The crew of an unflagged ship allegedly smuggling missile parts to Houthi rebels were talking by satellite phone to Revolutionary Guard members, according to an FBI affidavit.
The revelation comes as the captain and three other men from the dhow are due to appear in a federal court in Virginia on Tuesday.
The vessel was intercepted by US naval forces in January in the Arabian Sea amid continuing Houthi attacks on shipping in the region. Two American Navy SEALs drowned in the operation.
The captain, Pakistani national Muhammad Pahlawan, refused to slow the ship when the US Navy began its boarding attempt.
Instead he “shouted for the crew to burn the boat before the Navy could board it,” according to court documents filed in the federal court in Richmond.
Upon searching the vessel, US forces seized Iranian-made weaponry consistent with Houthi attacks, marking the first confiscation of such weapons since the current series of attacks on shipping began in November.
“Initial analysis indicates these same weapons have been employed by the Houthis to threaten and attack innocent mariners,” an FBI agent wrote, quoting Central Command.
Crew members were in communication with a member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard via satellite phone, according to the FBI.
Pahlawan and the other crew membesr, Mohammad Mazhar, Ghufran Ullah, and Izhar Muhammad, face charges of attempting to smuggle missile components and providing false information. They are accused of misleading authorities about the ship's origin and cargo.
Prosecutors are expected to push for their detention without bond.
Their legal representatives have yet to comment on the case. A further 10 crew members are being detained as material witnesses under federal law.
Iran sponsors the Houthis, providing funding, weapons, and even direct support on the ground. While Iranian officials claim the Houthis operate independently, recent events suggest Iran can influence their actions, as seen in Syria and Iraq.
When questioned about the absence of clerics on his candidate list for Tehran, Ali Motahhari, a former deputy speaker of the Majles (parliament) and current candidate, responded candidly. He explained, "There was no deliberate exclusion of clerics from our list. However, among the nominated clerics, we couldn't find anyone who would add more depth or interest to our lineup."
Motahhari, the son of Morteza Motahhari, a prominent ideologue of the Islamic Republic and a cleric himself, has long been known as a staunch defender of the regime's policies, including obligatory hijab. However, he has recognized a notable shift in the preferences of voters participating in the sham elections, indicating a declining demand for clerical representation in parliament.
The diminishing support for clerics as parliamentary representatives has been a persistent trend in the Islamic Republic over the years. In the early years of the regime, during the first Majles (1980-1984), over 50 percent of the seats were occupied by clerics.
However, this proportion dwindled significantly to just 5.5% (16 out of 290 seats) in the tenth Majles (2016-2020). This decline has been evident irrespective of whether the majority voted for the reformist or principlist camp or how the Guardian Council handled candidate disqualifications.
Why is this phenomenon occurring in a regime where clerics hold significant sway in politics and are pervasive throughout society? Several social trends may shed light on the declining representation of clerics in parliament.
Firstly, government incompetence plays a significant role. Across various facets of life, public services and infrastructure development have faltered and deteriorated. According to a confidential survey conducted by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture in 2023, a staggering 73 percent of Iranians, in a confidential survey conducted by the government, expressed the view that clerics should retreat to their mosques and relinquish their involvement in government affairs.
This marked a notable increase from about 31 percent recorded in 2015. This shift in public sentiment has been a gradual trend within Iranian society spanning over four decades.
Another trend is the de-Islamization of society. Despite the regime's efforts to enforce Islamic practices through incentives and penalties, society has moved in the opposite direction.
The Mahsa Movement of 2022 can be seen as a national and social response to the stringent imposition of Sharia law in the public sphere. Iranians are holding Shia clerics accountable for these stringent regulations and oppressions, and as a result, they advocate for reduced clerical influence in the government.
The third trend involves the gradual erosion of public trust in Shia clerics. Prior to the 1979 Revolution, clerics enjoyed some of the highest levels of public trust compared to other societal groups. However, according to the same confidential survey, approximately 56 percent of respondents now express little to no trust in the clergy, while about 25 percent still hold some level of trust in them. Another 18 percent fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Even in Qom, the primary base of Shia clerics, 51 percent of individuals exhibit limited or very limited trust in this group. This marks a significant decline.
On the top of the list for public trust now are physicians by 73 percent and public school teachers by 60 percent.
The fourth trend pertains to an increasing disillusionment with government propaganda permeating every aspect of life. The religious establishment spearheads the government's indoctrination efforts across various sectors including sports, arts, public education, universities, media, and governance. This propaganda campaign, funded by billions of dollars annually allocated to the Shia clergy, has left the public weary of being force-fed such rhetoric.
In response, wherever possible, the public vehemently expresses its disdain for this manipulation. During election periods, this sentiment manifests in two distinct ways: a significant portion of the population opts to abstain from voting altogether, while those who do participate tend to favor non-clerical candidates. Unfortunately, the regime has yet to heed this message.
However, the composition of the Majles, whether predominantly clerical or not, holds little sway over its function within the system governed by the Guardian Jurist. With its oversight powers effectively neutered, the Majles has been relegated to a ceremonial role, while authority lies with 15 councils such as the Expediency Council and Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, which regularly legislate.
Consequently, the dwindling presence of clerics in the Majles has negligible impact on the performance of this beleaguered institution. What truly matters is the shift in public sentiment: not only are people disillusioned with clerics' ability to improve their lives, but they also harbor a conviction that their influence may exacerbate their circumstances.
“Hamas’s main goal is to take Ramadan, with an emphasis on the Temple Mount and Jerusalem, and turn it into the second phase of their plan that began on October 7,” Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant said Tuesday. “This is the main goal of Hamas, it is being amplified by Iran and Hezbollah.”
Ramadan is one of the more sacred times for Muslims, when the community comes together in a month of fasting and prayer. It has often been a time of heightened tensions between Israel and Palestinians who seek access to holy sites come but encounter Israeli restrictions and tightened security measures.
Pro-Palestinian rallies are held in some Muslim countries every year on the last Friday of Ramadan, called Quds Day (after the Arabic name of Jerusalem, al-Quds). Iran has been the main force behind promoting the Quds Day as a symbol of continued opposition to Israel.
Gallant was speaking to Israeli commanders responsible for operations in the West Bank, where Palestinians fuming at Israel’s onslaught on Gaza would likely face unprecedented measures put in place by the most far right government in Israeli history.
Israel’s minister for national security Itamar Ben Gvir is seeking to prevent Palestinians from praying at the Temple Mount during Ramadan. He is even considering a ban on Arab Israeli citizens below the age of 70, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.
Gallant seems to be opposed to such measures on the grounds that it could inflame Palestinian feelings. He warns against “Irresponsible statements from people who are supposed to be responsible,” most likely addressing Ben Gvir. “We must not give Hamas what it has not been able to achieve since the beginning of the war and converge the combat fronts.”
More than a hundred days since Hamas rampaged Israeli border areas, the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions. Thousands of Palestinians have been killed or maimed, although there is no independent exact toll on civilian deaths.
Global trade has been hit by ongoing Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea. And Hezbollah continues to exchange fire with Israeli troops across the border almost on a daily basis. The only good news is that Iran 's proxies in Iraq and Syria have gone quiet after several rounds of US airstrikes in response to the killing of three American soldiers last month.
On Tuesday, Hezbollah announced that it had launched several rockets at an Israeli aerial surveillance base. One day earlier, the Israeli military had struck targets at the Bekaa Valley, more than a 100 km from the Israel-Lebanon border, where most of the attacks have been concentrated.
It was a clear escalation in a conflict where both sides have shown some restraint despite regular attacks and retaliations.
The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, UNIFIL, urged both sides to avoid further escalation, according to Reuters, warning that it had observed a "concerning shift" in the exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is widely believed to be the most powerful non-state actor in the region. It is funded and armed by Iran, reportedly capable of hitting any point in Israel with its vast arsenal of more than a hundred thousand missiles. So far, it has not entered the war, fearing harsh response from Israel perhaps, and is likely to stop its attacks if Israel and Hamas agree to the much-anticipated ceasefire.
The confidential correspondence from Mohammad Mohammadi-Golpaygani, Khamenei’s chief of staff, to Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, dated January 31, 2023, reveals dissatisfaction with the stagnant budget allocation for Khamenei's affiliated entities and organizations in the 2022-2023 budget.
The letter, unveiled by the hackers' group "Ghiyam ta Sarnegouni" (Uprising till Overthrow), a hackers group linked to the opposition People's Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MEK), appeared on their Instagram account last week.
Golpaygani urged parliament to amend and augment the budget for these entities and organizations, such as the Social Security Center of Seminaries, in the upcoming fiscal year (March 21, 2023, to March 20, 2024), citing the need for adjustments in line with inflation, which has been hovering above 40 percent for the past five years. The center oversees payment of benefits and health insurance to unemployed seminary students.
The document is part of a collection the group claims to have obtained by breaching 600 of the parliament's main servers through its Khaneh Mellat (Nation’s Home) News Agency.
In his letter, Golpaygani also called for a separate budget allocation to support a center responsible for addressing accommodation issues among foreign students at Al-Mustafa International University in Qom.
Al-Mustafa International University, a state-funded Shiite seminary under Khamenei's authority, has branches in over fifty countries and annually sponsors hundreds of foreign students from various regions, enabling them to pursue studies in Iran.
In 2020, the university received a budget of nearly 5 trillion rials, approximately $100 million based on the official exchange rate at that time, surpassing the budget of any other university in Iran.
In June 2023, the same hackers' group leaked a document obtained by hacking the presidential office, indicating a 96 percent increase in the previous year's budget for the same center, amidst a significant budget deficit faced by the government.
The budget allocated to a host of religious and propaganda entities under Khamenei’s control as well as the military is often augmented with “contributions” from government bodies, which obscures the total money put at their disposal and their expenditure is usually very untransparent.
The budget bill proposed by the government of President Ebrahim Raisi for the next fiscal year starting March 21, for instance, obligates government banks and companies to allocate one percent of their spendings to “promote the Islamic culture, the [ideology of] martyrdom, [encouragement to] having more children, Quranic affairs, and the media”. The parliament is unlikely to contest or scrape proposed budget.
Salaries and pensions of civil servants and workers and the minimum wage, however, have not increased in tandem with an inflation of over 40 percent in the past few years, leading to great dissatisfaction among ordinary people. Monthly wages for workers and government employees hovers around $120-200, while a family of three needs at least $450 a month to survive.
For the next fiscal year, for instance, the parliament has so far approved an increase of 20 percent in minimum wage against the backdrop of an alarming annual inflation rate nearing 50 percent, the rising US dollar rate which hugely affects prices and consumers’ purchasing power, and the threat of further depreciation in the upcoming fiscal year, starting March 21.