Why Khamenei’s clerics look for the crescent moon on Friday

Diesel will be sold at market rates, and a significant portion of government subsidies will be eliminated.

An executive directive outlining the changes has already been drafted and awaits official approval.

The change is likely to deepen the economic burden on citizens, adding to the existing strain caused by a weak currency and high inflation.

A gasoline price hike in November 2019 triggered days of nationwide protests, during which authorities deployed paramilitary forces who used overwhelming force to suppress the unrest.

At least 1,500 people were killed, according to a Reuters investigation.

Economic conditions have since worsened, with persistent high inflation pushing tens of millions of Iranians into deeper poverty.

Iran International reported in December that Iran was preparing to ease fuel subsidies in a move likely approved at the highest levels of government.

At the time, documents indicated that the monthly distribution of subsidized gasoline would be drastically cut from 87 million liters to 42.5 million liters.

Iranians had already begun noticing changes as fuel stations started installing eight-digit price displays—signaling a potential shift in pricing policies.

The diesel price increase comes as Iran’s top officials continue to discuss also a possible gasoline price hike this spring.

Sources told Iran International that security agencies are increasingly worried about the country’s growing dependence on fuel imports and its shrinking capacity to meet demand under escalating US sanctions.

Washington this week imposed a new round of sanctions targeting Iran’s oil industry, including key brokers, shipping firms, and the head of the National Iranian Oil Company.

These measures, part of the renewed "maximum pressure" campaign by the Trump administration, aim to cut Iran’s oil revenue, which remains the backbone of its economy and regional military operations.

With Iran pumping 3.2 million barrels per day as of January, the latest restrictions are expected to further strain the country’s financial and energy sectors.

Zeidabadi's remarks came after Pezeshkian reaffirmed his commitment to the promises he made during his June 2024 election campaign. Pezeshkian frequently repeats this claim when confronted with accusations of breaking or neglecting his promises.

The commentator remarked, “Pezeshkian explicitly promised to lift sanctions on Iran, guarantee social liberties, and end the ban on social media. He now needs to clarify which of these promises he still stands by.”

Although Pezeshkian has consistently advocated for negotiations with President Donald Trump’s administration, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prohibited such talks in early February. As a result, Pezeshkian aligned with this stance, stating that negotiating with Trump is not a realistic option.

He added: "When I talk with the people, I realize that Pezeshkian's popularity is declining and those who had voted for him feel frustrated. We have not seen any initiative from him for a long time now, and this is dangerous for him and the country."

Earlier, Iranian media on both ends of the country's political spectrum had summed up what Pezeshkian had promised to voters.

Mehr News Agency, affiliated with conservative clerics, highlighted that Pezeshkian made 10 promises to revive Iran's struggling economy. These included preventing gasoline price hikes, stabilizing the stock exchange, reducing inflation, addressing deteriorating living standards, establishing a unified exchange rate, permitting the import of foreign vehicles, and promoting social justice.

Mehr also highlighted Pezeshkian’s promise to guarantee freedom and dignity for Iranian women. He had stated, “Just as pre-1979 governments failed to eliminate the hijab, we cannot impose it on women.” However, mandatory hijab remains a deeply contentious social and political issue in Iran.

Even Reformist newspaper Etemad, which backs the president, drew attention to Pezeshkian’s economic promises under six key areas: dismantling the centralized government-controlled economy, opening up to international trade and diversifying trading partners, combating economic cronyism and ending special privileges for the well-connected, fostering a competitive market, enhancing living standards, and supporting the stock exchange to encourage public participation in the economy.

Other media outlets also highlighted Pezeshkian’s civil rights promises, including protecting women from harassment by hijab enforcers, promoting women to key government positions, ending government censorship of the internet and social media, safeguarding university students and professors from dismissal, allowing Sunni Muslims to hold top positions, encouraging political participation by ethnic minorities, lifting censorship on books and the press, and combating discrimination and injustice.

Critics have increasingly pointed out that most of Pezeshkian's promises remain unfulfilled, with minimal progress on key issues such as the hijab and internet censorship.

For example, Zeidabadi noted that while the controversial Hijab Enforcement Bill has been suspended, it has not been fully abolished.

Meanwhile, addressing remarks from both critics and supporters who argue that resolving Iran’s nuclear and other disputes with the United States is essential for tackling the economic crisis, Zeidabadi urged Pezeshkian to clarify his stance. He asked, “If negotiating and reaching a deal with Trump is impossible, then what is your alternative solution?”

The commentator also criticized Pezeshkian’s administration for its lack of strategy and decisiveness, questioning, “If the government lacks the authority to address these issues, why should it continue to exist?”

President Pezeshkian speaks both Torki (a Turkic language spoken in northwestern Iran and several other provinces) and Kurdish, his parents' native languages. He has been one of the few officials to advocate for granting official status to ethnic languages under Article 15 of the Constitution. In 2016, he was elected chairman of a parliamentary faction consisting of Torki-speaking lawmakers, with approximately 100 of the 290 members of Parliament joining the group at the time.

However, during Wednesday's debate, Pezeshkian's government representative, Kazem Delkhosh, sided with lawmakers opposing the motion. Delkhosh argued that the proposed plan would create challenges for the educational system, including hiring specialized teachers, and could spark disputes in ethnically diverse regions.

The motion, put forward by the Parliament’s Education Committee, sought to introduce two hours of ethnic literature studies in secondary schools on an optional basis. The proposal was rejected by 130 lawmakers, with 104 voting in favor and five abstaining.

Supporters of the motion cited the Iranian Constitution, which designates Persian as the official language but also guarantees the right to use regional and tribal languages in the media and to teach literature in schools. However, opponents expressed concerns about national unity. Mohammad-Mehdi Shahriari, one of the lawmakers who spoke against the motion, warned that it could "threaten the country’s territorial integrity and national unity.”

Conversely, Alireza Novin, a lawmaker from Tabriz—the capital of East Azerbaijan Province and a majority-Torki-speaking city—strongly criticized the notion that promoting ethnic languages could deepen divisions or endanger national security. During a fiery speech in Parliament, he denounced the argument as baseless.

In an interview with the local news outlet Asr-e Tabriz, Novin further accused presidential candidates of making empty promises regarding the constitutional recognition of ethnic languages. He argued that Pezeshkian's administration, at the very least, should have refrained from opposing the motion.

Amir Karimzad, the managing director of another local media outlet, also took to X (formerly Twitter) to criticize the stance expressed by the government's representative in the Parliament. He claimed that Parliament's rejection of the plan reflected "extremists' fear of the power of ethnic groups."

The decision sparked widespread outrage on social media, with many non-Persian speakers and advocates for mother-tongue education expressing frustration over Parliament's refusal to allow even a limited form of ethnic literature instruction in schools.

The debate over the motion took place just days after the UN-designated International Mother Language Day. On February 21, activists in several Torki- and Kurdish-speaking cities marked the occasion by distributing children’s books and leaflets to raise awareness of the importance of native-language education.

Meanwhile, some others have reported the arrest of Mohammad Asadi in Maragheh for handing out books written in Torki to children. Reports also surfaced that security forces summoned the administrators of a private school in Tabriz after they organized a children’s musical performance featuring songs in Torki at a shopping mall on February 21. Social media users reported that authorities had warned the school against such activities.

Ethnic language activists in Iran are frequently accused of promoting separatism and often face prosecution or imprisonment. Advocates argue that the exclusive use of Persian in education erodes cultural heritage and disadvantages children who do not speak Persian fluently or at all when they begin school.

There are no official statistics on the number of speakers of ethnic languages in Iran. However, languages such as Torki, Kurdish, and Balochi are spoken by millions across the country.

“The reality is that in an economy built on rent-seeking, where wealth depends on political connections, creativity has no place,” Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi, who served as telecommunications minister under the Rouhani administration, told a gathering of fintech experts in Tehran.

As Iran’s oil-dependent economy has plunged into crisis over the past five years, local economists, some media outlets, and politicians have increasingly criticized the underlying system while also attributing the downturn to US sanctions.

The term “rent-seeking economy” is increasingly used in Iran to describe a system where politically influential individuals and entities secure economic privileges—such as government subsidies, lack of oversight, and market monopolies—to generate profits without contributing significantly to productivity.

A clear example is the Revolutionary Guard receiving over 30% of Iran’s crude oil for export, rather than relying solely on government budget allocations.

Jahromi implicitly referred to that when he said, “Certain entities can obtain oil under the pretext of bypassing sanctions and then decide whether or not to bring the revenue back. This approach is far easier than putting in the effort to create markets and provide services.”

The former minister explained that “In this rent-seeking environment, there is no incentive for individuals to pursue creativity. Ultimately, the system operates through intermediaries.”

Nearly all of Iran’s banks, automakers, petrochemical plants, steel producers, and various other industries are either government-owned or quasi-public, managed by a politically connected elite. Despite their inefficiency and mounting debts, these industries are deemed essential and remain heavily reliant on continuous government support.

Jahromi noted that banks use their capital to engage in the real estate sector instead of helping new industries. They also own many companies and lend money to their own enterprises instead of others.

“The economy is facing fundamental and obvious obstacles. In this situation, the workforce is migrating, and investment is scarce due to the high level of risk involved,” Jahromi said.

Tehran and Moscow say Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, will discuss mutual relations, trade, and economic cooperation, as well as key international issues, including the situation in Syria, during the one-day visit.

The visit follows discussions in Ankara on Monday and comes just a week after his meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh.

Delivering a message from the United States to Iran?

Iranian media, analysts, and the public have closely scrutinized recent visits by high-ranking foreign officials to Tehran, including Lavrov and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who met with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei last week. These visits are widely interpreted as potential mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington or as channels for delivering messages from the Trump administration.

A commentary published Tuesday by Iran’s official news agency, IRNA, acknowledged that the purpose of Lavrov’s visit might extend beyond the official agenda. However, it argued that many experts doubt Lavrov is carrying a direct message from the Trump administration. Instead, it suggested that Lavrov might share his assessment of Washington’s approach to Iran and relay Iran’s desired roadmap back to the US in a similar manner.

The commentary also speculated that Lavrov could be conveying Moscow’s own message to Tehran, warning against shifting Iran’s nuclear doctrine or withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as some Iranian ultra-hardliners advocate.

Speaking to the reformist Etemad daily, foreign policy analyst Abdolreza Faraji-Rad cast doubt on the likelihood of Lavrov delivering a direct US message to Tehran.

If such a message were being conveyed, he suggested it might involve Washington offering a temporary reduction in “maximum pressure” sanctions—reimposed by Trump’s executive order on January 20—in exchange for Iran agreeing to direct negotiations over its nuclear program.

Others suggested that Lavrov is simply planning to inform the Islamic Republic about its changing relations with the Trump administration and Ukraine negotiations.

Concerns about Iran being used by Russia as a bargaining chip

Some Iranian media and analysts warned that Iran could be betrayed by Russia and become a bargaining chip in potential negotiations between the Trump and Putin administrations, particularly regarding the Ukraine conflict.

A commentary published Tuesday by Khabar Online, a news outlet close to former conservative Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, compared Lavrov’s recent meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the planned Trump-Putin meeting compared by some to the Yalta Conference of February 1945, which reshaped global geopolitics. The article warned that “Iran is also in danger.”

Khabar Online also quoted former chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, who argued that Iran is merely a bargaining chip in these negotiations. “I am concerned that Iran may be sacrificed for peace [in Ukraine],” he stated.

Reza Taghizadeh, a Glasgow-based Iranian political commentator, echoed similar concerns on X, speculating that “Lavrov's goal in Tehran is to convince the Islamic Republic to surrender its nuclear program and disband the ‘axis of resistance’ in exchange for avoiding an Israeli military attack and blocking [its] oil exports! … Are the Russians securing [concessions from the US over] Ukraine while offering up Iran [in return]?”