Costa Rica designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization, the foreign ministry said on Thursday, in a move that also blacklisted three other Iran-backed groups in the region.
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and Houthis in Yemen were also designated.
The government made the decision on Monday, according to the ministry, which said the measure was taken in line with Costa Rica’s international commitments to combat terrorism and its financing.
The move will "allow intelligence authorities and judicial bodies to strengthen their prevention, investigation, and prosecution capabilities, acting more decisively against any logistical and financial support networks that may be operating within the country to sustain these organizations,” the foreign ministry said.
It added that the designation would help intelligence and judicial authorities strengthen their ability to prevent, investigate and prosecute logistical and financial support networks linked to the groups.
“The designation seeks to prevent any form of action or influence by these groups in Costa Rica, safeguarding the security of the population and integrity of our democratic institutions," according to the statement.
Several countries have moved in recent weeks to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, while the Trump administration has urged allies to take similar action against the IRGC and Hezbollah.
Iceland, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Liechtenstein designated the terror group on March 20, followed by Argentina on March 31.
Western governments have increasingly targeted the IRGC over its regional activities, support for armed groups and role in Iran’s security apparatus.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards have been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Australia.
Two sources close to the presidential office said a tense exchange took place on Saturday, April 4, between Pezeshkian and Hossein Taeb, a powerful figure close to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Those present described the conversation as unusually difficult and highly charged.
During the meeting, Pezeshkian accused IRGC chief commander Ahmad Vahidi and Ali Abdollahi, commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters – the country’s armed forces' unified command, of acting unilaterally and driving escalation through attacks on regional countries, especially against their infrastructure.
According to the sources, Pezeshkian said those policies had destroyed any remaining chance of a ceasefire and were steering the Islamic Republic directly toward “a huge catastrophe.”
He also warned that, based on what he described as precise assessments, Iran’s economy would not be able to withstand a prolonged war for much longer and that full economic collapse was inevitable under current conditions.
The confrontation comes amid mounting evidence of a broader power shift inside the Islamic Republic, with military and intelligence networks increasingly displacing both the elected government and the traditional clerical order.
Ideological collapse and hidden state
A regional source familiar with internal developments told Iran International in February that the model of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) that has defined the Islamic Republic for more than four decades is now undergoing a fundamental transformation and even an “ideological collapse.”
According to that source, the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei to the leadership, despite lacking the traditional qualifications and legitimacy associated with the position, took place through an opaque process that in practice amounts to the sidelining of the traditional clergy and the consolidation of full control by the Guards’ military-intelligence apparatus.
The source said this process has strengthened what many insiders describe as the Islamic Republic’s “hidden state.”
Iran International has previously reported growing tensions between Pezeshkian and senior IRGC commanders, particularly Vahidi, over how the war should be managed and over its destructive impact on people’s livelihoods and the economy.
On March 28, informed sources said Pezeshkian had criticized the Guards’ approach to escalating tensions and continuing attacks on neighboring countries, warning that without a ceasefire the economy could collapse within three weeks to a month.
Subsequent reporting by Iran International showed that the president’s authority has continued to shrink.
Sources said the Guards have resisted Pezeshkian’s appointments and decisions, effectively stripped the government of executive control and erected a security barrier around the core of power.
According to those reports, Pezeshkian’s attempt to appoint a new intelligence minister collapsed under direct pressure from Vahidi, who rejected all proposed candidates, including Hossein Dehghan, and insisted that all key wartime positions must, for now, be chosen and managed directly by the Guards.
Iran International also reported that Pezeshkian was forced, under direct IRGC pressure, to appoint Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council despite his dissatisfaction with the choice.
Logistical crisis
Alongside the political infighting, fresh field reports received by Iran International point to a worsening human and logistical crisis inside the Guards and the Basij.
Sources said that over the past 72 hours, operational forces have faced acute shortages of basic supplies, including edible food, hygiene facilities and places to sleep.
Recent strikes on infrastructure and bases have left many Guards and Basij personnel sleeping in the streets, and in some areas they have had access to only one meal a day.
According to informed sources, some personnel were forced to buy food from shops and restaurants with their own money after expired rations were distributed.
At the same time, disruptions affecting Bank Sepah’s electronic systems have reportedly delayed the salaries and benefits of military personnel, fueling fresh anger and mistrust within the ranks.
Iran International had previously reported similarly dire conditions in field units, including severe shortages of ammunition, water and food, as well as growing desertions by exhausted soldiers.
Even in the Guards’ missile units, which have historically received priority treatment, sources reported serious communications failures and food shortages. They said commanders were continuing to send only technical components needed to keep missile systems operational, rather than food or basic individual supplies for personnel.
Information obtained by Iran International shows that Hatami, who was executed on April 2, remains unburied as authorities continue to withhold his body.
Hatami was one of the defendants in a case linked to a fire at the Mahmoud Kaveh Basij base on Namjoo Street in eastern Tehran during the January protests.
Others in the same case included Mohammadamin Biglari, Shahin Vahedparast Kalur, Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani and Ali Fahim, all of whom were sentenced to death.
Biglari and Vahedparast were executed on April 5, while Fahim’s execution was carried out on Monday, April 6.
Informed sources told Iran International that Hatami’s body has not been released because his name appeared on a website linked to the Mojahedin-e Khalgh organization, an allegation his family strongly rejects.
Sources familiar with the case said Hatami was an industrial design student at the University of Tehran and was fluent in three languages.
A source with knowledge of the events of January 8 said the case involved seven defendants, none of whom had any role in starting the fire.
According to the source, Hatami and the others entered the Basij base with around 50 other people only after the fire had already broken out.
Minutes later, another fire began. Many managed to escape, but seven people, including Hatami, were unable to flee.
They went to the rooftop, where they were detained by Basij forces and severely beaten, the source said.
Judicial authorities later accused the defendants of trying to gain access to the armory.
After their arrest, the detainees were subjected to severe interrogations and then transferred to Ghezel Hesar prison.
They were denied in-person visits throughout their detention and were allowed only phone calls.
Their trial was presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati, and they were denied access to lawyers of their own choosing.
Death sentences were issued on February 7.
Sources told Iran International that the confessions in the case were extracted under pressure and coercion, and that the judicial process ended in executions carried out without the defendants and their families having full knowledge of the proceedings.
In the same case, 28-year-old Shahin Vahedparast was also executed on April 5, and his body, too, has still not been returned to his family, according to informed sources.
Those sources said Vahedparast’s wife was four months pregnant at the time of his execution.
Relatives said he had dreamed of opening a restaurant with her.
His death matters because he sat at the junction of two of the system’s most sensitive functions: guarding the Guards from infiltration and directing the intelligence arm accused of crushing dissent.
In March, Washington’s Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on Khademi and other senior IRGC figures, a sign that he was seen abroad not just as an internal operator but as a high-value intelligence target.
In symbolic terms, one of the men tasked with stopping penetration of the state was himself reached in the middle of Tehran.
A security man from the inner system
Khademi was one of the least public senior figures in Iran’s power structure. Iranian and regional reports have described him as being from the Fasa area in Fars province, while official and semi-official outlets have referred to him under different versions of his name, including Majid Khademi and Majid Hosseini, reflecting the opacity that surrounds senior intelligence officials.
Unlike many top IRGC commanders, he does not appear to have built his standing mainly through front-line war command. He rose instead through the quieter, more secretive world of protection, vetting and internal security.
From internal monitoring to the top intelligence job
Khademi was appointed head of the Defense Ministry’s intelligence protection organization in 2018. In 2022, after a major shake-up inside the IRGC following a series of security failures and reported Israeli penetrations, he was made head of the Guards’ Intelligence Protection Organization.
He was promoted again in June 2025, after the killing of his predecessor Mohammad Kazemi, to lead the IRGC Intelligence Organization itself.
That move put him in charge of a body the US Treasury later said had been “instrumental” in violently suppressing protests through mass violence, arbitrary detentions and intimidation.
That progression is part of what makes his killing significant. Khademi had spent years policing the system from within before ending up at the top of one of its most feared coercive institutions.
Why his role was so sensitive
The IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization and its Intelligence Organization do different jobs, but together they form a core part of the Islamic Republic’s security state.
The first looks inward – loyalty, secrecy, infiltration and internal discipline – while the second has been linked to domestic repression and political-security cases.
Khademi mattered because he had moved through both worlds. He was not simply another general; he was a custodian of the regime’s inner files, vulnerabilities and suspicions.
That means his loss is not only personal or symbolic, but potentially institutional, at least in the short term. This is an inference from his portfolio and the structure of the IRGC, rather than a point Iranian officials have conceded.
How Khademi framed tighter control
Khademi gave a rare interview in February to the website of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and it offered a blunt window into how he saw the country.
He framed the January uprising not as a domestic revolt against the state, but as a foreign-backed plot, and presented mass preemption as routine intelligence work.
In that interview, he said the Guard had summoned 2,735 people linked to what he called anti-security networks, “counseled” 13,000 others, seized 1,173 weapons and identified 46 people allegedly tied to foreign intelligence services. He also said authorities had received nearly 500,000 public tips and reports by the end of the month.
Those figures are important less as verified facts than as a statement of doctrine. In his telling, the answer to unrest was wider surveillance, earlier intervention and a larger dragnet.
He also recalled Khamenei telling him to “pay attention to intelligence work” because “this period is like the year 60” – a reference to the early 1980s, one of the Islamic Republic’s bloodiest and most repressive phases.
The line is revealing because it shows the regime was reading the moment through the lens of existential internal threat, not ordinary dissent.
Khademi said Khamenei had stressed “two types of infiltration”: one deliberate and one broader current of people advancing the enemy’s aims without necessarily knowing it. Read plainly, that is the language of a state that sees not only organized opponents but also ordinary social and political currents as security problems.
Another revealing part of the interview was his insistence on the “national information network,” the state-backed effort to tighten control over Iran’s internet and communications space. That linked Khademi directly to the Islamic Republic’s broader push for censorship, digital control and isolation of the domestic information sphere.
A telling figure of the post-crackdown state
Khademi’s rise after the 2022 reshuffle suggested that the Islamic Republic wanted a harder, more security-centered figure to restore trust after repeated failures. His career embodied a system trying to repair itself through tighter internal control.
His death therefore lands on two levels at once. It removes a senior official tied to repression, and it exposes the vulnerability of a security apparatus that has long defined itself through secrecy, discipline and counter-penetration.
Why the killing matters now
Khademi was not just another uniformed commander. He was a product of the Islamic Republic’s hidden architecture – the part built to monitor loyalty, protect secrets and suppress threats before they reached the street.
His killing is more than the loss of one official. It is a blow to a man who personified the Islamic Republic’s effort to defend itself from within – and a reminder that even those charged with hunting infiltration have not been beyond its reach.
