Israel’s Mossad identified a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander it says directed a series of thwarted attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets across multiple countries, exposing what it called a years-long Iranian campaign of global terrorism.
The Mossad named Sardar Ammar, a senior Quds Force officer operating under commander Esmail Ghaani, as the leader of a network responsible for planned operations in Australia, Greece, and Germany during 2024-2025, a statement released via the prime minister’s office on behalf of the Mossad said on Sunday.
The Mossad described the network’s methods as “terror without Iranian fingerprints,” using foreign recruits, criminal intermediaries, and covert communications to conceal Tehran’s role.
“Thanks to intensive activity with partners in Israel and abroad, dozens of attack tracks were thwarted, saving many lives,” the statement said.
In August, Australia expelled Iranian Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi and announced plans to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, after intelligence linked Tehran to antisemitic arson attacks in Melbourne and Sydney. Sadeghi denied the allegations upon his departure.
In Germany, authorities summoned Iran’s ambassador, Majid Nili Ahmadabadi, in July after the arrest of a Danish suspect accused of spying on Jewish and Israeli-linked sites in Berlin for Iranian intelligence. German officials said the surveillance could have been preparatory to terrorist attacks.
Iran’s covert campaign and regional reach
The Mossad accused Iran of pursuing a long-term strategy “to harm innocents around the globe while maintaining deniability,” but said the recent revelations “strip Iran of its space for denial and impose heavy diplomatic costs.”
The statement cited earlier cases in Greece as part of the same pattern. In 2024, Greek police arrested suspects, including Iranian and Afghan nationals, over arson attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel and a synagogue in Athens.
A year earlier, two Pakistani men were charged with plotting attacks on Israeli and Jewish sites in the city under Iranian direction.
The dismantling of Ammar’s network and the resulting diplomatic pressure, the Mossad said, marked a significant blow to Iran’s covert operations abroad, demonstrating what it called the Islamic Republic’s “repeated operational failures and growing international isolation.”
The State Attorney’s Office filed the indictment on Sunday at the Nazareth District Court against Rahman Gokayer, Younes Ozel, and Oktay Asci, accusing them of illegal entry, weapons trafficking, and ties to foreign arms dealers. Asci also faces a charge of aiding terrorist activities.
Gokayer and Asci traveled from Turkey to Saudi Arabia and then to Jordan in September 2025, where they agreed to infiltrate Israel and smuggle three handguns supplied by Iranian intermediaries, according to the indictment.
The plan was later abandoned after internal disagreements, but the two crossed illegally near Kibbutz Shaar HaGolan.
Asci had previously lived in Israel without a permit for more than two years before being deported in July 2025. During that period, prosecutors say, he obtained a firearm in Bat Yam, buried it near his apartment, and later handed it to an unidentified individual.
After his deportation, Asci maintained contact with Gokayer and Iranian brokers through Turkish intermediaries, planning to route guns from Iran to Jordan and into Israel via Palestinian laborers. Gokayer’s role was to collect the weapons, transfer them to others, and manage the proceeds, for a promised payment of one million dollars.
“The plan was to transport the guns to Jordan and smuggle them into Israel using workers crossing the border. Gokair was supposed to receive the guns and transfer them to other parties and collect the money from the transactions. For his role in the smuggling network, Gokair was promised a payment of $1 million,” reads the indictment.
Ozel, already in Israel, was told to complete a weapons deal in Tel Aviv but twice left empty-handed. Prosecutors say he kept 5,000 shekels from the funds meant for the transaction. All three men remain in custody.
Iranian smuggling networks foiled
Earlier this month, Israel’s Shin Bet security agency said it had thwarted a major Iranian attempt to move a cache of advanced weapons into the West Bank for planned attacks. The haul included explosive devices, drones, anti-tank weapons, grenades, rifles, and ammunition.
Shin Bet traced the operation to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, involving Unit 400 under Javad Ghafari and Unit 18840 in Syria, which reports to Asghar Bakri, head of the covert Unit 840. Two IRGC operatives killed in Israeli strikes in Lebanon in July -- Salah al-Husseini and Muhammad Shuayb -- were also involved.
Iran is pursuing a broader strategy to arm groups in the West Bank to attack Israeli civilians and forces, the agency said.
In March 2024, Shin Bet and the Israel Defense Forces intercepted another Iranian arms shipment that included grenade launchers, explosives, mines, and assault rifles.
“Iran received assistance from Libya and North Korea in the field of missile technology, but not from the Russians,” Mohammad-Ali Jafari said in an online interview posted on YouTube on Saturday.
During the early post-revolutionary years, he added, Iran was permitted to reverse-engineer certain systems and exchange limited technical information with Tripoli and Pyongyang.
“The Russians offered no real help,” he said. “On the contrary, they are now the ones who need our missiles and drones.”
Iranian-designed drones have been key to Russia's war effort against Ukraine, even though Tehran denies providing Moscow with such weapons.
However, Moscow provided little, if any, support during Iran's brief summer war with Israel.
The two countries have signed a long-term security framework, but Russia’s restraint underscores the limits of its backing.
Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said his country was "engaged in supplying the equipment that the Islamic Republic of Iran needs" even after UN sanctions were reimposed last month.
‘Russia now seeking Iranian technology’
Iran has "never relied on Russia for our [military] capabilities, they are the ones who need our missiles and drones," Jafari said in his online interview, adding that Moscow’s reliance on Iranian systems underscores how the balance of capability has shifted.
Jafari dismissed the notion that Moscow’s technology exceeds Tehran’s, arguing that Iran’s advancements in precision and guidance systems outpace those of Russia.
“It’s unlikely that the Russians possess the pinpoint accuracy our missiles have. In terms of precision and technology, we are different from them,” he said.
Iran’s strength lies in domestically developed systems, the former IRGC chief said, describing the country’s missile and drone capabilities as products of “decades of indigenous effort.”
“Foreign input had been useful in the early stages but our engineers quickly surpassed the models we studied.”
Iran, Jafari said, had been preparing for potential conflict with Israel since the 1990s, which guided the decision to focus on missile and drone forces over fighter jets.
“At that time, it was decided that the army’s air force would concentrate on aircraft and defense, while the IRGC would handle the aerospace, missile, and drone sectors.”
The decision, he noted, stemmed from both cost and survivability concerns, given the technological gap with Western powers.
Earlier this month, leaked Russian defense documents indicated Iran had signed a €6 billion deal to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Moscow, with deliveries expected between 2026 and 2028.
Last month, an Iranian lawmaker said Russian MiG-29 fighter jets had arrived in Iran as part of a short-term plan to bolster its air force, with more advanced Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft to follow gradually.
Iran has long sought to modernize its aging air force, which relies heavily on US-made jets purchased before the 1979 revolution and a small number of Russian and locally upgraded aircraft.
Western analysts say Iran’s request for 50 aircraft remains only partly fulfilled, with deliveries slowed by Russia’s own needs in Ukraine.
Tehran also faces vulnerability in air defenses after Israeli strikes earlier this year destroyed its last Russian-provided S-300 systems. Iran had acquired the four S-300 battalions from Russia in 2016.
The June conflict was capped off on June 22 with US strikes on major nuclear sites, marking the superpower's first direct assault on Iranian territory after decades of proxy conflicts.
Tehran's lack of any meaningful retaliation, Yaphe said, laid bare how exposed 86-year-old Supreme Leader Khamenei was and how a security apparatus he had built up for decades had failed to perform.
"It’s very hard to see how Iran regains legitimacy,” said Yaphe, who worked as a Middle East analyst for the State Department for 15 years.
“These are the people who crafted the narratives of the ‘resistance economy’ and other doctrines supporting Khamenei’s agenda,” he added. “That generation is retiring, dying off, or leaving leadership roles, with no coherent transition plan for what comes next.”
Iran’s central challenge, he said, is generational. The revolutionary cadre from the 1979 Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War built key institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij domestic militia and economic conglomerates which dominate large sectors of the economy.
Memory of pre-1979 grievances such rural inequality under the Shah as well as torture and killings by his security agencies, Yaphe says, lingers strongly for the superannuated ruling cadres.
These authorities remain committed to anti-Western confrontation and nuclear advancement, viewing compromise as weakness, according to Yaphe.
“The government in Iran has chosen to die on a particular hill, and they’re going to die there slowly, in their sleep,” he said. “It’s going to be a very slow, mundane transition, the outcome is likely gradual change rather than abrupt upheaval.”
Even the most apparently reactionary institutions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could theoretically play a role in a transition.
"In the event of a change in power, there’s no future for the Guards as they exist today,” he said. “Internally, the IRGC could pursue a coup or maintain clerical oversight to preserve influence—they’ll have to weigh costs and benefits.”
Across the region, Yaphe said Islamist movements are declining, citing sidelined groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and weakened Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
‘Next move happens soon’
Donald Trump’s maximum pressure campaign and the 2020 US assassination of senior IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani were major turning points, Yaphe said.
“Actions under Trump advanced these trends. The Soleimani strike disproved fears of escalation, direct measures disrupted Iran’s comfort with covert operations dating back to its 1982 interventions in Lebanon," he said, referring to the IRGC's founding of its powerful Lebanese affiliate Hezbollah.
“Iran prefers operating in the shadows,” Yaphe added. “Israel and the US responded forcefully, degrading proxies - probably the most effective approach.”
He criticized Washington’s traditional Iran policy as overly partisan: negotiation-driven on the left, confrontational on the right, but often lacking depth.
The analyst contrasted this with Trump’s approach, which, he said, prioritized results over ideology.
“President Trump has specified acceptable terms,” Yaphe said. “Tehran, still trapped in 1979-era thinking, doesn’t grasp the shift toward pragmatic power dynamics. They don’t seem to understand that the West will act.”
“In the next three to five years, something significant will happen in Iran,” Yaphe said. “Either way, it won’t remain the Islamic Republic we know today.”