Iran International
Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf ramped up pressure on the government to issue ration coupons for essential goods, invoking Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s warnings about the deterioration of the economy.
His initiative appeared to be a thinly-veiled rebuke to the relatively moderate president as Iran's ruling classes resort to traditional infighting as diplomatic isolation and sanctions mount.
“The livelihoods of various social groups are under duress. Once again I stress the urgent need for officials to implement the electronic coupon scheme,” Ghalibaf told lawmakers on Sunday.
“This is not the first time I have raised this point from this podium,” he added, in an implicit jab at President Masoud Pezeshkian — who defeated him in the 2024 election.
Ghalibaf’s call highlighted the depth of hardship and the absence of a coherent strategy from the cabinet, but also the continued factional attempts to score points.
The president has indeed acknowledged the severity of the crisis, but his responses remain vague and reactive, prompting critics to see him as resigned rather than decisive.
Recent measures such as removing four zeros from banknotes are widely dismissed as superficial attempts to patch a sinking economy.
Several economists have warned in recent weeks that while such steps may cosmetically reduce exchange rate figures, they do little to address underlying problems of inflation, unemployment or a growing budget deficit.
But Iran’s crisis is not only economic. Its roots are political as well, shaped by fundamental foreign-policy choices that fall far outside Pezeshkian’s remit.
Both Ghalibaf and the Supreme Leader he invokes know this, yet they continue the blame game rather than confront the structural causes.
Khamenei’s intervention at last month’s cabinet meeting served mainly to bolster his image as a defender of the poor.
Television bulletins and newspaper front pages were saturated with his concern over rising prices, portraying him as attentive to ordinary people’s plight even as implementation of solutions lags.
For the Supreme Leader, the messaging is as much about maintaining legitimacy as it is about practical policy.
Priorities lost
The Pezeshkian administration does not help itself, offering almost daily reminders it is out of touch.
Last week, Beheshti University of Medical Sciences announced it was renaming its “Office of Vice Chancellor for Student and Cultural Affairs” to “Office of Vice Chancellor for Cultural and Student Affairs,” a cosmetic change that amused and angered many Iranians on social media.
In Manjil, northern Iran, local officials staged a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new staircase at the regional power authority headquarters, just ten meters from an existing one.
A photo of the local Friday Imam inaugurating the stairs ran in conservative outlet Ghatreh News, sparking public frustration and ridicule, with many questioning priorities and the government’s will to address real problems.
The expletive-laden jibes on social media point to a deeper truth that neither Ghalibaf nor Pezeshkian are willing to admit: inefficiency in Iran’s theocratic system is not incidental, but systemic.
