad, where he is due to be buried on Thursday.
WELT said the authorities were planning a sweeping security and logistical operation in Tehran, including movement restrictions, possible disruption to air travel, thousands of buses, temporary kitchens and the use of schools and mosques to house participants.
The report said officials had spoken of as many as 20 million people attending, a figure that is difficult to verify and is often used by Iranian authorities to portray state ceremonies as displays of mass support.
According to WELT, Tehran Municipality, led by hardline mayor Alireza Zakani, is playing a central role in the preparations, deploying 11,000 buses and keeping metro and bus rapid transit lines free and operating around the clock.
Municipal employees told the newspaper that each Tehran district had been allocated the equivalent of around 500,000 to 650,000 euros for the three days of ceremonies, excluding additional funds for bodies such as the fire department, parks organization, transport authorities and construction units.
Government-linked journalists cited by WELT estimated the budget at about 15 million euros for Tehran alone, with another five million euros each for Qom and Mashhad. With ceremonies also planned in Najaf and Karbala, the report said the funeral could become one of the most expensive state burials in modern history.
The scale of the preparations has raised concern because Iran has a recent history of deadly funeral crushes. At least 56 people were killed and more than 200 injured during the 2020 funeral for IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani in Kerman, while Ruhollah Khomeini’s 1989 funeral also descended into chaos, leaving at least eight people dead and hundreds injured.
WELT also described deep political tension around the ceremonies, saying radical supporters of the Islamic Republic have used nightly gatherings to denounce the US-Iran memorandum and threaten senior officials involved in negotiations, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
Some participants have demanded continued war to avenge Khamenei’s killing, while videos circulating online showed hardline religious speakers making militant speeches, with some attendees carrying rifles.
The funeral is taking place during a fragile ceasefire and amid growing public frustration over the cost of the ceremonies, economic hardship and the government’s mobilization of state resources for political display.
This time, Taghi Changalvaei was one of those who went.
He entered the fire to help save Khayiz, a protected area in the southern Zagros near Behbahan, in Khuzestan province. He did not return.
For Zagros communities, his death was familiar. For years, local residents and environmental volunteers have been losing friends and relatives to fires that return each summer across the mountains.
Iranian media have reported that since 2020, 27 people have died while trying to control fires in the Zagros.
Most were not professional firefighters. They had no specialized training, no protective clothing and little more than improvised tools.
They went because the forests were burning, and because in many parts of the Zagros, people know that if they do not move first, help may arrive too late.
A landscape primed to burn
The Zagros Mountains run for about 1,600 kilometers, from northwestern Iran toward the Persian Gulf. Their oak woodlands cover almost six million hectares, roughly 40 percent of Iran’s forest area, and support millions of rural livelihoods while helping regulate water and prevent soil erosion.
The Persian oak defines this landscape, shaping village economies, water systems and grazing patterns. But the Zagros oak belt has been shrinking for decades under pressure from illegal logging, overgrazing, drought, climate change and poor management.
Each summer, fire turns that decline into an emergency. That pattern was visible again in Khayiz, where a blaze that began on Badil Mountain burned for days through protected forests near Behbahan, exposing shortages of aerial firefighting capacity.
Experts say the fires have become larger, harder to contain and more closely tied to climate stress, fuel buildup and weak management.
Winter and spring rains can cover the slopes with grasses and seasonal plants. By early summer, heat dries that vegetation into fuel load: the combustible layer that lets a spark, a cigarette butt, a campfire or an intentional blaze spread quickly.
One part of the debate concerns grazing. In the past, livestock consumed part of the seasonal vegetation that now dries out in the mountains. From around 2021, authorities pursued efforts to reduce grazing pressure more seriously to help forests and pastures recover from overuse.
The aim was environmental protection: overgrazing has long damaged Zagros forests, limiting natural regeneration and weakening young oak growth. But some experts argue that reducing livestock presence without alternative vegetation management may have left more dry grass and brush by summer.
That does not make grazing restrictions the cause of the fires. Climate change, drought, oak decline, human negligence, arson, weak fire roads, aircraft shortages, poor coordination and lack of equipment all remain central. Unmanaged vegetation, some experts say, may be one piece of a larger puzzle.
In parts of Spain and the western United States, targeted grazing is used to reduce wildfire fuel loads and maintain firebreaks. For the Zagros, the question is whether the state can protect forests without removing one form of vegetation control and failing to replace it with another.
Bigger fires, weaker capacity
The statistics point to a worsening burden. In the Iranian year that began in March 2021, about 21,000 hectares of forests across the country burned, according to figures cited in Iranian media. By the year that began in March 2024, that figure had risen to about 27,000 hectares.
By November 2025, Iran had recorded more than 2,300 fires across national land, forests and rangelands, burning about 46,000 hectares. A recent study of the southern Zagros recorded more than 13,000 fire events from 2000 to 2023, with a sharp increase in the most recent years covered by the study.
The year that began in March 2026 has opened with another wave of fires, from Khayiz and Mongasht to the highlands of Lorestan, Fars and Kordestan provinces. Mongasht, a long mountain massif between Khuzestan and Chaharmahal-Bakhtiari, is one of several rugged areas where local residents are often the first responders.
The financial picture has also worsened. On paper, the rial budget of Iran’s Natural Resources and Watershed Management Organization has increased. But once the collapse in the value of Iran’s currency is taken into account, its real resources appear to have fallen sharply.
Calculations based on budget figures cited in Iranian media and market exchange rates suggest the organization’s dollar-denominated budget dropped from roughly $94 million in the Iranian year that began in March 2021 to about $41 million in the year that began in March 2026. Compared with the year that began in March 2016, the decline is estimated at more than 60 percent.
The direction is clear: while the fires have grown, the state’s real capacity to fight them has shrunk.
The consequences are visible on the ground. The fire in Khayiz is now out. But for Changalvaei‘s family, and for the families of others who died trying to save the Zagros, the fire has not ended.
Without changes in policy, funding and firefighting capacity, next summer will bring the same scene again: men with shovels, branches and bottles of water climbing toward the smoke, while fire moves through the oaks and leaves behind ash and names.
Vice President Mohammad-Jafar Ghaempanah came under fierce criticism from ultra-hardliners after saying Khamenei’s recent message on the memorandum showed respect for the Islamic Republic’s institutional decision-making process, not opposition to the agreement.
The dispute follows the publication of a written message attributed to Khamenei, in which he said he had “a different view in principle” about the memorandum but approved it after receiving assurances from the Supreme National Security Council and its chairman, Pezeshkian, that Iran’s national interests and those of the so-called Axis of Resistance would be protected.
That phrase has become the center of an increasingly bitter dispute.
Ultra-hardliners argue that Khamenei’s statement proves he had serious reservations about the agreement and accepted it only under pressure.
Some conservative figures and media outlets, including the hardline daily Kayhan, have warned that portraying the Supreme Leader as being at odds with the SNSC risks deepening political polarization.
A message read two ways
According to Ghaempanah, Khamenei had instructed that the memorandum be discussed at an SNSC meeting attended by senior military commanders, and had said the agreement should be accepted if three-quarters of members approved it.
“If every opinion expressed by the Leader were implemented without question, there would be no need for institutions such as parliament or the SNSC. The Leader expresses his views, and those views are examined by experts,” he added.
Ghaempanah said all but one member voted in favor of signing the memorandum, after which Khamenei authorized it while warning that “Iran must not retreat in the face of excessive American demands.”
He also said Khamenei’s reported remark that he had “a different view in principle” did not mean opposition to the memorandum, but instead strengthened Iran’s bargaining position with the United States.
Authority at the center of backlash
Ultra-hardliners interpreted Ghaempanah’s remarks as diminishing the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, arguing that he had implied the Supreme Leader’s view could be subordinated to decisions taken by the SNSC.
Reza Narimani, a prominent eulogist or maddah (religious singer) associated with the ultra-hardline camp, accused Ghaempanah of misunderstanding the concept of Velayat-e Faqih.
Writing on the hardline Raja News website, Narimani said Ghaempanah should not hold office if he believed “not everything the Leader says is binding,” arguing that practical commitment to the Leader’s directives is a prerequisite for serving in the Islamic Republic.
He further wrote that Ghaempanah “is not in a position to subject the Leader’s opinion to expert review because the Leader’s opinion itself is the expert judgment within the framework of divine law.”
Addressing Ghaempanah directly, Narimani added: “The problem is your understanding. Your understanding of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist is flawed, and that is why the country’s problems remain unresolved. Instead of negotiating with America and looking to the West to solve the country’s problems, improve your own understanding until it reaches that of the Leader.”
The comments were widely shared by ultra-hardline social media users.
One user, Hamid Khorasani, wrote: “This system is the system of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. Either you do not understand the meaning of Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, or you do understand and are acting on behalf of the enemy.”
Another user wrote: “You cannot consider your own opinion on par with the opinion of the Leader! According to the Constitution … the Leader’s opinion is the top priority of the entire system and governmental institutions.”
The 'coup' claim spreads
The controversy comes amid an escalating ultra-hardline campaign against the Pezeshkian administration over the US memorandum.
Hardline lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian has already accused Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of carrying out a “coup” against the Supreme Leader by bypassing his authority to push through the agreement with Washington.
A hardline social media user, Shahram Rashidnia, wrote that “the time for advice and warnings to Pezeshkian’s government is over; the coup against the Leader is now open and explicit.”
He urged supporters to use Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies to defeat what he described as the conspiracy.
Government says remarks distorted
Supporters of the government argue that Ghaempanah was explaining Khamenei’s message, not challenging his authority.
They say the text shows that Khamenei initially held a different view but approved the memorandum after receiving guarantees from Pezeshkian on behalf of the SNSC, while making clear that implementation depended on the United States honoring its commitments and avoiding excessive demands.
The Executive Vice Presidency’s public relations office issued a statement on Wednesday rejecting criticism of Ghaempanah’s remarks, saying they had been taken out of context and distorted.
It said his comments “in no way conflict with the position of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.”
The statement also warned that “in the current sensitive circumstances, taking officials’ remarks out of context and creating a false dichotomy between the Leader and the state’s institutions not only fails to protect the position of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist but could weaken national cohesion and distort understanding of governance in the Islamic Republic.”
