Iran's Attorney General Calls For Stricter Enforcement Of Ramadan Rules

Energy analyst Morteza Behrouzifar highlighted that it would harm Iraq to continue with the project. “Iraq currently enjoys access to global facilities, financial resources, and major international companies, whereas Iran faces limitations due to sanctions,” he said amid Iran's sanctions for its nuclear program, human rights abuses and support of Russia's war on Ukraine.

He noted that Iran's restricted access to global facilities, financial resources, and major international companies due to sanctions severely impedes progress.

A major deal was signed with Iraq last week to develop six oil fields in the south and west of the country, just a week after entering into $20bn contracts to boost pressure in the South Pars gas field.

According to Shana News Agency, the upstream deals with local private firms, worth more than $13bn in investment, are aimed at expanding Iran’s crude output, which stands at 3.45mn barrels per day.

The oil fields include Azadegan and Masjed Soleyman in southern Khuzestan province, Azar in western Ilam province, and Sumar, Saman, and Delavaran in western Kermanshah province.

Oil Minister Javad Owji said the contracts would add up to 400,000 more barrels to Iran’s daily crude output.

Meanwhile, recent developments in Iran's oil industry have raised questions about domestic capabilities. The Iranian oil ministry's $11.5 billion contract with 11 domestic firms, spearheaded by Advand Azadegan Company, has drawn scrutiny due to the latter's limited track record in oil exploration and extraction.

Iran's oil industry is in the midst of a crisis as approximately 80% of its active oil fields are in the latter stages of their life cycle, experiencing productivity declines. To mitigate this, Iran requires substantial gas injection, but shortages hamper efforts, with only a fraction of the required volume being injected daily.

But with his memoir published in Persian in Tehran, The Depth of Patience (or The Audacity of Resilience), former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif seeks to do much more than that.

Zarif – whose role as Minister was really an illusion – tries to draw an effective and decisive case for the role of the Foreign Ministry. All the while, he was never part of the real game.

In an interview with the Jamaran website in Tehran, Zarif says that he was never seen as an "insider" and that he was considered "to be on his way out" from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and that is why, he claims, the employees of the ministry did not click the like button for his tweets.

Zarif was often left out of key foreign policy developments, such as during Bashar al-Assad's controversial trip to Iran in 2019, or he was left in the dark about Iran’s attack on the Ain al-Assad US base. At the same time, the Iraqi prime minister had prior knowledge of the attack, while he remained in the dark.

In his memoir, he fails to say what his master plan was – or even what his tenure achieved in eight years, during which millions of dollars of Iranian resources were squandered on numerous foreign trips.

He could have said that improving relations with the West and easing the burdens of the people are not possible within the confines of the current regime – and that the Iranian people have no choice but to overthrow it. But, steadfast in his loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he did not dare to do so.

In his writings, Zarif consistently portrays himself as unaware of the purpose for which he was chosen: He was picked not for his capabilities, skill in deception or even being a good liar – but, because he could spearhead a lobbying effort in America to sell the idea of a peaceful nature of the nuclear program.

Zarif was chosen to champion the JCPOA at a crucial juncture when the regime sought European involvement on the issue, to advance its own regional expansion agenda. All the while, Khamenei and the IRGC harbored distrust toward him. For this reason, ambassadors to regional countries were appointed not by him, but by Qassem Soleimani.

Illusions of success

Zarif's eight-year tenure was nothing short of a glaring failure in foreign policy and diplomacy, with the regime’s nuclear program, terrorism, and expansionism setting the stage for this dismal outcome.

One prominent example showcasing his foreign policy shortcomings, and indicative of his limited authority, occurred in 2016.

Just months after the nuclear deal was agreed on, attacks on the Saudi missions in Iran undermined then-President Hassan Rouhani and shattered any illusion of moderation in Iran's foreign policy. Orchestrated by so-called hardliners, the attacks signaled to the West that Khamenei’s nefarious agenda would continue – deal or no deal.

Despite the Rouhani administration's alleged intention to de-escalate tensions with the West, after the failure of political reforms by the reformists, and to foster better foreign relations – by the end of Zarif’s eight-year term, there were no tangible achievements to show for his efforts.

The most important delicate waste

To sweep his lack of success under the rug, Zarif chooses to sidestep crucial matters in his book and focuses solely on peripheral issues.

One way Zarif infamously justified his abysmal record is by using the phrase "we chose ourselves" – a phrase that shifts the responsibility for the choices made by the Islamic Republic, along with its policies and programs, onto the people indefinitely. This particular statement has long angered Iranian dissidents, who argue that there was a revolution 45 years ago with the intention of creating a more democratic country, but clerics steered the new regime towards a dictatorship. Even if a choice was made in 1979, people have a right to demand change after four decades.

In his book, he changes the content of his baseless phrase; Choosing it as a title (TDP, p. 27) he instead discusses idealism and realism in foreign policy – irrelevant to the context of the original meaning of his statement.

While the title of Zarif’s book aims to highlight his purported patience and perseverance, the only areas where the former Minister demonstrated such traits were in deception, manipulating the public, covering up misdeeds, and self-promotion before Ali Khamenei and IRGC commanders.

Two key challenges

As a diplomat who claims the art of persuasion and justification, Zarif faced two significant challenges during his tenure, wherein his success was notably lacking.

The first involved maintaining regular relations with Ali Khamenei, necessitating the balance of praising the Supreme Leader while disliking his Russophile policy.

In this context, he demonstrates his allegiance to Khamenei by portraying him as a servant of the nation and the country, asserting, "The cornerstone of the Leader's approach to foreign policy has always been grounded in honor." (TDP, p. 101)

Then, he defines honor, stating, "He is exceedingly vigilant and meticulous regarding the constitution, prioritizing national dignity and thwarting any attempts by foreign powers to exert dominance over the Islamic Republic." (ibid.) Zarif refutes assertions portraying the Leader as a revolutionary, which imply a disregard for international regulations.

In the case of the IRGC's downing of Ukrainian Flight PS752 in 2020 and the regime's initial three-day denial of responsibility, Zarif once again attempts to deceive the reader.

Zarif tries to present himself as a brave and expedient person in deception and concealment and complains that he was not allowed to "cure" (justify and trowel) the issue. (TDP, p. 139)

Years after leaving office, Zarif is still trying to wash his own hands and absolve himself of any responsibility.

According to reports by Halvash, Captain Mohammad Mehdi Nejatinia, the commander of a border guard group stationed in Mirjaveh, was shot in the head.

Despite efforts to transfer him to medical facilities, he succumbed to his injuries, added Halvash, which reports incidents in Baluch regions.

The incident adds to a concerning trend of armed attacks targeting government forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province. Last night, clashes between a group of armed men and military forces were reported in the Roodak region of Khash County and Gosht region of Saravan county.

While the extent of casualties remains unknown, the region has been a hotspot for clashes between Iranian security forces and militant ethnic Baloch separatist organizations advocating for enhanced rights for the Baluch minority.

Jaish al-Adl, one such militant group, has been involved in numerous assaults on Iranian security forces in the province.

The incident underscores the ongoing challenges faced by authorities in maintaining security in Sistan and Baluchestan province, which has witnessed several violent episodes in recent months.

Earlier incidents, including the assault on a police station in the village of Shuru near Zahedan on January 25, and an armed attack on a checkpoint near Rask on January 10 which led to the loss of life of at least one law enforcement officer, emphasize the growing violence in the area.

The documents, made public by Soltani, reveal that on December 10, in a notary office in Niavaran, northern Tehran, Sedighi sold a garden owned by a seminary for approximately 65 billion rials in cash (equivalent to over $100,000).

Sedighi, considered close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, faces allegations of involvement in acquiring a 4,200-square-meter garden in northern Tehran through a family company. The property, estimated to be worth around $20 million, was reportedly transferred from the seminary to the family company, which includes Sedighi and his sons among its members. Other individuals close to Sedighi, such as his daughter-in-law and his security chief, also hold positions within the company established in June 2023.

The disclosure of the new documents contradicts Sedighi's earlier denial of involvement, where he claimed ignorance of the company's establishment and accused a former associate of forgery. 

Sedighi's case is not isolated, recent years uncovering allegations of corruption involving other trusted figures, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda.

Critics demand accountability from the country's supreme leader for those he appoints, emphasizing the need for transparency and integrity within the regime's institutions. Moreover, some within the clergy have expressed concerns over the potential damage to the reputation of clerics as a result of such revelations, already under fire amidst a nationwide uprising sparked in 2022 as Iranians reject the clerical regime.

Reza Alijani, a reform-minded religious-nationalist political observer, penned a Persian article for Iran International suggesting that the new Iranian year, beginning on March 20, is poised to be characterized by "chaos and disillusionment in the upper echelons and challenge and erosion in the lower depths" of Iranian society.

Alijani asserts that with the increasing empowerment of radical forces, the social sphere is unlikely to open up; instead, more restrictions may be imposed to suppress militant women opposing the compulsory hijab rule.

Moreover, the ongoing battle between dissatisfied youths and the rigid minority opposing modern lifestyles is expected to persist. Alijani suggests that beneath the surface, public dissent simmers, poised to erupt fueled by frustration over declining livelihoods and resentment toward the lifestyle promoted by hardliners.

Within the government, as the new parliament convenes in the summer, internal strife is expected to intensify. This year, preparations for the upcoming presidential election in 2025 will also commence, further fueling chaos and infighting among the upper echelons of power.

Simultaneously, a complex chess game will unfold among clerics and politicians, shaping the landscape for succession and the post-Khamenei era of the Islamic Republic.

Additionally, Alijani predicts that foreign-based opposition groups will become more radical, while there may also be opportunities for moderates to emerge. This could pave the way for the establishment of an efficient democracy after a transitional period.

Reformist commentator Abbas Abdi characterized the new year as the last opportunity for the regime to come to its senses and begin a process to bring the country to cohesion and progress. The new year, he wrote in Tehran’s Etemad newspaper, marks the need for the government to wake up and accept to bring about or surrender to changes in domestic and foreign policies, as well as in the economy.

In his commentary headlined as "Year of reforms, Year of Awakening," Abdi wrote that "last year was the end of dreams and wishful thinking and the new year is an opportunity for awakening and change.” He added that although the current wishful thinking in the government based on illusions was once tried under the Ahmadinejad administration in the2010s, toward the end of that period even hardliners looked forward to its end.

The new wave of ultraconservatism which started in 2021 by the coming to power of Ebrahim Raisi as President was marked by a surge in "political purification". It is now evident that this process will never end. The new ultraconservatives refused to take a lesson from the fate of their predecessors, but the latest low-turnout elections in Iran should be proof got them that without changing their ways, everyone can drown in an unpredictable storm.

Abdi expressed the belief that hardliners have now realized that political purification cannot help materialize the unrealistic promises they made at the beginning of their government. Now the people have lost all hope and trust in the government and its promises.

However, knowing the Iranian regime, the idea of an awakening is more out of reach than ever. Describing the grim situation, Massoud Pezeshkian, an MP from Tabriz, told Rouydad24 website: "I have no answers for the people's questions. Every morning they wake up to higher prices. Slightly more than a year is remaining from the lifetime of this government. What has it done for the people so far? Rising prices are breaking the people's back and I have no answer for their questions."