While Iran suffers its worst social and economic unrest since the 1979 revolution, the Kayhan daily, linked to Iran's Supreme Leader, claimed Iran would resemble present-day Saudi Arabia under the Pahlavi monarchy rule.
"Those rejected by the people [the Pahlavi royals] claim that if the Pahlavi government had remained, Iran would have moved towards progress and development, but in the most optimistic scenario, we would have the situation of today's Saudi Arabia," wrote Kayhan.
However, Iranians have led the biggest uprising against the government since the founding of the Islamic Republic since the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom movement, which has been met with brutal suppression by the regime.
Surging executions have seen hundreds of dissidents killed and hundreds of peaceful protesters murdered as the regime struggles to quash dissent and discontent. In the upcoming elections, turnout is expected to reach less than 15 percent.
However, the bizarre comparisons with Saudi Arabia, which last year resumed diplomatic ties with Iran, could only be wished for by the regime which is crippled under international sanctions for its nuclear program, suppression of unrest and most recently, its support of Russia's war on Ukraine.
Over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia's GDP has surged from $200 billion to over $800 billion, fueled largely by robust oil revenues and strategic economic diversification efforts. The kingdom, with its vast petroleum reserves, remains a dominant force in global oil markets and actively pursues initiatives to expand its non-oil sectors and foster employment among its nationals.
Despite possessing considerable oil and gas resources, Iran's GDP has dwindled to under $250 billion, experiencing a significant decline from $480 billion in 2016. Iraq, despite internal challenges, has surpassed Iran's GDP, while even non-oil producing Turkey boasts a GDP surpassing Iran's by over $800 billion.
Iran's economy, characterized by statist policies, faces systemic inefficiencies and a lack of private-sector-led growth. In contrast, Saudi Arabia's concerted efforts towards economic diversification and investment in sectors beyond oil underscore a divergent trajectory from Iran's economic struggles.
The kingdom's strategic initiatives to bolster education, job training, and attract foreign investment stand in stark contrast to Iran's economic challenges, marked by inflation, unemployment, and a persistent brain drain.
A 2022 survey by Netherlands-based Gamaan institute found that 41 percent of respondents wanted the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, exiled prince Reza Pahlavi the most popular alternative to take over.
In contrast to the Kayhan commentary, the royal family is still viewed with fondness. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, overthrown by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, was viewed positively by 64% of respondents.
Firstly, the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement, which operates independently of religious affiliations, renders religious reformism largely irrelevant. Secondly, the impending sham elections scheduled for March 1, have divided reformists on whether to engage or boycott, further undermining their cohesion and leadership.
For over two decades, Abdulkarim Soroush has been a leading advocate for modern interpretations of Shia sacred texts. Meanwhile, as an ex-political prisoner and disciple of the late Hossein Ali Montazeri, Mohsen Kadivar has emerged as a prominent figure in religious traditionalism. Montazeri, once Khomeini's designated successor, was sidelined by the security establishment. Now, Soroush and Kadivar find themselves engaged in a religious and political rivalry, each vying to position themselves as an alternative to secular figures like Prince Reza Pahlavi.
The dispute between Soroush and Kadivar, stemming from theoretical disagreements over the interpretation of religious texts, has escalated. Kadivar has excommunicated Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, while Soroush has called for Kadivar’s public repentance. However, amidst these theological debates, many Iranians, particularly those actively opposed to the regime, have shifted their focus away from such issues. Nevertheless, Soroush and Kadivar persist in their efforts to sway politically motivated believers within Iran, despite residing on the East Coast of America.
This ongoing debate holds significant importance for observers of Iranian politics and society. It sheds light on the fate of the reformist project of the 1990s, which aimed not only to challenge the authority of Shia clergy in interpreting texts but also to introduce political and social reforms. Initially viewed as a promising alternative to religious authoritarianism, reformism gained momentum, leading to significant political shifts, such as Mohammad Khatami's election victory in 1997. However, subsequent events, including the Green Movement's defeat in 2009, marked the decline of religious reformism, paving the way for other political movements.
Internationally, Mohammad Khatami's presidency was initially welcomed by Western governments and the UN, who saw him as a moderate seeking dialogue and cooperation. During this time, figures like Soroush gained attention in Western academia for their efforts to reinterpret Islam. Books and academic dissertations were written and published about his project on the ‘de-shariatization’ of Islam and the negation of totalitarian Islamism through the channel of new religious interpretations.
However, the regime’s suppression of the reformist-led Green Movement in 2009, was the end of the religious reform movement, and after that, its ideologues were sidelined by the opposition constitutionalist or secular republican movements. Instead of supporting the secular, libertarian, and nationalist discourse of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the religious reformists opposed women leaders and constitutionalists, and as a result mostly isolated themselves. Even before recent protests, Western governments, academia and think tanks had concluded that the engine of reformism and religious moderation had broken down and could no longer be an alternative discourse for the Islamist expansionism. For this reason, for a decade, the technocrat lobby of the Islamic Republic gradually took the place of the pioneers of religious reformism in Western academia, think tanks, and media.
Domestically, during Hassan Rouhani's administration, hopes for de-escalation with the West diminished, polarizing Iranian society between pro-Khamenei factions and those advocating for regime change. Figures like Soroush and Kadivar found themselves increasingly marginalized within this landscape, as the political discourse shifted away from religious reformism.
As the social credibility and access to power of reformists has waned, internal strife has intensified among different factions. The current tension between Soroush, Shabestari, and Kadivar underscores the decline of alternative religious discourses in the face of the government's totalitarianism. This rift becomes especially apparent on the eve of the upcoming elections, where reformers' attempts to participate are met with skepticism, reflecting the disillusionment of a population weary of political Islam and religious reformism.