Israeli FM warns of ‘military option’ to prevent Iran going nuclear - Politico

The unsigned 2,000 word article on the government's news website, IRNA, argued that the postponement of a meeting of European foreign ministers with Iran and critical remarks made by the head of IAEA, the UN nuclear watchdog, shows pressure from Washington.

“Has Europe once again settled into the safe zone of inaction, completing Donald Trump's puzzle and allowing him to dominate the scene?", the article said.

European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday that a planned ministers-only discussion on Iran was postponed due to the absence of key foreign ministers.

“On Iran, we were supposed to have discussions, ministers-only format, regarding Iran today but because very important foreign ministers were missing, so we postponed this,” Kallas said.

IRNA accused Europe and the IAEA of making contradictory statements about Iran’s nuclear program, arguing that Tehran has the right to unlimited uranium enrichment, as international conventions do not prohibit it. The article also blamed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for orchestrating international opposition to Iran.

The article then went on to suggest “confidence building” measures between Europe, the IAEA and Iran, acknowledging that for three decades the two sides have spelled out their positions.

“The JCPOA formula offers the most cost-effective and efficient way to build trust," the letter on IRNA stated, while many consider the deal outdated and even dead.

"Through a series of strategic calculations and negotiations among the parties involved, the 2015 JCPOA became one of the most significant agreements of the past century. These dynamics can be replicated if the European Union abandons its outdated carrot-and-stick approach and engages in transparent dialogue," it added.

Last week, amid Iran's continued denials of building a nuclear weapon, the IAEA chief said the UN body was prepared to help Iran prove it did not seek nuclear weapons.

"We want to make ourselves available, providing technically sound alternatives to eliminate the possibility that Iran develops a nuclear weapon, to prevent Iran, or to help Iran prove that they don't want to develop a nuclear weapon," Rafael Grossi told reporters at Japan’s National Press Club.

However, only last year, Grossi warned that Iran, which has limited IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities since 2021, was "weeks not months" away from a nuclear weapon.

Trump withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement in May 2018, calling it a bad deal and demanding more concessions from Tehran. He then imposed strict economic sanctions, which the Biden administration was accused of not fully enforcing.

However, earlier this month, the US president announced the revitalization of these sanctions under his “maximum pressure” policy. He underlined that his main demand is for Iran never to acquire nuclear weapons.

Iran, facing a serious economic crisis, needs to reach an agreement with the Trump administration if it wants to reduce or eliminate the sanctions, but its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei this month banned talks with Washington.

Iranian officials insist that they will not negotiate under Trump’s pressure.

Looking from afar, it appears that Khamenei is banking on what he perceives as resilience of the Islamic Republic—the system, as he usually calls it.

If the system can withstand the storm, there may be a chance to negotiate in circumstances less treacherous and toward terms more favorable.

A historical overview could be enlightening.

The 2015 nuclear deal, officially named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was presented as a diplomatic breakthrough by all sides involved. It only came through, however, after heavy sanctions by the United Nations and the US under Barack Obama.

Khamenei reluctantly allowed talks, first secretly then publicly, calling it "heroic flexibility", and eventually nodded through the ensuing agreement, essentially accepting a halt to Iran’s nuclear activities while preserving the nuclear infrastructure.

But how should we read Khamenei's opposition this time? Is he truly and absolutely, as he claims, against negotiating with Trump?

His history of dual positioning suggests otherwise.

Saving the system at all costs

Contrary to the prevailing narrative, Khamenei’s opposition to a potential detente with Washington is not absolute.

He may not authorize talks if he believes sanctions, even tightened ones, are not detrimental to his system’s survival, or if he thinks other world powers could throw him a lifeline.

But what if he sees no such sign of relief on the horizon?

The Islamic Republic is arguably in a weaker position now than it has ever been, both internally and externally, with no clear outlook for a revival of the Resistance Front of armed allies in the region that it all but lost in the past year.

This reality may compel Khamenei to allow talks as much as it could force him not to, since he wants to negotiate from a position of power. In short, the unfavorable circumstances call for negotiations but the terms of the potential agreement forbid it.

It is Catch-22. What is to be done if you perceive the concessions required of you in an agreement as existentially threatening as refusing to negotiate in the first place?

Flexing over the fence

Khamenei’s answer to that question appears to come in two parts, either limited but aggressive confrontations, or, dialogue through intermediaries. The aim is to alter the conditions of negotiation or muddle through Trump’s second term.

Iran’s supreme leader will not hesitate to announce a variation on the theme of heroic flexibility, If circumstances align with his expectations.

If Khamenei were entirely opposed to negotiations, he would have fully withdrawn from the JCPOA and escalated into full confrontation. Instead, he has halted further uranium enrichment and adopted a defensive regional stance to strengthen his bargaining position and shift negotiation conditions in his favor.

Turning to domestic power dynamics, all factions appear to be singing from the Khamenei sheet, rejecting Trump’s proposal for talks.

Even then, the hardline principalists continue to criticize the relatively moderate administration of Masoud Pezeshkian because while the president himself is fully in line, some figures close to him utter out-of-line views from time to time.

The hardliners—and Khamenei himself—reject the moderates’ de-escalation and diplomacy as strategic solutions. They will keep doing so until they hit an impasse or arrive at waters calmer for roundtable.

In their view, hard power, including the now diminished Resistance, is the country’s primary tool in dealing with external pressure.

It is also imperative to national security. The continued attacks on Pezeshkian aim to prevent him from politically capitalizing on the situation and enhancing the moderates’ position within the system.

Khamenei would likely carry on sitting on the fence, ruling out talks with Trump in words but not deeds. Even in words, Iran’s supreme leader has been markedly measured when talking about the US president.

The Supreme Leader knows, better than everybody perhaps, that he may need to change tack at any moment.

"Iran and Russia have appropriate capacities to strengthen cooperation with each other, and we are determined to strengthen the interactions between Tehran and Moscow," Pezeshkian said.

"Iran and Russia have similar views on regional issues and seek to strengthen their regional and international cooperation", he added.

Moscow was dealt a boost this month as Washington under Trump emphasized the swift ending of the war Ukraine and restoration of bilateral ties.

Tehran, mired in economic malaise, faces a trickier choice dealing with Trump, who has ruled out allowing Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb and said he wants a deal which Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has ruled out.

Pezeshkian also urged for expediting the implementation of agreements, especially a Comprehensive Strategic Agreement between the two countries.

Tehran and Moscow signed a long-term agreement in March 2001 which was initially set for a ten-year term but was extended twice, each time for five years. Despite prior discussions, similar promises to finalize a renewed treaty have remained unfulfilled.

Lavrov, who conveyed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s greetings to Pezeshkian, said: “Iran and Russia have many common interests in continuing effective regional cooperation with each other.”

In a press conference following separate discussions with Lavrov, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi ruled out direct negotiations with the United States over the country’s nuclear program.

"Regarding Iran's nuclear issue, we will move forward and coordinate our positions in cooperation with our friends in Russia and China," Araghchi said.

"Iran's position in the nuclear talks is completely clear, and we will not negotiate under pressure and sanctions. There is no possibility of direct negotiations between us and the US as long as maximum pressure is being applied in this manner," he added.

Tehran’s envoy to Moscow, Kazem Jalali, also said the discussions specifically covered the nuclear issue and joint approaches in the field.

Tehran and Moscow say Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, will discuss mutual relations, trade, and economic cooperation, as well as key international issues, including the situation in Syria, during the one-day visit.

The visit follows discussions in Ankara on Monday and comes just a week after his meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh.

Delivering a message from the United States to Iran?

Iranian media, analysts, and the public have closely scrutinized recent visits by high-ranking foreign officials to Tehran, including Lavrov and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who met with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei last week. These visits are widely interpreted as potential mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington or as channels for delivering messages from the Trump administration.

A commentary published Tuesday by Iran’s official news agency, IRNA, acknowledged that the purpose of Lavrov’s visit might extend beyond the official agenda. However, it argued that many experts doubt Lavrov is carrying a direct message from the Trump administration. Instead, it suggested that Lavrov might share his assessment of Washington’s approach to Iran and relay Iran’s desired roadmap back to the US in a similar manner.

The commentary also speculated that Lavrov could be conveying Moscow’s own message to Tehran, warning against shifting Iran’s nuclear doctrine or withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as some Iranian ultra-hardliners advocate.

Speaking to the reformist Etemad daily, foreign policy analyst Abdolreza Faraji-Rad cast doubt on the likelihood of Lavrov delivering a direct US message to Tehran.

If such a message were being conveyed, he suggested it might involve Washington offering a temporary reduction in “maximum pressure” sanctions—reimposed by Trump’s executive order on January 20—in exchange for Iran agreeing to direct negotiations over its nuclear program.

Others suggested that Lavrov is simply planning to inform the Islamic Republic about its changing relations with the Trump administration and Ukraine negotiations.

Concerns about Iran being used by Russia as a bargaining chip

Some Iranian media and analysts warned that Iran could be betrayed by Russia and become a bargaining chip in potential negotiations between the Trump and Putin administrations, particularly regarding the Ukraine conflict.

A commentary published Tuesday by Khabar Online, a news outlet close to former conservative Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, compared Lavrov’s recent meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the planned Trump-Putin meeting compared by some to the Yalta Conference of February 1945, which reshaped global geopolitics. The article warned that “Iran is also in danger.”

Khabar Online also quoted former chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, who argued that Iran is merely a bargaining chip in these negotiations. “I am concerned that Iran may be sacrificed for peace [in Ukraine],” he stated.

Reza Taghizadeh, a Glasgow-based Iranian political commentator, echoed similar concerns on X, speculating that “Lavrov's goal in Tehran is to convince the Islamic Republic to surrender its nuclear program and disband the ‘axis of resistance’ in exchange for avoiding an Israeli military attack and blocking [its] oil exports! … Are the Russians securing [concessions from the US over] Ukraine while offering up Iran [in return]?”

Citing two unnamed government sources, the outlet said the Islamic Republic has also been bolstering defenses around key nuclear and missile sites, which include the deployment of additional air defense system launchers.

According to the sources, the measures are in response to growing concerns of potential joint military action by Israel and the United States.

“They [Iranian authorities] are just waiting for the attack and are anticipating it every night and everything has been on high alert – even in sites that no one knows about,” one source said.

“Work to fortify nuclear sites has been ongoing for years but it has intensified over the past year, particularly since Israel launched the first attack,” he added referring to Israel’s October attack that damaged Iran's air defense systems.

“Recent developments, including Donald Trump’s comments and reports about potential plans from his administration to strike Iran, have further intensified activities.”

The report follows warnings from US intelligence to both the Biden and Trump administrations that Israel would likely target key Iranian nuclear sites this year.

In February, the Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post cited US intelligence findings from January suggesting that Israel saw an opening for an attack on Iranian nuclear sites as early as the first half of this year.