Tehran checkpoints hit in reported drone attacks
Checkpoints in Tehran came under attack Wednesday evening, according to Iranian state media, which said Israeli drones killed several security personnel and Basij members in the capital.
Checkpoints in Tehran came under attack Wednesday evening, according to Iranian state media, which said Israeli drones killed several security personnel and Basij members in the capital.
Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Fars News reported at least 10 people were killed in what it described as “terrorist” attacks. Witness accounts sent to Iran International also suggested checkpoints had come under attack and that air defenses were engaged against Israeli drones over parts of the city.
According to Fars, the checkpoints targeted were in District 14 near the Mahallati Highway, District 15 opposite the Hashemabad gas station, District 16 on Fadaiyan-e Islam Street and District 1 at the end of Artesh Boulevard. Residents reported explosions and exchanges of fire in several areas, the outlet said.
An unnamed official cited by Fars said the operation was carried out jointly by Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency and monarchist groups, alleging the aim was to infiltrate operatives and carry out sabotage inside Iran. No evidence was provided for the claim.
The reported attacks come amid tightened security across Tehran, where residents say checkpoints have multiplied and nighttime patrols intensified as the conflict escalates.
Some witnesses say Basij units accompanying patrols have chanted slogans warning against unrest and challenging people to protest.
Since the strikes began, leaders in the United States and Israel have urged Iranians to rise against the authorities, framing the conflict as an opportunity for change, while the exiled prince Reza Pahlavi has told supporters to remain ready to mobilize when the time is right.
A spokesman for the Israeli military said Wednesday that Israel was prepared to continue the war with Iran for as long as necessary.
Separately, Fars reported that an overnight strike early Tuesday hit a residential area in the central city of Arak, killing five civilians from the family of Gen. Ismail Dehghan.
Iran’s new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei inherits not merely his father’s office but also the constitutional ambiguities and political compromises that accompanied Ali Khamenei’s own controversial elevation nearly four decades earlier.
The death of Khamenei in the February 2026 US–Israeli airstrikes on Tehran has triggered the most consequential constitutional transition in the Islamic Republic since 1989—and revived a question that has long shadowed the system since its founding: whether supreme authority rests primarily on religious legitimacy or political power.
Within days, Iranian state media announced that the Assembly of Experts had selected his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, a figure long powerful behind the scenes but lacking broad clerical standing, as the new Supreme Leader.
The office of Supreme Leader is defined primarily by Articles 5, 107, 109 and 110 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Article 5 establishes the principle of velayat-e faqih, entrusting governance during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam to a qualified jurist combining religious authority with political competence. Article 107 assigns the Assembly of Experts the responsibility of selecting the Supreme Leader, while Article 109 sets out the required qualifications, including justice, political insight and administrative ability.
The precedent of 1989
When Khomeini died in June 1989, the Islamic Republic faced an immediate leadership vacuum. No obvious successor possessed comparable clerical stature.
The Assembly of Experts ultimately chose Ali Khamenei, then president, despite his limited standing as a senior jurist; the constitution was soon revised to accommodate the decision, stating that the leader need not possess the full recognition as a grand ayatollah.
The amendment reflected political calculation rather than abstract principle.
The episode established an enduring precedent: constitutional interpretation could adapt to political necessity. In practice, legitimacy rested not only on religious authority but also on institutional alignment and security power.
Mojtaba Khamenei now confronts a similar dilemma. Like his father in 1989, he is not widely recognised within the traditional hierarchy of Shiʿi scholarship as a senior jurist.
Wartime succession
Under Article 107, the Assembly of Experts must deliberate and appoint the Supreme Leader, ordinarily implying a formal session. Yet Mojtaba’s selection occurred amid ongoing war and severe disruption following the airstrikes that killed Ali Khamenei.
Public information about the process remains sparse. It is unclear whether the assembly gathered physically, voted remotely or reached its decision through emergency consultation. Iranian state media confirmed his appointment but provided few procedural details.
Such ambiguity does not necessarily invalidate the decision within the Islamic Republic’s flexible constitutional practice. Still, the opacity surrounding the process has intensified debate over the legitimacy of the succession.
For more than a decade Mojtaba sought to strengthen his clerical credentials. Beginning in 2009, he taught dars-e kharej—advanced jurisprudence seminars traditionally led by senior clerics aspiring to marjaʿ status. Observers widely interpreted the move as preparation for a possible future succession.
Reports from Persian-language sources suggest some senior grand ayatollahs objected to what they saw as a politically engineered effort to manufacture clerical authority. Attempts were reportedly made to obtain written attestations of Mojtaba’s ijtihad, though evidence of broad clerical recognition remains limited.
After roughly thirteen years, Mojtaba suspended the classes in September 2024 as succession speculation intensified.
Power without office
Power in the Islamic Republic has rarely flowed through formal titles alone. It often moves through the networks surrounding the Supreme Leader.
Over two decades Mojtaba emerged as one of the most influential yet least publicly visible figures in the Iranian state. His authority derived not from elected office but from his role inside Beit-e Rahbari, where he functioned as a gatekeeper to his father—managing access, filtering political actors and coordinating with security institutions.
In practice this amounted to a tightly controlled security network of clerical aides, intelligence officials and Revolutionary Guard commanders whose influence depended less on formal office than on proximity to the Leader.
This informal authority allowed Mojtaba to cultivate a patronage base closely tied to the IRGC. The United States Treasury sanctioned him in 2019, stating that he acted on behalf of the Supreme Leader while maintaining close relationships with IRGC elements and the Basij militia.
The Guards connection
The relationship between the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards deepened decisively during the 2009 post-election unrest.
Following the disputed presidential vote that returned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power, mass protests erupted across Iran. The Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia ultimately played the decisive role in suppressing the demonstrations.
The events of 2009 reaffirmed the supremacy of the Supreme Leader while strengthening the alliance between the leadership and the security apparatus. Many analysts argue Mojtaba played a coordinating role inside the Leader’s office during the crisis.
One figure embodied the partnership between the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards more fully than any other: General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force.
Soleimani maintained unusually direct access to Ali Khamenei and operated with a degree of autonomy rare within the Islamic Republic’s formal hierarchy, shaping Tehran’s regional military strategy across Iraq, Syria and beyond.
His killing by a United States drone strike in January 2020 removed a central node in the system that linked the Leader to the Guards’ external operations.
Although the IRGC remained institutionally powerful, no successor fully replicated Soleimani’s combination of battlefield authority, political influence and personal access to the Supreme Leader..
Continuity and uncertainty
Another turning point came with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024.
Long viewed as a plausible successor with stronger clerical credentials, Raisi’s absence narrowed the field and sharpened attention on Mojtaba Khamenei, whose embedded position within Beit-e Rahbari and longstanding ties to the security apparatus left him uniquely placed when wartime succession arrived.
Mojtaba Khamenei’s accession does not resolve the deeper tensions within the Islamic Republic. Like his father in 1989, he assumes power without universally recognised clerical authority. His legitimacy rests instead on political coalition, institutional continuity and the support of the Revolutionary Guards.
At the same time, the war that accompanied his elevation has destabilised the very networks that sustained his rise. The destruction of Beit-e Rahbari and the deaths within the leadership circle have left the inner workings of the system partially obscured.
Mojtaba inherits the same contradiction that shaped his father’s rise: a system that claims religious authority yet repeatedly turns to political necessity in moments of crisis.
In 1989, that necessity elevated Ali Khamenei as the republic emerged from the long shadow of the Iran–Iraq War. In 2026, it has elevated his son amid war once again—leaving the durability of Iran’s constitutional order dependent, as before, less on theology than on power.
UNESCO has warned that intensifying hostilities are already damaging cultural landmarks in Iran and the broader region, saying it has communicated with all parties to the conflict to coordinate protections for heritage sites.
“We are deeply concerned by the first impact that the hostilities are already having in the many World Heritage sites, for instance in Iran, where already four World Heritage sites have suffered from the consequence of the hostilities,” Lazare Eloundou Assomo, director of the agency’s World Heritage Centre, said in an interview.
The organization said it was continuing to assess damage and urged restraint as fighting escalates.
President Donald Trump wrote on social media this week that the United States would “take out easily destroyable targets that will make it virtually impossible for Iran to ever be built back, as a Nation, again.”
The comments were widely interpreted as a threat against infrastructure and other soft targets.
Iran is home to 29 UNESCO World Heritage sites. Assomo said early assessments confirmed damage to four of them, though the full extent remains unclear.
“We don’t know the extent for the moment because we need to continue to check and verify,” he said. “But clearly, with the images that we have been able to receive, we can confirm the damage.”
Golestan Palace: 'Iranian Versailles'
Among the affected sites is Tehran’s Golestan Palace, which Assomo described as “a very important and outstanding palace” reflecting “the grandeur of Iran’s civilization in the 19th century.”
He noted its elaborate decorative features, including mirrored glasswork, and said it is sometimes compared with the Palace of Versailles in France.
The palace served as the Qajar dynasty’s royal residence and seat of power and illustrates the introduction of European styles into Persian arts. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s last monarch, held his coronation ceremony there in 1969.
Video images circulating online appear to show damage inside the palace, with piles of shattered glass, broken woodwork and debris scattered across its interior.
Elsewhere in Iran, Isfahan—once one of Central Asia’s most important cities and a major Silk Road hub—is home to the Masjed-e Jame, a mosque more than 1,000 years old that reflects the evolution of Islamic architecture across 12 centuries.
Assomo said UNESCO was also concerned about broader risks to cultural heritage across the region.
“Everything that tells the history of all the civilization of the 18 countries in the region—we’re talking about Iran but there are many, many others even in the Gulf countries—and we are calling for the protection of all of the sites and their importance,” he said.
Britain banned London’s al-Quds march on Sunday, saying the annual event organized by a pro-Islamic Republic group could trigger serious disorder as tensions over Iran and planned counter-protests intensify.
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood approved a Metropolitan Police request to prohibit the march and any associated counter-marches for one month from 1600 GMT on Wednesday, while allowing only a static protest under strict conditions.
Police said it was the first time such powers had been used since 2012 and said ordinary protest conditions would not be enough given the scale of the event, expected counter-protests and heightened tensions linked to the Middle East conflict and Tehran’s threats to British allies and bases overseas.
The Met said the London march was “uniquely contentious” because it originated in Iran and is organized by the Islamic Human Rights Commission, which police described as supportive of the Iranian regime.
Officers also pointed to security service warnings about Iranian state-backed threats in Britain, saying MI5 and counterterrorism police had foiled more than 20 such plots over the past year.
Previous Quds marches in London have led to arrests for support for proscribed groups and antisemitic hate crimes, police said, though they stressed this year’s ban was based on a specific risk assessment rather than politics.
The IHRC condemned the ban as politically motivated and said a static protest would still go ahead. Its spokesman Faisal Bodi told British media the march had taken place peacefully for decades, but he also openly praised Iran’s former supreme leader Ali Khamenei and said he would “happily” hold his picture.
Britain is not the first European country to move against such rallies. Berlin banned its annual Quds march in 2021 after years of controversy over Hezbollah-linked symbols and antisemitic messaging, although German courts and local authorities have continued to wrestle with similar cases since then.
Tehran’s decision to widen the war is an attempt to project strength but may better be understood as a survival strategy—one rooted in deliberate escalation and shaped by a logic akin to mutually assured destruction.
Following US and Israeli attacks on the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leadership followed through with a long-standing threat: expanding the conflict beyond its borders and drawing neighboring states into the confrontation.
One notable example came on February 1, roughly a month before Khamenei was killed in a joint US–Israeli missile strike on February 28, when he said that if the United States attacked Iran militarily, the conflict would become “regional.”
Today, the armed forces of the Islamic Republic—led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—appear to be implementing that doctrine by expanding hostilities beyond Iran’s borders.
The logic is to link the fate of the Islamic Republic to the stability of the wider region: as the state faces mounting internal and external pressures, it seeks to entangle neighboring countries in the crisis, raising the costs of continued confrontation.
This approach resembles elements of Nixon’s “madman theory” and Israel’s “Samson option,” reflecting a strategic logic akin to mutually assured destruction. Whether such a strategy can deter adversaries—or instead isolate Tehran further—remains uncertain.
Several neighboring countries have now been drawn into the conflict. States along the Persian Gulf have been targeted, and missile and drone strikes have also been directed toward Azerbaijan and Turkey.
In some cases, countries that previously maintained relatively cooperative relations with Tehran, including Qatar, have found themselves on the receiving end of these attacks.
The responses of neighboring governments suggest that widening the conflict could ultimately produce stronger regional opposition rather than easing pressure on Tehran. From their perspective, the concern is precedent: if such attacks occur once, what guarantees exist that they will not happen again?
This concern increases the likelihood of coordinated responses designed to prevent further escalation.
The strategy also reflects long-running domestic pressures on the system. Over the course of its existence, the Islamic Republic occasionally managed to regain some degree of public support at critical moments—including the elections of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and 2001, the high participation in the 2009 election, and the victories of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and 2017.
But the broader trajectory has been one of declining engagement and growing disillusionment. By the time of the 2024 presidential election—officially won by Masoud Pezeshkian—turnout had fallen sharply, reflecting wider frustration shaped by years of repression and repeated cycles of protest.
Demonstrations in 1999, 2009, 2019 and 2022 were met with force, while the downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane and the large-scale crackdown in January 2026 further deepened mistrust between the state and society.
At the same time, nearly five decades of governance have left Iran confronting multiple structural crises, including environmental degradation, water scarcity, energy shortages, mounting economic pressure on households, systemic corruption and widening inequality.
Together, these pressures have steadily eroded confidence in the system and narrowed expectations for reform from within.
Against this backdrop, widening the conflict may appear to the leadership less a choice than a calculation: that survival at home increasingly depends on raising the stakes abroad. Yet this logic carries obvious risks.
Attempts to regionalize the confrontation could deepen Iran’s isolation and accelerate pressures already bearing down on the system.
Taking into account both long-term domestic trends and the current military situation—including damage to Iran’s military capabilities and the widening of hostilities—the future of the Islamic Republic remains uncertain.
International politics rarely unfolds along a single predictable path, and multiple outcomes remain conceivable. Still, history suggests that political systems under sustained internal strain and external pressure often appear stable until they do not.
As Iran confronts war with the United States and Israel abroad while continuing to face mistrust and periodic unrest at home, the strategy of widening the conflict may prove less a path to survival than a reflection of the system’s mounting vulnerability.
Failure to restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is beginning to show what prolonged disruption could mean for global energy markets.
Early volatility has been sharp but manageable, yet the longer the disruption lasts, the greater the risk that physical shortages—rather than price swings—will drive the crisis.
In recent days, Iranian attacks have expanded to energy infrastructure across Arab Gulf states alongside the continued closure of Hormuz.
On March 9, an oil refinery in the United Arab Emirates was targeted. Qatar has halted liquefied natural gas production, while Iraq and Kuwait have each reduced oil output by roughly 70 percent.
Brent crude briefly surged more than 25 percent to $115 a barrel as markets opened Monday before retreating after the Group of Seven said it was considering releasing 300–400 million barrels from strategic reserves.
Prices later eased to about $98—still roughly 30 percent above prewar levels—suggesting markets are bracing less for an immediate collapse than for a sustained disruption.
Before traffic through Hormuz was disrupted, roughly 20 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products passed through the corridor, most of it bound for Asia. In addition, about 330 million cubic meters of liquefied gas moved through the same route daily.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have diverted part of their exports through alternative pipeline routes, but those volumes remain well below what previously moved through the strait.
Energy consultancies including Wood Mackenzie and Kpler warned early that global markets could withstand severe volatility for only three to four weeks without a reopening of the waterway.
Strategic reserve releases could cushion the shock temporarily, but even a 300–400 million barrel release would offer only limited relief—particularly if attacks continue to damage infrastructure or delay the restoration of export capacity.
Released reserves would also need to be replenished relatively quickly, limiting their long-term utility as a buffer.
The gas market is even more exposed. About one-fifth of global LNG trade previously passed through Hormuz, and there are few viable substitutes for QatarEnergy’s supplies. Global gas prices have nearly doubled at a moment when European storage levels are at their lowest since 2022, with facilities less than 30 percent full.
Hormuz also carries a substantial share of global trade in sulfur and chemical fertilizers—a reminder that prolonged disruption could have broader consequences for food prices and inflation beyond the immediate energy shock.
The strategic stakes are becoming increasingly explicit. On Monday night, President Donald Trump warned that the United States would respond “20 times harder” if shipping through Hormuz were not restored.
On Tuesday, Iran’s security chief Ali Larijani responded on X with a defiant message: “The Strait of Hormuz will either be a strait of peace and prosperity for all or will be a strait of defeat and suffering for warmongers,” adding, “beware lest you be the ones to vanish.”
For now, markets are absorbing the shock. But the longer disruption persists, the less the outcome will depend on price volatility and the more it will hinge on physical supply—a shift that strategic reserves and alternative routes alone cannot offset.
