South Africa's MTN says Iran stake is now a frozen asset

Bread remains the cornerstone of an affordable meal, but even that is slipping beyond reach as prices surge.

“If inflation remains unchecked … Iran could witness a bread riot,” economist Hossein Raghfar told the moderate outlet Rouydad24 this week, warning that inaction could have consequences far beyond the economy.

“The lack of planning, combined with external pressures, could leave the country vulnerable to regime change efforts by foreign powers and threaten Iran’s political and social stability,” he added.

Several Iranian outlets linked the latest hikes to the psychological impact of the reactivation of the “trigger mechanism” and the snapback of pre-2015 sanctions.

Raghfar said poor crisis management has already driven up the cost of foreign trade and imports, predicting further increases and unrest as pressures mount.

Bleak outlook

Iran’s Chamber of Commerce last week projected a worst-case scenario of a 60% currency plunge, inflation at 75%, and unemployment at 14% in the coming months if sanctions are reinstated.

The Chamber later retracted its forecasts, reportedly after a visit by security agencies to its Tehran offices.

Raghfar echoed the concern without citing the forecast. “The snapback of sanctions will severely impact Iran’s international trade and shipping,” he said. “At the same time, Iran will face increased restrictions on international banking.”

Tehran is failing to address mounting challenges, Raghfar argued, accusing the government of devising policies that often appear to align with the aims of those seeking to topple the Islamic Republic.

President under fire

Some critics have been more specific.

Moderate politician and former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi told Khabar Online that President Masoud Pezeshkian was wasteful and misplaced his priorities.

“When he visits shrines or the graves of martyrs, he is accompanied by a massive entourage … of 1–2,000, whose presence is unnecessary and has no meaningful impact on the president’s security,” Karbaschi said.

“The funds allocated to certain religious propaganda organizations exceed the annual budgets of entire ministries,” he added.

Karbaschi omitted that most such organizations are linked to the office of the supreme leader and lie beyond any administration’s remit. Pezeshkian himself underlined this limited authority on Wednesday.

“Why should the country’s resources be handed over without reason to institutions and bodies that have no benefit or usefulness?” he asked at a conference.

Britain, France and Germany last week triggered the so-called snapback mechanism which is due to reinstate UN sanctions by month's end, sending Iran’s fragile economy into a tailspin.

Iran’s currency, the rial, now trades at more than one million to the dollar, having lost nearly a third of its value since Donald Trump won the US presidential election last November.

Even the country’s private sector has sounded the alarm, but fast regretted it.

The Iran Chamber of Commerce—an institution run by business elites under heavy state oversight—published a report warning that UN snapback sanctions could spark a “deep crisis,” with inflation hitting 90 percent and GDP shrinking by three percent.

The report was swiftly deleted. Tasnim News, tied to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), blasted it as “dangerous and inflammatory,” saying it could fuel panic and speculative inflation.

Within hours, IRGC intelligence officers raided the Chamber, interrogated staff, and pressured the board into silence. It was yet another display of the regime’s instinct: shoot the messenger.

Official bravado

Government officials have chosen defiance over honesty.

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy Hamid Qanbari declared that Iran’s “economy is so big and self-sufficient that it will not break under sanctions.”

Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad admitted snapback could tighten restrictions on oil exports but boasted that “our hands are not tied.”

The message is meant for domestic consumption, but Iranians have heard it before: decades of promises that sanctions are survivable, even beneficial. Few believe it now.

Rial’s dead cat bounce

The rial’s collapse has not been a straight line.

On March 24 it hit a historic low of nearly 1.1 million to the dollar. But in April, as Tehran and Washington engaged in Oman-mediated nuclear talks, the currency clawed back 31 percent.

Officials convinced themselves they could entice the Trump administration into a deal that would preserve Iran’s nuclear leverage, maintain funding for regional proxies, and leave intact its growing missile and drone programs.

But surprise Israeli strikes on June 12 torpedoed the talks, upended markets and erased the rial’s temporary gains, initiating the next slide.

An economy in ruins

Iran’s economic woes go beyond currency freefall. Inflation and joblessness are grinding daily life, while water shortages, blackouts and environmental crises repeatedly halt basic activity.

Public anger simmers but has not so far erupted.

Meanwhile, Tehran’s military capacity has been gutted. Missile stockpiles are depleted, air defenses degraded, and armed allies from Gaza to Lebanon weakened by repeated blows. Once a symbol of strength, Iran’s arsenal is now a reminder of vulnerability.

And yet, the clerical establishment shows no sign of recalibrating.

Faced with looming UN sanctions, domestic crisis and international isolation, it clings to the illusion that a mix of propaganda, repression and tactical stalling can buy survival.

Talk therapy as diplomacy

For years, Tehran has treated negotiations less as a path to resolution than as a pressure valve—a way to appear engaged, delay enforcement and test the patience of counterparts.

That strategy may have worked when the global community was divided or distracted. It no longer does.

The snapback mechanism is proof: Europe has abandoned its posture of indulgence, siding with Washington in reimposing penalties.

Iran’s rulers now face the consequences of years spent refusing with one hand and pretending to accept with the other.

For ordinary Iranians, the result is an ever-shrinking future: savings vaporized, wages worthless and hope steadily eroded.

Tehran remains content to offer the world more of the same—talk therapy instead of genuine negotiation, illusion instead of strategy—while hoping for divine intervention.

One proposal would prevent Iranian officials from shopping at wholesale clubs such as Costco and Sam’s Club without State Department permission. The AP said such stores have long been favored by Iranian diplomats, who buy large quantities of goods unavailable in Iran and send them home.

Three years ago, footage of then-President Ebrahim Raisi’s delegation in New York drew wide attention on social media, showing aides loading piles of goods with US retail labels into a truck outside their hotel.

The internal memo seen by AP also outlined possible curbs on delegations from Sudan, Zimbabwe and Brazil.

The report follows the Trump administration’s decision to revoke visas for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and more than 80 officials, blocking them from the UN meeting. Palestinian diplomats accredited to the UN mission were allowed to remain.

Security review for Iran

The State Department said last week that visas for Iran’s UNGA delegation are subject to a security review. In response to a query from Iran International, a spokesman said Washington “will not waver in upholding American law and the highest standards of national security and public safety in the conduct of our visa process.”

The spokesman added that ensuring foreign visitors pose no threat to US national security “remains a paramount priority.” The Department declined to say whether Iranian officials will be issued visas this year, citing visa confidentiality rules.

The decision to admit President Masoud Pezeshkian and his delegation last year drew criticism from Iranian diaspora groups and activists, despite their movements being restricted to a few blocks around the UN headquarters.

In 2019, then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was granted a visa under similar limits. The US has also refused visas in past years, including to Iran’s 2014 UN ambassador nominee over his role in the 1979 embassy takeover.

Syria waiver highlights contrast

The AP memo said the Trump administration last week lifted long-standing travel restrictions on Syria’s delegation to the UN. The move followed the ouster of President Bashar Assad last year and Washington’s effort to integrate Damascus into the Middle East.

In Iran, the term “guaranteed purchase of wheat” refers to a government program whereby the Government Trading Corporation (GTC) commits to buying wheat from domestic farmers at a pre-established, fixed price.

The government says the policy shields farmers from volatile market prices and ensures a stable income by offering a predictable price while also enabling the government to manage reserves of the staple crop and guarantee supply.

However, state-guaranteed purchases had dropped to 700,000 tons, Attaollah Hashemi, head of the National Wheat Farmers Foundation, told ISNA news agency on Thursday.

'Risks ahead'

“This year’s guaranteed purchases have decreased by 35 percent compared to last year, a decline that is a direct result of reduced production caused by drought and insufficient rainfall,” he said.

The government still owes some farmers payments for wheat deliveries but promised settlement soon, Hashemi added. He warned that “reliance on wheat imports could bring serious risks for the country.”

According to US Department of Agriculture data, the country's wheat production for the 2024/25 season is projected at around 16 million metric tons.

Despite these figures, Iran’s import needs can vary: the FAO projects wheat import requirements for the 2024/25 marketing year (April–March) at 1.3 million tons.

However, due to drought-induced production shortfalls, imports are expected to rise in the current calendar year to about 4.5 million tons, according to state media.

Water crisis

Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri Ghezaljeh recently described the situation as unprecedented. “From the perspective of food security, we are in the most difficult circumstances,” he said, citing poor economic conditions and what he called the worst droughts in memory.

Production had fallen by 35 to 40 percent due to energy shortages and irrigation problems, Ghadamali Bourbour, deputy head of the Wheat Farmers Foundation, said in late August.

“This decline is rare in Iran’s agricultural history,” he said, adding that the trend would also push up dairy and meat prices.

Despite repeated water cuts across cities, official data show that 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s consumption still goes to agriculture, much of it under traditional methods.

With procurement falling and drought intensifying, the government faces rising pressure to reform or risk deeper food insecurity.

None of Tehran’s counterparts, including Russia, has agreed to settle transactions in national currencies, leaving Iran isolated despite years of lobbying.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on September 1, President Masoud Pezeshkian repeated the call.

A day earlier in Tianjin, China, he unveiled a new initiative under the title “SCO Special Accounts and Settlements,”describing it as a three-pronged plan to “reduce the effects of illegal sanctions on SCO members.”

What’s the proposal?

According to Pezeshkian, the initiative has three components:

• Expanding the use of national currencies and reducing dependence on the dollar.
• Establishing shared digital infrastructure and adopting central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) for faster, more secure payments.
• Creating a multilateral currency-swap fund to support sanctioned members or those facing liquidity crises.

Pezeshkian argued that the plan could boost the “economic resilience” of SCO countries and turn the bloc into “a successful model for building a multipolar, fair financial order resistant to external pressure.”

Is it realistic?

The hurdles are steep.

SCO members’ national currencies lack international credibility and many are volatile. The Iranian rial has lost 99 percent of its value in the past two decades, while the Russian ruble has sharply fluctuated since the Ukraine war.

Over the past five years, all SCO currencies—except Tajikistan’s—have depreciated.

Trade imbalances add to the problem.

Chinese customs data show China’s exports to India, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan are seven times larger than its imports from them. With Tajikistan, the imbalance reaches tenfold.

China, with a $150 billion annual trade surplus with those countries, is unlikely to accept settlement in their weak currencies—and even if it did, they would be of little use in trade with third parties.

Energy trade underscores the limits further.

Of China’s $512 billion in total trade with SCO members last year, $90 billion was fossil fuel imports. About 80 percent of global energy transactions—especially oil—are conducted in US dollars. Even the euro and pound play only marginal roles.

Beyond energy, the dominance of the dollar and euro in global commerce is overwhelming: the dollar accounts for more than 65 percent of trade transactions, the euro about 20 percent.

China’s yuan makes up just 3–4 percent, mostly in neighboring countries.

The core problem

Above all, Iran remains on FATF’s blacklist, which restricts transactions regardless of currency. Whether in dollars, euros, yuan, or local money, doing business with Iran carries legal and financial risks.

For these reasons, Tehran’s latest de-dollarization push is less a practical plan than an aspirational talking point.

Currency weakness, trade imbalances, dollar dominance in energy, and Iran’s isolation from the global financial system make the proposal unworkable.

Adding to the difficulty, Washington has taken a firm line against such initiatives, warning the BRICS bloc over de-dollarization efforts and threatening more sanctions and tariffs if they advance.