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ANALYSIS

Another year ends with the erosion of Iran’s governing institutions

Behrouz Turani
Behrouz Turani

Iran International

Mar 20, 2025, 09:05 GMT+0Updated: 08:48 GMT+0

The Iranian year 1403, which ended on March 20, saw the further weakening of major state institutions as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tightened his grip over a network of overlapping bodies, some of which he created himself.

Nonetheless, while the weakening of state institutions, including the parliament and the presidency, has largely succeeded, it does not mean Khamenei rules unchallenged.

As the country’s economy sinks deeper into crisis, many challenges come from within his own conservative camp, where critics—often quietly—hold him responsible for the system’s failures, referring to him indirectly as the "political system."

Throughout the year, Iran struggled with a broken economy and the looming threat of political unrest. Gas and electricity shortages have plagued both industries and households for months, while officials warn of an impending water crisis. Meanwhile, the US dollar has doubled in value against the rial. Most Iranians now see Khamenei as the primary figure responsible for these crises.

With the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May 2024—widely seen as appointed rather than elected—the Islamic Republic’s leader had to find another obedient aide to serve as a silent partner in governing. But the new president proved to be even more obedient than Khamenei expected.

Rescued from disqualification by the Guardian Council at Khamenei’s behest, he has repeatedly acknowledged that he would not be president without the Supreme Leader’s favor. He has gone even further, openly stating that he has no independent plans or platform and will simply implement Khamenei’s vision for the country.

In a recent example, he told parliament that while he initially supported negotiations with the United States over Tehran’s nuclear program, he opposed them as soon as Khamenei dismissed the idea. “It is as simple as that,” he explained.

The Iranian parliament (Majles), shaped by Khamenei and the Guardian Council in its two most recent elections, was engineered to ensure an overwhelming majority of hardline conservatives. The Guardian Council disqualified nearly all moderate and pro-reform candidates as part of what former Majles Speaker Ali Larijani described as "political purification."

Under both Raisi and Pezeshkian, key decisions on critical issues, including the annual budget and contentious matters like the compulsory hijab bill, were made by the heads of the three branches of government or the Supreme Council of National Security, rather than the Majles. Government insiders often criticize the parliament as "illiterate and inefficient."

The Assembly of Experts, tasked with selecting the next Supreme Leader, has been effectively sidelined, as a three-member committee reporting exclusively to Khamenei now secretly vets candidates for his consideration alone.

Meanwhile, the council’s deputy chief, Ahmad Khatami, was stripped of his privileges for violating unwritten rules set by Khamenei.

The Guardian Council's decisions have also been occasionally overturned by Khamenei himself, allowing disqualified candidates such as Mostafa Moein, Mohsen Mehr Alizadeh, and Massoud Pezeshkian to run for president.

The Expediency Council has become so ineffective and paralyzed by intimidation that it has failed to issue a verdict on approving laws meant to improve Iran’s compliance with international regulation against money laundering.

For years, Khamenei has not publicly assigned it any new responsibilities, instead making all key decisions himself.

Until five years ago, when these institutions functioned with a degree of quasi-efficiency, some Western observers described Iran’s system as resembling a democracy. Today, such a characterization is no longer plausible. Iran’s political landscape is now "unique" for all the wrong reasons.

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