A new year dawns in Iran, shadowed by loss and war

Nowruz and the turning of the year have always carried, even in the happiest times, a blend of celebration and sorrow. Remembering the departed is part of welcoming the new year.
Iran International

Nowruz and the turning of the year have always carried, even in the happiest times, a blend of celebration and sorrow. Remembering the departed is part of welcoming the new year.
Among Iranians, Nowruz has long been tied to renewal and to the idea of the “triumph of good over evil.” Yet Iran’s turbulent history has often cast a shadow over the holiday, turning it into a moment marked by loss, war and unresolved grief.
This year carries all three.
Since 2022, a continuous national mourning has taken hold. The dead of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement—some known, many unnamed—have left their mark on the country’s rituals.
At Nowruz tables across Iran, mothers sit with clenched throats and tearful eyes, or stand beside the graves of their children.
Iran has seen such Nowruzes before. During the war with Iraq, the new year arrived under the sound of missiles falling on cities, as young men were sent to the front in waves. Celebration persisted, but it did so alongside fear and loss—often shaped by what many would later call the “ignorance and irresponsibility” that drove a generation to war.
The death of the young has long been among the deepest sorrows in Iranian culture.
The story of Siyâvash, the innocent prince killed unjustly, still carries the grief of mourning mothers. In the Shahnameh, his death comes on the eve of Nowruz. The holiday marks renewal, yet in Ferdowsi’s telling it is shadowed by war and sacrifice.
That grief echoes in one of the epic’s most enduring lines: “If death is justice, then what is injustice?”
Over time, mourning became ritual. The death of Siyâvash gave rise to Suvâshun ceremonies, observed for centuries in parts of greater Iran. The convergence of death and renewal came to symbolize a belief that justice, however delayed, would prevail.
Today, the Siyâvashes are many. Their images appear on walls, in homes and in the hands of protesters, carried like the banner of Kaveh the Blacksmith.
One custom, known as now‘id, marks the first Nowruz after a loss, when families visit the bereaved. Last year, at one such table, a young woman sat silently, her hair turned white by grief for her slain son. Then she broke the silence: “Was it not enough to kill him? What did you do to my child’s head?”
Her question lingers. So do many others like it.
Nowruz has long been intertwined with remembrance. In ancient belief, the days before the new year—Farvardegân—were a time when the spirits of the dead returned. Homes were cleaned and tables set not only for the living but for those who had passed. The bond between the two was renewed.
In recent years, many of the dead have been buried in unmarked graves, or in cemeteries where tombstones are repeatedly destroyed and rebuilt by grieving families. Flowers return, even when they are torn away.
And yet Nowruz endures.
Neither war nor repression, nor the hostility of those who reject Iran’s pre-Islamic traditions, has erased it. Each year, after the fires of Chaharshanbeh Suri are lit and the dead are honored, the new year arrives again.
As one line often recited at gravesides has it: “If we feared the sword, we would not dance in the gathering of lovers.”
Iranians celebrate Nowruz as they always have: with hope that the coming year may bring a more just life—one in which rights are equal, dignity is preserved and the state serves its people rather than stands above them.







The hanging of a 19-year-old wrestler on Thursday intensified concerns over the fate of other detained athletes, with fears growing that more executions could follow in cases linked to protests earlier this year.
Three protesters – Mehdi Ghasemi, Saleh Mohammadi and Saeed Davoudi – were executed on Thursday after being accused of killing two police officers during unrest in January, according to the judiciary-linked Mizan news agency.
Mohammadi, a national-level wrestler who had competed internationally, denied the charges in court and said his confession had been obtained under torture, according to accounts from those close to him. Members of Iran’s wrestling community had also defended him, saying he had no history of violence.
Mohammadi had represented Iran in international wrestling events, including the 2024 Saitiev Cup in Russia, where he won a bronze medal.
His execution has drawn comparisons to wrestler Navid Afkari, whose case became a symbol of the use of capital punishment following protests.
Afkari was sentenced to death and executed in Shiraz after being accused and convicted of murdering a security guard during the 2018 Iranian protests.


Athletes remain in custody
A growing list of athletes, coaches and referees remain detained, many linked to the recent wave of protests as well as earlier unrest.
Among those named are footballer Mohammad Hossein Hosseini, water polo goalkeeper Ali Pishevarzadeh, marathon runner Niloufar Pas, kickboxing champion Benjamin Naghdi, teenager footballer Abolfazl Dokht, and boxer Mohammad Javad Vafaei Sani.
Others include basketball coach Payam Vahidi, billiards coach Hamzeh Kazemi, aerobics coach Narges Heidari and former footballer Amir Reza Nasr Azadani, whose earlier arrest had already drawn international concern.
Several detainees are young athletes, including Amirhossein Ghaderzadeh, 19, and Abolfazl Dokht, raising alarm among campaigners who say they face similar charges and judicial processes.
Boxer Mohammad Mahshari, a bronze medalist at the 2024 Asian youth and under-23 championships, is also reported to be in custody.
The list extends to referees and lesser-known competitors, showing how deeply the crackdown has reached into Iran’s sporting community.
Pattern of executions after protest trials
Authorities accused those executed of acting on behalf of Israel and the United States, an allegation frequently used in cases linked to protests.
Cases linked to protest-related violence have repeatedly raised concerns over due process, including forced confessions, lack of access to legal representation and the exclusion of defense witnesses.
Saleh Mohammadi’s case followed that pattern, with those close to him saying CCTV evidence did not identify him and that alibi witnesses were not allowed to testify.
Sporting community under pressure
The crackdown has reverberated across Iran’s sporting world, where athletes have increasingly become visible participants in protests.
There is no single confirmed, comprehensive number specifically for athletes killed in the January 2026 protests. However, according to compiled lists from activists and sports networks, at least 65 athletes, coaches and referees have been identified among those killed during a crackdown in January.
The scale of the violence remains contested. Iran International reviewed documents proving that more than 36,500 Iranians were killed by security forces during the January 8-9 crackdown on nationwide protests, making it the deadliest two-day protest massacre in history, while other estimates suggest it could be significantly higher.
Earlier, more than 200 athletes signed open letters urging the International Olympic Committee to take stronger action and questioning its continued engagement with officials they say are tied to Iran’s security apparatus.
For those still in detention, Mohammadi’s execution has deepened fears that similar cases could be pushed rapidly through the courts.
The combination of protest-related charges, allegations of foreign links and the use of forced confessions has left many families fearful and uncertain about the fate of detained athletes.
Messages sent to Iran International and posts on social media showed a split reaction to Wednesday’s strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field, with some welcoming the hit on state-linked assets and others warning of civilian costs.
Messages sent to Iran International and posts on social media were divided over Wednesday’s strike on the South Pars gas field in southern Iran, with some welcoming the hit on state-linked assets and others warning of civilian costs.
US President Donald Trump said Israel had struck Iran’s South Pars gas field “out of anger” over developments in the Middle East, describing the damage as limited and warning there would be no further attacks unless Iran targeted Qatar again.
The strike marked a shift in a conflict that has spread across the Persian Gulf, disrupting energy flows after Iranian missiles targeted facilities in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Strike seen as blow to state-linked networks
Some messages sent to Iran International framed the attack as a setback for institutions tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
“Israel, by hitting South Pars, saved us from more theft… the money was turned into bullets fired at our children,” one citizen wrote.
Another, who said he had worked on projects in the field, downplayed the long-term impact.
“Even with the complete destruction of all 24 gas refineries… they will return to production in less than three months,” he wrote, adding that supply lines from offshore platforms would shut automatically and protect reserves.
A separate message from an engineer challenged concerns about offshore facilities.
“The platforms are not even fully operational because of sanctions… after the Islamic Republic, they can be rebuilt better,” he wrote, contrasting them with higher-quality installations on the Qatari side.
Others shifted the focus away from infrastructure entirely.
“The main infrastructure was the young people they took from us… the rest can be rebuilt with better technology.”
Social media posts echoed that line in sharper language. “Don’t worry about infrastructure,” one post read. “What infrastructure are you talking about? What life was left that needed infrastructure?” it added.
Concerns over civilian impact
Other messages cautioned that strikes on energy infrastructure would translate directly into hardship for civilians.
“Don’t look at infrastructure so simply,” one user wrote. “Lack of electricity and gas means death – cold, hunger, medicine shortages.”
Another post rejected attacks on non-military targets. “Hitting Iran’s infrastructure by any side is condemnable. It belongs to all Iranians,” the message read.
Some called for limiting strikes strictly to military-linked targets. “Please just hit those responsible and leave non-military infrastructure alone.”
One message also questioned the timing. “Hitting South Pars at this moment is not the last and best solution,” it read.
Back to corruption and rebuilding
Even among those critical of the strike, some framed the debate through long-standing economic grievances.
“If infrastructure belonged to the people, no one would be searching in trash for food.”
Another argued that damaged facilities could ultimately be replaced. “That worn-out infrastructure… will be rebuilt better – but those lives won’t return,” the user wrote referring to thousands of people killed during the January protests.
Others pointed to historical reconstruction. “Germany and Japan were flattened in World War II – where are they now?” one user said.
Across the exchanges, a recurring thread linked both support for and opposition to the strike back to mistrust of the Islamic Republic, with many portraying the country’s energy wealth as mismanaged or diverted, and arguing that any future recovery depends less on infrastructure than on political change.
The assassination of Ali Larijani has opened a rare gap at the center of Iran’s security system, raising immediate questions about who can replace him and whether anyone can perform the same role.
With a career spanning both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the political establishment, including a decade as parliament speaker, Larijani functioned as a bridge between Iran’s military and civilian centers of power.
That position—part coordinator, part mediator—made him one of the system’s most important internal stabilizers. His removal further narrows the circle of actors capable of managing competing interests within the system.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei praised him in a brief statement Wednesday, vowing to avenge his blood.
Senior officials sought to project continuity. President Masoud Pezeshkian said Larijani’s “path of resistance combined with rationality” would continue, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi insisted that the absence of any individual cannot destabilize the Islamic Republic’s “powerful political structure.”
Even with continuity, however, the system Larijani helped manage now faces a more immediate test: succession.
Formally, the secretary of the SNSC is appointed by the president, but the role only acquires real authority when the Supreme Leader designates the holder as his representative, granting voting power within the council.
Early indications suggest that Mojtaba Khamenei is overseeing key appointments. Whether he does so here will shape both the balance of power and the direction of decision-making.
Two names dominate early speculation.
Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the current speaker of parliament, is already a member of the council and holds voting rights, making his elevation procedurally straightforward.
A former IRGC Air Force commander and national police chief, he brings operational experience and political stature. But his appointment carries risks. His high profile and role in recent military operations could place him near the top of potential Israeli target lists, raising questions about durability and continuity.
Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, a senior IRGC naval commander, represents a more technocratic option. He previously served as both secretary of the council and the Supreme Leader’s representative before being reassigned in 2025.
His return would provide institutional familiarity, but he would require reappointment by the new leadership to regain full authority. Compared to Ghalibaf, he offers less political reach but fewer immediate security liabilities.
Other figures—including former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei and former SNSC secretary Saeed Jalili—have been mentioned but appear less likely contenders, either because they would require additional endorsement or because of political frictions within the current leadership.
Larijani’s influence rested less on formal authority than on his ability to navigate between institutions that do not always align: the IRGC, the presidency, parliament, and the clerical establishment. Replacing that function may prove harder than filling the office.
His absence therefore raises a broader question about the system’s internal cohesion. Without a figure capable of managing competing centers of power, the risk of renewed factionalism increases—particularly at a time when external pressure is intensifying.
Iran’s leadership insists the system remains stable. The coming appointment will test that claim.
Esmail Khatib, killed in overnight strikes, mattered not because he ran spies but because he helped redraw the line between politics and security, turning dissent into an intelligence battlefield and recasting protest as hybrid war.
That was the frame Khatib laid out in a long interview published on Ali Khamenei’s website during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising. It became more than rhetoric. It became a governing logic that collapsed protest, foreign media, activism and espionage into one threat map.
Khatib’s career made him unusually suited to that task.
Born in 1961 and trained in Qom, he rose through the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence world, later ran the intelligence office in Qom, moved into the Supreme Leader’s protection orbit and then headed the judiciary’s protection and intelligence apparatus.
By the time Ebrahim Raisi made him intelligence minister in 2021, Khatib had passed through nearly every institution that mattered in the Islamic Republic’s coercive core: the Guards, the judiciary and the Supreme Leader’s household.
His retention in 2024 confirmed that his authority rested less on party politics than on trust from the system above elected government.
Under Khatib, the state increasingly treated social unrest as proof of foreign infiltration.
Protesters were not simply angry citizens. They were portrayed as nodes in an enemy network. Foreign-based Persian media were not just broadcasters. They were recast as operational arms of hostile states.
That logic also hardened into law.
Under his watch, the state broadened the definition of espionage and hostile collaboration, making it easier to turn contact, information-sharing, media work and loosely defined cooperation with enemy states or affiliated groups into national-security crimes.
The point was not only to punish spies. It was to widen the category of who could be treated like one.
The United States designated Khatib twice in September 2022, reflecting the breadth of his role across both overseas operations and domestic repression.
The Treasury first sanctioned him and the Intelligence Ministry over malicious cyber activity, including the disruption of Albanian government systems.
Later that month, it sanctioned him again, saying the ministry under his leadership had targeted human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, journalists, filmmakers and religious minorities, and had subjected detainees to torture in secret detention centers.



Years of the gallows
The intelligence ministry did not sign every death sentence. But the execution surge is still part of the meaning of Khatib’s tenure, because it formed the climate in which his security doctrine operated.
In the four full calendar years after he took office, Iran carried out at least 4,000 executions: about 580 in 2022, 830 in 2023, 975 in 2024 and 1,900 in 2025.
Those numbers belong formally to the judiciary and the prison system.
Politically, though, they sit inside the same larger story: a state that answered dissent, insecurity and social fracture with a heavier reliance on coercion, exemplary punishment and fear.
Operations beyond Iran
Khatib was also important beyond Iran’s borders. The ministry he led was accused by Western governments of directing cyber operations, targeting dissidents abroad and helping run the wider machinery of transnational repression.
His significance, though, was not that he was publicly tied to every individual plot.
It was that he sat atop a ministry that linked classic espionage, cyber activity, surveillance of exiles and operational cooperation with Iran’s other security arms.
In that sense he was less a field commander than a system manager, overseeing one part of Iran’s long war against opponents at home and abroad.



The glue
That coordinating role may be the most revealing part of his legacy.
Iran’s intelligence world is fragmented. The Intelligence Ministry, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the judiciary and the Leader’s office all have their own stakes, rivalries and chains of command.
Khatib’s value was that he could move across those worlds.
He came from the Guards’ intelligence culture, served in the Leader’s protection orbit, worked closely with the judiciary and then ran the ministry that was supposed to give the system a more unified picture of the threat environment.
After the 2022 uprising, that became even more important.
The Islamic Republic needed its rival security organs to act less like competing fiefdoms and more like a single architecture.
Khatib helped provide that common language, one in which protest, activism, foreign media, exile politics, sabotage and espionage could all be placed on the same continuum of danger.
That is why Khatib mattered. He mattered because he helped normalize a broader idea: that almost any challenge to the Islamic Republic could be reclassified as infiltration.
In the end, that was his real achievement for the system he served. He helped make dissent legible as intelligence warfare.
The US counterterrorism chief’s resignation over the Iran war made waves in Washington, but his assertion that Tehran posed no imminent threat was swiftly challenged by officials and analysts.
In his resignation letter to President Trump Joe Kent wrote that “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation” and accused the White House of going to war on behalf of Israel.
US officials pushed back quickly, with Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt saying Trump had evidence to support his decision to strike and House Speaker Mike Johnson questioning Kent’s information.
“I don't know where Joe Kent is getting this information, but he wasn't in those briefings,” Johnson said. “Had the president waited, we would have had mass casualties. That proposition at the end is clearly wrong.”
Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard also pushed back publicly, saying that the administration rejects the view that Iran posed no threat.
Kent resigned on Tuesday, saying he “cannot in good conscience” support the Trump administration’s war in Iran, and arguing the conflict had been driven by pressure from Israel and its supporters in the United States rather than an immediate security necessity.
President Trump dismissed him shortly afterward, calling it a “good thing” he stepped down and describing him as “very weak on security.”
'Kent’s claim contradicts years of warnings'
Analysts echoed that assessment.
“The fact of the matter is that Donald Trump, in his State of the Union address, said that Iran is a threat and Iran is thinking about directly attacking the United States. That's not Trump's imagination,” said Shayan Samii, a former US government appointee and Iranian-American analyst.
He pointed to Iran’s missile program and nuclear activity as further evidence.
“They bragged about having 60% enriched fuel, enough for eleven bombs. They told me and Jared [Kushner], ‘We're not gonna give you diplomatically what you couldn't take militarily,’” White House envoy Steve Witkoff said on March 8 alongside Trump aboard Air Force One.
Samii said such positions reinforced concerns that Iran was using diplomacy to buy time.
“They were saying, yes, we do have this material… why should we give [it] to you voluntarily?” he said.
More broadly, US security agencies have long warned that Iran poses a multifaceted threat, including cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, potential operations on US soil, drone capabilities and proxy attacks across the Middle East.
The FBI has also warned law enforcement in California of possible retaliation linked to the war, including the risk of Iranian drone activity targeting the US West Coast, according to an alert reviewed by ABC News.
Kent’s claim has also drawn emotional backlash from those directly affected by Iranian-linked violence.
“My husband, Alan, was killed by Iranian proxies in Iraq. And now, after decades, the fight is finally leading back to the number one state sponsor of terrorism in the world,” a Gold Star widow wrote on X.
“You understood it when it was your loss. Now you’re minimizing it when it’s mine. You don’t get to redefine this war just because it’s not your grief anymore.”
Questions over access, motive and past ties
Against that backdrop, questions have also emerged about Kent’s access to intelligence and the motivations behind his position as well as his past political associations.
A senior administration official told Fox News Kent was “a known leaker” who had been cut out of presidential intelligence briefings months earlier and excluded from Iran-related planning – raising doubts about whether he had access to the information he was disputing.
“He has a history of white supremacism,” Jake Wallis Simons, host of the Brink podcast and a columnist with The Telegraph, told Iran International, adding that Kent’s background should be considered when evaluating his position.
Open-source reporting reviewed by Iran International shows Kent faced criticism during his political campaigns over engagement with white nationalist figures.
According to The Forward, he sought support from white nationalist Nick Fuentes and made comments describing American culture as “anti-white,” though Kent has said he disagrees with some of those views.
Stephen F. Hayes of The Dispatch reported that Kent’s former campaign manager acknowledged in texts that he had sent racist and antisemitic messages, and that a senior adviser attended a conference hosted by Fuentes.
Warren Kinsella, a former special assistant to Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, said opposition to the war in some cases reflects ideology rather than security realities.
“Kent is an example of that,” Kinsella said. “The war is defensible on any number of grounds… the fact that Iran is the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism. This was the right thing to do.”
He added that Kent’s past associations had long raised concerns.
“Kent had long had associations with white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups,” he said. “He was widely seen as a national security risk and only got through Senate scrutiny by the skin of his teeth.”
As head of the National Counterterrorism Center, Kent oversaw the agency responsible for analyzing terrorist threats – making his assertion that Iran posed no imminent danger particularly consequential.