Tehran hardliners push impeachments despite Khamenei's praise of cabinet

The debate sharpened last week when President Masoud Pezeshkian took part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China.

While his usual detractors in the hardline camp hailed the trip as proof of Iran’s integration into a multipolar world order, some moderate backers warned the bloc’s loose structure and rival interests limits its usefulness in times of need.

Proponents of the Look East approach portray SCO membership as a political win.

“Strengthening Iran’s presence in the SCO and BRICS disrupts the US and West’s project of isolating Iran,” hardline daily Kayhan wrote in a Sunday editorial. “The clear message is that the more pressure increases, the deeper Iran’s ties with major non-Western powers will become.”

Nour News, linked to Iran’s security establishment, stressed that the trip coincided with Europe’s activation of the snapback sanctions mechanism and argued that membership helps Tehran build a “political consensus” against Western pressure.

The summit’s final communiqué denounced sanctions on Iran as unjust and condemned Israel’s military strike on Iranian soil.

But reformist voices highlight the bloc’s limitations. Sazandegi noted the SCO is neither NATO nor the EU, offers no security guarantees and has in the past refused Iran’s entry over UN sanctions

“The example of Russia, which after Western sanctions received little practical support from the SCO, reinforces this view,” the editorial argued.

Economic expectations

Economically, Look East advocates frame the policy as an antidote to sanctions and a gateway to new markets.

Pezeshkian used the summit to call for greater use of national currencies, shared digital financial systems, and a multilateral settlement fund.

Javan, the Revolutionary Guards-linked daily, argued that such mechanisms could reduce reliance on the Western financial system.

“The SCO provides a platform to reduce dependency on the Western financial system,” the paper wrote on Sunday.

The multilateral currency fund… can accelerate Iran’s digital economy growth, while linking Chabahar port to the North–South corridor will turn Iran into a trade crossroads between China, Russia and India.”

Critics counter that these ambitions face hard limits. Key SCO members including India and Central Asian states maintain close economic ties with the West and may hesitate to risk secondary sanctions.

Security expectations

While the SCO is not a military alliance, conservatives view its security framework and symbolism as central to Look East.

Javan said Pezeshkian’s presence alongside Chinese, Russian, and Indian leaders sent a deterrent message.

“The response (to any US-Israeli attack) will not only come from Tehran but also, by other means, from the Eastern bloc,” the daily asserted.

The same outlet pointed to prospects for cyber cooperation, artificial intelligence and advanced telecoms, arguing that Russian and Chinese technologies could help Iran close its sanctions-induced tech gap and support “the smart modernization of defense and the economy.”

The government's Iran newspaper acknowledged that expectations for Eastern alliances had been overblown in some circles.

"Some inside Iran had expected the (SCO) bloc to act as a genuine security shield for its members, not merely issue a formal statement of condemnation.

"Yet such expectations rest less on institutional realities than on romanticized notions and political myth-making," it added. "Over the past two decades, labels such as the 'Eastern NATO,' an 'anti-Western hegemonic alliance,' or even a 'new Warsaw Pact' have fueled these inflated perceptions within Iran’s political discourse."

The judiciary said experts concluded that poor storage of hazardous materials, weak oversight, and lack of coordination among authorities contributed to the disaster. Official bodies including the Ports and Maritime Organization, Customs, the Central Bank and several ministries, were among those cited.

The blast, triggered by containers in the wharf area and followed by a massive fire, devastated part of Bandar Abbas’s main port infrastructure.

The Mostazafan Foundation, a multi-billion-dollar conglomerate controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and sanctioned by the United States, was also named.

Judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei called the explosion “very bitter and sad” and said inquiries into both organizations and individuals were continuing.

“According to expert assessments, some organizations and individuals were found at fault. Once the matter is finalized, those responsible will be held accountable,” he said on Monday.

He said several people had been arrested, but gave no numbers.

Ejei said damages for all 58 victims had been secured and most families had already received payments. Assistance has also been provided to survivors and to businesses that lost property.

The blast began with a fire in a container yard at the Sina company site in Bandar Abbas and spread quickly, destroying part of Iran’s main southern port. The area was operated by Sina Marine and Port Services, a subsidiary of the Mostazafan Foundation. Satellite images showed the yard, which could hold up to 20,000 containers, was completely destroyed.

The judiciary said port operations have restarted, with new measures promised to prevent similar tragedies.

Ejei said the judiciary would press for tougher safety enforcement and faster investigations. “Matters must be pursued with determination and should not be allowed to drag on,” he said.

Supporters of the move argue that only the SNSC can bring coherence to policymaking, uniting rival political factions in a way the Foreign Ministry cannot.

That case was made most clearly in a rare joint commentary by moderate journalist Mohammad Ghoochani and conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri, published September 7 in the centrist daily Ham Mihan.

“(The council) is the only body capable of coordinating between the military, diplomats, revolutionaries, reformist and conservative politicians, the President and the Supreme Leader, or indeed between the government and the people,” they wrote.

Notably, they criticized the continued involvement of former SNSC secretary Ali Shamkhani in the nuclear talks and dismissed the idea of handing the file to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, arguing that Iran could no longer afford the stagnation of recent years.

A day after the joint editorial, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, Alireza Sheikh Attar, told the conservative daily Farhikhtegan that Larijani had been appointed on September 5 to oversee Iran’s entire nuclear dossier.

If confirmed, Larijani would once more take center stage in tough negotiations in the weeks ahead.

Regroup or rethink?

Although final authority rests with Khamenei, the emphasis on the Council’s coordinating role by Ghoochani and Mohajeri may point to Larijani’s potential to nudge the Leader toward a definitive decision on engagement with Washington.

Khamenei appeared to be abandoning his “neither war nor talks” line in his meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet. The state of “no war, no peace,” he said, was “the enemies’ plan” and harmed the country.

Hints of movement are already emerging.

Conservative diplomat Alireza Sheikh Attar suggested on Monday that decisions have been made about resuming talks with the United States, possibly coupled with a request to delay activation of the snapback mechanism until negotiations yield results.

Whether these shifts mark a genuine rethink or simply a bureaucratic reshuffle remains uncertain.

Council on the rise?

The proposal by the two prominent editors also reflects frustration at the Council’s long decline.

Created in 1990 amid post-war turmoil, the SNSC was designed as a mechanism for cohesion, tasked with protecting national interests and reconciling state institutions with public needs.

Its first secretary, Hassan Rouhani, held the post for 16 years and was credited with pragmatism, particularly in preventing new wars.

The nuclear dossier was assigned to the Council in the early 2000s, but under president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad control shifted to the foreign ministry—and effectively to Ahmadinejad himself, whose chaotic management eventually forced Khamenei to open backchannels of his own.

Larijani’s return has been welcomed by moderates as a potential revival of rational governance, though his occasional firebrand remarks—such as threats against IAEA chief Rafael Grossi—have raised doubts.

Larijani may bring new energy to the Council. The question is whether he can direct diplomacy in ways others could not or his ascent merely repackages decisions that still flow from the top.

In the hardline Kayhan daily, columnist Jafar Bolouri described the country’s situation as “extraordinary,” cautioning that a new war could erupt at any moment alongside worsening economic and social pressure. He said the government’s priorities “do not match the situation,” accusing it of focusing on secondary issues instead of inflation, which “creates openings for enemies to exploit.”

The IRGC-linked Javan wrote that Western powers, unable to achieve their goals in the June 12-day war, are now using the snapback process as part of a “cognitive war” to inflame the economy and provoke unrest. “Supporters of the Zionist regime…exploit the snapback and hostile media to stir inflation, currency volatility and social unrest,” the paper said, warning that “domestic infiltrators” amplify these pressures.

The reformist Ham Mihan criticized what it called complacency among officials. “Snapback leads to the return of Security Council resolutions and gives sanctions a binding legal character. Evading them will be very difficult and costly,” the paper said. It added: “Some believe snapback adds little to existing sanctions. Such an interpretation is completely wrong.”

Snapback countdown

On August 28, Britain, France and Germany triggered the UN snapback mechanism, demanding that Tehran return to talks, grant inspectors wider access and account for its uranium stockpile. Under Resolution 2231, sanctions will automatically return after 30 days unless the Security Council votes otherwise.

Tehran has rejected the step. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas in Doha on Thursday that the decision was “illegal and unjustifiable,” and insisted that the EU should “play its role in fulfilling its responsibilities to neutralize moves against diplomacy.”

IAEA report raises alarm

A confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency said Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% remains “a matter of serious concern” after inspectors lost visibility following Israeli and US strikes in June. The report noted Iran had 440.9 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium as of June 13, a short step from weapons-grade levels.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told Reuters: “It would be ideal to reach an agreement before next week. It’s not something that can drag on for months.”

Officials downplay risks

Not all voices share the newspapers’ sense of alarm. IRGC political deputy Yadollah Javani called snapback talk a “psychological operation” to mask Western defeat in the June war. Babak Negahdari, head of parliament’s research center, argued that “the real pressure on Iran has come from US secondary sanctions,” and said any UN measures could be blunted by Russia and China, though he acknowledged “psychological and economic side effects if not handled carefully.”

Former presidential chief of staff Mahmoud Vaezi stressed that “some individuals do not understand the sensitivity of this moment” and warned against rhetoric that fuels division. He said the 12-day war had proved “national cohesion has completely overturned the enemy’s calculations,” and urged leaders to focus on preserving unity.

Supporters hailed the plan to feature renowned vocalist Homayoun Shajarian at Azadi (Freedom) Square as a rare chance for collective joy, while critics denounced it as a state ploy to deflect from the looming anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in custody.

Some urged Iranians to seize the event as a protest, while hardliners at home warned it would unleash unrest.

Shajarian, son of the late maestro Mohammad Reza Shajarian, announced on Instagram that after years of denials by the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, he had finally been granted permission to hold a free public concert.

He described it as the fulfillment of an impossible dream.

“This concert is neither for anyone nor at anyone’s request. I stood with the people during the war with Israel, and now I just want to lift their spirits,” he said.

Sudden storm

Critics were quick to react.

“The Homayoun Shajarian 'concert' is not a concert—it’s a government project … Those who take part in it (under any pretext) are without question agents of the regime and its foot soldiers,” one posted on X.

Ultra-hardliners claimed the state lacked the security capacity to manage such a gathering.

Supporters countered that the city had organized vast religious rallies like the “10-Kilometer Ghadir Feast” even during the turmoil following the recent 12-day war with Israel.

Sadegh Koushki, a politician close to the ultra-hardline Paydari Front, condemned the idea, calling it a show of numbers meant to “extort revolutionary people and the Leader.”

Filmmaker Abolghasem Talebi warned the event would become “a display of nudity” and a launchpad for protests.

“A free concert in Freedom Square means lawlessness,” he said. “First Shajarian, then others. Gradually, we’ll face a coup of public squares through nudity and unveiled women—with government permission.”

Cancellation

By Wednesday, Shajarian admitted his worst fear had come true: the concert would not take place, and his “impossible dream” would remain out of reach.

Tehran’s ultra-hardline mayor, Alireza Zakani, said security authorities had rejected the plan because of “time constraints” and lack of preparation, proposing to move it to the 12,000-seat Azadi Stadium.

Municipality officials claimed they were only informed days earlier, but the government countered that preparations had long been under discussion.

Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said the administration had supported the event from the start, asserting that "millions" attending would have strengthened national unity.

Administration public relations chief Ali Ahmadnia said Freedom Square remained the priority but the 100,000-seat Azadi Stadium could serve as a fallback.

Shajarian has reportedly ignored officials’ calls, and many supporters on social media say they will not attend if the concert is not held at Freedom Square.

‘Problem lies elsewhere’

The cancellation itself became a new battlefield, as critics highlighted what it revealed about the establishment’s insecurity.

Many believe the decision stemmed from fear that massive crowds would dwarf the regime’s own rallies in Freedom Square, which often struggle to fill even with free transport, food, and mandatory attendance.

Sociologist Mohammad Fazeli ridiculed the municipality’s claim of being unprepared: “Fine, give them two weeks! If they’re not lying, they can prepare. Otherwise, their problem lies elsewhere.”

Veteran reformist Abbas Abdi, writing in Ham Mihan, argued that those in power fear the people more than foreign invasion. “Domestic warmongers and hardline opposition [abroad] alike oppose peaceful, joyful gatherings,” he wrote.

“From the start, I doubted authorities would accept such a security risk,” political analyst Omid Memarian told Iran International.

“The cancellation proves the regime lacks self-confidence and reveals the depth of the rift between people and the state.”