64-Year-Old Protester In Iran Sentenced To Public Hanging For 'Insulting Prophet'

While the government does its best to downplay the impact of sanctions for Iran's nuclear program, and more recently, its support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and human rights abuses, the deputy head of the Joint Chamber of Commerce of Iran and India, admitted that "following the intensification of sanctions, trade relations between Iran and India have diminished".

It was an understatement however, with Iran reporting that trade in 2023 was down 26 percent from 2022, from $2.5b to $1.8. India's exports to Iran for the period of January to December 2023 decreased by 35 percent to $1.2b, down from $1.8b.

Rice emerged as the primary export product from India to Iran in 2023. However, rice exports from India to Iran experienced a decline of 34 percent in 2023, dropping from $2b in 2022 to $723m.

In a statement released by India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry, it was reported that the total trade volume between Iran and India reached $1.8 billion in 2023. This marked a decrease of 26 percent from the previous year, which recorded a trade volume of $2.5 billion in 2022.

China, the UAE, Iraq, Turkey, and India are Iran's primary trade partners. Except for the UAE which primarily re-exports Iranian goods, the remaining four partners significantly reduced their imports of Iranian goods in 2023. China, for example, decreased its imports of Iranian non-oil products by 28 percent to $4.6b, while its exports to Iran increased by 8.6 percent to over $10b, according to China's Customs statistics.

China hasn’t taken any direct Iranian oil since 2020 and doesn’t acknowledge any Iranian oil imports in its customs statistics. But according to Kpler’s data, seen by Iran International, Chinese independent small refineries, called teapots, imported about 1.2 million barrels per day of Iran’s crude oil and gas condensate, re-branded mostly as Malaysian oil.

Turkey's Statistics Center also reported a 33 percent decline in imports from Iran last year, largely due to a reduction in natural gas imports. Turkey has drastically reduced its Iranian gas imports since July 2023, with average daily imports declining by 67 percent year-on-year to 10 million cubic meters.

This year, the death anniversary of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first Shiite imam – which changes every year according to the lunar calendar -- also falls on April 1, prompting the Islamic government to try to prevent dancing and merry-making by millions of people on Sizdah Bedar. In addition to Imam Ali's death anniversary, it is still Ramadan when it is forbidden to eat and drink during daytime.

While governors and local police in several provinces have announced closure of parks and recreational areas on the spring picnic day, the Interior Ministry has denied any official directive for such restrictions. However, during Ramadan, Iranians, including those exempt from fasting, are required to abstain from eating, drinking, and smoking in public, even if they are inside their cars.

On Saturday, the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) news agency, cited the Interior Ministry as saying that all parks, public gardens, and recreational areas would be closed on Sizdah Bedar due to the death anniversary of the first Shiite Imam and the "sanctity" of the month of Ramadan.

Last year, authorities closed parks and blocked roads to northern forests and other locations where people traditionally picnic on this day, but videos posted on social media showed huge crowds singing and dancing despite the restrictions and even chasing away the government-sponsored vigilantes from their picnic grounds. 

Local authorities in several provinces, including East Azarbaijan, Yazd, Qazvin, Mazandaran, Golestan and Gilan, have announced that parks are closed to the public until sunset, when people are allowed to eat and drink. For instance, Mehdi Amadeh, the prosecutor of Dezful in Khuzestan province, announced the establishment of "patrol and inspection teams" to deal with people he described as "norm-breakers" on Sizdah Bedar.

The IRIB also reported that museums and historical sites under the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts would also be closed.

However, several hours after the report was published, other state-run media outlets quoted Majid Mirahmadi, the Deputy Interior Minister for Security, as denying the closures.

It is unclear whether the Interior Ministry has actually made a decision about park closures or if they are avoiding public responsibility for the decision previously communicated to provincial authorities.

This is not the first time park closures on Sizdah Bedar have become a source of contention between the regime and the people. For over four decades since the early years of the Islamic Republic, the religious autocracy has opposed the celebration of ancient festivals, including the Persian New Year Norouz and Sizdah Bedar. Instead, they have sought to substitute them with Islamic calendar events such as Eid al-Fitr, Eid ul-Adha, Mab’ath (the beginning of the Prophet Muhammad’s mission), and the birthdays of the Prophet and Shiite Imams.

However, despite warnings and threats every year, the regime reluctantly tolerates some of the country’s ancient festivals such as the New Year and other occasions such as Sizdah Bedar due to their extreme popularity. Nevertheless, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 it renamed Sizdah Bedar as Nature Day because the religious establishment particularly opposed the “superstition” implied by it. 'Sizdah Bedar' means good-riddance to the 13th day after Norouz.

Most Iranians, even many religious families, however, have not forsaken their beloved ancient festivals and continue to celebrate them, sometimes even alongside religious occasions.

The government's attempt to regulate public conduct clashes with the public's yearning to uphold cultural identity and embrace traditional liberties, transforming a mere picnic on Sizdah Bedar into an act of civil disobedience.

According to an audio file sent by an Iran International viewer, “The Islamic Republic wants to take away the joy of the Iranian people by any means necessary. But we will use even the smallest places to celebrate Sizdah Bedar.”

Yaser Jabraili, the head of the Center for Strategic Supervision of the Expediency Discernment Council, highlighted President Ebrahim Raisi's administration's apparent lack of intent to alter its course, officially speaking of an exchange rate of 1,000,000 rials per dollar.

“What caused concern is that Raisi's government has no intention to change direction and officially speaks of 1000,000 rials per dollar.”

A recent report from Iran's state news agency, IRNA, underscored the dire situation, projecting an alarming trajectory for the exchange rate. According to IRNA, if the current monthly growth trend of 4% persists, the value of the dollar could exceed 1,000,000 rials in the near term, escalating to 1,300,000 rials by March 2025 and a staggering 2 million by March 2026.

Iran's economy has long grappled with persistent inflation exacerbated by international sanctions and domestic economic mismanagement. Restricted access to global markets has led to shortages of essential goods and currency devaluation. Last week, the Iranian rial plunged to a record low of 613,500 to the dollar, coinciding with celebrations for the Persian New Year.

The depreciation of the Iranian rial has had profound repercussions, eroding the life savings of many citizens. Since the signing of the nuclear accord in 2015, the rial's value has plummeted drastically, with inflation rates soaring. Discrepancies in official inflation figures have added to the uncertainty surrounding Iran's economic outlook, with the government's Statistics Center and Central Bank reporting conflicting data.

According to the IRNA state news agency, a "morality police officer" was hospitalized after an attack on Friday evening in Hamedan, allegedly suffering "severe injuries".

On Saturday, in Esfahan Province, another hijab enforcement agent was "assaulted" in Naghsh-e Jahan Square. Several businesses were shut down after the incident which went viral on social media.

Widespread public defiance of hijab underway since 2022 was sparked by the death in morality police custody of Mahsa Amini, who suffered severe head injuries after her arrest for 'improper' wearing of the mandatory hijab. Since then, hundreds of thousands of women have discarded their hijab in defiance as women demand the right to choose their own clothing.

Verbal and physical altercations have since been on the rise as the state continues to expand the morality police patrols amid the mass rebellion, citizens fighting back against the Islamic Republic's theocratic rulings.

Women have been barred from public spaces, education and work places for refusing to wear the Islamic dress code, businesses closed and as a result, state surveillance, both overt and covert, has become ever more repressive.

While Iran boasts having the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, its production capacity has consistently fallen short of meeting escalating demand in recent years, especially during peak periods such as winter.

Historically, Iran has played a pivotal role in providing vital natural gas to fulfill Iraq's energy requirements, particularly for powering electricity generation.

Yet, a notable decrease in the supply of natural gas from Iran has exacerbated Iraq’s own energy crisis – with the country’s electricity output significantly lagging behind its increasing demand currently at 35 gigawatts.

While several multibillion-dollar contracts were signed with power giants by Iraq since 2008, efforts to address the crisis have largely failed, with corruption, mismanagement, and political interference leading to significant losses in investment.

Siemens and American General Electric (GE) are positioned to dominate the sector, leveraging partnerships with Iraqi interests.

South Pars field and Iran’s underperformance

The South Pars field – the world's largest natural gas field – is crucial for Iran's economy as it provides a substantial portion of the country's natural gas production.

The field, located in the Persian Gulf between Iran and Qatar, is also exposing Iranian officials’ underperformance in developing it in contrast to Qatar Petroleum.

Qatar has been extracting gas from South Pars since 1990, a decade ahead of Iran, and has produced nearly double the amount of gas from the field.

Meanwhile, based on its own estimates, Iran is expected to elevate its numbers over the next five years – from 1.07 billion cubic meters per day to 1.3 billion cubic meters (bcm). However, such official claims often remain unrealized due to financial and technological constraints.

Iran is currently under a myriad of US and Western sanctions over its contentious nuclear program and confrontational foreign policy. Western energy giants are the only ones with the technology and resources to help boost Iran’s gas and oil production.

Officials, under pressure to increase production, claim that projects like the Kish gas field development, Farzad-B gas field cooperation, and ongoing development in the North Pars and Bilal gas fields are aimed to significantly increase Iran's daily gas output.

The head of Pars Oil and Gas Company, Mohammad Hossein Motejalli, has stated that initial development efforts aimed at enhancing gas production in Iran will result in an output equivalent to five standard phases of the South Pars gas field by 2027.

But, the South Pars field is reaching the latter stages of its productive lifespan. And, as the pressure in the field decreases, it becomes more challenging for Iran to maintain its capacity to supply natural gas for its domestic needs and to Iraq over the long term.

Unless Iran takes action to address the production and pressure issues within the South Pars field, its ability to sustain natural gas shipments to Iraq will be compromised.

Iraq, however, is not the only neighbor to influence the regional energy landscape.

Turkmenistan's capability and willingness to provide natural gas to Iraq through a swap agreement with Tehran introduce an additional dimension to the competition within the energy market of the region.

Sanctions exacerbate Tehran's underperformance

Iran’s existing challenges in its relationship with Iraq are further complicated due to payment methods restricted by US sanctions.

These sanctions have made it difficult for Iran to receive payments from Iraq for its oil exports, prompting discussions about alternative payment arrangements.

The recent agreement to exchange Iranian natural gas for Iraqi crude oil and fuel oil represents a strategic shift to bypass these financial constraints, ensuring the continuous flow of energy supplies between the two countries and strengthening their economic ties.

Despite Iran’s own technological challenges, underperformance, regional tensions and sanctions, Tehran hopes to grasp and hold on to its efforts to sustain energy cooperation with Iraq.

Far from flawless, Iran's gas promise to Iraq serves Tehran’s strategic aims beyond mere revenue generation: attempting to secure its regional influence by desperately trying to remain competitive by influencing energy dynamics.