Senior Iranian lawmaker says Europe ‘hanging onto the US’ in snapback move


The head of Iran’s parliamentary national security and foreign policy commission said the activation of the UN snapback mechanism by European powers would not affect the country’s strategic calculations.
“Snapback has no impact on the equation,” Ebrahim Azizi said on Saturday, according to Fars News Agency.
“Europe is hanging onto the United States and lacks the capacity to push its own agenda,” he said. “They are trying to spread fear in Iran through media pressure, but we should not pay attention to this noise.”
Azizi added that Western powers imposed wide-ranging sanctions during the nuclear deal and failed to lift them despite their commitments. “Snapback plays no real role in this situation,” he said.
He said the commission and parliament would meet next week to discuss the issue and make a decision based on national interests.
The hardliner Kayhan newspaper, funded by Iran's Supreme Leader, called on Tehran to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after European powers moved to trigger the UN snapback mechanism.
“Europe shamelessly activated the snapback mechanism to hammer the final nail into the JCPOA’s coffin,” the paper wrote. “Iran’s response is just one sentence: withdrawal from the NPT.”
It added that such a move would be “a heavy slap that will upend not just US and European calculations, but the entire balance of power in the region.” Remaining in the treaty, it said, “means mocking national independence and insulting the Iranian people.”
Aday after three European states triggered a UN mechanism that reimposes international sanctions on Iran, the move appeared to wrongfoot Tehran's establishment despite months of warnings.
Iran's new Security Chief, Ali Larijani, seemed to misread the immediacy of the threat in an interview days before the diplomatic setback.
In an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's official website on August 22, Larijani insisted that China and Russia could shield Iran against the snapback threat.
"This issue is currently under review domestically, and as far as I know, some countries are making efforts to negotiate in order to prevent it from happening. Russia and China also hold a different position. They're acting as obstacles."

A day after three European states triggered a UN mechanism that reimposes international sanctions on Iran, the move appeared to wrongfoot Tehran's establishment despite months of warnings.
Iran's new Security Chief, Ali Larijani, seemed to misread the immediacy of the threat in an interview days before the diplomatic setback.
In an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's official website on August 22, Larijani insisted that China and Russia could shield Iran against the snapback threat.
"This issue is currently under review domestically, and as far as I know, some countries are making efforts to negotiate in order to prevent it from happening. Russia and China also hold a different position. They're acting as obstacles."
Larijani is a seasoned politician, but less savvy figures, including state-appointed Friday prayer leaders, also contributed to the confusion with their remarks.
In Shiraz, Friday Prayers imam Lotfollah Dejkam offered a revisionist take on world history, saying: "Europeans have been defeated by Iran several times, and they are likely to experience an even bigger defeat as a result of the snapback."
Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday Prayers Imam of Mashhad, appeared to downplay the seriousness of the likely economic pain due to be wrought by sanctions.
Iranians, he said, who rushed to capital markets to buy gold and foreign currency in anticipation of further devaluation of the Iranian rial were "simpletons."
Many commentators questioned the leadership's broader understanding of the nuclear deal and the international frameworks governing it.
Among the critics was Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, former head of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, who condemned fellow politicians for their impulsive reactions.
In a post on X, he specifically addressed members of parliament who had tabled a triple-urgency motion calling on the Islamic Republic to exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ironically, despite attaching the highest urgency label to the bill, lawmakers postponed its discussion until Saturday, as Friday is a public holiday in Iran.
"Exiting NPT, closing Strait of Hormuz and producing an atomic bomb! For years, the nation has been paying the price for the nonsense you still repeat on (state TV)," Falahatpisheh wrote.
"You believed your own nonsense, which has prevented any rationality and initiative to get out of the deadlocks," he added.
Meanwhile, the promise of diplomatic roads not taken was examined anew.
In an interview with the Entekhab website, Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former President Hassan Rouhani, revealed that during Rouhani's final days in office, he had asked his successor, President Ebrahim Raisi, to allow him to broker a deal with the United States to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement.
According to Vaezi, Raisi insisted on reviving the agreement under his own administration. Rouhani argued that even if his government signed the deal, the revenue from oil sales would benefit the incoming government.
Nonetheless, Raisi rejected the proposal, and negotiations with the United States ran aground.
"Under the hammer of snapback, with Moscow's shield broken and Beijing resigned, Khamenei may, like Khomeini before him, bow to survive," Iranian academic and political analyst Shahram Kholdi wrote in his latest piece for Iran International.
"He could proclaim a volte-face: accept spontaneous inspections anywhere in Iran; relocate enrichment to a consortium abroad—in the United Arab Emirates or Qatar—or cede it wholly to Russia," the piece reads.

The sands of time fall swiftly through the glass, and with each passing day the Islamic Republic of Iran is borne closer to the fateful hour: 18 October 2025, when a 2015 nuclear deal finally expires.
What was once heralded as a diplomatic triumph—a landmark nuclear agreement that promised peace in our time—now stands battered, its legal scaffolding trembling beneath the weight of defiance, duplicity and exhaustion.
In these waning weeks, the world confronts a choice of historic consequence. Shall sanctions be restored, snapping back with the force of law? Will diplomacy, extended yet again, provide a further lease on life to a faltering compact? Or will events-military, political, or economic overtake deliberation and hurl the region into crisis?
To speak plainly: snapback is no illusion. Contrary to misreporting, there is no "30-day prerequisite" before the mechanism may be activated.
The Council requires no incubation period. Once a party files notification of "significant non-performance," the thirty-day clock begins. Unless a fresh resolution is passed, the sanctions of a bygone decade automatically return-immediately, inexorably and beyond veto.
Europe's gambit
The E3—Britain, France and Germany—have already pulled the lever. In their formal notice, they declared Iran to be in "significant non-performance" of its obligations. This, procedurally, is the point of no return.
Unless Moscow can secure nine votes for its draft, and unless Washington refrains from veto, the sanctions of yesteryear will rise again like specters.
For Europe, this is both an act of law and of frustration. Years of oscillation—inspectors expelled, enrichment concealed, commitments broken-have eroded the credibility of diplomacy.
The E3, once patient custodians of compromise, now stand as executioners of its failure.
Moscow's shield, Beijing's hedge
Earlier last week, before E3 notify the UN of their intention to "trigger the snapback à la UNSCR 2231", Russia and China had already stepped into the breach by a draft resolution to extend October 18, 2025, expiry date of UNSCR 2231.
Moscow's draft resolution, tabled before the Security Council, proposes a six-month extension of 2231 to April 2026, granting Tehran a stay of execution.
It is a tactical gambit: stall the clock, suspend deliberation and deny Europe the satisfaction of reimposed sanctions. For Russia, it is one more lever in its great game against the West, wielding Iran as both pawn and partner.
China, ever cautious, has lent its support. Beijing's foreign ministry denounces snapback and extols dialogue, yet behind closed doors its diplomats speak with candor.
If Moscow's extension fails, they admit, China may be resigned to the automatic return of sanctions. For all its rhetoric, Beijing is loath to be cast as breaker of the Council's law. In this careful hedging lies recognition: once triggered, snapback is a machine that runs of itself.
Khamenei's defiance
In Tehran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei responded with thunder. In a speech days ago, he rejected outright the prospect of direct negotiations with the United States, branding the dispute "unsolvable."
He warned that Israel, ever the adversary, may seize the moment to again strike Iranian facilities. His words were defiance clothed as prophecy, meant to steel his people and to warn his foes.
Yet, however loud the thunder, the storm advances. Sanctions gnaw at Iran's economy. The rial buckles. Inflation devours. To millions of Iranians, Khamenei's words are less shield than sentence.
Even as the Leader railed, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors returned to Iran for the first time in months, resuming limited work at Bushehr. It was no great opening: they were kept from Fordow, Natanz and other contested sites.
But it was something. Director General Rafael Grossi hailed the step as "an early indication of progress," though with Churchillian caution: "full cooperation," he warned, "remains a work in progress".
Iran presented the move as magnanimity; parliamentarians denounced it as betrayal. Yet the fact remains: Tehran, sensing peril, cracked open the door.
The transformation ultimatum
There is yet a more radical road. Under the hammer of snapback, with Moscow's shield broken and Beijing resigned, Khamenei may, like Khomeini before him, bow to survive.
He could proclaim a volte-face: accept spontaneous inspections anywhere in Iran; relocate enrichment to a consortium abroad—in the United Arab Emirates or Qatar—or cede it wholly to Russia.
The Leader could pledge compliance with the Financial Action Task Force and thereby grant external auditors full access to Tehran's banking system.
Khamenei might even agree to dismantle the Revolutionary Guards, curtail ballistic missiles and drones and to watch, powerless, as Lebanon advances toward the disarmament of Hezbollah and Iraq presses its own militias into submission.
Already Israeli strikes on Iran's allies in Yemen, with senior Houthi officials reported killed.
Were all this to unfold, Iran would face not mere concession, but transformation. A kleptocratic, hybrid theocracy would be stripped of its praetorian guard, its financial opacity and its regional claws.
History shows that regimes so hollowed seldom survive. This, then, would be snapback not as sanction, but as sentence.





