Iranian Cleric Complains Of Too Much Joy, Amid Soaring Depression Rates

In a letter dated February 5 addressed to Attorney General Merrick Garland, a copy of which was obtained by Iran International, US Representative Jim Banks (R-IN), Elise Stefanik (R-NY) and Mike Waltz (R-Fl) call for an investigation into the potential violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) by the ICG, a think tank that advises the US government.

An investigation by Iran International, published last week, showed that the Iranian government in 2016 signed a previously undisclosed agreement with the International Crisis Group, and used the organization to lobby the Obama administration on its behalf about nuclear issues.

According to a cache of documents obtained by Iran International, the Crisis Group signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s in-house think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), but never made it public. The MoU outlined a framework for “scientific and academic interactions,” aimed to “promote and intensify the friendship and the mutual understanding,” the documents showed.

“FARA requires all individuals in the United States acting as agents of foreign principals to regularly disclose their status and activities as a foreign agent to the Department of Justice,” the lawmakers noted in their letter to Mr. Garland. They emphasized that the law was meant to prevent organizations operating in the United States “from secretly serving the interests of a foreign power and to provide transparency to reduce foreign agents’ ability to credibly promote propaganda from hostile governments.”

The Crisis Group is headquartered in Belgium, but also maintains “a substantial presence in the United States,” according to the lawmakers. “While the Crisis Group ostensibly conducts research on conflict resolution, recent reporting has revealed that the group has a disturbing and longstanding official relationship with the government of Iran,” they said.

More than 50 Western research institutions - including the Crisis Group - had boycotted the Iranian foreign ministry’s IPIS for hosting a anti-Holocaust conference in 2006, but the Crisis Group was one of two organizations that reversed course and signed a formal agreement with the IPIS a decade later.

A half-dozen leaders in Western think tanks expressed surprise to Iran International and Semafor, our partner in the investigation, that the Crisis Group entered into a formal research agreement with the IPIS and said the partnerships with foreign governments, especially Iran, could raise concerns about the think tank's objectivity and potential lobbying for foreign interests.

A sanctions attorney based in Washington, who requested anonymity, said that from a legal liability perspective, there was a question of whether the Crisis Group complied with the registration requirements outlined in FARA or the Lobbying Disclosure Act if they were actively advocating for Iranian interests within the United States.

Responding to questions on this occasion, the think tank told Iran International, “Crisis Group only acts to resolve conflict, not for or on any country's behalf. Iran’s threats to our staff and accusations that we work for the US and Israeli governments have been ongoing for more than a decade and underscore our independence. We are fully compliant with U.S. law.”

However, the members of Congress concluded their letter by demanding a Justice Department investigation. “There is a clear pattern of behavior indicating that the Crisis Group is in fact not an independent organization, but a chief mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States. Given this evidence, we urge you to launch an investigation of the Crisis Group without delay for potential FARA violations to protect our nation from malign foreign influence.”

IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency reported Wednesday that “Several foreign spies and terrorists, under central guidance, entered Iran from the Republic of Azerbaijan with the intention of carrying out sabotage operations within the country, but they were identified and arrested before taking action.”

Iran's intelligence agencies frequently announces busting spy networks and detaining saboteurs within Iran borders, although subsequent information about trials and convictions is scarce. Such incidents have been on the rise in recent years, with clandestine attacks targeting nuclear facilities, and military installations. Iran’s intelligence apparatus lost significant face after sabotage attacks on its Natanz nuclear facility in 2020 and 2021.

While the Iranian government often attributes such incidents to Israel, Israeli officials have never officially claimed responsibility.

In late January, the Iranian regime executed four Kurdish political prisoners on charges of plotting to bomb a defense facility. Human rights groups have criticized the executions, citing allegations of confessions obtained under torture and unfair trials.

Amidst growing tensions between the government and the populace, football has morphed into a battleground for ideological conflict. At the heart of the dispute lies the question: Is the team representing Iran truly the national team, or merely a tool of the regime? On both sides of the debate, myriad factions offer diverse perspectives. This strife is absent in less prominent sports like water polo, badminton, and skiing, where neither the government nor the people invest significant interest, rendering them immune to political exploitation.

The convergence of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement with the 2022 World Cup in Qatar catapulted this struggle onto the streets, prompting some to rally behind opposing teams—some even cheered for the American team after Iran's defeat in their match. In this clash, several youths fell victim to the regime's brutality, like Mehran Sammmak in Bandar Anzali. Although the Asian Games in 2024 saw less street activism, the conflict rages on through social media and traditional channels.

Arguments from both camps:

“Regime’s Squad”

Those branding the existing team as the regime's squad cite several factors. Foremost is the regime's penchant for anti-meritocracy and ideological vetting, even in sports. Under the Islamist regime's totalitarian grip, no sphere of life remains immune to government intervention. The regime extends special privileges to footballers, including duty-free luxury imports and generous state-backed salaries. These perks serve as ideological carrots, motivating players to echo regime rhetoric, as exemplified by Qala Noui's post-match gratitude to divine intervention after a victory.

Furthermore, the regime's propaganda machine operates in overdrive within football, from orchestrated spectator attendance to grandiose declarations by top officials upon victory. The regime intertwines football successes with national achievements, glorifying players' meetings with high-ranking officials and showering them with accolades. The regime's obsession with celebrity status extends to football, positioning players as national icons.

Additionally, footballers face constant surveillance, with every word and action scrutinized. Their families are not spared from intimidation, reinforcing the regime's grip over players' public personas. Despite expectations of solidarity with the populace, footballers remain tethered to the regime's narrative, perpetuating its agenda regardless of match outcomes.

People expect a national team to be with them in their joys and sorrows, something the current football team fails to do in the view of many Iranians, who return the attitude by turning their backs to them.

National Team

Conversely, proponents of the team as the national squad offer a contrasting narrative. They argue that many players are European-based professionals selected on merit rather than political allegiance. While the regime may exploit players for propaganda, it does not define their allegiance. Some players have demonstrated dissent, supporting past protests like the 2009 Green Movement, indicating their independence from regime narratives.

However, the issue is not about a few players voicing solidarity with protesters, but the attitude of the team as a whole.

Victories by the team elicit national jubilation, transcending regime affiliations. Despite forced interactions with regime figures, players harbor no illusions about their roles as symbols of national pride. Their mandate is not to champion dissent but to represent the nation on the global stage.

The absence of comprehensive surveys complicates attributing public sentiment, or the exact attitudes of team members. Nonetheless, verifiable accounts underscore the chasm between regime control and public sentiment, demonstrating that both sentiments exist among the populace.

Identified by IRNA as Ali Hosseini (son of Amir), Ali Hosseini (son of Mohammad Hossein), Ali Hosseini (son of Ebrahim), Hamzeh Alavi, and Mohammad Ali Akbari, the militias were killed in the recent US attacks.

Reports from the Telegram channel Defenders of the Shrine indicated on Monday that four members of the Fatemiyoun, including Ali Hosseini, Hamzeh Alavi, Mohammad Ali Akbari, and Mohammad Reza Sadat Alavi, died in a recent US attack on Syria. The moniker Defender of the Shrine is associated with forces dispatched to Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Ali Hosseini was a commander within the Fatemiyoun Brigade in eastern Syria. Images circulating onlineshow him alongside Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force who was killed by the US in 2020.

The Sunday US military's strike on Iran-affiliated militias in eastern Syria occurred as the US has increased strikes against Iran-backed forces in retaliation to the killing of American soldiers in Jordan. Last week, three US service members lost their lives in drone attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed groups in northeastern Jordan, the first American fatalities since Iran’s proxies has come out in allegiance with Hamas in Gaza.

The Fatemiyoun Brigade, operating under the auspices of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, comprises Afghan immigrants in Iran and has been actively deployed in Syria in recent years. Criticism of Iran's recruitment tactics has been pervasive, with observers and human rights activists condemning the exploitation of Afghan refugees' dire circumstances to engage in regional conflicts, including the ongoing conflict in Syria.

In an interview with the Afkar Network, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi said, "Although Afghanistan is farther from Gaza, if necessary, more than one brigade from this country will go to support Gaza."

Iran-backed Hamas invaded Israel on October 7 in what was the most deadly single day for Jews since the Holocaust. Since then, Israel's relentless retaliation and the US support for its right to defend itself has sparked a regional proxy war. Iran's militias in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen have joined the fight in support of Hamas in Gaza.

Kazemi-Qomi's statement comes after the Iranian regime launched a multi-platform campaign to recruit fighters for the Hamas conflict against Israel. Despite Iranians branding it as a propaganda stunt, the regime initiated the campaign through various outlets including websites affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and the state broadcaster.

A chyron message urging viewers to sign up and declare their readiness to be dispatched to Palestine aired during broadcasts. Additionally, Iranians received SMS messages prompting them to express their willingness to participate. The regime also established a website named "al-Aqsa Storm," mirroring Hamas's codename for its offensive into Israel, which claimed numerous civilian and military casualties, alongside the taking of hostages.

Iran's proxies are mostly made up of fighters from Shia Muslim–majority countries such as Iraq and Lebanon but Shia groups in Sunni-majority Afghanistan, its border neighbor, the