Why some think a weakened Iran could emerge stronger

The central question, some observers say, is no longer whether Iran lost the war but whether it survived long enough to turn military setbacks into political gains.

"The Iranian regime is now entering the strategy of what I call surviving, recovering, and rebuilding," former Israeli intelligence official and Middle East analyst Avi Melamed said.

That assessment reflects a broader regional anxiety that after years of pressure on Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance, Tehran may now gain the time and space necessary to reconstruct its influence.

Since the October 7 attacks and the ensuing regional conflict, Iran's proxy network has faced unprecedented pressure. Hezbollah and Hamas have been weakened, while Iranian military infrastructure has come under direct attack.

Yet some in the region fear a return to “square one and even in the worst conditions,” as Melamed put it.

"The Iranian regime marked a triumph," Melamed added. "As far as the Iranian regime is concerned, it views itself as the victorious one."

Whether Tehran can ultimately translate survival into renewed influence will depend in part on whether the emerging understanding with Washington evolves into a durable agreement.

But the prospect alone has already prompted debate across the region about the political consequences of the war.

A changing Middle East

The implications extend beyond Iran.

Middle East analyst and ISGAP research fellow Dalia Ziada argues that one consequence of the war may be a more fragmented regional order. The familiar framework of an Iran-led axis facing Israel and moderate Arab states may no longer adequately describe the region's evolving dynamics.

"What we thought is a Gulf Cooperation Council or a unified Gulf opposition is now being dismantled, dismantled severely," Ziada said, adding that Iran's Arab neighbours will increasingly “act individually and they will not be shy about it.”

According to Ziada, the post-war Middle East may increasingly be shaped by competition between regional powers, mainly “between Turkey and the axis it represents and Israel and the axes it represents.”

This fragmentation comes at a moment of growing uncertainty over America's role in the region.

The reliability question

One theme surfaced repeatedly across interviews: concerns over US credibility.

"There is a narrative that has been already circling around for many years," Melamed said. "That narrative basically says that the United States is not a reliable ally."

Many Persian Gulf states had hoped the war would significantly reduce Iran's regional influence. Instead, the prospect of a US-Iran understanding has generated unease among some regional actors who fear Tehran could once again rebuild its capabilities.

Ziada argued that many regional actors feel abandoned.

"The US probably is not the same ally we expected it would be," she said.

For Arab monarchies, geography remains inescapable. Iran is not a distant adversary but a permanent neighbor with missile capabilities and extensive regional networks.

If the regime emerges emboldened, Persian Gulf states may increasingly feel compelled to accommodate Tehran even as they continue to view it as a threat.

Victory or strategic pause?

Not all analysts agree that Iran has emerged stronger.

Iran scholar Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg argues that military realities still matter. In his view, Iran's ability to project power has been significantly degraded.

"Iran is now fighting for its survival and it fails to project power," said Grinberg of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and the Turan Research Center.

He cautions against viewing the conflict through a zero-sum lens in which anything short of regime collapse constitutes failure.

"The balance of power shifted in favor of the US and Israel," he said. But, he added, "it doesn't mean that Israel and America control the Middle East."

Grinberg also argued that Tehran may be exploiting Washington's priorities.

"Iran is, of course, exploiting the weakness of the US, which resides in the mere desire to reach a deal," he said.

Whether Tehran ultimately gains influence, he argues, depends less on Iran itself than on the choices made in Washington.

A people forgotten

Lost amid discussions of geopolitics and regional balances of power are the people of Iran themselves.

Many Iranians had hoped that increased pressure on the Islamic Republic would lead to meaningful political change after years of repression and deadly crackdowns. Instead, some now express feelings of abandonment.

Melamed acknowledged those expectations.

"There has been a lot of expectations and hope," he said. "Well, it doesn't seem to be like the case at least at this point."

For many inside Iran, the post-war settlement is viewed not as a breakthrough but as a return to a status quo that has repeatedly failed to address their aspirations.

Their frustration underscores a deeper question: if military pressure, mass protests and international isolation do not alter the regime's behavior, what comes next?

The answer may determine not only Iran's future but also the future balance of power in the Middle East.

Wars do not always end with winners and losers. Sometimes they end with paradoxes.

The greatest paradox of all may be that a weakened Iran could still emerge with greater influence.

The public anger from some regime supporters has exposed real divisions within Iran’s political and media establishment. But those divisions appear to be less about whether to preserve the Islamic Republic than about how best to preserve it.

That is the assessment of several Iran experts who spoke to Iran International following the announcement of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding.

Hardliners protest the deal

Much of the dissent appears to be coming from the hardline Paydari Front, which sees itself as a guardian of the values of the 1979 revolution that established the Islamic Republic. The faction has long opposed engagement with the West and advocates a more ideological vision of the state rooted in Shia Islamist principles.

Ahead of the signing of the MoU, prominent hardline lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian warned that accepting the agreement would effectively turn Iran into “a colony of the United States.” He also criticized provisions related to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing they would amount to surrendering one of Iran’s most important strategic levers.

The rhetoric spilled into the streets. At rallies in Tehran over the weekend, protesters called for the resignations of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Some invoked the memory of the late Supreme Leader, chanting: “Ghalibaf, Araghchi — what about my Leader’s blood?”

Some went even further, calling for their death and execution.

Opponents of the deal have also launched a “we will not accept” campaign.

The question now is whether these internal fractures could eventually weaken a system that, while more resilient than many anticipated, remains under significant strain. For now, experts say the divisions do not appear sufficient to break the system from within.

“The hardliners are loud, but they have a weak case to make,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.

“This regime has now proven beyond doubt that they’re much more entrenched and resilient than people thought they were. That doesn’t make them nice, just makes them harder adversaries.”

Survival over ideology

Arash Azizi, an Iran analyst and author of What Iranians Want: Women, Life, Freedom, argues that the Islamic Republic is shifting from ideological hardliners toward a more pragmatic — though still authoritarian — collective leadership focused on regime survival.

“They are authoritarian and they’re thugs, to be clear. But they care about keeping their own economic interests, which means social peace as much as they can, and which means deals with the US,” Azizi told Iran International.

In other words, the Islamic Republic is not moderating. It is acting pragmatically — and, as Azizi argues, cynically — to survive.

According to Azizi, the hardliners around Saeed Jalili are important precisely because they have revealed their weakness. They loudly opposed the deal but appear unable to stop it.

Real power, he argues, lies with a collective leadership centered around Ghalibaf, the IRGC leadership and the Supreme National Security Council. That leadership appears to view a deal with Washington as necessary to protect the system.

The deal’s progress, despite Mojtaba Khamenei’s continued absence from public view, has fueled speculation that a new power structure may be consolidating inside the Islamic Republic.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, notes that such divisions are not new.

Similar opposition emerged during the 2013–2015 negotiations that led to the JCPOA, when hardliners attacked then-President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

“The Supreme Leader made a decision, and that’s going to carry the day,” Brodsky said.

But Brodsky argues the real struggle may begin if sanctions relief materializes.

“There will be those who want to use resources toward economic rebuilding, but there will be a very hardened IRGC contingent ... who are going to want to rebuild their military, rebuild the nuclear program, and rebuild the terror apparatus.”

Media split reflects political divide

Iran’s media landscape reflects the same tensions.

Hardline newspaper Kayhan has denounced the MoU as surrender to the United States. Khorasan has framed it as a temporary pause rather than peace. Hamshahri has argued that diplomacy was made possible by Iran’s military deterrence.

Meanwhile, reformist and moderate outlets such as Shargh, Etemad and Khabar Online have presented the agreement as a state-backed effort to end the war, ease economic pressure and stabilize the country.

Some supporters of the deal have gone further, arguing that the agreement is superior to the 2015 nuclear accord because Iran has retained strategic leverage, including influence over the Strait of Hormuz.

Government supporters have also pushed back against the Paydari Front, arguing it does not represent ordinary Iranians, many of whom have grown weary of war and economic hardship.

Taken together, the reactions suggest that few inside Iran view the MoU as a peace agreement.

Instead, supporters and critics alike largely see it as a mechanism for preserving the Islamic Republic, though they disagree sharply on what kind of compromise would best serve that goal.

For hardliners, the agreement risks being remembered as a retreat from revolutionary principles. For pragmatists inside the establishment, it is a necessary concession aimed at keeping the system intact.

The domestic battle over the MoU may ultimately prove just as consequential as the negotiations themselves.

In a written response to Iran International, the Canadian government said all parties involved in the latest exchanges between Iran, Israel and the United States must comply with international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure.

Ottawa also stressed the need for diplomacy and dialogue to resolve the crisis. But in Canada’s case, that language does not signal a softer approach toward Tehran. It sits alongside one of the most restrictive Iran policies among Western governments, built around sanctions, terrorist designations and a long-standing diplomatic rupture.

That tension is especially visible in Canada’s concern over the Strait of Hormuz.

Global Affairs Canada said Ottawa remains worried about disruptions in the strategic waterway and emphasized that respect for international navigation rights under international law is essential. It said the free flow of maritime traffic through the corridor is critical to global energy stability and supply chains.

For Canada, the crisis is therefore not only about preventing a wider war or limiting civilian harm. It is also about protecting the rules and routes that underpin global trade, energy flows and maritime security.

That is where Ottawa’s call for diplomacy begins to narrow. Canada supports de-escalation, but not in a way that separates the current crisis from Tehran’s broader conduct in the region.

Global Affairs Canada said Ottawa will continue working with allies and partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to support a diplomatic solution while countering what it describes as destabilizing activities by the Islamic Republic.

Those activities include Iran’s support for terrorist organizations, its ballistic missile program, nuclear activities and systematic human rights violations.

In other words, Canada’s message is not simply that the fighting should stop. It is that any diplomatic path must exist alongside continued pressure on the structures Ottawa believes drive Iran’s regional behavior.

That pressure is not only rhetorical.

Canada lists Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi movement, also known as Ansarallah, as terrorist organizations. Ottawa has accused Iran of providing political, financial or military support to such groups.

In June 2024, Canada also listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, following years of pressure from victims’ families of Flight PS752, human rights advocates and the Iranian-Canadian community.

Since 2012, Canada has designated Iran as a foreign state supporter of terrorism under the State Immunity Act, a legal framework that allows victims of terrorism to pursue civil action against the Iranian state in Canadian courts.

Together, those measures make Canada’s diplomatic language more constrained than it may first appear. Ottawa can call for dialogue, but it is doing so with a state it has legally and politically framed as a sponsor of terrorism and a source of transnational threats.

The sanctions record points in the same direction.

In March 2026, Canada sanctioned five individuals and four entities involved in procurement networks supplying technology used in IRGC weapons production, including drone-related systems. Canada said some Iranian arms, drones and technology have been transferred to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine.

A month earlier, Ottawa sanctioned seven individuals linked to Iranian state bodies responsible for intimidation, violence and transnational repression targeting dissidents and human rights defenders.

These measures show why Canada’s Iran policy cannot be read only through its latest call for restraint. The government is trying to prevent escalation in the short term while preserving the tools it has built over years to isolate and pressure Tehran.

The relationship has been moving in that direction for more than a decade.

Canada severed diplomatic relations with Iran in September 2012, closed its embassy in Tehran and declared Iranian diplomats in Canada persona non grata. Relations have not been restored since.

The gap widened further after the downing of Flight PS752, crackdowns on protests in Iran, allegations of transnational repression, Tehran’s regional activities, and concerns over its missile and nuclear programs.

Against that backdrop, Canada’s latest response is less a change in policy than a reminder of its limits. Ottawa wants diplomacy to contain the crisis, but it has little trust in the government with which diplomacy would have to be conducted.

That is the uneasy mix shaping Canada’s approach: avoid direct military involvement, keep channels for de-escalation open, and continue working with allies to restrict Iran’s room for maneuver.

The unresolved question is whether diplomacy can contain the crisis if Tehran is unwilling to make lasting changes, or whether negotiations will again become a way to delay pressure while preserving the policies that brought the region to this point.

Iran and Israel have paused direct attacks, but Tehran's latest warning suggests the conflict may be evolving rather than ending.

On Monday, Iran said it would suspend operations against Israel but warned attacks would resume if Israel continued striking Lebanon.

Israel rejected the condition, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accusing Tehran and Hezbollah of trying to create a new equation in which attacks on Israel would no longer carry consequences.

The development has fueled debate over whether the latest ceasefire represents the end of the fighting—or merely the end of its first phase.

Read the full article here.

On Monday, Iran said it would suspend operations against Israel but warned attacks would resume if Israel continued striking Lebanon.

Israel rejected the condition, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accusing Tehran and Hezbollah of trying to create a new equation in which attacks on Israel would no longer carry consequences.

The development has fueled debate over whether the latest ceasefire represents the end of the fighting—or merely the end of its first phase.

A ceasefire tied to Lebanon

For UAE-based analyst Amjad Taha, the answer is straightforward.

"It's a pause rather than a ceasefire or an end of war," he told Iran International.

Taha argues that Tehran's decision to link its ceasefire to Lebanon reveals that the Islamic Republic continues to view regional conflicts through the lens of its proxy network.

"The fact that the Islamic regime right now says it's fighting and its condition in Lebanon ceasefire with its own, it tells us that Iran's, the Islamic Regime still sees Lebanon and other countries as its own proxy and its own extension," he said.

In his view, the current calm risks postponing rather than resolving the underlying conflict.

"If the ceasefire happens right now, we are just postponing another 7th of October-style event, but this time across the Middle East, not just the state of Israel."

Elizabeth Tsurkov, a fellow at the New Lines Institute, sees Iran's Lebanon condition as part of a broader effort to shape the post-war landscape.

"It appears clear that the Iranian regime believes that it won the 40-day war and is therefore trying to establish new rules of the game to project its power and deter Israeli action in Lebanon as well," she said.

Tsurkov also rejected suggestions that apparent tensions between Washington and Jerusalem amount to a coordinated strategy.

"I don't think that this is a matter of bad cop, good cop," she said. "Trump genuinely wants a deal."

Her assessment points to a broader reality emerging from the latest crisis: Lebanon is no longer a separate arena. It has become intertwined with negotiations over Iran, regional deterrence and the future of the ceasefire itself.

A new equation?

The debate over Iran's intentions has exposed sharply different interpretations of the latest escalation. While some see Tehran acting from a position of weakness, others argue it has successfully shaped events since the ceasefire.

Avi Melamed, a former Israeli intelligence official, believes Iran has managed to place itself at the center of multiple interconnected disputes.

"The Iranian regime, as of now, has been quite clearly able to dictate the pace," he said.

Melamed argued that Tehran is attempting to connect "the story of the Hormuz Strait, Iran, the nuclear program and the situation in Lebanon," creating additional pressure points for both Washington and Jerusalem.

As the dispute over Lebanon intensified, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi shared an image on X showing the Iranian and Lebanese flags intertwined, reflecting Tehran's position that the two fronts are inseparable.

Still, Melamed cautioned against drawing firm conclusions.

"I think we are at a phase where you could say that, at the same time, the Iranian regime could mark some significant achievements as far as the Iranian regime is concerned," he said, describing the current situation as an "ongoing ping pong game."

Others reject the notion that Iran is acting from a position of confidence.

John Craig, a former US ambassador and senior fellow at the Transatlantic Leadership Network, sees the latest missile attack as an attempt to undermine diplomacy rather than demonstrate strength.

"Iran is desperate to slow/stop any negotiations," Craig said.

He remains skeptical that the current pause will hold.

"Nothing is over," he said. "The IRGC does not want any agreement. Ever."

For military analyst Andrew Fox, the future of the ceasefire may depend less on Tehran and Jerusalem than on developments in Lebanon.

"I think it very much depends on what happens in Lebanon," Fox said.

While describing Israel's latest response as limited compared with the broader war phase, Fox said the underlying conflict remains unresolved.

"It clearly wasn't a full-scale return to combat operations. It was nothing like the scale or intensity of what we saw during the war phase. But it did send a message."

And despite the current lull, he does not believe hostilities have truly ended.

"I don't think it is an end to hostilities," Fox said. "I don't think it is an end to attempts to overthrow the Iranian regime, but I think it will draw a line under this phase."

That may be the clearest point of agreement among analysts. Whether they view Iran as emboldened, opportunistic or desperate, few believe the latest ceasefire has settled the larger struggle.

Trump continues to pursue negotiations with Tehran. Netanyahu has vowed Israel will respond forcefully to future attacks. And Iran has made clear that its restraint is conditional on events beyond its borders.

The missiles may have stopped flying between Iran and Israel. But by tying its ceasefire to Lebanon, Tehran has ensured that the next test of the truce may come not in Tehran or Tel Aviv, but on Israel's northern border.